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Enhancing ‘Human Nature’: The Human Enhancement Debate in U.S. Bioethics 
Joseph Andrew Fisher 
 
 It is often remarked that we are entering into a biotech age that will afford us with the 
unprecedented means to remake human biology. The question is: should we use our imminent 
techno-scientific powers to ‘enhance’ and even ‘transcend’ our ‘natural’ limitations or remain 
human ‘as we have always been’? But is this the right question? This dissertation critically 
examines the human enhancement debate in bioethics and bioethics-adjacent literature. More 
specifically, it mobilizes a wide range of disciplinary tools to reflexively explore the discursive 
resonances, effects, and shortcomings of human enhancement as a conceptual framework. Through 
this exploration, I demonstrate that the well-established therapy/enhancement distinction depends 
upon deeply humanist ontologies that are insufficient for understanding and addressing the 
biotechnological ‘crisis’. In turn, I provide a posthumanist approach to thinking human nature, 
which highlights the relational, embodied, and differential character of subjectivity. Such an 
approach implies that we have always been cyborgs and, therefore, never been human as such. In 
doing so, I take a small step towards constructing post-enhancement frameworks for doing 
bioethics in our posthuman moment. 
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Debating the Human Enhancement Debate 
 
0.1 Introduction to the Introduction 
In an August 2012 edition of Science, geneticist Jennifer Doudna, microbiologist 
Emmanuelle Charpentier, and four of their colleagues at the University of California, Berkeley 
proposed a groundbreaking technique for gene-editing: CRISPR-Cas9.1 In the months and years 
that followed, CRISPR was heralded as a “molecular biology revolution” that would usher in an 
unprecedented age of biotechnological intervention. 2  For scientists, bioethicists, legalists, 
theologians, and journalists, the prospect of this revolution prompted a host of ‘big-picture’ 
questions about what is does and ought to mean to be human. Will ‘re-naturing’ ourselves through 
genetic manipulation make us less, in-, or post- human? Where, if at all, should we draw the line 
 
1 CRISPR (Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic Repeats) refers to a family of DNA sequences found 
in the genomes of prokaryotic organisms that play a vital role in the organism’s antiviral defense system. These 
sequences function as small copies of viruses that enable bacteria to identify the presence of the original viruses in the 
body. Cas9, on the other hand, is an enzyme (protein) that uses single-guide RNAs to identify and cut specific strands 
of DNA related to the CRISPR sequences. Bacteria, in essence, fight off viruses by sending the Cas9 enzyme to cleave 
foreign genetic elements. The groundbreaking nature of the 2012 CRISPR-Cas9 study, however, did not lie in the 
mere detailing of this process (indeed, much of the basic knowledge concerning CRISPR-Cas9 was well-established 
at the time of the article’s publication). Rather, it lay in the experimentally supported conclusion that this structural, 
immunological process could be harnessed to edit genomes rather than just kill viruses. If one used synthesized RNA-
guides to intentionally introduce double-stranded breaks in the genome, one could trigger the repair process and alter 
the genetic code at a particular DNA sequence of one’s choosing. Martin Jinek et al., “A Programmable Dual-RNA-
Guided DNA Endonuclease in Adaptive Bacterial Immunity,” Science 337, no. 6096 (2012): 816-821. 
2 The description of CRISPR as a “molecular biology revolution” comes from Jeffrey Perkel, “CRISPR/Cas Faces 
the Bioethics Spotlight,” BioTechniques 58, no.5 (2015): 223-227. Similar academic articles on CRISPR are too 
multitudinous to cite exhaustively here. Some other pertinent examples and summaries thereof, however, include: 
Elizabeth Pennisi, “The CRISPR Craze,” Science 341, no. 6148 (2013): 833-836. Heidi Ledford, “CRISPR, The 
Disruptor,” Nature 522, no. 7554 (2015): 20-24. Mazhar Adli, “The CRISPR Tool Kit for Genome Editing and 
Beyond,” Nature Communications 9, no. 1 (2018): 1-13.  
For an overview of how CRISPR was represented in U.S. popular press, see: Alessandro Marcon et al., “CRISPR in 
the North American Popular Press,” Genetics in Medicine 21, no. 10 (2019): 2184-2189. While the authors are most 
concerned with the misrepresentation of the science behind CRISPR, their article notes an abundance of popular 
interest – including 228 relevant articles published between January 1, 2012 and July 12, 2015 – and a consistent 
attitude of skepticism among media outlets and the public toward CRISPR research. 
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between ethical and unethical uses of biotechnologies on human beings, and on what normative 
grounds? When will our Promethean aspirations have ‘gone too far’ and how will we know?3 
Recognizing these widespread anxieties, a leading group of developers, scientists, and 
bioethicists met in Napa Valley in January of 2015 to discuss the biomedical, legal, and ethical 
aspects of CRISPR systems. These discussions initiated a more robust discourse, which soon 
resulted in the National Academies of Science, Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) organizing 
the First International Summit on Human Genome Editing in 2015 and publishing a comprehensive 
report, Human Genome Editing: Science, Ethics, and Governance, in 2017.4 If their proactive 
response tacitly acknowledged that CRISPR’s potential to rewrite genetic code posed novel ethical 
problems, these experts nevertheless turned to a well-established framework from the field of 
bioethics to reconcile them: human enhancement. 
Since the late-1980s, bioethicists and bioethics-adjacent theorists have classified and 
debated a wide range of speculative biotechnological interventions according to their presumed 
ends so that bioethical debate takes the shape of two mutually constitutive ethical ideals: therapy 
 
3  For representative articles that raised likeminded ethical questions about the possibilities of “eugenics,” 
“superpeople,” “designer babies” “changing human evolution,” and “lines that shouldn’t be crossed,” including 
interviews with highly involved scientists and bioethicists, see: John J. Miller, “The CRISPR Conundrum,” Human 
Life Review 42, no. 3 (2016): 90-94. Antonio Regaldo, “Engineering the Perfect Baby,” MIT Technology Review 118, 
no. 3 (2015): 26-33. 
These ethical concerns regarding CRISPR, however, did not reach a fever pitch until November of 2018 when, to the 
surprise of the audience at the Second International Summit on Human Genome Editing in Hong Kong, Chinese 
scientist Dr. He Jiankui announced that he had used CRISPR-Cas9 on two female embryos that were brought to term 
through an in vitro fertilization (IVF) pregnancy. For examples of the reactions to this experimental success, including 
government bodies, scientists, bioethicists, and theologians, see: Anonymous, “Scientist Claims First Gene-Editing of 
Human Embryos, Igniting Storm of Controversy,” Issues in Science and Technology 35, no.2 (2019): 20. Neal Bear, 
“Commentary: Code Dread,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 63, no. 1 (2020): 14-27. Arvin M. Guow, “The 
CRISPR Apple on the Tree of Knowledge Conference Highlights: CRISPR in Science, Ethics, and Religion,” Zygon 
55, no. 2 (2020): 409-420. 
4 George Q. Daley, “Introduction the Special Issue on CRISPR,” Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, 63, no. 1 
(2020): 1-13. J. Benjamin Hurlbut, “Imperatives of Governance: Human Genome Editing and the Problem of Progress,” 
Perspectives in Biology and Medicine 63, no. 1 (2020): 177-194. National Academies of Science, Engineering, and 
Medicine, Human Genome Editing: Science, Ethics, and Governance (Washington D.C.: National Academies Press, 
2017). 
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and enhancement.5 Whereas therapies are medical practices that return individuals to ‘normal’, 
‘healthy’, or ‘species-typical’ functioning, enhancements are biotechnological interventions that 
increase one’s capacities, performances, or dispositions to greater than ‘normal functioning’, i.e., 
that make one “better than well.”6 Taken to its logical extreme, human enhancement is directed 
toward the end of creating “posthumans,” i.e., beings so “improved” that they are no longer 
recognizable by today’s standards of human life.7 To speak of human enhancement is thus to 
imagine imminent futures in which biotechnologies are used to make people healthier, smarter, 
happier, longer-lived and even more moral than their current biological makeup affords; and, in 
the process, to potentially lose the exceptional qualities that make them human in the first place. 
Taking up this instrumentalist framework, NASEM and their cohort contended that while 
using CRISPR for the purpose of medical treatment was a consensus, ethical end for scientific 
research, developing it for the purpose of substantively transforming human nature, regardless of 
benefit, was not.8 As its appearance in the CRISPR discourse testifies, the therapy/enhancement 
 
5 As I detail in Chapter One, the first use of the therapy/enhancement distinction I could identify in this context was 
in William French Anderson, “Human Gene Therapy: Scientific and Ethical Considerations,” Journal of Medicine 
and Philosophy 10, no. 3 (1985): 275-292. As Erik Parens notes though, it was already part of the regular bioethical 
lexicon by the mid-1990s. Erik Parens, ed., Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998). 
6 The phrase “better than well” comes from: Carl Elliott, Better than Well: American Medicine Meets the American 
Dream (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2004). For definitional work on the therapy/enhancement distinction, 
see: Alberto Giubilini and Sagar Sanyal, “The Ethics of Human Enhancement,” Philosophy Compass 10, no. 4 (2015): 
233-43. Norm Daniels, “Normal Functioning and the Treatment-Enhancement Distinction,” Quarterly of Healthcare 
Ethics 9 (2000): 309-322. 
7 This end is most often associated with the transhumanist ideal of becoming “posthuman.” See, for example, Nick 
Bostrom, “The Transhumanist FAQ: A General Introduction,” World Transhumanist Association, last modified 2003, 
http://www.the-astrolabe.net/transhumanist_faq.htm. Gregory R. Hansel and William Grassie, ed., H±: 
Transhumanism and Its Critics (Philadelphia: Metanexus Institute, 2011). 
It is also, however, often used by critics to make ‘slippery slope’ arguments against human enhancement. See, for 
example, Francis Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (New York: 
Picador - Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2007). George J. Annas, Lori Andrews, and Rosario Isasi, “Protecting the 
Endangered Human: Toward an International Treaty Prohibiting Cloning and Inheritable Alterations,” American 
Journal of Law and Medicine 28, no. 2 (2002): 152-3.  
8 While the 2017 report defended the current science of CRISPR – detailing how current research in the United States 
conformed to existing biomedical oversight frameworks and claiming that gene-editing research was “necessary for 
medical and scientific purposes” – it also called for a moratorium on applications directed at altering the genomes of 
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distinction has become a de facto fault line for making sense of the moral potential of 
biotechnologies. In this regard, CRISPR, despite its apparent radicalness, did not prompt new or 
different perspectives on biotechnology and the future of human nature. Rather, bioethicists and 
other concerned actors operationalized concepts and language from a genre of bioethical literature, 
the human enhancement debate, that has been operative for decades.  
How did human enhancement become a ‘commonsense’ language with which to debate 
the ethics of biotechnologies? How has the framework of human enhancement shaped the field of 
bioethics – academic, professional and public – since its inception? What historical, philosophical, 
and scientific means do bioethicists and adjacent theorists use to argue for and against human 
enhancement? What normative accounts of ‘human nature’ does the framework of enhancement 
both depend upon and validate? How can imaginings of the future of science and technology help 
us understand how ‘the human’ is being reconstituted in the present? And what alternative 
imaginings of human nature can help us make sense of the ethics of researching and developing 
biotechnologies moving forward? At stake in these questions is what and who will define 
authoritative notions of normative and desirable humanity in the twenty-first century.  
This project is a critical examination of the discourse of human enhancement in bioethics 
and bioethics-adjacent literature. It helps us understand how techno-scientific speculation and 
bioethical deliberation are remaking human nature in the present, i.e., how the prospect of human 
enhancement is informing how ‘we’ understand what it means to be human in the first place. The 
particular goals of my analysis, however, can be understood as threefold. First, it complicates the 
standard account of the history of bioethics as one of secularization and rationalization that 
 
babies through germ-line (inheritable) or embryonic interventions. Even the ethical use of CRISPR for somatic (non-
inheritable) interventions, however, was defined within strict limits. National Academies of Science, Human Genome 
Editing, 81. For a summary of the report’s principles and recommendations, see pages 181-194. 
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depended on the erasure of ‘substantive’ inquiries about human nature and purpose. While the de 
facto framework of common moral principlism has all-too-often concealed conceptually prior 
questions about the values and ends that ought to guide biotechnological innovation, these 
foundational questions are returning to the bioethical mainstream through the topic of human 
enhancement. 9 Second, it deconstructs the models of subjectivity being forwarded in the human 
enhancement debate, which, despite the radical nature of enhancement technologies, tend to be 
remarkably traditional in their recapitulation of Western, humanist beliefs such as Cartesian 
dualism, moral universalism, and cultural evolutionism. Third, I use biotechnologies as a 
discursive occasion to challenge the ontological fault lines of human/technology, nature/artifice, 
and mind/body upon which the framing of enhancement itself depends. In concert with emerging 
posthumanist critical theory, I elaborate a view of human nature in which cognition is an extended 
and embodied phenomenon and the self is a relational and distributed process. While I situate this 
model as a social and historical construct, I contend that it can nevertheless provide an important 
counter-weight to the dualistic and anthropocentric treatments of human nature that predominate 
in the enhancement debate.  
By the end of this dissertation, the reader should walk away with an understanding that the 
ethics of biotechnology is necessarily an ontological problem and, furthermore, that the 
predominant framework of human enhancement is insufficient for addressing this crisis; not 
simply because it is a vague or contingent category, but also because it depends upon highly 
traditional notions of human nature that are both normatively and ontologically incoherent.     
 
 
9 As I will detail in Chapter One, common moral principlism, which presumes that all members of moral communities 
are predisposed to four predominant principles – autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice – has been the 
de facto framework for professional bioethics since the field’s inception in the late-1970s. See: Tom L. Beauchamp 
and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
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0.2 Critical Posthumanism(s) 
This project contributes to the emergent and interdisciplinary field of critical 
posthumanism. “Posthumanism” is a multifarious term in academic literature. It is often conflated 
with transhumism, the intellectual and cultural movement that advocates using techno-scientific 
means to bring into being “posthumans,” i.e., future persons who possess capacities beyond what 
is now recognizable as human.10 The term posthumanism, however, can be traced to literary 
theorist Ihab Hassan’s 1977 journal article, “Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist 
Culture.”11 In this foundational article, the author claimed that the growing power of techno-
science was changing the matrix of human cultural performances as human consciousness co-
evolved with new sciences and technologies and extended itself further and further into the “natural” 
universe. We must, therefore, recognize that anthropocentric models of human culture – including 
the then-status-quo belief in the “two cultures” of the sciences and the humanities – are becoming 
obsolete. 
Hassan’s critical stance toward the inherited ontological boundaries between nature and 
culture has since become a defining feature of posthumanist thought. Posthumanist physicist Karen 
Barad, for example, defines posthumanism as “the practice of accounting for the boundary-making 
practices by which the ‘human’ and its other are differentially delineated and defined.”12 Likewise, 
posthumanist theologian Elaine Graham explains that critical posthumanism argues that “digital, 
cybernetic and genetic technologies have not only a material but existential impact, in their ability 
 
10 Robert Ranisch and Stefan Lorenz Sorgner, ed., Beyond Humanism: Trans- and Posthumanism (Frankfurt: Peter 
Lang, 2014). 
11 Ihab Hassan, “Prometheus as Performer: Toward a Posthumanist Culture,” The Georgia Review 31, no. 4 (Winter 
1977): 830-850.  
12 Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning  
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 136. 
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to question the boundaries and categories by which we have always delineated ‘human nature.’”13 
The critical task of posthumanism, then, is “to gain some analytical grasp” on the “discursive 
technologies which demarcate humans from nature, non-human animals, [and] machines.”14 This 
desire to treat emergent technologies as a discursive occasion to question how the boundaries 
between humans and their others are being symbolically and materially (re)constituted represents 
one of the principle goals of this dissertation.  
In the past two decades, however, critical posthumanism has also begun to emerge as a 
distinctive intellectual field with self-identified scholarship, disciplinary cartographies, and 
common theoretical and methodological interests. 15 Two genealogical threads are most often 
traced for this brand of scholarship. First, posthumanist theorists understand themselves as 
building on the critical tradition of the various “Studies” – Women’s, Gender, Queer, Feminist, 
Race, Disabilities, and Postcolonial, among others – that, beginning in the 1970s and 1980s, 
challenged the empirical and normative premises of a homo universalis from within the 
 
13 Elaine Graham, “Post/human conditions,” Theology and Sexuality 10, no. 2 (2004): 18. 
14 Graham, “Post/human conditions,” 18. 
15 It is important to note that there is a deep diversity of posthumanist literature, and that there are sometimes internal 
distinctions drawn between different schools of posthumanist thought, including: cultural posthumanism, critical 
posthumanism, philosophical posthumanism, methodological posthumanism, and radical posthumanism. While I 
believe that there is merit to these distinctions, I choose to treat works from across these subgenres as part of a larger 
discourse of “critical posthumanism,” or just “posthumanism” for short. This is due in part to, as I suggest in Chapter 
Five, the presence of overlapping theoretical commitments, and in part to the explanatory and interpretive functionality 
it affords. I want to be clear though that there are multiple posthumanisms rather than just one posthumanism.  
For examples of taxonomic and cartographic efforts to distinguish posthumanism as an intellectual genre, see: Neil 
Badmington, ed., Posthumanism (New York: Palgrave, 2000). Cary Wolfe, What is Posthumanism? (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010). Stefan Herbrachte, Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis (New York: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2013). Rosi Braidotti and Maria Hlavajova, ed., Posthuman Glossary (London, UK: Bloomsbury 
Academic, 2018). Christopher Peterson, “The Posthumanism to Come,” Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 
16, no. 2 (2011): 127-141. Nicholas Gane, “Posthuman,” Theory, Culture and Society 23, no. 2-3 (2005): 431-434. 
Francesca Ferrando, “Posthumanism, Transhumanism, Antihumanism, Metahumanism, and New Materialisms: 
Differences and Relations,” Existenz 8, no. 2 (2013): 26-32. Tamar Sharon, “A Cartography of the Posthumanist, Non-
Humanist and Mediated Perspectives on Emerging Biotechnologies,” Krisis: Journal for Contemporary Philosophy 
2 (2012): 4-19. 
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humanities.16 The common theme across these different disciplines was a recognition that ‘the 
human’ of classical humanism was defined through hierarchical opposition to non-normative 
persons, which, in spite of claims to universal inclusion, justified the exclusion and marginalization 
of a wide range of sexualized, racialized, and naturalized ‘others’. In other words, the in-built 
Euro- and Anglo-centrism and “methodological nationalism” of the humanist tradition resulted in 
a failure to recognize human beings as multiple and contextual and, in doing so, generated its own 
unethical hierarchies.17   
The second genealogical thread can be traced to the modes of non-humanistic scholarship 
that emerged closer to the turn of the millennium – e.g., Science and Technology Studies, Media 
Studies, Animal Studies, Environmental Studies – and a host of disciplinary subfields based around 
different objects of inquiry such as affect, memory, migration, and extinction. While building on 
earlier critiques of humanist thinking, this growing list of academic projects differs in that it de-
centers the human as its object of analysis to a radical a degree and instead focuses on its various 
(ostensible) others – e.g., machines, plants, animals – which have so often been instrumentalized 
or altogether excluded in academic analyses. It is also important to note that this shift co-emerged 
with the ‘digital revolution’ of late-1990s and early-2000s in which widespread technological 
mediation made it increasingly difficult to think the human in non-mediated and non-technological 
terms.18  
 
16 In addition to the aforementioned sources, this particular genealogical framing of posthumanism owes much to 
Rosi Braidotti and Francesca Ferrando. See: Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge, MA.: Polity Press, 2013), 
13-54. Francesca Ferrando, Philosophical Posthumanism (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2019), 22-59. 
17 Sociologist Ulrich Beck offers a particular framing of this point in arguing that the quintessentially modern 
sociological framing of the nation-state as both autonomous agent and political context struggles to account for our 
current global interdependence and the presence of transnational actor-networks. Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan 
Condition: Why Methodological Nationalism Fails,” Theory, Culture & Society 24, no. 7-8 (2007): 286-290. 
18 Here I have in mind philosopher Jean Baudrillard’s foretelling assertion that we are entering into a state of 
“hyperreality” according to which “the immanent surface of operations unfolding, the smooth and functional surface 
of communication…the surrounding universe and our very bodies are becoming monitoring screens.” For Baudrillard, 
this entails a ‘satellization of the real itself according to which individuals gain personhood through the functional 
 9 
Most important for our purposes, this second wave of Studies challenged anthropocentrism 
not just through underlining the constructed and unethical nature of humanist thought, but also 
through recognizing and seeking to make sense of the relational character of human being – i.e., 
that human life is embedded within media-nature-culture continuums and that non-humans are no 
less important than their counterparts in constituting the world(s) in which humans dwell. As 
feminist and posthumanist philosopher Rosi Braidotti explains, these first- and second-generations 
of Studies share a “commitment to voice the experiences, insights, and understandings produced 
by the excluded and marginalized.” 19  Herein lies one of the fundamental ends of critical 
posthumanism: to not just describe the historical and philosophical inadequacies of humanism, but 
also to re-think the human through the lenses of, and in relation to, its others. 
While a comprehensive survey of the textual field of critical posthumanism is beyond the 
scope of this introduction, we can nevertheless understand this diverse literature in terms of a 
common theoretical and practical aim. In the words of Braidotti, critical posthumanism 
focuses, through critical and creative cartographies, on the margins of expression 
of yet unrealized possibilities for overcoming both Humanism and 
anthropocentrism by concentrating on the issue: who is this ‘we’ whose humanity 
is now at stake? What ‘we’ could become as a species and a set of technologically 
interlinked material culture? The challenge consists in tracking the multiple, 
grounded and hence specific and diversified ways in which we are becoming 
knowing subjects.20  
 
 
control of telematic technologies. Since such technologies remain invariably connected to multiple networks, the 
individual functions as something like a node or terminal within those networks. This connectivity contributes to the 
homogenization of the social whole into a single process of miniaturization in which all components are reduced to 
code and played out on screens. Jean Baudrillard, The Ecstasy of Communication, trans. Bernard Schutze and Caroline 
Schutze (South Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e), 2012), 22. For more Baudrillard, see: Jean Baudrillard, Simulations, trans. 
Pual Foss, Paul Patton, and Philip Beitchman (South Pasadena, CA: Semiotext(e), 1983). Jean Baudrillard, Symbolic 
Exchange and Death, trans. Hamilton Grant (London: Sage, 1993). 
19 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 112. 
20 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 86.  
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On one hand, critical posthumanism seeks to make sense of what ‘we’ – those ontological entities 
or ‘assemblages’ heretofore recognizable as ‘humans’ – are becoming under the interrelated and 
common conditions of late-stage capitalism, info- and bio-technological convergence, and the 
Anthropocene. It asks us to self-critically examine what kinds of knowledge are being produced 
in our ‘posthuman’ moment and how we can best understand the subjects producing that 
knowledge. On the other hand, it seeks to imagine what we can become under those conditions – 
to move beyond just critique, and to symbolically and materially re-invent subjectivities through 
multiple, creative, and affirmative means; to use our alienating and uncanny condition of bio- and 
info-technological mediation as a discursive occasion to challenge and reimagine the self-
contained, self-determining ‘Man of reason’ that the neologism of ‘human’ has historically 
represented.  
While these ends might seem quite abstract or impractical on the surface, I want to suggest 
that it is just the opposite. We must understand what we are becoming and what we can become in 
order to act effectively and ethically within the context of our emergent conditions. This speaks to 
a longstanding premise of the ‘traditional’ humanities and its grounding rational humanism: 
knowledge ought to precede action.21 But both critical posthumanism and this project take this 
premise a step further in two related senses. First, ontological knowledge in particular ought to 
precede ethical knowledge insofar as the questions of ‘What am I?’ and ‘What can I do?’ are 
 
21 Here I have in mind the Kantian conception of autonomy, which presupposes that authentic and ethical expressions 
of autonomy are grounded in prior, rationally derived principles or “maxims.” Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1998). But we 
can also imagine this in the much broader terms of methodological assumptions about “rational actors,” i.e., the 
premise that individual choices are the result of prior, internal modes of reasoning that prioritize self-interest. If this 
is most often the basis of economic analysis, it is nevertheless present and contested within a wide range of social 
theories. Gianluca Manzo, “Is Rational Choice Theory Still a Rational Choice? A Response to Opp,” Social Science 
Information 52, no.3 (2013): 361-382. 
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conceptually prior to the question of ‘What should I do?’.22 In this sense, my project is informed 
by what philosopher Ian Hacking describes as a framework of “dynamic nominalism,” which 
claims that “numerous kinds of human beings and human acts come into being hand in hand with 
our invention of the categories labeling them.”23 The important implication of this claim is that 
“making up people changes the space of possibilities for personhood.”24 If “all intentional acts are 
acts under a description,” then as “new modes of descriptions come into being, new possibilities 
for action come into being in consequence.”25 Thus, in order ask how we ought to act – to evaluate 
the horizon of possibilities for ethics – we must first ask what we are (or are in the process of 
becoming) and what we can become.  
In this regard, I am also influenced by Continental philosopher Martin Heidegger’s 
foundational, mid-twentieth century critique of “techno-science.” To understand how power 
operates under conditions of radical technologization, Heidegger argued that we must go beyond 
a simple “instrumentalist” view of technology in which technologies are mere neutral objects 
subject to the irrational and unethical ends of individual actors. Instead, we must seek the “essence 
 
22 In the most general sense, my use of “ontology” and “ontological” in this project refers to discourse about what the 
human is or what constitutes the state of human being. Following the Platonic and Aristotelian traditions, such 
discourse tends to be essentialist and oppositional, defining a unique, fixed human nature in (hierarchical) contrast to 
its others. I, however, presuppose neither the existence of an unconditional, noumenal real nor access to it. Rather, 
following Foucault’s call for a “critical ontology of ourselves,” I am speaking about operative philosophies of the self 
(i.e., ontologies, plural) that are taken up as if self-evidently true – what he calls “historical a prioris” – which are 
both products and determinants of particular discourses, institutional apparatuses, and other ‘games of truth’. These 
ontologies are ‘real’ or ‘true’ in the sense of being operative and powerful, but there is no completely independent, 
empirical reality outside of discourse to which we can refer in evaluating them. While this, in some sense, folds all 
ontologies into the domain of social, historical, and material determination, it does not a priori equalize them. Rather, 
it affords the possibility of calling them into question, identifying internal incoherencies, and imagining potential 
alternatives. The term “ontology of ourselves” is taken from Michel Foucault, “What is Enlightenment?” in The 
Foucault Reader, ed. Paul Rainbow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), 32-50. The term “historical a prioris” is 
taken from Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse on Language, trans. A.M. Sheridan 
Smith (New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 126-131. 
23 Ian Hacking, Historical Ontology (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 2002), 170. 
24 Hacking, Historical Ontology, 166. 
25 Hacking, Historical Ontology, 166. 
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of technology” in ontological terms, i.e., the conception of Being and beings structured into the 
modern scientific and technological worldview – our operative “metaphysics of calculation” or 
condition of “Enframing” in which all beings, including the knowing human itself, are always 
already encountered as subject to objectification and instrumentalization. When this 
phenomenological lens of encounter is operationalized, Heidegger claimed, humans structurally 
relate to all beings – not just natural resources and material technologies, but also other human 
subjects – as “standing-reserves,” i.e., in terms of their potential for human use and domination.26 
While both Heidegger’s belief in the operation of a single dominant ontology and his 
overwhelmingly negative view of techno-science merit complication, his larger theoretical point – 
that how we understand both ‘the human’ and ‘the technological’ is determinative of certain modes 
of ethical thinking and action – is instructive for this inquiry into biotechnology and the future of 
human nature.  
If Heidegger’s genealogical influence on critical posthumanism is contested and his 
intellectual presence is (rightly) contentious in the discourse, it nevertheless points us to a second 
sense in which critical posthumanism goes beyond the ends of the classical humanities.27 Critical 
posthumanists contend that the humanistic model of subjectivity – the self-contained and self-
determining ‘Man of reason’ – is no longer adequate for knowledge-production under the 
posthuman conditions of late-stage capitalism, info- and bio-technological convergence, and the 
 
26 See: Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” in Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. Julian Young and 
Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2002), 57-85. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, ed. and trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). Martin Heidegger, 
“Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 190-242. 
27 Heidegger’s presence in the discourse is most controversial due to his affiliations with the Nazi regime during and 
after the Second World War. While I believe it is essential to acknowledge his deeply problematic biography, it would 
be intellectually dishonest to ignore his genealogical influence on philosophy of technology and modern 
posthumanism. In this regard, I am in accord with Ferrando, who answers the question of “why Heidegger?” by 
explaining that when it comes to “bringing the conversation on technology to the realm of ontology,” Heidegger was 
“the first philosopher to radically and convincingly move in this direction.” Ferrando, Philosophical Posthumanism, 
40. 
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Anthropocene. An individualist view of the self that makes structural distinctions between nature, 
culture, and technology accounts for neither the material realities of our networked, global 
interdependence nor the biological realities of cognition as an embodied and extended process. In 
other words, classical humanist models of selfhood fail to recognize the various modes through 
which subjects are increasingly (and have always been) assembled through discursive and 
technological processes ‘external’ to the walls of the individual human skull. Thus we arrive at the 
overarching project of critical posthumanism: recognizing the structural limitations of our 
inherited humanist ontologies and reimagining subjectivities for the sustainable grounding of 
social recognition and relational ethics in our posthuman moment. And while this goal holds true 
for normative ethics in the more general sense, I will suggest that it hold a special weight for the 
discipline of bioethics, which is uniquely authorized to produce knowledge about and to govern 
the ongoing material and symbolic convergence of biology and technology.  
The notion of undertaking a critique of humanism might seem odd to many readers. Given 
the multifarious potential threats to our familiar ideals of human nature, human rights, and human 
dignity – from biotechnological modification to deep automation to governmental totalitarianism 
– should we not be seeking to reaffirm the inherent and unalienable value of human life? Is 
humanism, even in spite of its historical failures to live up to its promises, so problematic as to 
demand abandonment? The point I mean to make here is that this question cannot be reduced to 
‘mere ethics’; it also ontological in nature. Even if one were to admit that the ethical ends of the 
conceptual frameworks of human nature, human rights, and human dignity are admirable, 
humanism cannot just be approached as a normative framework; it depends on prior structural 
beliefs about what the human is – most often traits such as rationality and autonomy that are 
assumed to be given ‘by nature’ and which are, therefore, static, universal, and ideal.  
 14 
More than just flattening and normalizing human capacities though, humanism depends 
upon what social theorist Bruno Latour names the “Modern Constitution.” For Latour, ‘modernity’ 
is best understood as a historical project of theoretical “purification” that aims to separate the 
ontological zones of the nonhuman sphere of nature (including the technological) from the human 
sphere of culture. Scientific rationalism itself, the argument goes, depends upon a view of scientific 
products – from theories to instruments – as existing not just ‘external’ to human life but also as 
being self-sufficient and self-contained; science is objective because it is, in its epistemological 
foundations, politically neutral.28 As Latour demonstrates at length, however, techno-scientific 
controversies are settled as much through “social” means as intellectual or practical ones. To 
understand how and why certain theories or instruments become normative (or, for that matter, 
come into being at all), we must foremost approach them as “assemblages” or “machines” that 
result from networks of actors, ideas, and objects being enrolled and controlled, i.e., as “hybrids” 
that transgress our inherited distinctions between the natural, cultural, and technological.29 
The point here runs deeper than just understanding science as a phenomenon ‘in action’. 
Rather, the point is that material technologies are both the condition of social life and embedded 
within it; the natural, the cultural, and the technological are co-constituted and mutually 
dependent.30 We need not, however, take up Latour’s theoretical or methodological framework 
wholesale to see this. Whether it is object-oriented analyses from the social sciences, postmodern 
critiques from the humanities, information-based theories from the ‘hard’ sciences, or empirical 
observations about the mediated state of modern life, it has become increasingly apparent that the 
 
28 See: Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
29 See: Bruno Latour, Science in Action (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1987). 
30 See: Bruno Latour, “On Technical Mediation: Philosophy, Sociology, Genealogy,” Common Knowledge 3, no. 2 
(1994): 29-64. 
 15 
self-contained, self-determining humanist model of selfhood does not adequately map onto the 
phenomenon of subjectivity in our posthuman moment. 
While I do not subscribe to the naturalistic fallacy insofar as I do not presume that ought 
necessarily follows from is, I am suggesting that ought and is are internally related. How we 
understand what we are and how we understand what we can do (and more often than not what we 
should do) go hand-in-hand. In turn, the normative humanist beliefs that operate in the field of 
bioethics, which depend on flattening, anthropocentric ontologies, lose their intellectual force and 
coherence when their grounding conceptions of human subjectivity come under fire. Bioethics de 
facto framework of common moral principlism, for example, is only compelling insofar as one 
assumes not just A) that there are common, universal ends toward which all persons in moral 
communities are predisposed, but also B) that all persons within that community are self-
legislating rational actors who possess an ontological coherence prior to and outside of the techno-
scientific projects that their common principles are intended to govern. This project’s call for a 
posthumanist bioethics, then, is as much about approaching biotechnologies through a lens that 
can account for human subjectivities and futures as relational and differential phenomena as it is 
about imagining a ‘more ethical’ bioethics.  
To use the language of “we” – as I have already done on numerous occasions in this 
introduction – runs the risk of reifying the very notion of homo universalis that I am criticizing in 
this project. Critical theorists have rightly been skeptical of such inclusive, normalizing language 
as it seems to run counter to the tenets of multiplicity and difference at the heart of the posthumanist 
turn.31 In this regard, I choose to follow Braidotti, who suggests that, “the crucial question is: who 
 
31 Literary theorist N. Katherine Hayles, for example, ironically named her seminal work How We Became Posthman 
in order to position herself in opposition to techno-enthusiasts who assume that the posthuman is a universal condition 
“when in fact it affects only a small fraction of the world’s population.” If “people [only] become posthuman because 
they think they are posthuman,” it follows that ‘the posthuman’ is the “successor” to ‘the human’ in only the most 
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and how many are ‘we’?”32 In turn, she encourages us to resist the political appeal of the people – 
a people assumed to always already share a community based in their common nature – and instead 
begin with “assembling just a people, a community constructed around a shared understanding 
their condition.”33 The presence of “we” in this project, then, is performative, functioning as an 
invitation to readers to join the emergent intellectual and political communities of posthumanist 
thought, to become a part of a “we” that might otherwise be ‘other’ to their familiar modes of 
thinking human nature.  
But rather than a collective self-understanding grounded in individual faculties or 
teleological histories – as has so often been the case with humanism – solidarity is imagined here 
in terms of common conditions. The concurrent emergence of late-stage capitalism, info- and bio-
technological convergence, and the Anthropocene present conditions with global consequences 
and the inclusive “we” is therefore intended to prompt readers to recognize their interest as both 
mutual and vested. Rather than recomposing a familiar ideal of pan-humanity, however, 
posthumanist approaches challenge us to address our common conditions through grounded, 
complex, and differential visions of the future. We might all be in this together, but we are not all 
the same, and the latter point must inform how we approach the former one. 
The bioethical debate concerning human enhancement demonstrates an ontological 
impulse – i.e., an impulse to crack open the black box of the pre-given neologism of ‘human nature’ 
 
superficial sense of the former emerging after the latter. Hayles, however, also uses “we” to connote a “performative 
dimension” of posthumanist thinking: a self-understanding based in collectivity, “an ‘I’ transformed in the ‘we’ of 
autonomous agents operating together to make a self.” In other words, it is intended to speak to the relational and 
multiple character of individuals who, rather than being self-contained entities, are made up of different biological, 
technological, and cultural systems intra-acting both inside and outside of individual bodies. N. Katherine Hayles, 
How We Became Posthuman Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics (Chicago : University of 
Chicago Press, 1999), 6. 
32 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 36. 
33 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 36. 
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– that would seem to fit with the intellectual project of critical posthumanism. Yet, recognizing 
that familiar modes of thinking human nature are under theoretical and material pressure is not the 
same as recognizing that those understandings demand substantive revision. As literary theorist 
Neil Badmington explains, the reactions to our posthuman conditions are more often than not all-
too-human, affording humanist thought a haunting power.34 In the case of the human enhancement 
debate, we will see that this manifests in dualistic framings of biotechnology as a harbinger of 
liberation or oppression, transcendence or apocalypse, authenticity or monstrosity.  
These dualisms map onto what I identify as “bioliberal” and “bioconservative” positions. 
Whereas the former contends that to use biotechnologies to enhance our capacities would fulfill 
our true human purpose as rational, progressive beings, the latter contends that to do so would 
transgress our sacrosanct, pre-given nature. In both cases, however, the ethics of enhancement 
depend on demonstrating whether or not enhancement is ‘truly human’ and, therefore, both 
positions fail to go beyond a classical notions of ‘human nature’ as a normative determinant. We 
are, in turn, presented with a simple and polarized view of biotechnological futures: intervening at 
the biological level will either liberate us from the constraints of an oppressive natural world or 
transform us into something altogether inhuman. What, however, happens when these grounding 
ideals of human nature are challenged and reimagined? This is the critical task of posthumanism 
and the one this project brings to bear on the textual field of human enhancement – to map 





34 Neil Badmington, “Theorizing Posthumanism,” Cultural Critique 53 (2003): 10-27 
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0.3 Religious Studies 
Readers might be surprised to encounter a religious studies dissertation that focuses on the 
topics of bioethics and human enhancement.35 Techno-scientific projects such as germ-line genetic 
engineering, brain-machine interfaces, and engineered senescence are, after all, not the usual 
domain in which scholars of religion operate. In the past two decades, however, the discipline of 
religious studies has experienced multiple intellectual shifts that point to this domain as an exigent 
space for examination within our discipline. Foremost, the field has experienced a “media turn,” 
according to which scholars have become increasingly concerned with how actors invest their 
technologies with meaning so that material objects become sites for negotiating identity, morality, 
and epistemology.36  Put in discipline-specific terms: all religious activity requires some form of 
material mediation as a condition of its possibility. The underlying theoretical premise here, 
however, can be stated in even more capacious terms. Technologies, sacred and otherwise, are not 
mere instruments; they are the prior condition of all communication and, most important for our 
purposes, situated always amongst competing meanings and explanations.  
This is no less true of the speculative technologies that populate the human enhancement 
debate where biotechnologies act as a discursive means to forward beliefs about the nature and 
future of ‘the human’. And while literature on religion and media has done important labor in 
 
35 For readers familiar with the emergent subfield of Science, Technology, Religion (STR), this topic might not seem 
so odd. It is worth noting, however, that there are still minimal intersections between religion and bioethics in this 
subfield, and even fewer that also broach posthumanism. Rather, most texts at the intersection of religion and bioethics 
come from theology as opposed to religious studies. For examples of theological accounts, see: Ronald Cole-
Turner, Transhumanism and Transcendence: Christian Hope in an Age of Technological Enhancement (Washington, 
D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2011). Calvin R. Mercer and Tracy J. Trothen, ed., Religion and Transhumanism: 
The Unknown Future of Human Enhancement (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2015). Christopher C. Knight and Nancey 
Murphy, Human Identity at the Intersection of Science, Technology, and Religion (Burlington, V.T.: Ashgate, 2010). 
36 For an overview on the “media turn” in religious studies, see: Jeremy Stolow, “Religion and/as Media,” Theory, 
Culture & Society 22 (2005): 119-145. Matthew Engelke, “Religion and the Media Turn: A Review Essay,” American 
Ethnologist 37, no. 2 (2010): 371-379. David Morgan, ed., Key Words in Religion, Media, and Culture (London: 
Routledge, 2008). Hent de Vries ed., Religion: Beyond a Concept (New York: Fordham Press, 2008). 
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transitioning the field from a classical focus on linguistic communication and symbolic structures 
to the material and affective aspects of religious life, it has given little attention to speculative 
technologies, which have little or no material component to speak of. One central claim of this 
project, then, is that technologies do not need to be materially present to mediate subject-formation. 
Present as pure horizon, future human enhancement technologies are still able to function as what 
Michel Foucault calls “technologies of the self,” i.e., as discursive sites through which actors form 
and reform ontological and ethical self-understandings.37 Though the possibility of a substantive 
material transformation of human biology is pressing to consider, my main interest here is in 
understanding how imaginings of human enhancement influence our present knowledge – 
generating spaces, demands, and tools for forwarding beliefs about what it does and ought to mean 
to be human. 
It is here that some observers start to see the ‘religious’ character of the discourse. After 
all, these ‘big-picture’ questions regarding what is does and should mean to be human have long 
been foundational for the “onto-theological” tradition.38 Furthermore, terms that explicitly evoke 
 
37 Foucault identified four “major types” of “technologies”: 1) technologies of production, 2) technologies of sign 
systems, 3) technologies of power, and 4) technologies of the self. Technologies of the self, he explained, “permit 
individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others a certain number of operations on their own bodies 
and souls, thoughts, conduct, and way of being, so as to transformation themselves in order to attain a certain state of 
happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection, or immortality.” Particular technologies of the self depend upon historical 
context, and Foucault’s interest in medieval Christianity led him to cite examples such as abstinence, fasting, and 
meditation. These “technologies,” then, do not refer to (just) material instrumentals or appliances so much as 
existential means of “knowing oneself’” Michel Foucault, “Technologies of the Self” in Technologies of the Self: A 
seminar with Michel Foucault, ed. Martin H. Luther, Huck Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst, M.A.: University 
of Massachusetts Press, 1988), 18-20. 
The concept of “technologies of the self” has seen renewed interest from scholars working on new media as a heuristic 
for thinking about self-design and social identity in the digital age. See, for example: Steven Dorrestijn, “Technical 
Mediation and Subjectivation: Tracing and Extending Foucault’s Philosophy of Technology,” Philosophy & 
Technology 25, no. 2 (2012): 221–241. Rodrigo Hernández-Ramírez, “Technology and Self-Modification: 
Understanding Technologies of the Self After Foucault,” Journal of Science and Technology of the Arts 9, no. 3 (2017): 
45-57. 
38 The term “onto-theology” is taken from Heidegger, who, anticipating the deconstructive turn, brought ontology 
and theology together under the umbrella of a “metaphysics of presence.” More than just identifying how philosophy 
and theology are both driven by ‘faith’, the term onto-theology signals the reduction of theological mysteries to the 
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a sense of religiosity such as ‘transcendence’, ‘immortality’, and ‘playing God’ appear frequently 
in the human enhancement lexicon. Given the now-common scholarly understanding of religion 
as a heuristic, rather than a thing-in-itself,39 there is a temptation to map religion, or at least some 
idea of religiousness, onto this discursive territory.40 I want to suggest, however, that we should 
push back against such a temptation.  
While self-identified religious actors and texts do appear in the enhancement debate, the 
most prolific and influential actors understand their contributions as secular. Indeed, we will see 
that appeals to authentic secularism act as argumentative levers that are entangled with the question 
of how the ethics of human enhancement should be decided. Claiming the mantle of authentic 
secularism acts as a rhetorical means to also claim the mantles of historical progress, objective 
truth, legitimate reasoning, and democratic representation. While scholars of religion know all too 
well that secularism, like religion, is an unstable, contingent, and normative concept, the point I 
meant to highlight here is that it is also an operative concept that theorists of enhancement pick up 
and negotiate in order to reach some kind of ethical reconciliation.41 The key question for this 
project, then, is not: is this person, text, community, etc., ‘religious’ or ‘secular’? Rather, it is: how 
 
immanent order of beings. Martin Heidegger, “What is Metaphysics?” in Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings, trans. 
and ed., David Farrell Krell (London: Routledge, 1993), 93–110. 
39 If this is now a common approach in Religious Studies, it is worth noting that Jonathan Z. Smith was one of the 
first to cogently argue that “‘Religion’ is not a native term; it is a term created by scholars for their intellectual purposes 
and therefore is theirs to define.” Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, Religions, Religious,” in Critical Terms for Religious 
Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 281. 
40 While this turn has led to a great deal of reflexive, anti-essentialist work on the category of “religion,” I am also 
suggesting that it has coincided with some quite straightforward mapping of non-traditional territories as ‘religious’ 
in character. While this is not problematic in and of itself, it can paradoxically lead to the idea that certain secular 
formations are ‘really’ religious. I believe this has been the (implicit) initial tendency for scholars of religion trying to 
make sense of transhumanism and likeminded movements. See, for example: Robert Geraci, Apocalyptic AI: Visions 
of Heaven in Robotics, Artificial Intelligence, and Virtual Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). Hava 
Tirosh-Samuelson, “Transhumanism as a Secularist Faith,” Zygon 47, no. 4 (December 2012): 710-734. 
41 While I will return to this notion of secularism as an unstable formation in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, two 
texts that have been particularly influential for my thinking are: Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, 
Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). Janet R. Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, Secularisms 
(Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 
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are specific ideas of religion and secularism operationalized in the discourse of human 
enhancement, and, likewise, how is the prospect of human enhancement reshaping those ostensibly 
‘commonsense’ imaginings?  
In this regard, I believe that to ask ‘how is this a religion project?’ is to approach 
disciplinary thinking backwards. The more important and useful question is: how can theories and 
methods from the field of religious studies help us to make sense of this issue?42 There is currently 
a regrettable absence of intersections between the fields of religious studies, bioethics, and critical 
posthumanism. Religious studies, however, offers a unique and useful vantage point through which 
we can make sense of the discursive mechanisms by which humanism is being reinscribed in the 
human enhancement debate and the larger field of bioethics. While not often named as such, 
scholars of religion have long been attuned to the conceptual and institutional nexuses that buttress 
and instantiate humanist thought – namely, structural distinctions between private and public, 
religious and secular, sacred and profane, immanent and transcendent. As we will see, it is so often 
these same ideas that theorists of human enhancement operationalize in order to account for the 
ethics of ‘going beyond’ the human. This project, then, is not a religious studies project in the 
sense that it identifies religion in unexpected places, as is so often the case in extending our 
 
42 In approaching religious studies as an interpretive toolbox rather than a pre-determined subject, my thinking is 
strongly influenced by Mark C. Taylor, Kathryn Lofton, and John Lardas Modern, who use insights from religious 
studies to make sense of non-traditional sites of examination – from consumer culture to the logic of networks to 
historical literature – without just reducing them to ‘identifiable’ religion. While my method shares little with Lofton’s 
quasi-Durkheimian analysis of consumer culture or Modern’s close reading of canonical literature, it takes seriously 
what Modern describes as a demand “to confront the incoherence of using the religious or the secular as stable analytic 
categories.” While this insight has most often been met with a (productive) reflexive turn by religionists, I also see it 
as an invitation to expand the subject of religious studies to include topics that the category of ‘religion’ has 
traditionally been assumed to touch upon; in this case, (biotechnological) discourses concerning the nature and future 
of human being. Just as important, I treat it as an invitation to approach religious studies pragmatically; that is to say, 
I draw on what I see as the field’s most instructive features, its interdisciplinarity and reflexivity, as an especially 
useful means to analyze sites independent of their ostensible religiousness. John Modern, “Commentary: How to Read 
Literature, Win Friends, Influence People, and Write about American Religion,” American Literary History 26, no. 1 
(2014): 195.  
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disciplinary gaze. 43 Rather, it is a religious studies project in the sense that it draws on the 
discipline’s attunement to and tools for making sense of the discursive mechanisms by which 
subjects are formed and reformed. 
0.4 Discourse Analysis and Its Limits 
My methodological practices might seem somewhat ‘traditional’ when compared to my 
theoretical commitments to critical posthumanism. That is, while I stress the entangled nature of 
the discursive and the material at a theoretical level, this project still mostly takes the form of 
discourse analysis, i.e., a critical reading of a textual field. While “discourse” is a term with 
multifarious meanings, I use it to designate “an interrelated set of texts, and the practices of their 
production, dissemination, and reception, that brings an object into being.” 44  Within the 
framework of discourse analysis, texts are not treated as representations of an independent social 
world but as linguistic media that construct, enact, circulate, and reveal the possible or legitimate 
modes of understanding phenomena and making statements about what is ‘true’. To borrow from 
Michel Foucault’s definition, discourses are linguistic (though never just linguistic) “practices that 
systematically form the objects of which they speak.”45 Discourse analysis, then, “tries to explore 
how the socially produced ideas and objects that populate the world were created in the first place 
and how they are maintained and held in place over time.”46  
 
43 Here I am observing a widespread trend within religious studies according to which theorists attempt to show – 
genealogically, empirically, or otherwise – that religion is in some sense present even when it is not apparent. While 
I think these insights are invaluable, I am also suggesting that this need not be the exclusive means through which 
extend our disciplinary gaze toward (ostensibly) non-religious formations. 
44 Nelson Phillips and Cynthia Hardy, Discourse Analysis: Investigating Processes of Social Construction (Thousand 
Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2002), 3. 
45 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, 49. 
46 Philips and Hardy, Discourse Analysis, 6. 
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In this sense, I approach the textual field of human enhancement as a site of ‘coproduction,’ 
in which knowledge and norms are being produced ‘symmetrically,’ rather than either of them 
being given in advance or the former being the straightforward cause of the latter. More than just 
approaching bioethical knowledge and norms as historically situated, this means attending to how 
social actors are engaged in boundary-making – asserting, reinforcing, challenging, or adopting 
ideals of human nature in order to reconcile the moral potential of biotechnologies. I am, however, 
less concerned with ‘how we got here’ than I am with which particular epistemological, ontological, 
and normative claims are being (re)produced in the human enhancement discourse, how that 
(re)production is being effected, and what it might portend for the future development and 
application of biotechnologies. 
What, however, demarcates the boundaries of a discourse? Since discourses are embodied 
and enacted through multiple texts and textual forms, we can best approach individual texts as part 
of larger “discursive units,” i.e., inter-textual classes of texts.47 While determining the content of 
such a unit is a precarious process, there are nevertheless helpful methods for choosing appropriate 
source materials. I follow Foucault’s position that we can delineate the material ‘internal’ to a 
given discourse based on statements that share ‘modalities of existence’, i.e. the same 'objects', 
'modalities of enunciation', 'concepts', and 'strategies'. 48 While the more general focus of this 
project is the ethics of human enhancement, the language of “human nature” functions as featured 
part of the enhancement lexicon. Bioethicists concerned with enhancement operationalize concepts 
of human nature – philosophical, scientific, legal, and historical – to ground their claims regarding 
whether enhancement is ethical and to persuade their audiences of their respective positions. These 
 
47 Jean K. Chalaby, “Beyond the Prison-House of Language: Discourse as a Sociological Concept,” The British 
Journal of Sociology 47, no. 4 (1996): 688. 
48 Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge, 31-70. 
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statements both represent and enact ontological and normative assumptions about what it does and 
should mean to be human. Given this common thematic focus, I contend that making sense of the 
ethics of human enhancement requires us to analyze how bioethicists pick up and make use of the 
language of human nature, rather than just focusing on traditional bioethical categories such as 
risk, access, and justice. The aim of this form of discourse analysis, then, is “to go beyond [just] 
content to see how [that content] is used flexibly to achieve particular functions and effects.”49 
How does this shared anthropological language function in the human enhancement debate and 
what kinds of interpretive lenses does it provide for the competing meanings and explanations 
being assigned to (speculative) biotechnologies?  
The idea of persuasion is especially important here as bioethical texts are intended to appeal 
to imagined communities or publics that are purported to be united by a common ethical concern 
for biotechnologies and the future of ‘the human’.50 Whether their imagined audiences are non-
specialists, bioethicists, scientists, politicians, or lay citizens, texts on enhancement are rhetorical 
in style. While I mean this in the traditional sense of rhetoric as language and logic that function 
with the purpose of persuasion, we can also understand these appeals as forms of “constitutive 
rhetoric,” i.e., rhetoric that “(1) provide[s] a collective identity for an addressed 
 
49 Linda A. Wood and Rolf O. Kroger, Doing Discourse Analysis: Methods for Studying Action in Talk and Text 
(Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2000), 6. 
50 When I speak of “imagined” communities or publics, I am drawing on Benedict Anderson’s work in which he 
argues that national publics are not given empirical realities so much as imaginative models (of readerships) 
constructed through shared material-linguistic practices of time and consumption such as the circulation of newspapers 
and novels. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (New 
York: Verso, 1983). 
We can see another excellent example of this in Michael Warner’s work on the invention of the American public 
sphere in the eighteenth century, which, he argues, owes much to the reciprocal production of printed political 
materials and particular visions of democratic republicanism. Michael Warner, The Letters of the Republic: 
Publication and the Public sphere in Eighteenth-Century America (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
While the texts I reference in this project are not always appealing to a national audience – indeed, there is often a 
tacit ideal of globalism that transcends national identities – we must nevertheless approach them as necessarily writing 
for an imagined readership or public. Inversely, I am also suggesting that an imagined community of enhancement 
theorists, many of whom are not traditional bioethicists, emerges through the production of such topical texts. 
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audience; (2) construct[s] the audience as a subject in history; and (3) demand[s] that subjects act 
in accordance with their identity as enacted in history.”51 Prior to the act of persuasion, there must 
be a narrative that presumes the existence and identity of the subject, an identity which the rhetoric 
both depends upon and validates.52 The focus of this discourse analysis, then, is: how do theorists 
of enhancement persuade their audiences to take up ethical obligations through rhetorical appeals 
to human nature? And what normative and ideal accounts of ‘the human’ do these appeals both 
depend upon and validate? 
But I also want to suggest that even a somewhat ‘traditional’ discursive analysis can 
substantively challenge existing methodological practices. First, I do not presume that texts are 
free-floating, abstract containers of knowledge. Not only are texts, like all information patterns, 
materially embodied, but they also circulate and resonate in networks of information exchange 
after their production. While much of the recent critical theory in science and technology studies 
(STS) has shifted to rethinking the prior social and material conditions of knowledge-production, 
I am – Chapter One notwithstanding – most concerned with how ideas operate and resonate within 
existing textual fields and what this might portend moving forward.53 
Using the auditory framework of “resonance” as an analogue, literary theorist Wai Chee 
Dimock explains that, like frequencies of sound, texts are activated and constituted (at least as 
 
51 Raymie E. McKerrow, “Constitutive Rhetorics,” in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 618. 
52 See, for example: Maurice Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric: ‘The Case of the Peuple Québécois,’” Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 73, no.2 (1987): 133–150. 
53 The ‘material turn’ in STS can be seen as a response to the overwhelming presence of social constructivist analyses 
within the field. To be clear, many such materialist analyses constructively approach their objects in terms of 
relationality and natural-social intersections. For overviews on this turn, see: John Law, “The Materials of STS,” in 
The Oxford Handbook of Material Culture Studies, ed., Dan Hicks and Mary C. Beaudry (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2010), 173-190. Hannah Star Rogers, “STS by Material Means,” in Dialogues Between Artistic Research and 
Science and Technology Studies, ed., Henk Borgdorff, Peter Peters, and Trevor Pinch (New York: Routledge, 2019): 
76-87. 
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“objects” of study) by their “continual transit through new semantic networks, modifying their 
tonality as they proceed.”54 The important implication is that to discern and analyze patterns within 
a body of texts is not merely to identify representations of stable ideas, i.e., to simply map how 
things are (or are being) understood. Rather, it also to consider how these ideas are, or might be 
contributing to, the production and reproduction of different subjectivities – in this case, through 
the explicit conceptual nexus of human enhancement. In the mold of the earlier mentioned 
framework of dynamic nominalism, we can think of texts as nodes in complex feedback loops that 
both represent and influence the interrelated possibilities for knowing, being, and acting – of 
bringing particular kinds of entities and actions into being through their discursive inscriptions and 
performances. As N. Katherine Hayles explains, “Literary texts are not…merely passive conduits. 
They actively shape what the technologies means and what scientific theories signify in cultural 
contexts.”55 Texts thus provide us with critical levers for making sense of how meaning is being 
assigned to sciences and technologies in particular cultural contexts and the understandings of 
human nature that are being (re)constituted in and through them.  
Second, and for similar reasons, I did not begin this project with the ambition to engage 
bioethics as a discrete discipline. Even within highly rationalized academic or governmental 
apparatuses, it would be naive to assume that there are ready-made, stable boundaries that can tell 
us exactly where a discourse begins and ends. Rather, I began with a capacious topic, the ethics of 
future biotechnological interventions, and traced citations in and between academic, governmental, 
and other relevant texts in order to delineate shared forms of enunciation, concepts, and strategies. 
Again and again, however, I found myself dwelling with texts that self-identified as doing, or that 
 
54 Wai Chee Dimock, “A Theory of Resonance,” Publications of the Modern Language Association of America 112, 
no. 5 (1997): 1061. 
55 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, 21. 
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appealed to audiences within, bioethics and which operationalized the discipline-specific language 
of human enhancement. Furthermore, bioethical literature on enhancement demonstrated a 
distinctive polemical and rhetorical style in which the authors placed themselves on a particular 
side within a common intellectual debate, cited similar scholars as allies or opponents, and referred 
to similar forms of philosophical and empirical evidence. Through close reading of content and 
citations, then, I have attempted to map the enhancement discourse as the participants have 
understood and enacted it, and, based on disproportionate references, to determine the most 
‘influential’ or ‘representative’ actors.56 I do not assume that this method is exhaustive. Rather, it 
is one useful means to identify the common ethical fault lines, rhetorical methods, and 
anthropological understandings in texts on a particular topic in which the authors understand 
themselves to be in conversation and competition with one another.  
The notion of competition is important here as it brings to the fore not only the rhetorical 
style of enhancement texts but also the issue of disciplinary authority. Within sociology of 
knowledge this topic has received a great deal of attention under the category of “jurisdiction.”57 
Sociologist John Evans brings this framework to the context of bioethics in his study of human 
genetic engineering (HGE). Evans defines a jurisdiction as “the link between a profession and its 
work,” which can be forged through methods such as state licensing, institutional affiliations, and 
 
56 To be clear, I am not referring to a sociological sense of “social influence” here. Rather, I have attempted to choose 
texts from actors who are especially prolific on the topic of human enhancement and who appear in a disproportionate 
number of textual citations. I do not presume that this method is empirically or quantitatively comprehensive, nor that 
the actors and texts in question possess a special social or material influence. 
57 I do not take up a wholesale theory of jurisdiction in this project. I am merely noting here that classical ‘division 
of labor’ models can struggle to account for the complex composition of certain bioethical discourses. Likewise, to 
the extent that I use terms like “discipline” or “profession,” I use them as interpretive and explanatory devices, rather 
than presuming that they map neatly onto empirical realities. For more on the sociology of jurisdiction and profession, 
see: Andrew Abbott, The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1988). Andrew Abbott, Chaos of Disciplines (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2000). Graham 
Crow and Jaimie Ellis, ed., Revisiting Divisions of Labour: The Impacts and Legacies of a Modern Sociological 
Classic (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 2017). 
 28 
public opinion.58 For Evans, the contest for jurisdiction in bioethics is between distinct professions 
(e.g. theologians and scientists) who seek to translate or reduce bioethical issues into particular 
forms of argumentation so that those issues fall under their “home” jurisdiction. Those 
professionals are, in turn, legitimized as agents of social change with the right to institutionalize 
their own abstract frameworks and ethical ends. In Evans’ historical account, scientists ‘win’ 
jurisdiction over bioethics by reducing the field to ‘formally rational modes of argumentation’, 
effectively erasing the ‘substantive’ concerns of theologians.59 
Through this account, however, Evans draws strong social and intellectual distinctions 
between professions – defining a profession by the abstract knowledge that it uses to work rather 
than its political/organizational form – and, in doing so, diminishes the complex composition of 
jurisdictional contests in bioethics. While bioethics has become an increasingly credentialed and 
discrete discipline since the 1970s, bioethical literature and institutions nevertheless include 
scholars from a diverse number of intellectual and technical fields including: philosophy, law, 
psychology, sociology, environmental studies, evolutionary biology, and medicine. This not only 
demonstrates a growing interest in bioethical issues across academic disciplines, but also reflects 
the original goal of the field as an interdisciplinary project based on self-authorizing 
participation. 60  This interdisciplinary predisposition is even more pronounced within the 
enhancement debate where scientists, technologists, legalists, theologians, philosophers, and 
popular writers weigh in on biotechnological ethics using similar forms of rhetoric and, in doing 
 
58 John H. Evans, Playing God?: Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization of Public Bioethical Debate 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 28. 
59 See also: John H. Evans, “Science, Bioethics, and Religion,” in The Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion, 
ed. Peter Harrison (Oxford, UK: University of Oxford, 2010), 207-226. 
60 While I will return to this idea in greater detail in Chapter One, one of the biggest proponents of this original vision 
was Daniel Callahan, founder of the Hastings Center. See: Daniel Callahan, The Roots of Bioethics: Health, Progress, 
Technology, Death (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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so, enter the same web of citations as credentialed bioethicists. Furthermore, when it comes to the 
topic of enhancement, credentialed bioethicists use multiple textual media in order to participate 
in (ostensibly) different discursive spheres (popular, professional, and public).61 The use of a wide 
range of disciplinary tools and textual media to pursue intellectual correctness, institutional 
influence, and public support confirms that the contest for jurisdiction over bioethics remains 
ongoing and, furthermore, that it exceeds straightforward demarcations of professional jurisdiction.  
Given the unstable boundaries of the enhancement debate, I use a more inclusive 
understanding of “bioethics” than most bioethicists would recognize. I choose to treat bioethics as 
a genre or class of texts – united by inter-textual references and common ethical concerns and fault 
lines – rather than (just) as a formal discipline. In doing so, I include texts from popular writers, 
cultural critics, academics, theologians, and members of industry who see themselves as 
participating in the human enhancement debate and who contribute to the larger textual field of 
biotechnological ethics. Rather than collapsing all sense of defined disciplinarity, however, we 
will see that approaching bioethics as a distinctive professional field is still quite exigent. In spite 
of the interdisciplinary nature of the enhancement debate, its grounding linguistic and conceptual 
frameworks – including human enhancement – both build upon and extend premises that have 
shaped the field of bioethics since its inception in the 1970s. While not every text featured in this 
project comes from a credentialed bioethicist then, each one inhabits a common, if unstable, 
discursive space – what I call the human enhancement debate – that both revolves around and 
exceeds the fulcrum of disciplinary bioethics.  
 
61 For example, it is not unusual for a prominent bioethicist like Leon Kass to write for popular periodicals, academic 
journals, and government commissions. 
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Given the scope of this examination, this dissertation necessarily omits a great deal of 
information about the topic it examines. There is no material means to fit all of the relevant 
information on bioethics and human enhancement within these pages, and part of the task of 
interpretation is therefore making difficult choices about what does and does not merit inclusion 
in such an analysis. This is especially true when, as in my case, one is engaging in a macro- or 
meta-analysis of a field of knowledge and, furthermore, the knowledge in question is still very 
much in the process of being produced. For example, in mapping the enhancement debate, I choose 
to privilege the viewpoints of far-left and far-right perspectives under the respective monikers of 
“bioliberal” and “bioconservative.” As a result – Chapter One notwithstanding - I give somewhat 
minimal attention to the left-leaning or “moderate” cohort of bioethicists that are typically 
identified as constituting the ‘mainstream’ of the discipline.  
I have made this hermeneutic choice for three reasons. First, given that the discourse of 
human enhancement concerns abstract, future interventions, it tends to attract theorists less 
invested in the pragmatic conventions of traditional bioethical work. The positions I describe as 
bioliberal and bioconservative might be ‘extreme’ in the intensity of their normative commitments, 
but they are not minority or marginal positions in the context of the human enhancement debate. 
Second, these positions represent a more explicit engagement with the language of human nature 
than most other bioethical works. Given my interest in the ontological aspects of bioethics, these 
actors and texts represent an especially useful means to think about how subject-formation is 
becoming a site of bioethical discourse and the limitations therein. Third, one of the crucial 
contentions of this project is that these positions are far less divorced from the bioethical 
mainstream than one might expect. As I show in Chapter One, these supposed extremes are 
extensions of the biopolitical culture wars that has restructured much of the field since the early 
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1990s. And as I show in Chapters Two, Three, and Four, both bioconservatives and bioliberals 
share many of the original humanist commitments of the bioethical discipline, including a 
problematic, and sometimes ironic, emphasis on ‘consensus’ or ‘commonsense’ morality. This is 
why, no matter how far afield the enhancement debate is becoming, I believe it is still essential to 
frame it within the historical and intellectual context of bioethics as an academic, professional, and 
public discipline. 
0.5 Interdisciplinarity 
It should be apparent by now that my method of analysis is deeply interdisciplinary. Such 
an approach builds on the conventions of each of the intellectual fields – bioethics, religious studies, 
and critical posthumanism – in which this project intervenes. Unlike say history or anthropology, 
these three fields cohere based on their respective objects of study rather than a discipline-specific 
set of methods. Indeed, one of the defining methodological features of critical posthumanism is its 
“supra-disciplinarity.” As Braidotti explains, “the driving force for their knowledge production is 
not the policing of disciplinary purity, but rather the modes of relation and cross-hybridization 
these discourses are able and willing to engage in.”62  
This mode of supra-disciplinary analysis is, foremost, intended to generate reflexivity. We 
can understand reflexivity as “critical scholarly practices that aim to reflect on, and systematically 
take account of, the investigator’s role as an instrument in the constitution of evidence. Reflexivity 
aims to acknowledge the tripartite arrangement between objects, representations, and knowers that 
produce knowledge, as opposed to less-reflexive modes of investigation that leave the knower out 
of the equation.”63 Religious studies has been in the process of a reflexive turn for decades, opening 
 
62 Braidotti, The Posthuman, 102. 
63 Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway, 86. 
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its own disciplinary black box in order to question who is producing knowledge about religion, 
how such knowledge is and should be produced, and to what that knowledge actually 
corresponds. 64  Indeed, it is a common refrain among scholars of religion that – in spite of 
purportedly being united by our object of study – we do not (or cannot) actually know what 
‘religion’ is.  
While bioethicists have long expressed a similar desire for interdisciplinarity, the field’s 
cross-disciplinary work demonstrates pronounced limitations; not just in that it occludes non- and 
post-humanist critical theory but also in that it demonstrates insufficient reflexivity. Even as 
theorists of enhancement think through what does and should constitute human nature, there is a 
failure to question how the (normative) knowledge being produced contributes to remaking human 
nature in the present. The human enhancement debate thus demands greater reflexivity in order to 
account for its own role in emergent processes of subject-formation. Interdisciplinarity is, in turn, 
one tool with which to achieve that reflexivity. Holding and taking seriously multiple, concurrent 
perspectives toward the same object of knowledge affords one with capacities for questioning 
traditional objectivist or realist approaches. I do not mean this in the sense of generating a 
straightforward relativism but rather in the sense of recognizing ‘truth’ – at least as something that 
operates in the world – as multiple and contingent. One can, in turn, de-center their own 
epistemological approach and question not just the role of ‘the knower’ – as Barard’s definition of 
reflexivity intimates – but also their entire mode of knowledge-production and the warrants that 
underpin it.  
 
64 We can find a prime example of this reflexivity in Tomoko Masuzawa’s work, which provides a (critical) 
genealogical examination of the invention of ‘World Religions’ as the predominant framework for understanding 
religious life in the Euro-American (intellectual) context. Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religion, or, 
How European Universalism Was Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2005). 
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This project thus mobilizes and reconciles interpretive tools from a wide range of 
disciplines – including but not limited to religious studies, Continental philosophy, sociology of 
science, feminist studies, and information theory – in order to prompt a more reflexive approach 
to the ethics of human enhancement. As Barad reminds us, however, we must be careful not to 
settle for straightforward reflexive practices, which all-too-often presuppose structural distinctions 
between inside and outside, word and thing, representation and reality, i.e., frameworks that 
achieve an inward turn through reifying or extending ontological distinctions between objects, 
representations, and knowers. While I will return to Barad’s quantum physics-inspired work in the 
concluding chapter, I should state now that I am not quite as dismissive of reflexivity as she is. 
But I am very much in agreement that, for reflexive approaches to achieve their potential, they 
must make sense of the entangled nature of matter and meaning rather than merely lapsing into 
representationalism.  
Though interdisciplinary in nature, scholarship from religious studies tends to take an 
agnostic approach to its object of study, seeking to make sense of – rather than critique or reform 
– temporally and spatially specific religious beliefs, practices, communities, and so forth. This is, 
at least in principle, what separates this kind of scholarship from the very thing it most often 
examines, theology. This is not to say that religious studies scholarship is uncritical or 
unconstructive; rather, it is to say that scholars from the field go to great lengths to critique one 
another rather than their object of study and, in so doing, to maintain a kind of classical ‘critical 
distance’. In other words, we talk to each other and about religion. I have by and large eschewed 
the idea of an agnostic approach in this project. To attempt to speak ‘from a distance’ on this issue 
makes little sense when we are all increasingly becoming ‘bio-subjects’, our social identities 
grounded in the naturalizing language of genes and neurons and our bodies, therefore, always 
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already encountered as possessing the potential for techno-scientific intervention. The human 
enhancement debate is, in turn, one discourse among others that is in the process of forming and 
reforming operative bio-ontologies in intersecting social, intellectual, economic, and political 
worlds – justifying biotechnological research, determining health care policies, and shaping 
biomedical norms.65 Whether or not the issue of human enhancement is an explicit concern for the 
reader then, it is one that implicates almost all of us as a structural feature of our posthuman 
moment. The point here, however, is not just that this topic should be seen as exigent; rather it is 
that there is no true ‘outside’ that the critical theorist can claim as a vantage point in this context. 
Insofar as it concerns what ‘we’ are becoming and what ‘we’ ought to become, to speak on the 
ethics of human enhancement is necessarily to speak with a vested interest. If we are not already 
“all bioethics experts now,” then it is important that we become so.66 
But it is not enough, as is so often the case in academic literature, to just settle for critique 
– to discern and criticize discursive patterns without attempting to imagine their possible 
alternatives. And while this project expends much of its energy on the interrelated tasks of 
cartography and critique, it is done so with the hope that it can lead the reader to an understanding 
of both why rethinking human enhancement is necessary and what such a rethinking might entail. 
In acknowledging that, with this inscription, I am entering into the same bioethical discourse as 
 
65 As I detail at various points in the project, both funding and policy decisions concerning biotechnological research 
have long depended on representing that research in terms of ‘therapeutic’ ends, often over and against the potential 
‘slippery slope’ of enhancement to which it could lead. We are also, however, beginning to see some of the inverse in 
the private sector with biotechnological companies like AgeX Therapeutics (engineered senescence), Neuralink 
(brain-machine interfaces), and the Alcor Life Extension Foundation (cryonics and reanimation) aiming towards 
human enhancement as developmental ends. Indeed, Silicon Valley entrepreneurs’ interest in human enhancement is, 
at this point, a well-worn observation. To these private projects, we might also add governmental ones like DARPA’s 
collaboration with the BRAIN Initiative to explore neuro-stimulation of soldiers. Nicolas Le Dévédec, “The 
Biopolitical Embodiments of Work in the Era of Human Enhancement,” Body & Society 26, no. 1 (2020): 55-81. 
66 This quote is taken from Joanna Zylinska, who argues that, in spite of bioethics’ self-proclaimed need for 
professional “expertise,” bioethical topics have become such a matter of public concern in the ‘age of new media’ that 
we are all, in some sense, “experts now.” Joanna Zylinska, Bioethics in the Age of New Media (Boston, MA: MIT 
Press, 2009), 3-34. 
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the texts I examine, I must also acknowledge that it is necessary to do more than add by subtraction. 
In this case, this does not necessarily mean providing ready-made, practical tools for ‘doing 
bioethics’ so much as different interpretive tools for making sense of the ethics of biotechnology, 
i.e., for rethinking ‘commonsense’ understandings of ‘human’ and ‘technology’ from the ground 
up.  
0.6 Chapter Outline 
To make sense of the human enhancement discourse, we must first understand the state of 
U.S. bioethics prior to the nomenclature’s emergence – the initial topics that shaped bioethics’ 
intellectual formation and the theories and methods that constituted it as a discipline. Chapter One 
thus provides an intellectual history of the field of bioethics in the United States (1960-2010), 
giving particular attention to the formative historical debates (e.g., embryo research and human 
experimentation) and ethical approaches (e.g., common moral principlism) that afforded the 
emergence of bioethical expertise as a recognizable mode of knowledge-production. In the first 
half of the chapter, we will see that, in spite of the grand philosophical ambitions of its forebears, 
the field’s formation was co-substantial with a process of intellectual ‘thinning’ that represented 
an attempt to secularize and rationalize bioethical knowledge, i.e., to produce ethical knowledge 
that was both abstract enough to be universal and practical enough to be applicable within specific 
scientific and medical contexts. As a result of this process, ontology was increasingly restricted in 
bioethical discourse; the very structure of the discipline’s knowledge-production depended on 
taking up a normative theory of subjectivity as if it were pre-given.  
How, then, do we end up with the human enhancement debate, which hinges on the 
question of what it does and should mean to be human? The second half of the chapter 
demonstrates how transformations in intellectual, professional, and techno-scientific conditions 
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afforded the inscription of biological ethics in terms of human enhancement. In particular, I 
underline three important trends: 1) the predominance of a “molecular” way of thinking; 2) the 
popularization of biotechnological concerns in the American public sphere; and 3) the 
reconstitution of bioethics in terms of a disciplinary “culture wars.” In tandem, these 
transformations revealed a conceptual gap in bioethical knowledge and challenged bioethicists to 
make sense of the profound potential of the biological sciences to remake human nature. In 
response to this challenge, bioethicists invented a convenient but limited interpretive tool: the 
therapy/enhancement distinction. On one hand, we will see that the framework of human 
enhancement ‘thickened’ the state of bioethical discourse; both in that ontological and existential 
inquiry began to return to the textual field and in that the circle of bioethical expertise was 
expanded. On the other hand, and as much of this project aims to demonstrate, the very framework 
of human enhancement reinscribed humanist premises long characteristic of the bioethical 
discipline. 
Chapter Two maps the textual field of the human enhancement debate as it has taken shape 
over the past three decades. I demonstrate that, rather than producing ethical knowledge for 
immediate, practical application within scientific and medical contexts, the future-oriented human 
enhancement debate has been organized around the ontological relationship between human nature 
and biotechnologies. In turn, the question becomes: what theories of human nature are operative 
in this discourse and how do these theories inform particular ethical approaches to biotechnologies? 
Extending the polarization of the culture wars, we find that bioethicists and bioethics-adjacent 
scholars who write on human enhancement tend to fall into one of two intellectual camps: 
bioconservative or bioliberal. Bioconservatives pick up a quasi-Aristotelian account of virtue 
ethics in which enhancement is framed as a transgression of the natural, sanctified ground of 
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human dignity and moral status. Biotechnological modification, the argument goes, would 
destabilize an otherwise fixed and stable human nature and, as a result, undermine the fundamental 
conditions for individual flourishing and social and political inclusion. Bioliberals, on the other 
hand, pick up an Enlightenment, capacities-based framework to position enhancement as the 
realization of our natural, ‘higher’ faculties of rationality, autonomy, and self-creation. To 
‘improve’ our biologies through technological intervention, the argument goes, would not just 
provide clear utilitarian benefits, but also affirm what is ‘humanly best’ about ourselves. 
In spite of taking up oppositional stances on enhancement, I contend that these positions 
nevertheless have far more in common than scholars have been able or willing to recognize. 
Bioconservatives and bioliberals both reduce the ethics of biotechnologies to the question: is 
enhancement ‘natural’ and, in even more fundamental terms, would it make us more or less human? 
For theorists from both camps, justifying whether or not enhancement is permissible, desirable, or 
even obligatory depends on showing how it is or is not in accord with an essentialist human nature. 
In turn, I contend that the current discourse of enhancement recapitulates a traditional ‘humanist’ 
approach to ethics that takes up ‘the human’ as an ontological given and, furthermore, that such 
an approach narrows the possibilities for critiquing humanism and its dualistic and anthropocentric 
values. If we are to take ontological inquiry seriously as a structural feature of bioethics, then we 
must seek to think human nature in ways that complicate (what are assumed to be) ‘consensus’ or 
‘commonsense’ accounts.  
Chapter three turns our focus to the most formative and public-facing instantiation of the 
human enhancement debate: the work of The President’s Council on Bioethics (2001-2008) under 
President George W. Bush. We can understand this federal body as constructing a new normative, 
ontological ground for the therapy/enhancement distinction based in the conceptually prior 
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distinction of nature/artifice and expressed, in part, in Judeo-Christian theological terms. Based 
upon this grounding “dignitarian politics,” the Council sought to educate the American public 
about the a priori unethical nature of biotechnologies and regulate related scientific research. 
Given their use of theological language and conservative stance towards biotechnologies, the 
Council has often been represented as an anti-scientific cohort that sought to bring ideological and 
theological modes of governance into an otherwise public, secular, and neutral domain: 
governmental bioethics.  
Closer analysis of the Council’s language, however, troubles this reading. In spite of its 
members sometimes using theological language and reasoning, the Council still understood itself 
as engaging in secular, democratic deliberation. To make sense of this tension, I contend that we 
must resist the temptation to view the Council – and the bioconservative discourse it helped 
generate – as doing mere ‘religious’ work over and against secular science and politics. Instead, 
we can best understand the Council’s work as a discursive project of reconstituting the secularity 
of public bioethics through replacing “ideological neutrality” with “value diversity,” which, in turn, 
afforded an Aristotelian project of reclaiming naturalism from an imagined value-negligent 
epistemic domain (techno-science). While it will become apparent that the Council’s dignitarian 
politics are conceptually problematic, I suggest that we should be wary of a return to the bioethical 
norm and that the Council’s desire for “richer bioethics” can be instructive for the human 
enhancement debate moving forward. 
Chapter four turns to one of the most recent and controversial subjects of bioethical debate, 
moral bioenhancement, in order to provide a closer analysis of the bioliberal position and the 
current landscape of the enhancement field. In the most straightforward terms, moral 
bioenhancement refers to the use of bio- and neuro-technologies such as psycho-pharmaceuticals, 
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neural implants, and genetic engineering for the deliberate improvement of an individual’s moral 
character, motives, or behavior. While such a project might seem far-fetched to outsiders, theorists 
of enhancement – speculating on recent findings in genetics, evolutionary biology, psychology, 
and neuroscience – see moral bioenhancement as a plausible future scenario. The guiding question 
of the discourse, then, is not necessarily whether moral enhancement is feasible, but rather whether 
it is desirable. The issue of desirability, however, depends upon a more fundamental meta-ethical 
question: what moral frameworks are legitimate for evaluating the transformation of morality itself? 
More than just giving us a clearer sense of the ethical frameworks that constitute 
bioliberalism, analyzing this particular site of the enhancement debate reveals an important 
structural feature of far-left bioethical discourse: historical narration. We will see that advocates 
of moral bio-enhancement uncritically adopt, transform, and mobilize a classical narrative of 
secularization – a “subtraction story” (or, more accurately, a replacement story) – as a means to 
justify the permissibility, desirability, and even necessity of their imagined projects. According to 
this common narrative, the human species is on a historical trajectory of technologically-driven 
progress and bio- and neuro-technological interventions represent the next logical and necessary 
step – following not just magic and religion but also secular education and politics – in our 
individual and collective moral development. On one hand, this mobilization of ‘secularism-talk’ 
represents an unexpected inversion in which ideal bioethics is reconstituted in terms of science 
governing ethics rather than vice versa. On the other hand, it exacerbates the philosophical thinning 
long characteristic of the discipline through its reduction of ethics to not just ‘commonsense’ 
principles but also biological determinants. While emergent scientific thinking offers important 
theoretical resources for bioethics, such thinking must be approached in ways that highlight, rather 
than erase, complexity.  
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Chapter five thus introduces a different conceptual framework for thinking the relationship 
between biotechnologies and subject-formation: posthumanism. Drawing on information-based 
theories of autopoiesis, extended cognition, and complex co-evolution, I contend that human 
subjects should best be understood as relational, differential, and embodied beings who have never 
been human in the classical sense of the self-contained, self-determining Man of Reason. Instead, 
we are always already “cyborgs” and “assemblages” who co-evolve with our technologies as a 
condition of being (or rather becoming) itself. Instead of one more essentialist figuration of ‘the 
human’, I recognize this model of subjectivity as a social and historical construct that is contingent 
upon its cultural and intellectual conditions of production. Nevertheless, I contend that it can help 
us think biotechnologies outside of the polarized frames of salvation and monstrosity and act as a 
‘counter-weight’ to the dualistic and anthropocentric views of human nature that predominate in 
the enhancement debate.  
While this conceptual framework aligns more closely with the bioliberal view of human 
nature, it should not be understood as a necessary justification for the uncritical and unfettered 
development of bio- and neuro-technologies. Rather, such a framework is open to multiple 
normative interpretations and the techno-enthusiastic attitude that treats biotechnologies as a 
means to human – most often individual human – power can be contested from within. The 
contrasting bioconservative position of remaining human ‘as we have always been’, however, is 
even less viable, as it separates self from technology at an ontological level and is thus incoherent 
at its foundations. But I want to stress that the implications of a posthumanist model of subjectivity 
run deeper than a dissatisfaction with these two particular bioethical positions. It implies that 
appeals to an age-old human nature – whether that is biological or philosophical – cannot alone 
answer the question of how to handle the particular conditions of our emergent posthuman 
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moment; not because of the discursive presence of the naturalistic fallacy, but because human 
nature is both symbolically and materially unstable. In turn, I suggest that the fundamental problem 
lies with the framework of human enhancement itself, which is structurally dependent on all-too-
traditional humanist imaginings of normal species-functioning and individual wellbeing. Human 
enhancement is, in short, a category mistake.  
In the conclusion, I consider the uses and limits of a posthumanist approach in bioethical 
thinking; in other words, what I hope to accomplish through this project. Both the call to abandon 
the language of human enhancement and the ambition to introduce posthumanist thinking into this 
discursive space of bioethics might seem grandiose and impractical to some readers. After all, a 
non-humanist interpretation of human nature seems to offer little to the institutional and legalistic 
domains of bioethics that have played disproportionately large roles in raising the field to social 
and political prominence in the United States. While I acknowledge that I am not providing ready-
made institutional language, we must remember that normative ethics cannot be divorced from 
ontology. Defining and naming a thing is consequential for how that thing is understood and acted 
upon. As a discursive site uniquely authorized to govern emerging relationships between biology 
and technology, the field of bioethics demands richer – more ontological and more diverse – forms 
of thinking ‘the human’, i.e., it demands different more so than just ‘better’ philosophy. This 
project is intended to be a step, rather than the final word, in expanding that interdisciplinary 
conversation.  
Above all though, I am encouraging bioethicists and bioethics-adjacent theorists to move 
beyond the language of human enhancement, which might be a convenient heuristic for speaking 
about biotechnologies but is also a dangerous one. As I try to show throughout this project, the 
language of human enhancement has contributed to a polarized and simplistic ‘for or against’ 
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approach to techno-science, a flattened view of both human subjects and biotechnological 
interventions, and a deeply anthropocentric matrix for imagining biotechnological futures. The 
primary bioethical task moving forward, then, is to continue to develop conceptual frameworks 
that account for the relational and contingent quality of human nature, i.e., to develop post-
enhancement languages for our posthuman moment. In short, there remains plenty of room at the 



















67 This wording is a play on physicist Richard Feynman’s lecture, “There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom,” originally 
given to the annual American Physical Society on December 29, 1959. In this lecture, Feynman considered the 
possibility of using “infinitesimal machinery” to directly manipulate individual atoms as a more powerful form of 
synthetic chemistry. While Feynman’s speech received little acclaim at the time, by the mid-1980s, it was inspiring 
foundational work in the field of nanotechnology. Richard P. Feynman, “There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom,” 
Journal of Microelectrochemical Systems 1, no. 1 (1992): 60-66.  
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Chapter One: 
Towards an Intellectual History of Bioethics 
 
1.1 A History of What? 
In this chapter, I provide an intellectual history of the human enhancement debate. In doing 
so, I approach the human enhancement debate as an outgrowth of the ‘formal’ or ‘authorized’ 
discipline of bioethics in the United States. Much of the chapter, therefore, acts as a pre-history, 
highlighting the pertinent social, intellectual, and techno-scientific trends – e.g., the 
‘molecularization’ and ‘geneticization’ of the human, the institutionalization of common moral 
principlism, and the emergence of the bioethical ‘culture wars’ – that shaped the development of 
bioethics as an academic, public, and professional field. Ultimately, I argue that, while the 
framework of human enhancement has constructively brought ontological inquiry into bioethics’ 
purview, it is still deeply informed by the field’s original commitments to autonomy and consensus 
as principal ethical ends.  
1.2 Prefiguring Bioethics (1945-1970) 
The history of bioethics as a discipline begins in the United States in the 1970s with the 
establishment of bioethics’ institutions, journals, committees, programs, and principles, which, in 
tandem, created the conditions for new forms of biomedical professionalization and expertise. To 
understand the formation of this field, however, we must first understand how biomedical expertise 
functioned prior to the invention of “bioethics” and what contextual factors created the demand 
for new forms of specialized knowledge-production.  
Historians McGehee Harvey and James Bordley describe the three decades from 1946 to 
1976 as a “Period of Explosive Growth” in American medicine. In the first half of this period alone 
we can see the development of almost countless transformative medical technologies and 
techniques: streptomycin to treat tuberculosis, penicillin to treat bacterial infections, methotrexate 
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to treat acute leukemia, chlorpromazine to treat schizophrenia, anti-hypertensive drugs to treat 
malignant hypertension, vaccines to prevent polio, open-heart surgeries for valve replacement, 
electric defibrillators for full cardiopulmonary resuscitation, cardiac pacemakers and 
catheterization for visualization of heart defects, and chronic hemodialysis for kidney failure.68 
Bioethicist Albert R. Jonsen apprehends the importance of this period: “these dramatic clinical 
changes were at the surface of a boiling sea of research in which the secrets of metabolism, the 
endocrine system, the mechanisms of immunity and wound healing, the biology of reproduction 
and, most exciting of all, the secrets of the genetic code were revealed.”69  
The most exciting (if not yet practical) scientific advancement during this period was James 
Watson and Francis Crick’s 1953 discovery of the double helix, the twisted-ladder structure of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA). As sociologist Nikolas Rose explains, the discovery of the structure 
of DNA opened up a “molecular style of thought” in which life would henceforth be 
understood, and acted upon, at the molecular level, in terms of the functional 
properties of coding sequences of nucleotide bases and their variations, the 
molecular mechanisms that regulate expression and transcription, the link between 
the function properties of proteins and their molecular topography, the formation 
of particular intraceullular elements…with their particular mechanical and 
biological properties.70 
 
Mid-twentieth century molecular genomics not only laid the groundwork for rapid theoretical and 
practical advances in the biological and medical sciences, but also, through the introduction of the 
apparent means for reading and re-writing the code of life, created new demands for ethical 
expertise. 
 
68 A. McGehee Harvey and James Bordley, Two Centuries of American Medicine (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1976), 
385-771. 
69 Albert. R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 12. 
70 Nikolas S. Rose, The Politics of Life Itself: Biomedicine, Power, and Subjectivity in the Twenty-First Century 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007), 24. 
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During this period of explosive growth, the hitherto taken-for-granted ethical expertise of 
medical professionals came under fire. Since at least the postbellum period, the individual 
physician, esteemed as a public moral paragon, had been wholly entrusted with pastoral care of 
patients’ wellbeing. Under what Michel Foucault terms the “clinical gaze,” the expertise of the 
clinician extended beyond the diagnosis and treatment of diseases to the normative management 
of lifestyle. Through the 1950s, the tranquil medical ethic of absolute respect for the sanctity of 
life, formalized in literature such as Principles of Medical Ethics and the American Medical 
Association Code, was assumed to be sufficient for guiding medical conduct, needing mere 
exhortation rather than explanation.71 
With the explosive growth of medical sciences and technologies, however, new topics and 
questions began to be featured in intellectual and public debates concerning medical ethics. 
Euthanasia, abortion, genetic engineering, test tube babies, human experimentation, population 
control, and socialized healthcare became pressing topics of public concern. Questions of a 
different ethical scope structured these discussions: what is benefit and what is harm? Who shall 
live and who shall die? How should societal healthcare resources be distributed? Who should 
decide? Medical professionals – with their de facto pro-life coda – were not equipped with 
sufficient ethical expertise to address these questions of life, death, and justice; at least not alone. 
It was in the course of these debates that scientists, theologians, and humanists were invited – or 
just as often invited themselves – into the field medical ethics.  
The demand for more precise clarification of ethical problems and more persuasive 
explanations of ethical solutions manifested in numerous interdisciplinary academic conferences 
 
71 Rose, Politics of Life Itself, 9-11. Michel Foucault, The Birth of the Clinic: An Archeology of Medical Perception, 
trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon Books, 1973). 
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in the United States and England during the 1960s. Some of the most prominent meetings during 
this “decade of conferences” included: “Great Issues of Conscience in Modern Medicine” 
(Dartmouth University, 1960), “Man and His Future” (Ciba Foundation, 1962), the Nobel 
Conferences, “Genetics and the Future of Man” and “The Human Mind” (Gustavus Adolphus 
College, 1965, 1967), and “The Sanctity of Life” (Reed College, 1966). These conferences 
assembled a cast of public figures from different disciplines – including population geneticists 
James Crow and Hermann Muller, biologist Julian Huxley, author Aldous Huxley, Methodist 
professor Paul Ramsey, Episcopal minister Joseph Fletcher, Jesuit theologian Richard McCormick, 
and anesthesiologist Henry Beecher – who proved highly influential in communicating what would 
become the predominant concerns of bioethics in the 1970s.72 
While some speakers addressed specific, practical issues such as the effects of ionizing 
radiation, the pollution of water and air, and the statistical results of overpopulation, the tenor of 
these conferences tended to be much more theoretical and speculative in nature. For example, in 
his opening to the “Great Issues of Conscience in Modern Medicine” conference, Dr. S. Marsh 
Tenney, Dean of Dartmouth Medical School, explained that the conference was intended “to 
examine the issue of conscience in medical and science progress…not simply the question of the 
survival or the extinction of man, but what kind of survival? A future of what nature?”73 Modeling 
the big-picture questions that would become characteristic of the human enhancement debate, 
these intellectuals set the stakes at no less than the future of human nature and flourishing.  
Though the linear rate of scientific advancement was never in doubt, participants at these 
proto-bioethical conferences presented an ambivalent view of the benefits and harms of that 
 
72 Albert R. Jonsen, The Birth of Bioethics, 13-20. 
73 S. Marsh Tenney, "Opening Assembly," (paper presented at Dartmouth Convocation on Great Issues of Conscience 
in Modern Medicine), Hanover, NH, September 8-10, 1960, 2. 
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advancement – a stark difference from medical ethics even a decade prior. For example, the “Man 
and His Future” conference opened with a comparison to the advent of nuclear power:  
The world was unprepared socially, politically and ethically for the advent of 
nuclear power. Now, biological research is in a ferment, creating and promising 
methods of interference with ‘natural processes’ which could destroy or could 
transform nearly every aspect of human life which we value. It is necessary 
for…every intelligent individual of our one world to consider the present and 
imminent possibilities.74  
 
Statements such as these speak to one of the chief purposes of the conferences: bringing together 
and reconciling a diversity of opinions towards the end of consensus. If the medical possibilities 
on the horizon were unprecedented, so were the forms of ethical expertise needed to make sense 
of them. The decade of conferences thus not only brought into focus a number of concerns that 
would inform the invention of bioethics – such as the morality of abortion, the feasibility of 
eugenics, and medical research involving human subjects – but also the function of the bioethicist 
itself: the conceptual clarification of ethical dilemmas in biomedical sciences and the critical 
reformulation of (consensus) biomedical ethical codes. 
If the decade of conferences established the concerns that would guide the field of bioethics 
for the next five decades, sociologist John H. Evans explains that the character of its debates was 
nevertheless historically distinctive. Drawing on German sociologist Max Weber, Evans describes 
the historical development of bioethics in terms of a contest for “jurisdiction” between scientists 
and theologians.75 This contest for jurisdiction is characterized as a gradual process of “thinning” 
 
74 Gordon Wolstenholme, preface to Man and His Future: A Ciba Foundation Volume, ed. Gordon Wolstenholme 
(Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1963), v.  
75 Jurisdiction here is “the link between a profession and its work,” which can be forged through methods such as 
state licensing, institutional affiliations, and public opinion. For Evans, the contest for jurisdiction in bioethics is 
between distinct professions (e.g., theologians and scientists) who seek to translate or reduce bioethical issues into 
particular forms of argumentation so that those issues fall under their “home” jurisdiction. Those professionals are, in 
turn, legitimized as agents of social change with the right to institutionalize their own abstract frameworks and ethical 
ends. John H. Evans, Playing God?: Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization of Public Bioethical Debate 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), 28-32. 
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in which public debate became more “formally rational” and less “substantively rational.” Whereas 
formally rational modes of argumentation privilege certain pre-determined, procedural ends, 
substantively rational modes of argumentation question whether a given means is consistent with 
ultimate ends or values. As Evans explains, and as I will elaborate below, the eventual 
formalization of common morality principlism in the 1970s allowed scientists to delegitimize 
substantive theological concerns and claim de facto jurisdiction of the field of public bioethics. 
The formation of bioethics as a distinct discipline and profession can thus be understood as a 
Weberian process of formal rationalization.76 
While I will further complicate this account of bioethics’ gradual thinning, the proto-
bioethical debates Evans identifies as preceding and informing the invention of the field demand 
a closer reading. His analysis of Human Genetic Engineering (HGE) from 1959 to 1974 acts as an 
ideal case study insofar as it represents the oldest and most popular iteration of what we would 
now call the enhancement debate and is illustrative of the substantive forms of debate Evans sees 
as being delegitimized in bioethics – and which I contend are returning to the mainstream of the 
field in and through the discourse of human enhancement.  
From 1959 to 1974, the HGE debate was premised on the substantive question: what ends 
should we seek? Scientists such as Hermann Muller, Julian Huxley, and Theodosius Dobzhansky 
advocated a ‘reform eugenics’, which insisted that genetic engineering could reduce the ‘genetic 
load’ and provide meaning and purpose to life. Similar to the position of ‘liberal eugenics’ that we 
find in the current enhancement debate, these scientists posited a less explicitly racialized version 
of eugenics in which ‘valuable’ characteristics were to be found across all class and racial groups 
 
76 Evans, Playing God?, 11-44. 
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and believed that eugenic goals should be accomplished through popular support and liberal 
political action rather than mandatory social programs.77 
Population geneticist Hermann Muller (1890-1967), for example, introduced the concept 
of “genetic load” in a 1949 paper given to the American Society of Human Genetics, where he 
insisted that modern society was headed toward genetic apocalypse. Due to progress in medicine 
and agriculture, among other forms of cultural advancement, Muller argued that genetic selection 
of the “fittest” was no longer occurring at a high enough rate to breed out undesirable traits. 
Conditions such as diabetes were being propagated in the human gene pool because diabetics were 
surviving to a reproductive age in unprecedented numbers. The sum of these undesirable mutations 
was classified as the “genetic load,” a term that would come to define the field of population 
genetics for several subsequent decades.78 Most important, Muller understood the genetic load as 
an existential threat with the propagation of undesirable germ cells producing less and less fit 
human beings and the care of citizens requiring greater and greater societal resources. In 
apocalyptic terms, he concluded: “refashioning of these [future] pitiful relics into human form 
would be a far more difficult task than the synthesis of human beings out of raw materials.”79 He 
thus named reduction of the genetic load, through direct (biotechnological) or indirect (socio-
political) engineering, as a principal end of biomedicine and characterized it as a specification of 
the more general (and soon to be formalized) end of “beneficence.” 
 
77  For current examples of “liberal eugenics,” see: Nicholas Agar, Liberal Eugenics: in Defence of Human 
Enhancement (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008). Philip Kitcher, The Lives to Come: The Genetic Revolution and Human 
Possibilities (New York: Touchstone, 1997). 
78 Bruce Wallace, Fifty Years of Genetic Load: An Odyssey (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991). 
7979 Hermann J. Muller, “Genetic Progress by Voluntarily Conducted Germinal Choice” in Man and His Future, ed. 
Gordon Wolstenholme (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1963), 11. 
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Taking a more optimistic tone, British-born biologist and president of the British Humanist 
Association, Sir Julian Huxley (1887-1975), advocated an “evolutionary humanism” that would 
replace traditional religion with science and rationalism. Believing that the natural sciences had 
made the concept of divine authority unintelligible, Huxley insisted that biology could restore 
meaning to a world in which theology had lost its coherence. “Biology,” he explained, “reinstates 
man in a position analogous to that conferred on him as the Lord of Creation by Theology,” 
providing “hope and meaning to human existence.”80 Anticipating the bioliberal position, Huxley 
– who coined the term “transhumanism” – contended that the meaning of human existence was 
reflected in ‘man’ exercising ‘his’ autonomous and rational capacities to control and perfect 
evolution.81 We find an almost mirror image of current bioliberal rhetoric in the claim that man 
ought to use imminent biotechnologies to take control of his “destiny” and increase his “desirable 
genetic capacities for intelligence and imagination, empathy and co-operation, and a sense of 
discipline and duty.”82 
Competing for public opinion and intellectual recognition with these scientists were (at the 
time, liberal) theologians such as Joseph Fletcher, Paul Ramsey, and Richard McCormick. While 
these theologians shared a desire to insert their expertise into emerging biomedical debates, there 
was no consensus theological position on HGE. Paul Ramsey (1913-1988), a Methodist theologian 
 
80 Marc Swetlitz, “Julian Huxley and the End of Evolution,” Journal of the History of Biology 28, no. 2 (1995): 198. 
William B. Provine, “Progress in Evolution and the Meaning in Life,” in Julian Huxley, Biologist and Statesman of 
Science: Proceedings of Conference held at Rice University, 25-27 September 1987, ed. C. Kenneth Waters and Albert 
Van Helden (Houston, Rice University Press, 1992), 166. 
81 Huxley first used the term transhumanism in a 1951 lecture, which he later elaborated on in his 1957 text, New 
Bottles for New Wine. “We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve; man remaining man, 
but transcending himself, by realizing the new possibilities of and for his human nature.” Julian Huxley, New Bottles 
for New Wine (London: Chatto and Windus, 1957), 17. There is some debate about whether Huxley was indeed the 
first to use this term and, if so, where his first mention of it appears. Joseph Wolyniak et. al, “The History of 
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and professor of religion at Princeton University, argued that contemporary eugenicists such as 
Hermann Muller and Julian Huxley were establishing a “surrogate theology” of the “cult” of 
“messianic positivism,” which aimed at “Playing God” rather than being men on earth. In contrast, 
Ramsey proposed a “love deontology” or “covenant-fidelity” that underscored agape (i.e. love of 
neighbor/respect for persons) as the principal ethical tenet and placed the ends of genetic 
engineering under theological jurisdiction.83 Thus, he exclaimed, “Men ought not to play God 
before they learn to be men, and after they have learned to be men they will not play God.”84 In 
his reputed Patient as Person (1970), an ethical treatise on the medical care of patients, Ramsey 
contended that, “covenant-fidelity is the inner meaning and purpose of our creation as human 
beings.”85 In language that anticipates current bioconservative rhetoric on human dignity, he 
explained that, “just as man is a sacredness in the social and political order, so he is a sacredness 
in the natural, biological order.”86 While his covenant theology placed him firmly against positive 
eugenics, it still, unlike his more conservative contemporaries, allowed him to take a more 
permissive stance toward therapeutic means such as euthanasia and transplant surgery. 
On the other hand, Episcopal minister Joseph Fletcher (1905-1991), a career opponent of 
Ramsey, was seen as an apologist for scientists’ ends. Refusing the position that scientific means 
were ‘unnatural,’ Fletcher contended that, “laboratory reproduction is radically human compared 
to conception by ordinary heterosexual intercourse” since “man is a maker and a selector and a 
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designer, and the more rationally contrived and deliberate anything is, the more human it is.”87 
Like Ramsey, Fletcher was interested in forwarding the Christian end of agape; but, unlike 
Ramsey, he did not believe there were any means that were a priori impermissible. Translating his 
position into secular utilitarian terms, he argued that, “if the greatest good of the greatest number 
(i.e., the social good) were served by it, it would be justifiable not only to specialize the capacities 
of people by cloning or by constructive genetic engineering, but also to bio-engineer or bio-design 
para-humans or ‘modified men.’”88 While both Ramsey and Fletcher were attempting to reach 
beyond theological audiences, we will see that it was Fletcher’s implication that agape could be 
translated into secular utilitarianism that had the more enduring impact on which forms of 
theological thought were deemed appropriate for mainstream bioethics. 
The HGE debate between scientists and theologians is most important not for the battle 
lines it marks between distinct professions; after all, the sociological lines Evans draws between 
professions are far more map than territory. Rather, the debate is important because it demonstrates 
three important trends that have been reprised in the current enhancement debate in bioethics. First, 
the HGE debate is substantively rational; at stake is what ultimate ends or values should be pursued 
through science and, furthermore, what means are permissible to achieve those ends. Second, the 
HGE debate is thoroughly futuristic; while abortion and euthanasia debates concerned the present 
state of medicine, the HGE debate concerned technologies that existed as mere abstractions, 
present only as imminent absences. Third, the HGE debate brings to the fore the principal end of 
consensus in bioethics. From the outset, Evans notes that the goal of both scientists and theologians 
was to appeal to an imagined democratic audience. He thus characterizes the debate as a form of 
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“public” bioethics, “where social elites – in this case, professionals – debate…to influence the 
beliefs and values of the public, to come to some modicum of consensus, or in some cases to 
represent public opinion to policy makers.”89 Even as bioethicists regularly appeal to values such 
as diversity and inclusion, we will see that the goal of creating consensus – of systematizing 
universal ethical ends – remains a predominant theme in the field and, in the context of the 
enhancement debate, maps onto the contested language of human nature. 
If theologians play an important role in Evans’ historical account, philosophers are notably 
absent. This absence gives us good reason to scrutinize the frequent claim that bioethics mutated 
from a “sub-branch of philosophy,” i.e., normative ethics.90 On one hand, this claim appears to be 
true insofar as bioethicists represent themselves as engaging in practical or applied ethics, 
credentialed philosophers now make frequent contributions to the field’s corpus, and we can find 
regular references to the tradition of political liberalism (e.g., John Stuart Mill’s utilitarianism and 
John Rawls’ “justice as fairness”) in the mainstream literature.91 Indeed, it is not uncommon for 
historians to narrate the field as a complement to the ‘Rawlsian turn’ in American political 
philosophy, though Rawls had no direct involvement. 92  On the other hand, we find little 
engagement from academic philosophers with biomedicine prior to the 1970s. Even Jonsen, who 
accords moral philosophy a privileged place in the history of bioethics, admits that American moral 
philosophers, who were already considered out of fashion, were far more interested in meta-ethics 
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than normative ethics during the 1960s. The philosophers who ended up playing a central role in 
the formation of the field – e.g., Stephen Toulmin, Samuel Gorovitz, Daniel Callahan, Tom 
Beauchamp, and Danner Clouser – remained at the periphery of public biomedical debates until 
the establishment of institutions such as the Hasting Center (1970) and publications such as 
Philosophy and Public Affairs (1971).  
One of the few prominent philosophers to enter the biomedical debates during the 1960s 
was the German-born Hans Jonas, who studied under the German masters Edmund Husserl, Martin 
Heidegger, and Rudolph Bultmann in the 1920s. Jonas was interested in the metaphysical 
connections between mind and organism, which, he contended, had been distorted in the dualism 
of Western philosophy and the materialism of Western science. In his The Phenomenon of Life 
(1966), Jonas explicated a monistic “philosophy of the organism,” which, following his teacher 
Heidegger, sought to answer no less than the question: what is human being?93 Jonas, however, 
argued that Heidegger’s phenomenological approach had 'forgotten’ to account for the 
fundamental fact about human beings: they are living beings whose mode of existence is corporeal. 
Using the biological concept of metabolism, Jonas developed an ontological account of life based 
around freedom as both an objective trait and an ethical end. During this period, he was just 
beginning to formulate the bioethical position he later explicated in The Imperative of 
Responsibility (1984), where he reframed the Kantian categorical imperative as “act so that the 
effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of genuine human life,” or “act so that 
the effects of your action are not destructive of the future possibility of such life.”94 
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Jonas, however, represents an exception in terms of the philosophical traditions that have 
influenced bioethics. Indeed, one might be surprised to see Jonas’ name in the annals of American 
bioethics given how little his ontological concern with the nature of being itself resembles the 
analytic tendencies toward principlism and casuistry that have become predominant in the field. 
Jonas is just as useful, then, for bringing our attention bioethicists’ lack of textual engagement, 
even now, with the Post-World War II Continental tradition of critical techno-scientific philosophy. 
From the early 1940s to the late 1960s, European philosophers coalesced around what 
historian Leo Marx has described as a form of “postmodern pessimism” in which technocracy and 
rationalization became associated with cultural domination (rather than moral progress) and 
modernization became a metanarrative or myth (rather than an historical inevitability).95 This 
postmodern pessimism is evident in the corpuses of influential philosophers such as Hannah 
Arendt, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Ellul, and Theodor Adorno. While the works of these authors 
are far more diverse and complex than this space allows for, there was nevertheless a common 
thread among them: science and technology increasingly corresponded to a morally dangerous, 
systemic mode of apprehending self and world, which privileges efficiency above all other 
normative criteria. For each thinker, “techno-science,” to use Heidegger’s term, represented a 
metaphysics of calculation that was antithetical to those arenas of experience, knowledge, and 
action that constitute ‘authentic’ human being. For each then, the goal was to find – or mourn the 
loss of – some purchase outside of ‘the’ scientific worldview.96 
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This tradition, which we will return to in Chapter Five, is important for thinking about the 
history of the enhancement debate not so much for its direct influence, which is negligible, but 
because, as an antecedent, it helps us understand the latent expansion of bioethical expertise to 
include ontological inquiry. We will see that, in shifting the focus of critical investigation from 
therapies to enhancements, bioethicists also shifted their focus from practical questions of patient 
wellbeing to ‘big-picture’ questions concerning what it does and should mean to be human. This 
shift, however, is far from a complete or radical rupture; both because it is contained to the topic 
of enhancement and because the newfound interest in human nature fails to demonstrate a 
meaningful departure from established bioethical theories and methods. The goal of this project, 
then, is not just to call attention to this ongoing shift in bioethical content; it is also to suggest that 
it is not radical enough. 
This intense philosophical skepticism was counterbalanced by a no less intense enthusiasm 
among mid-century scientists and technologists. Not listed in Jonsen’s decade of conferences were 
the annual Macy Conferences on Cybernetics (1946-1953) held in New York City. This might be 
for good reason; the Macy Conferences were technical in nature, focused on developing a new 
scientific language – information theory – rather than on biomedicine or ethics. As we have seen 
though, the development of descriptive scientific paradigms opens discursive possibilities for 
prescriptive bioethical debate. In particular, James Watson and Francis Crick’s discovery of the 
double helix in 1953 produced both widespread hope and fear about the possibilities for reading 
and re-writing the ‘code of life’. The term “code” is especially telling here. Molecular genomics – 
underwritten with the metaphors of messages and codes, translation and transcription, programs 
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and commands – would not have been possible without the conceptual framework of information 
first developed in cybernetics.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, scientists and technologists such as 
Norbert Wiener, Warren McCulloch, John von Neumman, Claude Shannon, and Ross Ashby 
developed a trans-ontological model of information that reduced the behavior of all entities – 
organisms and machines alike – to the circulation of probabilistic, numerical patterns.97 Based on 
the scientific principles of entropy and feedback, cyberneticists contended that, just like digital 
machines, “any organism is held together…by the possession of means for the acquisition, use, 
retention, and transmission of information.”98 Insofar as all systems are communications systems, 
what matters most for cybernetic analysis is pattern rather than substance, information rather than 
substrate. To quote Wiener, “Information is information, not matter or energy.” 99  It is a 
surprisingly small leap from this dualistic distinction to imagining a world of information parallel 
to and determinative of the heretofore ‘real’ material world of quotidian experience. 
While I will return to cybernetics in greater detail in Chapter Five, the most important point 
for now is that this scientific paradigm produced a new model of subjectivity: the informatic self, 
i.e., “a self understood, managed, preserved and improved via the notion of information.”100 In 
cybernetics, then, we see the beginnings of what Rose describes as the current biopolitical 
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paradigm of “molecularization,” which “strips tissues, proteins, molecules, and drugs of their 
specific affinities – to a disease, to an organ, to an individual, to a species – and enables them to 
be regarded, in many respects, as manipulable and transferable elements or units, which can be 
delocalized – moved from place to place, from organism to organism, from disease to disease, 
from person to person.”101 Foremost, this ‘way of knowing’ has entailed an ontological discourse 
of medical surveillance that epidemiologist Abby Lippman calls “geneticization” “in which 
differences between individuals are reduced to their DNA codes.”102 But more than just reducing 
selfhood to genetic code, molecularization implies that the self is structurally open to 
(biotechnological) modification. If I am most fundamentally a code – genetic or otherwise – then 
I am no less ‘optimizable’ than a digital computer program. The informatic self thus provides both 
a knowable genetic destiny and the imminent possibility of asserting control over and against that 
destiny.  
1.3 The Birth Of A Discipline (1970-1985) 
It was in the midst of this epistemological paradigm shift towards information and 
concomitant anxieties about biotechnological futures that bioethics began to take shape as an 
academic, professional, and public field. The founding of three institutions in particular – The 
Hastings Center, The Kennedy Institute of Ethics, and The Society for Health and Human Values 
– were especially important for this historical moment of bioethical formation.   
In the mid-1960s, philosopher Daniel Callahan, a recent graduate in philosophy from 
Harvard, began working on a book on the controversial subject of abortion. He soon realized that 
philosophical expertise alone was insufficient for such a project; it would also require perspectives 
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from fields such as demography, law, medicine, and public policy. In step with the conferences of 
the prior decade, he recognized that there were no formal interdisciplinary spaces to address 
complex biomedical problems in a systematic way, and set out to create an institute for precisely 
that purpose. By 1969, he had incorporated a group of academic affiliates, “The Institute of Society, 
Ethics, and the Life Sciences,” and, by 1970, after receiving funding from the National Endowment 
for the Humanities and the Rockefeller Foundation, formed what still remains the premiere 
bioethics institution: The Hastings Center.103 
The following year, the Center began publishing its own journal, The Hastings Center 
Report, as a means to disseminate research and stimulate academic and public interest in bioethical 
issues. In the first issue of the journal, Callahan set the agenda for not just the institute but also the 
field of bioethics at large: 
The goal of this “Report,” the first regular publication of the Institute, is to advance 
public and professional understanding of the social and ethical problems arising out 
of advances in the life sciences. That, indeed, is the larger goal of the Institute itself. 
This cannot be done, we believe, unless pertinent data is presented, principles 
examined, different viewpoints heard, and the possible implications of decisions 
and policies explored. This is not a task to be restricted to one discipline, or one 
viewpoint, or one methodology. To say that it must be multi-disciplinary is only to 
say the issues are as complex as human beings themselves.104  
 
The use of “life sciences” in this excerpt is notable since it implies a larger field of critical 
investigation than just medical ethics. While doctor-patient relationships would remain at the 
forefront of bioethical discourse, Callahan, building on the prior decade’s interdisciplinary 
conferences, recognized that medical ethics could not be separated from the biological sciences 
that were rapidly transforming the field of medicine. This broader set of interests was reflected in 
the four initial research groups of the Center: death and dying, behavior control, genetic 
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engineering and counseling, and population control. 
If there is a central theme in Callahan’s article though, it was the need for intellectually 
open-ended debates where different viewpoints could be heard. On one hand, we can see almost 
immediate success in this regards as The Hastings Center brought together a disciplinarily diverse 
group of scholars that began collaborating and debating in accordance with their own ideals. 
Among these were some familiar names from the old guard such as Beecher, Dobzhansky, and 
Ramsey, and some unfamiliar ones, such as Robert Coles, René Dubos, Reneé Fox, and Robert 
Veatch, who would form the new vanguard of the field. The Center also organized a number of 
national, interdisciplinary symposia in its first years, including: “Problems on the Meaning of 
Death” (1970), “Ethical Issues in Genetic Counseling and the Use of Genetic Knowledge” (1971), 
“Heart Transplants and Public Policy” (1971), and “The Teaching of Medical Ethics” (1972).105 
On the other hand, there is a recurrent tension in bioethics between the desire to include different 
social and ethical perspectives and the demand to systematize ethical theories and methods for 
practical, universal application. We will see that, by the end of the 1970s, bioethics had both 
attained considerable social capital in the public sphere and formalized and narrowed its ethical 
approaches to an unsettling degree. 
Like Callahan, André E. Hellegers, director of Georgetown’s Center for Population 
Research, felt that the occasional academic conference was insufficient for dealing with emerging 
issues in the reproductive sciences. With funding from Georgetown, the Kennedy Foundation, and 
the Ford Foundation, Helleger opened The Kennedy Institute of Ethics – a unit within the larger 
Center for Population Research – in July of 1971. It bears remarking that the term “bioethics” was 
coined by R. Sargent Shriver, the first director of the Peace Corps, in a living room conversation 
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with Hellegers and several others about the possibility of the Institute receiving funding. In the 
University’s October press release announcing the funding of the Institute, it explained its purpose 
as: to "pioneer in the development of a new field of joint research which the institute's founders 
have named 'bioethics.'"106 
Like the Hastings Center, The Kennedy Institute provided a home to a number of 
foundational bioethicists: LeRoy Walters, Warren Reich, James Childress, and H. Tristram 
Engelhardt, Jr. Most important, the Institute was essential in creating an academic foundation for 
bioethics, providing professorships, fellowships, and tools for research in The Bibliography of 
Bioethics (1975), The Encyclopedia of Bioethics (1978), and the National Reference Center for 
Bioethical Literature. In collaboration with the university’s Philosophy Department, the Institute 
also created the first graduate degree program in bioethics in the late-1970s. The most influential 
product of the Institute, however, proved to be Childress and Georgetown philosopher Tom 
Beauchamp’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics (1979), which offered the first “systematic analysis 
of the principles that should govern a wide range of decisions affecting biomedicine,” and which, 
in its updated editions, still acts as the foundational textbook for bioethics.107 
The Society for Health and Human Values had more explicitly religious origins than its 
two counterparts. In the mid-1960s, the staff of the United Ministries in Education, a collaboration 
of Methodist and Presbyterian Churches, initiated discussions on the role of Christian ministry in 
medical schools. This led to the 1965 Committee on Medical Education and Theology, which 
focused on means for addressing the depersonalization of medical students and the teaching of 
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‘mechanistic’ medicine. In 1968, the committee changed its name to the Committee on Health and 
Human Values and, in 1969, applied for a grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities 
(NEH) “to identify explicitly the human values that are lacking or inadequately represented in the 
study and practice of medicine and to begin to remedy this deficit.” 108 The application was 
successful and, with funding from the NEH and the Russell Sage Foundation, led to the formation 
of the Society for Health and Human Values (SHHV).109 
Led by Dr. Edmund Pellegrino – who would later act as president of the Catholic University 
of America, Director of the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, and Chairman of the President’s Council 
on Bioethics – as chair, the SHHV made more explicit attempts to incorporate theological and 
humanist viewpoints into medicine, and medical education in particular, than its institutional 
counterparts. Besides fostering its own cohort of future bioethicists, the Society’s most important 
contribution might have been advancing the development of the “medical humanities.” Rather than 
just focusing on normative ethics, SHHV scholars insisted that questions of human values and 
medicine could be addressed through literature and art as well as philosophy and theology. While 
critical theorization from this field is often underappreciated by mainstream bioethicists, the 
discipline of medical humanities has established a firm foothold in the academic world.  
It was in large part due to the efforts of these three institutions that “bioethics” was 
canonized in 1974 when the Library of Congress entered it as a subject heading, citing Daniel 
Callahan’s “Bioethics as a Discipline.”110 But while these institutions created the social, economic, 
and intellectual networks that formed the basis of the field, it was bioethicists’ involvement in 
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public policy that specified and formalized the field’s predominant theoretical and methodological 
framework. 
Bioethicists’ involvement in public policy began in 1972 with the exposure of the infamous 
Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment. The Tuskegee Experiment was a clinical study conducted between 
1932 and 1972 by the U.S. Public Health Service in which six hundred impoverished African 
American men, under the guise of receiving free government health care, were infected with 
syphilis so that scientists could observe the natural history of the untreated disease. Even though 
penicillin had become the standard treatment for syphilis by 1947, and research subjects were 
informed that the study would last a mere six months, the experiment continued for forty years 
until its existence was finally leaked to the national press in July of 1972.111 
In response to the public outcry concerning the Tuskegee study and other examples of 
human experimentation such as research on fetal tissue, Congress and President Richard Nixon 
passed the National Research Act into Public Law 93-348 on July 12, 1974. This Act established 
the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral 
Research – the first bioethics public policy institution – and directed the Commission to 
recommend regulations to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare that would protect 
the rights and welfare of human research subjects with regard to informed consent and institutional 
review of research.112 
From the outset, the Commission was given the overarching congressional mandate to 
"identify the ethical principles which should underlie the conduct of biomedical and behavioral 
research with human subjects and develop guidelines that should be followed in such research."113 
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While the Commission produced a number of official reports on issues ranging from fetal research 
to psychosurgery in its first two years, it only began to address the mandate for ethical principles 
in earnest in 1976. The members of the Commission recognized the inherent challenge of deducing 
consensus ethical principles and the two years of ensuing commission meetings were contentious. 
Given the congressional mandate and deadline, however, the commissioners forged ahead, 
resulting in the publication of the Belmont Report in 1978 and the formalization of three consensus 
or “common moral” bioethical principles: respect for persons, beneficence, and justice. These 
principles justified the respective practices of informed consent, risk-benefit analysis, and the 
selection of research subjects, and were later given the force of law with respect to the federal 
funding of scientific research.114 
These prima facie binding moral principles would be further canonized and augmented in 
philosophers Tom Beauchamp and James Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics the 
following year as: “(1) respect for autonomy (a norm of respecting the decision-making capacities 
of autonomous persons), (2) nonmaleficence (a norm of avoiding the causation of harm), (3) 
beneficence (a group of norms for providing benefits and balancing benefits against risks and 
costs), (4) justice (a group of norms for distributing benefits, risks, and costs fairly)”115 More than 
just elaborating the principles themselves, Beauchamp and Childress provided a comprehensive 
explanation of the ethical framework, “common morality principlism,” in which those principles 
were grounded. According to the authors, autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice 
represent the most “basic” “set of norms that all morally serious persons share as the common 
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morality” and which therefore bind “all persons in all places.”116 Veatch captures the core idea of 
this framework, explaining that, common morality principlism begins from the assumption that 
“there is some primitive, pretheoretical insight that is shared by all normal, morally serious 
humans…in all places and cultures.” Humans can “intuit,” “see,” “or in some other way know that 
some behaviors are” wrong and others are right.117 The bioethicists of the 1970s thus claimed that 
they were not deciding what the ethics of the public should be based on a particular mode of 
reasoning. Rather, they were merely identifying the existing shared values and norms of all citizens 
so that they could be channeled to create public policy.  
In claiming that bioethics consisted of mere identification and application, bioethicists 
were, in effect, claiming to occupy a neutral and universal position as moral arbiters. This was also 
accomplished through a particular idealization of what ‘moral theories’ ought to accomplish. For 
Beauchamp and Childress, moral theories should be consistent and comprehensive, simple in 
containing the minimum number of principles necessary, and complex enough to account for the 
full range of moral action. Once again, however, this did not demand constructive ethical work so 
much as situating new problems within the predominant theoretical frames of normative ethics, 
utilitarianism and deontology.118 While Beauchamp had a preference for rule utilitarianism and 
Childress for rule deontology, they nevertheless concluded, “we find that many forms of rule 
utilitarianism and rule deontology lead to identical rules and actions. It is possible from both 
utilitarian and deontological standpoints to defend the same rules.”119 The four principles, then, 
were not just consensus in the sense of being shared by the public, but also in that they conformed 
 
116 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed., 3. 
117 Robert M. Veatch, “Is There a Common Morality?” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 13, no. 3 (2003): 189-
191. 
118 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5. 
119 Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 40. 
 66 
to the predominant frameworks in American analytic moral philosophy. This strategic rhetorical 
framing of the four principles as ‘commonsense’ demonstrates a “deliberative shallowness” that 
protected bioethicists from charges of particularism and relativism and allowed them to claim 
inclusiveness as a value and the law as part of their legitimate jurisdiction. 120 Insofar as the 
bioethical framework of common morality principlism claimed to reconcile a host of philosophical 
oppositions – particularism and universalism, neutrality and bias, simplicity and complexity, 
utilitarianism and deontology – it was cast as a form of expertise uniquely fit for the governance 
of the biomedical future.  
Of the four principles, respect for autonomy, which emphasizes the values of individual 
rights and self-determination, has occupied a privileged place in the matrix of bioethics. 
Bioethicists Renée C. Fox and Judith P. Swazey note that the nascent field attracted a sizeable 
number of persons who had been engaged with the civil rights, women’s rights, and anti-war 
movements of the 1960s and 1970s and, as a result, anti-paternalism and distrust of “establishment” 
institutions were guiding values in the formation of ideal relationships between physicians and 
their patients as well as researchers and their test subjects.121 The predominance of the principle of 
autonomy represented a meaningful shift in the history of medical ethics. Beneficence and 
nonmaleficence, which were, in effect, the established values of Hippocratic ethics, became 
subordinated to the freedoms of the patient. It signified a shift in authority, not just from physicians 
to bioethicists in matters of medical ethics, but also from physicians to patients in matters of 
medical decision-making. 
Just as important, the emphasis on individual autonomy and ‘rights talk’ formalized an 
 
120 Saxén, A Cultural Giant, 171-199. 
121 Renée C. Fox and Judith P. Swazey, Observing Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 234. 
 67 
intellectual trend of decontextualization in the field: decoupling analysis of patient wellbeing from 
analysis of social and cultural context as well as the good of ‘the patient’ from the good of 
communities. Fox and Swazey read this in terms of the philosophical tension between universalism 
and particularism; the framework of principlism has embodied “an intellectual and moral 
preference for universalism, in the form of transcendent principles that ‘rise above’ the 
particularities of historical circumstances and traditions, and of the social and cultural context and 
locale.”122 The result, the authors argue, has been a structural predisposition toward what French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu calls “the imperialism of the universal,” i.e., one culture 
“universalizing its own…particular characteristics by tacitly establishing them in a universal 
model.”123 
Later editions of Principles of Biomedical Ethics would clarify that the four abstract 
principles are not intended to be unconditional, absolute, or eternal, nor are they to be regarded as 
the constituent elements of a program that can be formulaically applied to all moral decision-
making. Rather the principles “provide only a framework for identifying and reflecting on moral 
problems” and, furthermore, rules, rights, virtues, moral ideals, and moral emotions can be 
understood as just as important for guiding action and a comprehensive view of moral life.124 The 
problem for critics is that the four principles have been understood and applied in a reductionist, 
oversimplified, and mechanical fashion, rather than as a deliberate (and deliberative) heuristic. 
Bioethicist Larry Churchill, for example, contends that basic knowledge of the ‘mantra’ of 
autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice has been conflated with bioethical expertise. 
The four principles, he suggests, ought to be understood as one set of philosophical tools, which, 
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like all tools, “imply skillful useful users and appropriate contexts of use…We cannot make up for 
using them poorly by claiming that they have some special status in and of themselves.”125 The 
problem for Churchill and likeminded critics, then, “is not the principles per se,” but rather their 
“theoretical hegemony.”126 In spite of such criticisms, as well as widespread calls for other ethical 
approaches in the field, principlism has persisted as the lingua franca of bioethicists and the 
guiding framework for policy advice, academic training, and institutional research.127 
Rather than addressing whether principlism is useful or coherent, a number of historians 
and sociologists have begun to address the question of why principlism became predominant in the 
first place. Evans’ approach is representative in this regard. “I do not assume,” he explains, “that 
ethical systems such as principlism become influential because they are ‘the best’ or ‘correct,' but 
rather because the social conditions were right for the promoters of principlism to defeat those who 
had competing ideas.”128 Focusing on bioethics’ professional legitimization through public policy, 
he argues that, “the rise of principlism in bioethics was not because of its inherent excellence, but 
was rather the result of the rise of the government official as the jurisdiction-giver in the research 
bioethics and public policy bioethics task-spaces.”129 Here we return to his Weberian framework 
of formal rationalization. Evans understands principlism as both a form of commensuration (i.e., 
a method of “measuring different properties normally represented by different units with a single, 
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common standard or unit”) and a form of transmutation (i.e., where information (values) that does 
not conform to a common standard (principles) are discarded). 130  Principlism simplified the 
otherwise too-complex discursive field of biomedical ethics – making it calculable and predictable 
– so that it could be used to formalize protocols and procedures in public policy, research review, 
and healthcare administration. 
I want to underline two important implications of Evans’ argument here. First, it is not 
merely that bioethics has influenced public policy, but rather that American law created the 
structural conditions through which bioethics was established as a discipline and profession. In 
discussing the relationship between law and bioethics, lawyer George Annas states that, 
“American law, not philosophy or medicine, is primarily responsible for the agenda, development, 
and current state of American bioethics.”131 Taking a more critical view than Annas, physician 
Carl Elliott explains that bioethics has “given us a picture of morality as somehow like the law in 
structure— for example, as a set of rules that govern interactions between strangers. This picture 
of morality,” he concedes, “may work adequately as long as we are in fact talking about 
interactions between strangers, especially strangers whose relationship is adversarial. But it 
overlooks the kinds of questions that are crucial to morality, and it distorts many others.”132 
While the reach of bioethics in American law has increased exponentially since the period 
I have been focusing on (1970-1985), we can nevertheless see the Commission for the Protection 
of Human Subjects as creating a legislative precedent for bioethicists’ function. Since this first 
Commission, almost all ensuing presidential administrations have appointed their own federal 
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bioethics committees. Bioethicist Alexander Caplan explains that, rather than possessing delegated 
lawmaking functions, these commissions are ad hoc panels convened to provide policy advice on 
a particular subject. The work of these commissions tends to be synthetic in nature: clarifying the 
relevant biomedical issues, drawing together the ‘best’ current thinking on those issues, and 
formulating a new consensus for bioethicists and policymakers. In spite of their limited legislative 
power, Caplan claims that these commissions are nevertheless given “legitimate authority” by 
virtue of their unique public visibility and “official” status as government bodies.133 Through these 
commissions, we can see that demands of American law still play an important structural role in 
determining the topics and frameworks that shape mainstream bioethics as well as in authorizing 
bioethics as a profession with particular kinds of social and political power.  
The second implication is what Evans describes as the “thinning” of public bioethical 
discourse and the corresponding ‘theological retreat’ in terms of the actors authorized to participate 
in that discourse. Even though several theologians (or at least experts with theological backgrounds) 
acted as commissioners, the Belmont Report and its framework of principlism set a precedent for 
the forms of argumentation deemed appropriate in public bioethics. With the establishment of the 
four common moral principles, theological concerns, particularly concerns regarding ultimate ends 
and values, ceased to be considered appropriate unless they could be translated (or, more accurately, 
transmuted) into the language of autonomy, nonmaleficence, beneficence, and justice. Public 
bioethical discourses focused on questions of ‘utility’ – i.e., how to maximize the (purportedly) 
consensus four principles – rather than continuing to reevaluate the principles themselves.  
We can see a representative example of this in 1980, when leaders from the National 
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Council of Churches, the Synagogue Council of America, and the U.S. Catholic Conference co-
authored a letter to President Jimmy Carter concerning HGE. The letter claimed that genetic 
engineering was tantamount to “playing God” and that its development would threaten “the 
fundamental nature of human life and the dignity and worth of the individual human being.” 134 
“Who,” they asked, “shall determine how human good is best served when new life forms are 
being engineered.”135 In response, President Carter turned to the President’s Commission for the 
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical Behavioral Research under the direction 
of bioethicist Albert Jonsen for guidance. The Commission’s report, Splicing Life (1983), however, 
declared that the playing God critique offered only “vague” theoretical concerns rather than 
“concrete” practical ones and that concerns over playing God were outside the scope of 
consideration for public policy commissions. 136 To the extent that Splicing Life did address the 
playing God critique, it translated substantive theological concerns about the ends of 
biotechnologies into a simple and incoherent concern for protecting nature (understood as the other 
of human culture) and contended that genetic engineering was no more “unnatural” than other 
biomedical means.137 
The Splicing Life report was in step with the ‘thinning’ of gene-editing ethics that had been 
formalized a decade earlier at the (in)famous 1975 Asilomar Conference on Recombinant DNA. 
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As new techniques for modifying DNA emerged in the early 1970s, a number of biomedical 
researchers called for a voluntary moratorium on recombinant DNA practices. In response, a group 
of elite biologists and scientific experts convened in Asilomar, California to deliberate on self-
imposed ethical guidelines for biological experimentation. As J. Benjamin Hurlburt explains 
though, these deliberations were, much like the earliest bioethics’ government commissions, 
limited in scope, focusing on technical questions of risk assessment and refusing to engage with 
deeper social and ethical questions regarding how new genetic technologies might be used and to 
what end. Streamlining the process of self-regulation through focusing on research protocols and 
public-facing communiqués, the scientific community viewed the conference as a major success 
in quelling public anxieties about molecular genomics.138   
But more than just ‘thinning’ the discourse, the Asilomar Conference normalized a top-
down structural relationship between scientists and the public. “If risk could be contained within 
the laboratory and the manipulated organisms, why should the wider public have any say?”139 
Scientists were, according to themselves at least, capable of self-regulation and their principal 
responsibility to the public was transparency and openness – the transmission of knowledge – 
rather than inclusion of outside parties in the decision-making process. As Hurlbut rightly contends, 
the foundational work done at Asilomar Beach placed certain discursive and imaginative 
limitations on public bioethics so that “society is not in a position to judge the ethical significance 
of scientific projects until scientists can declare with certainty what is realistic: in effect, until the 
imagined scenarios are already upon us.” 140  Insofar as scientists and technologists were 
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determining what warranted public attention, democratic governance of scientific and 
technological advancement was rendered “perpetually reactive.” 
In the next chapter, we will see that, even though principlism still remains the de facto 
intellectual framework in bioethics, substantive concerns such as those expressed in the letter to 
President Carter have been returning to the mainstream of the field through the human 
enhancement debate. Likewise, the enhancement debate represents a far more proactive approach 
to bioethics than the one developed at Asilomar and elaborated in bioethics’ earliest disciplinary 
formations. While principlism has been a detriment to more thoroughgoing examinations of ethical 
and ontological issues, then, it has not sounded a death knell on the forms of substantive debate 
seen in the 1960s. Indeed, the further we get from the original historical moment of bioethical 
professionalization, the more reason we have to question whether principlism erased substantive 
rationality as a condition of professionalization or merely temporarily concealed it. And if it is 
indeed the latter, we must also question: what historical changes have afforded a return of the 
repressed? 
We can find one important clue in the conceptual framework of “normalization” explicated 
in bioethicist Norman Daniels’ work on healthcare and justice. In his influential and controversial 
Just Health Care (1985), Daniels argued that asserting a basic right to healthcare does not alone 
help us make decisions about the allocation of healthcare and resources. Instead, he contended that 
we can ground a position on societies’ obligation to provide equal access to health services within 
a general theory of distributive justice. Daniels explained that healthcare is a “special good” 
because of the role it plays in meeting needs we possess at each stage of our lives. He characterized 
these “objectively important” needs as the basic health-related conditions necessary for “normal 
species functioning.” Building on the Rawlsian tradition, he defined normal functioning as the 
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range of opportunity within which an individual may construct and pursue his or her conception 
of the good. Given the universal interest in maintaining a normal range of opportunity over the 
course of life, Daniels concluded that individuals have a fundamental interest in establishing basic 
healthcare institutions to support that end. Using Rawls’ fair equality of opportunity principle, he 
further explained that the just allocation of health care resources can, in turn, be determined based 
on “fair” rather than equal distribution. Given that, for example, the natural disadvantages of 
disease and disability enforce more severe restrictions on normal functioning, it follows that 
individuals with disease and disability are entitled to a greater share of healthcare resources.141 
The most important contribution of Daniels’ ethical framework for our purposes is the 
introduction of “normal functioning” into the mainstream bioethical lexicon. There is no shortage 
of critical literature demonstrating how social norms structurally inform meanings of ‘health’ in 
the medical sciences – often to the detriment of marginalized individuals and communities.142 
While Daniels’ Rawlsian conception is far more philosophical than scientific, it nevertheless 
contributed to the proliferation of a biomedical and species-level discourse of normalization in the 
emergent field of bioethics. Normal species functioning was, in turn, used as the conceptual basis 
to define human enhancement in oppositional terms. If the concept of normal functioning afforded 
a universal norm and ethical end for thinking about disease and disability, bioethicists would soon 
begin to question where non-therapeutic technologies and techniques fit into theories of 
distributive justice and respect for autonomy. While Daniels’ work can, in retrospect, be seen as 
quite traditional in its use of universalist principlism and its repurposing of Rawls, it was 
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nevertheless an important intellectual bridge in expanding the limits of bioethical expertise and 
jurisdiction. 
1.4 From Normalization To Customization (1985-Present) 
 
The period of explosive growth in medical technologies that began in 1950s and 1960s 
reached new heights in the 1980s, initiating large-scale structural transformation in the biomedical 
sector. Sociologist Adele Clarke characterizes the period from the Second World War to the mid-
1980s as one of “medicalization,” i.e., the process through which aspects of life previously outside 
the jurisdiction of medicine become construed as medical problems. Clarke, however, contends 
that techno-scientific changes in biomedicine in the past three decades are coalescing into a second 
social transformation. Not only is the process of medicalization intensifying (e.g., the U.S. health 
sector has more than tripled in size since the Second World War), but it is also being reconstituted 
in new, complex, and techno-scientifically enmeshed ways. Medical information technologies and 
the networking and integration of hospitals, clinics, and insurance companies in particular are 
transforming institutional sites of healthcare knowledge-production, distribution, and information 
management. Clinical innovations are central to this process insofar as transformations in 
diagnostics, treatments, and procedures from bioengineering, genomics, proteomics, computer-
based visualization, computer-assisted drug development, and telemedicine are changing the very 
nature of medical practice. These “meso-level” institutional changes, Clarke claims, are reaching 
a critical mass in the structural shift to “biomedicalization,” i.e., a “regime of truth” in which 
“biomedicine has become a potent lens through which we culturally interpret, understand, and seek 
to transform bodies and lives.”143  
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Biomedicalization signals the extension of medical jurisdiction over life itself and the 
concomitant commodification of health. “Health itself and the proper management of chronic 
illnesses,” Clarke explains, “are becoming individual moral responsibilities to be fulfilled through 
improved access to knowledge, self-surveillance, prevention, risk assessment, the treatment of risk, 
and the consumption of appropriate self-help/biomedical goods and services.” 144  Under 
biomedicalization, health becomes an individual goal, a social and moral responsibility, and a site 
for routine biomedical intervention. Rather than illness, disability, or disease being viewed as 
matters of fate, health is viewed as a matter of ongoing moral self-transformation. In other words, 
under the regime of molecularization, the body is no longer viewed as immutable or the focus of 
regulation, but rather as capable of being reconfigured for specific purposes or identities. This has 
manifested in two future-oriented discourses emerging at the center of biomedicine: susceptibility 
and enhancement.  
Susceptibility refers to the discursive prominence of risk factors and self-surveillance. 
“Risks are calculated and assessed in order to rationalize surveillance, and through surveillance 
risks are conceptualized and standardized into ever more precise calculations and algorithms.”145 
These aspects of biomedicalization are, according to Clarke, quintessentially Foucauldian insofar 
as they represent a medical gaze directed toward the disciplining of bodies. Rather than being 
contained to specific spaces (e.g., hospitals or clinics) or relationships (e.g., doctor-patient 
relationships), "they implicate each of us and whole populations through constructions of risk 
factors, elaborated daily life techniques of self-surveillance, and the management of complicated 
regiments around risk and chronic conditions.”146 There is a “problematization of the normal” so 
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that one does not need to manifest symptoms to be considered “at risk.” We are always already at 
risk; it is simply a matter of degree. We therefore inhabit liminal spaces between illness and health, 
leading to the emergence of the “worried well” or “pre-patients,” which renders subjects prepared 
for and receptive to health-related discourses, commodities, and practices. Biomedicalization is 
thus manifested through the everyday practices of health care designed to minimize, manage, and 
treat risk and the taking up of risk-based individual and collective identities, e.g., “low risk” or 
“high risk” statuses based on epidemiological, genetic, and other quantifiable predispositions to 
illness.  
Enhancement, on the other hand, refers to a shift from the discourse of normalization to 
customization, i.e., ‘rhetorics of choice’ in spaces such as cosmetic surgery, reproductive 
technologies, gene therapies, and neuro-pharmaceuticals, which focus on producing “better bodies” 
or making individuals ‘better than well’. Rose expounds,  
previously, expert medical interventions were utilized in order to cure pathologies, 
to rectify generally accepted deviations from desirable functioning or to promote 
biopolitical strategies through lifestyle modification. Now recipients of these 
interventions are consumers, making access choices on the bases of desires that can 
appear trivial, narcissistic, or irrational, shaped not by medical necessity but by the 
market and consumer culture.147 
 
Anthropologist Sarah Franklin captures the larger symbolic meaning of this shift in arguing that 
we have entered into an age of “biological control.” “This means we can no longer assume that the 
biological ‘itself’ will impose limits on human ambition. As a result, humans must accept much 
greater responsibility toward the realm of the biological, which has, in a sense, become a wholly 
contingent condition.”148  
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This widespread sense of “biological control” owes much to the increasing national media 
coverage of bioethical issues in the past three decades. From newspapers and magazines to 
television talk shows to Internet campaigns, science has gone public in unprecedented fashion. 
This is true not just in the normalization and moralization of everyday health and illness described 
by Clarke, but also in the formation of flashpoint bioethical controversies. We can find familiar 
examples of this in beginning- and end-of-life controversies such as the “Baby Doe” law in the 
early 1980s or the case of Terri Schiavo in the early 2000s.149 
Since the mid-1990s, however, this trend of publicization has been just as prominent for 
bioethical issues focusing on human enhancement. There may be no more prominent example than 
the successful cloning of Dolly the Sheep by Scottish scientists at the Roslin Institute in Edinburgh 
in 1997. The cardinal issue raised by Dolly’s birth was that the same technique, somatic cell 
nuclear transfer, could, in principle, be used to clone human beings (or rather human embryos). 
The announcement of Dolly’s birth in Nature on February 27, 1997 unleashed a global torrent of 
print and electronic media coverage, with experts ranging from theology to law to biology offering 
commentary on the ethical implications of the suddenly real possibility of human cloning.150 As 
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bioethicist Arthur Caplan puts it, “So what was the ethical reaction to Dolly? An announcement 
was made and the world went crazy.”151 
These commentaries on cloning propagated the belief that limitless biological control was 
imminent. Callahan notes that cloning functioned as “one of the symbolic issues of what was, at 
that time, called ‘the new biology.’”152 Biologist Lee Silver, who authored a book on cloning later 
that year, Remaking Eden, described the birth of Dolly as “unbelievable…It basically means that 
there are no limits. It means all of science fiction is true.”153 While some scientists were critical of 
such sensationalist characterizations, viewing them as hyperbolic and fearing their regulatory and 
funding effects on future research, the predominant position was an expectation of limitless 
technological growth, for better or worse. Medical ethicist Ronald Munson, for example, 
commented that, “The genie is out of the bottle…this technology is not, in principle, policeable.”154 
Dolly, much like the later completion of the Human Genome Project in 2003 and the invention of 
CRISPR-Cas9 in 2012, blurred the line between fiction and possibility and popularized the notion 
of human biology as pure contingency to the American public and bioethicists alike. The public 
discourse surrounding Dolly, in turn, helped normalize and legitimize future-facing bioethics such 
as human enhancement literature. The Brave New World of Aldous Huxley was upon us and 
bioethicists were to be both its apostles and heretics.   
Dolly is a representative example of how biological control has become a site of moral 
panic in recent decades.155 News stories in the wake of Dolly focused not so much on Dolly herself 
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but the ethics of the apparently realistic possibility of human cloning. Fox and Swazey explain that, 
“commentators were unanimous in their condemnation of using the somatic cell nuclear transfer 
technique for human cloning on ethical, religious, and legal grounds” and that even the leader of 
the Edinburgh team, Sir Ian Wilmut, called cloning humans “repugnant” and emphasized that he 
and his colleagues “would all find it ethically unacceptable.”156 This sense of moral concern was 
exacerbated by media outlets, which used sensational headlines and selective quotations to stoke 
the anxieties of the public, suggesting that Dolly portended futures ranging from self-perpetuating 
dictatorships to the commodification of children to the loss of individuality and dignity. The 
following year, bioethicist P.D. Hopkins wrote about the panic: “Without having read a single 
article, heard a single presentation or taken a single bioethics class, most Americans have already 
received training in the ethics of cloning.”157 If the birth of Dolly produced public confidence in 
the limitless power of science, it also produced an immediate ethical condemnation of that power 
and attendant calls for strict regulation. 
The moral panic surrounding Dolly thus also signaled the increasing power of the national 
media and the U.S. public in determining bioethical concerns and regulation. Within a week of the 
announcement of Dolly, President Clinton issued a memorandum on the prohibition of federal 
funding for cloning human beings, which clarified that no federal funds would be used for research 
on human cloning (formalized as an executive order in the ensuring weeks) and, based on the 
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recommendation of the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, sought (but failed) to pass a bill 
banning human cloning in 1998.158 As we will see below, this was a period in which much of 
bioethical jurisdiction was transferred from ‘experts’ to social and political activists. For the 
moment, however, I merely want to emphasize the immediacy and intensity of the reaction to 
Dolly. In doing so, we see evidence of Jonsen’s contention that: “The public discourse provides 
the subject matter for the discipline of bioethics: while we often point to the new science and 
technology as the cause of bioethics, it is actually the discourse about the uses of science and 
technology—the differing views and values about human life that inform individual and social 
judgment about those innovations—that gives rise to bioethics.”159 While, like all moral panics, 
the intense concern with Dolly would pass in a matter of years, the more general ethical concern 
for biological control it exemplified has become a recurrent theme in both media coverage of 
science and the field of bioethics.   
To fully understand the moral panic surrounding Dolly, however, we must also examine a 
concurrent shift in public bioethical discourse: the culture wars. While common-moral principlism 
continued to be the predominant ethical framework in professional bioethics in the 1980s, its public 
appeal in the U.S. context began to wane. This was, in part, the result of the emergence of the 
religious right in the political sphere. As the religious right built up political machineries for 
influencing public policy in the form of thinks tanks and social-movement organizations such as 
the Christian Coalition, Concerned Women for America, and Focus on the Family, and became a 
core constituent of the National Republic Party, the jurisdiction and methods of bioethicists for 
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determining policies concerning beginning- and end-of-life issues came under increasing 
scrutiny.160  
Embryonic research in particular was a flash point in the emerging bioethical culture wars. 
The first bioethics commission focusing on embryonic research was the Ethics Advisory Board of 
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (1978-1980), which was designed to advise the 
department on “problematic protocols” and drafted a report called “research involving human in 
vitro fertilization and embryo transfer” that recommended that embryo research be allowed up to 
fourteen days after fertilization. The release of the report led to almost 13,000 letters opposing in 
vitro fertilization (IVF) research, most of which were the result of right-to-life social movement 
organizations that the Roman Catholic Church either created or collaborated with. Neither the 
report nor the commission ended up having a substantial effect on policy, in large part because of 
the outspoken opposition from the political right. Indeed, conservative opposition would lead to 
subsequent de facto or formal moratoriums on embryonic research until the NIH returned to 
democratic hands under President Clinton in 1992.161 
The debate concerning embryonic research is a representative example of several structural 
trends that have emerged in public bioethics since the mid-1980s. The first is a gradual diminishing 
of bioethicists’ jurisdiction in the political sphere. Wherever the religious right has contested the 
findings of government commissions, e.g., allowances for IVF and euthanasia, the ethical 
recommendations of those commissions have struggled to be implemented. This has, in part, been 
the result of growing skepticism towards the established methods and expertise of professional 
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bioethicists. For example, in deciding whether Congress should establish a new Ethics Advisory 
Board for recommending policy on embryonic research, Illinois’ Republican representative 
Dennis Hastert argued,  
So actually we have a board of people who are quote unquote ‘experts’… and 
they’re actually making moral decisions from a wide spectrum—even at this table 
we have quite a divergent view of what’s right and wrong—but somebody in the 
place of the legislator… would be making those decisions on whether this in vitro 
fertilization… for the purpose of experimentation should take place or should not 
take place.162  
 
Rather than just representing a general political skepticisms towards ‘expertise’, this frequent line 
of criticism implicitly takes aim at the fundamental premise of common moral principlism: that 
bioethicists can identify and channel the consensus ethical values of the American public. This 
premise became prima facie untenable in the face of the outspoken pro-life social and political 
activism that opposed the ‘consensus’ recommendations of bioethics commissions. The lack of 
success of these commissions in getting policies implemented can, in turn, be seen as evidence of 
a partial transfer of bioethical jurisdiction in the political sphere from professionals to social-
movement activists.163  
Rather than just a political contest between bioethicists and their others, however, the field 
of bioethics has internalized the culture wars with ethical positions being reconstituted along 
“bioliberal” and “bioconservative” lines. If the politicization of bioethics began with the 
maturation and expansion of the American conservative movement, it has now become reciprocal 
with it being “common for bioethicists to be identified as liberals or conservatives by each 
other.”164 The contest between conservative and liberal bioethicists, however, has not focused on 
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the entire gamut of issues associated with the culture wars on a national scale. For example, 
feminism, homosexuality, gay rights, evolution, and even climate change have tended to fall 
outside the scope of politicized bioethical discourse. Instead, controversies have focused on a more 
narrow range of biomedical instrumentalities associated with the beginning and end of life: 
embryonic research, reproductive cloning, germ-line genetic engineering, and engineered 
senescence. 
While bioliberals take up a permissive approach in this context, arguing that 
biotechnologies are a means to, and even necessary for, ensuring future human flourishing, 
bioconservatives take up a restrictive approach, arguing that biotechnologies will lead to ‘inhuman’ 
and amoral futures.165 Lawyer and bioethicist R. Alta Charo explains that this cultural divide is 
one that exists “between those who celebrate the transformative power of science” and those who 
“fear” its transformations will be too “profound.”166 She also, however, suggests that fear can be 
understood as a decisive motivator for both biopolitical positions. If bioconservatives fear the 
individual and social changes wrought by new technologies, bioliberals are “most fearful of the 
oppressive overreaching of a government bent on controlling those changes.” 167  She further 
explains that this debate is one that has been brewing for years in bioethics, but has now more 
explicitly joined “a debate over political philosophy and the role of government in moral 
regulations,” that, in her view, is as much about the “ethics of governance” as “the ethics of biology 
or medicine.”168 While Charo is right that the ethics of regulation are at the forefront of these 
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debates, I will, in Chapter Two, contend that these questions of regulation are best understood as 
extensions of more fundamental, ontological disagreements concerning what constitutes human 
nature. 
I should clarify that the culture wars in bioethics do not map neatly onto traditional left-
right political values. Conservatives sometimes include leftists concerned with social justice and 
environmentalism and liberals tend to lean libertarian. Take, for example, Carl Elliott, an 
outspoken critic of pharmaceutical enhancement. 
My worry is that we will ignore important human needs at the expense of frivolous 
human desires; that dominant social norms will crowd out those of the minority; 
the self-improvement agenda will be set not by individuals, but by powerful 
corporate interests, and that in the pursuit of betterment, we will actually make 
ourselves worse off.  
We live in a country where 46 million uninsured people cannot get basic 
medical care, while the rest of us spend a billion dollars a year on baldness remedies. 
It is not just the inequity here that is so impressive. It is the fact that we have gotten 
so accustomed to the inequity that we do not see it as obscene.169 
 
In recognizing the role of corporate interests in the “self-improvement agenda,” Elliott is able to 
characterize regulation as a means of protecting rather than inhibiting individual freedoms and 
interests. And while his focus on minority populations, social justice, distributive healthcare, and 
individual interests might all be thought of as liberal, he is nevertheless cast as a conservative due 
to his inhibitions about unregulated pharmaceutical enhancements.  
In contrast, bioliberalism has often been represented as the de facto position of 
“mainstream” bioethicists. Callahan, for example, claims that mainstream bioethics has “taken on 
a liberal cast” in that the “reigning values in the field [have become] those of liberal individualism,” 
i.e., “autonomy” coupled with “a strong antipathy to comprehensive notions of the common 
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good...closely followed by justice.” The “convergence of the liberal value of maximizing 
individual choice in matters bioethical and of the libertarian commitment to the market,” he further 
explains, has produced widespread support for “biomedical progress with few constraints” and 
“led to a systematic marginalization of religious and conservative perspectives.”170 This mode of 
bioliberal thinking has been even further heightened by the recent emergence of far-left techno-
enthusiasts such as Nick Bostrom and James Hughes, who make much of the liberal mainstream 
seem moderate by comparison. Indeed, transhumanists, who view techno-science as a literal means 
of salvation, and mainstream bioethicists, who espouse a ‘principled’ and cautious optimism, are 
somewhat odd bedfellows under the liberal moniker. 
If the mainstream of bioethics still leans liberal, there is nevertheless a strong conservative 
cohort of bioethicists that has made its political presence felt in the past three decades. As we will 
see in Chapters Two and Three, the most representative example of this is the appointment of the 
President’s Council on Bioethics under the George W. Bush administration. The Council’s 
conservative positioning was most evident through its consistent recommendations against 
scientific research on issues ranging from embryo research to human cloning to prescription 
pharmaceuticals. While this critical attitude toward science represents a shift in bioethical attitudes, 
the emergence of conservative bioethicists speaks to two more profound shifts in the field at large, 
both of which have challenged the premises of common moral principlism.  
First, the Council did not strive for consensus as such. The chair of the Council, Leon Kass, 
for example, argued that, “There are only two ways to get consensus in such a public body…Either 
stack the council, losing all credibility, or seek agreement on the lowest common denominator 
issues—e.g., human cloning is ‘at this time’ unsafe—leaving all the big questions for some other 
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body.”171 Kass and other conservatives believed that the desire for consensus had thinned the 
substance of bioethical debate, eschewing value diversity in favor of process, procedure, and 
applied norms. In an ironic twist, it was liberals who had failed to uphold the value of inclusive 
diversity, privileging demographic diversity rather than value diversity – race and gender rather 
than religion and profession – and, in doing so, excluded major political constituencies such as 
pro-life activists. For example, Kass responded to liberal critics by claiming that his commission 
was “the most intellectually diverse national bioethics council in recent history when it comes to 
embryo research—and, I would submit, also to most other things…by political leaning we are 
liberals and conservatives, Republicans, Democrats, and independents; and by religion we are 
Protestants, Catholics, Jews, and perhaps some who are none of the above.” 172  Indeed, the 
membership of the Council was more diverse than critics suggested, though their published reports 
belie this fact, both because of their consistent conservative recommendations and their own 
universalistic rhetoric.  
In articulating the deep divides in ethical values among both bioethicists and the American 
public, Kass brought to the fore the second structural transformation resulting from the cultural 
wars: the end of what bioethicist Jonathan Moreno describes as “the Great Bioethics Compromise,” 
which consisted of an “implicit agreement” based on a “consensus philosophy” that “allowed deep 
divisions about certain issues…to be courteously ignored.”173 While Kass, maybe more than most, 
has promoted dialogue across the aisle, both academic and public bioethics has become an 
increasingly partisan affair as “the terms ‘liberal’ and conservative’ have become recriminatory 
 
171 Leon Kass, “Reflections on Public Bioethics: A View from the Trenches” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 15, 
no. 3 (2005): 227. 
172 Kass, “Reflections on Public Bioethics,” 225-227. 
173 Jonathan D. Moreno, “The End of the Great Bioethics Compromise” The Hastings Center Report 35, no. 1 (2005): 
14. 
 88 
labels, rather than nonpolemical descriptors of differences in political philosophy and 
perspective.”174  
This partisanship has been lamented by a number of prominent bioethicists such as Moreno 
who suggest that “whether and how we can keep talking to each other during the next years may 
define the outcome of what may justly be characterized as a crisis of identity and perhaps the 
survival of bioethics as we know it.”175 In its more naïve interpretations, this has been understood 
as the introduction of “ideology” into bioethics, as if prior government commissions and their 
method of common moral principlism functioned as ideologically neutral formations. In Chapters 
Three and Four, we will see how this desire for ‘ideologically neutral’ expertise, like ‘consensus’, 
is not only a core commitment of American secularism but also manifests explicitly in bioethical, 
and in particular enhancement-related, discourses of secularity and secularization.  
For now, I want to emphasize that the appearance of the intrusion of ideological content 
signaled a return of substantively rational discourse in public bioethics. Kass’s critique of the 
thinning of bioethics concerned not just the exclusion of diverse value constituencies, but also the 
elision of fundamental questions of scientific and technological ends: 
In brief, our first charge is a mandate to raise questions not only about the best 
means to certain agreed-upon ends, but also about the worthiness of the ends 
themselves, a mandate to be clear about all of the human goods at stake that we 
seek to promote or defend. It is a call to restore to public bioethics the concerns that 
gave rise to the field in the late 1960s and early 1970s: Where is biotechnology 
taking us? What does this mean for our humanity?…We are charged once again to 
thicken and enrich public bioethics discourse, away from the more limited, 
explicitly practical approaches adopted by the collaboration of scientists/physicians 
and professional bioethicists through the work of previous national commissions 
and regulatory bodies.176 
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To this end, the President’s Council helped introduce alternative ethical concepts, modes of 
reasoning, and styles of rhetoric into the bioethical lexicon. The concept of “human dignity” is 
representative in this regard, functioning as an oft-used moral trump card and even receiving its 
own report in 2008, Human Dignity and Bioethics. While the concept is often used to mark an 
ambiguous ‘natural’ good threatened by scientific and technological innovation, bioethicist Eric 
Cohen points us to a more important implication, i.e., that human dignity is an “ontological” 
concept, intrinsic to “what it means to have a human life and to be a human person.”177 In refusing 
consensus pre-established bioethical ends, Kass and other conservatives have helped re-open 
ontological discussions concerning what it does and should mean to be human that had, to use 
Moreno’s words, been courteously ignored since the mid-1970s. 
If “bioconservative” and “bioliberal” are capacious and ambiguous labels, I want to suggest 
that they are still useful heuristics for analyzing the enhancement debate for three reasons. First, 
bioethicists increasingly identify themselves and their opponents according to these labels; in other 
words, bioliberal and bioconservative reflect how the relevant actors understand their own 
positions. Second, this distinction helps us identify substantive differences in the ethical 
frameworks, modes of reasoning, and styles of rhetoric between those for and against 
biotechnological research and development. The terms bioconservative and bioliberal map onto 
common rhetorical and philosophical fault lines in contemporary bioethical debate. Third, the 
conservative/liberal divide directs us to the public-facing nature of the human enhancement debate. 
There is an expectation among relevant actors that these positions will become increasingly 
decisive political battle lines in the age of biotechnology.178 If the liberal/conservative distinction 
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provides a useful starting point for analysis, however, it is far from a complete picture. As we will 
see in Chapter Two, both cohorts are, contrary to popular opinion, far more similar than dissimilar 
vis-à-vis their uncritical adoption of humanist ontologies. 
1.5 The Enhancement Debate 
To this point, I have given somewhat scant attention to the category of human enhancement 
itself. I have instead sought to outline the intellectual and material conditions that afforded the 
emergence and legitimization of what I call the enhancement debate, which both emerges from 
and exceeds formal bioethics. While the shape and content of the enhancement debate will be 
elaborated in much greater detail in the ensuing chapters, a brief definition is useful here. The 
enhancement debate is a multi-sited, interdisciplinary discourse concerning whether it is ethical to 
use biotechnologies to transform or ‘improve’ human nature. The most frequently cited forms of 
biotechnological enhancement include: germ-line genetic engineering, cybernetic implants, human 
cloning, psycho-pharmaceuticals, brain-machine interfaces, engineered senescence, and molecular 
nanotechnologies. Targets for these forms of enhancement include: physical features, intellectual 
capacities, psychological wellbeing, the aging process, phenomenological experience, and moral 
reasoning. To speak of the “enhancement debate,” as I do throughout this project, is to use a 
deliberate heuristic that brings together diverse actors and media based on common philosophical 
methods, styles of rhetoric, ethical fault lines, and citational practices. As I clarified in the 
introduction, I am most interested in human enhancement as a genre or class of texts that forms an 
authoritative discourse on techno-science and human nature. For the purposes of this intellectual-
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historical chapter, I want to underline several aspects of the enhancement debate that both build 
on and complicate the narrative I have thus far sketched.  
The first aspect concerns the foundations of the enhancement debate, which coincide with, 
and in some sense precede, the events of the past three decades. To my knowledge, there is no 
authoritative history of human enhancement. This is partially the result of the polemical nature of 
the enhancement debate. For supporters of human enhancement (i.e., bioliberals), enhancement is 
normalized so that it refers to all attempts to improve the human condition and is therefore as old 
as human culture itself. For detractors of human enhancement (i.e., bioconservatives), 
enhancement is discussed as a set of perpetually imminent interventions, something with a future 
but without a history. In other words, bioethicists tend to discuss enhancement as an object of 
analysis that is either always already present or never present as such, rather than as a discursive 
formation with a particular intellectual history. We can, however, identify certain foundational 
moments in the history of the discourse by tracing the usage of the term itself.  
The first popular use of “enhancement” in bioethics appears in geneticist William French 
Anderson’s 1985 article, “Human Gene Therapy: Scientific and Ethical Considerations,” in the 
Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. Anderson differentiates between four levels of human 
genetic engineering: 1) somatic cell gene therapy (i.e., correcting a genetic defect in the somatic 
cells of a patient); 2) germ line gene therapy (i.e., the insertion of the gene into the reproductive 
tissue of the patient so that a disorder in his or her offspring is also corrected); 3) enhancement 
genetic engineering (i.e., the insertion of a gene to enhance a known characteristic such as adding 
an additional growth hormone); and 4) eugenic genetic engineering (i.e. the attempt to alter or 
improve complex human traits coded by a large number of genes such as personality or 
 92 
intelligence).179 While what Anderson describes as eugenic genetic engineering is actually now 
most characteristic of the term enhancement (and germ-lime therapies are often included as well), 
his article established the basic conceptual and ethical fault line between therapies and 
enhancements. More specifically, he contended that, if safe and consensual, it is ethical and 
appropriate to use gene therapies for medical purposes (i.e., to correct genetic defects related to 
disease and disorder) but unethical and inappropriate to use gene therapies to “improve” a “normal 
healthy person.”  
While Anderson makes no direct reference, one can see a clear parallel to philosopher and 
bioethicist Jonathan Glover’s book, What Sorts of People Should There Be?, published the 
previous year (1984). Glover, who would later describe his work as “the first philosophical book 
on the ethics of genetic choices,” makes a similar distinction between negative genetic engineering 
(which aims at the elimination of genetic defects) and positive genetic engineering (which aims at 
bringing about improvements in normal people). Unlike Anderson, however, Glover made the case 
for positive genetic engineering (i.e., enhancement) as ethical and asserted the rights of parents to 
choose their children’s characteristics within a “mixed system” that tempers the “genetic 
supermarket” with a certain measure of centralized control. If Anderson provided the terms of the 
debate, Glover elaborated the ethical fault lines and established the proto-bioliberal position on 
enhancement.180 
Human enhancement became part of the mainstream bioethical lexicon over the course of 
the early-1990s as prominent bioethicists began to pick up and debate the concept, particularly in 
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relation to genetics. Two examples stand out in this regard. In November of 1991, the U.S. 
Department of Energy sponsored a conference called “Justice and the Human Genome” at the 
University of Illinois that brought together experts from bioethics and law, among other fields, to 
discuss questions of justice raised by the Human Genome Project. The proceedings were later 
published in 1994 in a volume titled Justice and the Human Genome Project edited by Timothy F. 
Murphy and Marc A. Lappé. In what could act as a description for almost all enhancement-themed 
texts, the editors explained that “part of what makes this volume unique is what has made the 
Hume Genome Project unique from its inception: its consideration of ethical, legal, and social 
implications of genomic research before that research has completed its tasks, before genomic 
applications have begun to alter social and institutional arrangements and policies.”181 
While the term enhancement appears in most of the essays in the volume, Norman Daniels 
essay, “The Genome Project, Individual Differences, and Just Health Care,” stands out for its 
definitional work. Building on his prior work from the mid-1980s, Daniels asks whether the 
therapy/enhancement distinction has a moral justification in relation to questions of healthcare, 
justice, and equality of opportunity. While he acknowledges that genetic information will pose 
complicated questions in regards to equality – e.g., what is our obligation in regards to non-medical, 
genetic-based differences such as height that have a demonstrable effect on equal opportunity? – 
he suggests that the therapy/enhancement line offers a practical (rather than metaphysical) 
conceptual framework for discerning moral obligation: 
We have obligation to provide services whenever someone desires that a medical 
need be met. Generally, this is taken to mean that the service involves treatment of 
a disease or disability, where disease and disability are seen as departures from 
species-typical normal functional organization or functioning. Characterizing 
medical need in this way implies a contrast between uses of medical services that 
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treat disease (or disability) conditions and uses that merely enhance human 
performance or appearance. Enhancement does not meet a medical need even 
where the service may correct for a competitive disadvantage that does not result 
from prior choices. Accordingly, medicine has the role of making people normal 
competitors, not equal competitors.182 
 
If the influence of Daniel’s work on actual healthcare practices is dubious, his conceptual 
distinction between therapies (as medical interventions that bring an individual back to normal or 
species-typical functioning) and enhancements (as non-medical interventions that bring an 
individual above normal or species-typical functioning) has become a definitional baseline in 
bioethics. 
The second example runs through the institutional heart of bioethics, The Hastings Center. 
At a Hastings Center meeting in 1993, Leroy Walters gave a presentation on “enhancement” in 
which he invited the audience to imagine four potential scenarios of genetic intervention: 1) 
increasing disease resistance, 2) decreasing the need for sleep, 3) improving long-term memory, 
and 4) “’reducing the ferocious tendencies of human beings and increasing their generous 
tendencies.’”183 The fourth scenario in particular proved controversial and raised the question: “are 
we so confident in the wisdom of our conceptions of normality and perfection that we are prepared 
to use new genetic technologies to achieve them?”184 In the following months, Peter Kramer’s 
book Listening to Prozac, which examined the worries about a drug that can make some feel 
“better than well,” became a best seller. Kramer argued that since we can now enhance ourselves 
with biotechnologies like Prozac, it is time to ask how (or whether) we should enhance 
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ourselves.185  
Late 1993 thus seemed like a fitting time for bioethicist Erik Parens and other researchers 
at The Hastings Center to ask the question: “Given that much of human history can be seen as the 
pursuit of one or another kind of ‘enhancement,’ and given that much of that history is strewn with 
needless worry about putatively ‘dangerous’ new technologies, will there ever be good reasons to 
worry about new biotechnologies aimed at the enhancing human capacities?”186 To explore this 
question, the Hastings Center received a grant from the National Endowment of Humanities in 
1995 to pursue a new project, “On the Prospect of Technologies Aimed at the Enhancement of 
Human Capacities.” In addition to independent research among the participants, the two-year 
project entailed four major research meetings, the papers from which became the basis for a 1998 
volume entitled Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social Implications. 
Given the standing of The Hastings Center within the field, this project helped normalize 
and legitimize enhancement as a principal bioethical issue. The majority of the essays reference 
Norman Daniels’ ‘hard line’ enhancement/therapy distinction, though most of the authors aim to 
complicate or challenge its coherence. For example, Parens explains that, describing whether a 
particular intervention is or is not a treatment is not legitimate grounds for a moral claim about the 
goals of society. Likewise, Eric T. Juengst contends that, “perhaps the enhancement/treatment 
distinction itself is best understood as a social construction reflecting the medical profession’s 
current values and willingness to perform interventions across difference cases.”187 If the concept 
of enhancement is to possess ethical meaning, he elaborates, we must recognize that what counts 
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as an enhancement is a measure of social dynamics and human values and therefore outside 
medicine’s domain of expertise. Anita Silvers, approaching the problem from disabilities studies, 
builds on this point by explaining that, “far from being the natural way of conducting ourselves, 
the modes of functioning that typify our species may merely be ways of doing things that are 
preferred by the dominant classes and to which we have therefore become accustomed.”188 In spite 
of these critical attitudes, the authors recognize enhancement as an ideal starting point for 
bioethical discussion of emerging technologies. Parens explains that, while “it would be a mistake 
to think that the treatment/enhancement distinction will ever provide good, transparent moral 
guidance about the particular decisions faced by individuals,” the distinction can still function “as 
one way to begin conversations about what doctors should and shouldn’t do” and “the term 
enhancement can alert us to and start conversations about the potential for long-standing 
problems such as unfairness, complicity, and inauthenticity.”189  
These three problems – unfairness in the distribution of resources, complicity with suspect 
norms, and threats to human authenticity – represent the three primary areas of ethical concern 
identified in the project. Given that these concerns are often put into conversation with questions 
of public policy, the ethics of governance can be counted as a fourth primary area. It is fair to say 
that these four concerns have become the predominant motifs of the enhancement debate in the 
two decades since the volume’s publication. I note this not so much to make a claim about the 
project’s direct influence, which is unclear, but rather to mark just how established the concept of 
enhancement had become in bioethics by the late 1990s. It was, as Parens notes, already a part of 
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bioethicists and medical experts’ “intersubjective use” and bound to “take on a life of its own.” It 
should be unsurprising, then, that by 2003 the term had made its way to the front of public bioethics 
with the President’s Council publishing a report titled Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the 
Pursuit of Happiness.  
The Council’s report represents another historical trend of note here, which is that the 
enhancement debate has been an especially fertile ground for substantively rational discourse in 
bioethics. In language that would look quite out of place even a decade prior, the Council 
announced the mission of the report as to undertake “an inquiry into the potential implications of 
using biotechnology ‘beyond therapy,’ in order to try to satisfy deep and familiar human desires: 
for better children, superior performance, ageless bodies, and happy souls.”190 Rather than a 
“research report,” the document is characterized as an “ethical inquiry” that pursues a “richer 
bioethics” that does “justice to the full human meaning of biotechnological advance” by focusing 
on “the desires and goals of human beings” and adopting “the perspective of human experience 
and human aspiration, rather than the perspective of technique and power.”191 In characteristic 
bioconservative fashion, the report hazards against the development and use of biotechnologies 
for human ends and, in conclusion, suggests that the solution is not to go beyond therapy through 
biotechnological intervention, but rather to look beyond therapy and the goals of medicine in 
determining ultimate ends and values. 
While I will return to this report in more detail in Chapter Three, I want to underline here 
how speculative discussions of future enhancement technologies lend themselves to ontological 
inquiry in the present. The concept of substantive rationality and the narrative of the culture wars 
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fail to capture the full breadth of this shift. The President’s Council – and the larger corpus of texts 
constitutive of the enhancement debate – are not just questioning the relationship between means 
and ultimate ends, nor are they just concerned with beginning- and end-of life issues; at hand, is 
the question of what it does and what it ought to mean to be human in the first place. Though still 
featured, the predominant questions are not those typical of abortion and euthanasia debates, e.g., 
when does life begin and end? Rather the questions are ones more familiar to the traditions of 
Western philosophy and theology: what is distinctive about human being? What constitutes human 
flourishing? What does it mean to live an ethical life? Given the diminished status of common 
moral principlism, we can also see a proliferation in meta-ethical discourses; in other words, it is 
no longer a given which ethical theories and methods are best suited to debate the ethics of techno-
science. While this substantive turn is most often associated with conservative bioethics, such 
questions have also become central to bioliberal texts in the context of enhancement. This is not 
to say that more practical questions concerning safety, access, and regulation have disappeared; 
far from it. It is, however, to say that the enhancement debate possesses an explicit ontological 
character and thus affords a unique opportunity to excavate the philosophical grounds of bioethics 
as a site of knowledge-production. 
This substantive turn has also been reflected in the expanding circle of professionals 
involved in bioethics vis-à-vis the enhancement debate. For example, given the trend toward 
privatization in the biotechnology sector, we can see a rise in far-left academic-activists and 
technologists contributing to and being discussed in bioethics’ conferences, journals, and 
anthologies.192 Given that transhumanism was little more than a fringe cultural movement in the 
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1980s and 1990s, it is more than a little surprising to see figures such as Nick Bostrom and James 
Hughes becoming prominent figures in the field and transhumanism becoming a common object 
of critique for conservative bioethicists. 193  At the same time, theological perspectives are 
becoming more frequent with the proliferation of Catholic and Protestant (and to a lesser extent 
Jewish and Islamic) medical and bioethical journals and institutions in the U.S..194 While part of 
this phenomenon can be attributed to a more general expansion of bioethical expertise, including 
less explicit identification with “bioethics” as a classification, it can also be attributed to the 
particular character of the enhancement debate. Always already directed toward the future, the 
enhancement debate blurs the line between fiction and possibility, speculation and analysis, and, 
in doing so, expands the circle of expertise to a radical extent. The question of who is authorized 
to debate human enhancement remains open-ended, even within the field of bioethics itself. 
Professional diversity, however, is not the same as intellectual diversity. As we will see in 
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the next chapter, positions on enhancement more often than not still fall along established 
bioliberal and bioconservative lines, which problematically share humanist commitments in their 
use of ‘human nature’ as an ontological framework and ethical criterion. And while the larger 
academic field of bioethics has become far more theoretically and methodologically diverse in the 
past two decades – including important contributions from fields such as sociology and 
anthropology as well as race, gender, and disability studies – this phenomenon has not been 
adequately manifested in texts on human enhancement. There is thus an opportunity, and I will 
argue an ethical demand, to diversify the theoretical and methodological approaches toward 
biotechnologies in the field of bioethics.  
1.6 Looking Backwards, Looking Forwards 
In this chapter, we have seen a number of intellectual trends responsible for the 
development of U.S. bioethics as an academic, professional, and public field: the geneticization 
and molecularization of the self, the retreat of public theological discourse, the institutionalization 
of common moral principlism, the proliferation of biotechnological moral panics, and the 
ossification of the biopolitical culture wars. I have not highlighted these trends because they tell 
the comprehensive history of bioethics. Rather, I have highlighted them because they have been 
important conditions for the emergence of the enhancement debate, which does not take shape in 
a vacuum but owes much to a particular, if wide-ranging, discursive history that runs through the 
heart of institutional bioethics in the United States. 
In particular, we have seen that the field of bioethics emerged, at least in part, as a response 
to an ontological anxiety, of which the enhancement debate is a microcosm. As advances in 
information-based biological sciences called into question the categorical binaries that have long 
grounded the Western humanist tradition – nature/artifact, organism/machine, human/God – a 
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demand for new ethical expertise emerged. What ethics should inform our newfound possibilities 
for biological control? In the span of a few decades, that (bioethical) expertise was formalized in 
public-facing conferences, journals, institutions, commissions, and certificate programs, all of 
which were guided by the overarching framework of common moral principlism. Common moral 
principlism, however, has demonstrated notable structural limitations; not just in its general 
‘thinning’ of bioethical discourse abut also its particular prioritization of autonomy and consensus 
as ethical ends. Through prioritizing these ends, this mode of principlism has reified humanist 
principles of individualism, anthropocentrism, and universalism, grounding itself in the very 
human(ist) subject that the information and biological sciences, to say nothing of academic critical 
theory, have been actively deconstructing since the mid-twentieth century.  
While less bound to common moral principlism than other bioethical discourses, the 
enhancement debate has inherited and even intensified this cat-and-mouse intellectual strategy. As 
we will see in Chapter Two, whether for or against enhancement, bioethicists and adjacent theorists 
acknowledge greater and greater theoretical and material pressures to classical ideals of human 
nature only to then reaffirm and mobilize the coherence of the individual, autonomous subject as 
a means of ethical reconciliation. At the cost of seriously accounting for particularity and 
relationality as ontic realties, theorists of enhancement still uncritically assume autonomy and 
consensus as the principal bioethical ends. The enhancement debate can thus best be understood 
as a discourse of re-humanization, re-inking old ontological lines in the process of drawing new 
ethical ones.  
Now that we understand some of the enhancement debate’s most important social, 
intellectual, and material conditions of possibility, the next step is to better understand the 
particular contours of the debate as it has emerged in this past three decades. Who or what is the 
 102 
human of human enhancement? What imagined futures populate this bioethical discourse? This 
examination will entail moving away from the moderate, liberal-leaning position of mainstream 
bioethics and more toward far-left and far-right bioethical positions. For, as we will see, it is 
theorists on the ends of the biopolitical spectrum who have had the loudest voices in the 

























Mapping the Enhancement Debate 
 
2.1 The Thin Line: Therapy and Enhancement 
In a nationally televised address on August 9, 2001, President George W. Bush announced 
his decision to restrict federal funding of human embryonic stem cell research. The new policy 
stated that new cell lines developed by researchers after the date of the address could not be used 
in laboratories that receive federal funding. While this was, in part, motivated by traditional 
conservative concerns about “the beginnings of life,” the president also explained that it was about 
“the ends of science,” and whether those ends ought to focus on “improving life” or “protecting 
life.” For the Bush administration, science ought to focus on protecting life and resist crossing a 
“fundamental moral line” by experimenting on potential human subjects (embryos) or modifying 
human nature, lest we find ourselves in the Brave New World of Aldous Huxley.195 
Since the mid-1990s, this juxtaposition between the ends of improving life and protecting 
life has dominated the language of professional and public bioethics and, in particular, literature 
on human enhancement. To review, most bioethicists define enhancement in contradistinction to 
therapy.196 Whereas therapies are medical practices that return individuals to “normal,” “healthy,” 
or “species-typical” functioning, enhancements are biotechnological interventions that increase 
one’s capacities, performances, or dispositions to greater than normal functioning, i.e., that make 
one “better than well.” 197  The most frequently cited forms of biotechnological enhancement 
 
195 George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research,” transcript of speech delivered from Bush 
Ranch in Crawford, TX, August 11, 2001, American Presidency Project, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-stem-cell-research. 
196 Erik Parens, “Is Better Always Good? The Enhancement Project,” in Enhancing Human Traits: Ethical and Social 
Implications, ed. Erik Parens (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 1-28. 
197 Alberto Giubilini and Sagar Sanyal, “The Ethics of Human Enhancement” Philosophy Compass 10, no. 4 (2015): 
233-43. Norm Daniels, “Normal Functioning and the Treatment-Enhancement Distinction,” Quarterly of Healthcare 
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include: germ-line genetic engineering, cybernetic implants, human cloning, psycho-
pharmaceuticals, engineered senescence, and molecular nanotechnologies. Targets for these forms 
of enhancement include: physical features, intellectual capacities, psychological wellbeing, the 
aging process, phenomenological experience, and moral reasoning. In spite of this wide range of 
technological projects, both proponents and opponents of enhancement classify and debate 
particular interventions (real and speculative) according to their presumed ends – i.e., therapy and 
enhancement – so that the debate takes the shape of two mutually constitutive ethical ideals.198 In 
keeping with the operative terms of the debate, I examine enhancement as a philosophical ideal 
and discursive mechanism rather than focusing on each biotechnological intervention to which it 
might refer.  
As we saw in Chapter One, the promise of enhancement technologies that modify, 
transform, or improve human nature has resulted in bioethicists introducing questions that were 
previously seen as too ambiguous, controversial, or impractical to feature in the mainstream of 
their field. In the context of the enhancement debate, these questions include: would human 
enhancement signal a fundamental transformation of human nature? Is it ethical to replace chance 
with choice through modifying human biology? What normative frameworks are legitimate for 
determining whether enhancement technologies are ethical? And what restrictions, if any, should 
be placed on related scientific research? These might be encapsulated in a single, more 
 
Ethics 9 (2000): 309-322. Carl Elliott, Better than Well: American Medicine Meets the American Dream (New York: 
W.W. Norton & Company, 2004). 
198 The President’s Council on Bioethics, for example, argues that, “biotechnology beyond therapy deserves to be 
examined not in fragments, but as a whole,” and that we should understand all biotechnologies that desire to go beyond 
therapy “as part of a larger human project - toward perfection and happiness.” The President's Council on Bioethics, 
Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (Washington, D.C: President’s Council on Bioethics, 
2003), 277, 22. 
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fundamental question: what does it mean to be human and should we strive to become something 
‘more than human’ or remain human ‘as we have always been’? 
Recognizing these “ethical mine fields,” President Bush commissioned the President’s 
Council on Bioethics directed by physician Leon Kass to advise his administration on bioethical 
issues. Unlike past practical, policy-oriented commissions, the principal mission of the Council 
was “to undertake fundamental inquiry into the human and moral significance of developments in 
biomedical and behavioral science and technology.”199 In 2003, the Council published a widely 
circulated report, Beyond Therapy, which encapsulated the “bioconservative” position: “We must 
live, or try to live, as true men and women, accepting our finite limits, cultivating our given gifts, 
and performing in ways that are humanly excellent. To do otherwise is to achieve our most desired 
results at the ultimate cost: getting what we seek or think we seek by no longer being ourselves.”200 
Contrasting this position, an increasing number of bioethicists, philosophers, and scientists 
– the most enthusiastic of whom being transhumanists – have begun defending enhancement in 
both academic and popular literature. Not only is enhancement ethically permissible, according to 
these theorists, but it is also an individual and social end toward which ‘we’ ought to strive, and, 
in some cases, an ethical obligation. While transhumanism is often regarded as marginal in terms 
of its cultural and political influence, prominent transhumanists such as Nick Bostrom, Julian 
Savulescu, and James Hughes have been widely cited in bioethical literature on enhancement and 
 
199 “Executive Order 13237 of November 28, 2001: Creation of the President’s Council on Bioethics,” Code of 
Federal Regulations, title 3 (2001): 821-823. 
200 The President's Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, 155. 
This denouncement of enhancement has constituted the de facto stance of government commissions and legislators 
since at least the late 1990s when the Clinton administration banned federal funding for research on human cloning, 
declaring it “morally unacceptable,” in response to the successful cloning of Dolly the Sheep by Scottish scientists at 
the University of Edinburgh. William J. Clinton, “President’s Letter to Congress: Cloning Prohibition Act” (official 
memorandum, Washington DC: White House Office of the Press Secretary, Jun 9, 1997), 
https://clintonwhitehouse4.archives.gov/textonly/New/Remarks/Mon/19970609-15987.html. 
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the transhumanist position frequently features as a foil for mainstream bioconservative arguments. 
Just as important, more mainstream liberal bioethicists such as John Harris, Jonathan Glover, 
Gregory Stock, Ronald Bailey, and Allen Buchanan stake an almost identical position on the 
desirability of human enhancement: mobilizing appeals to human nature, prioritizing the 
individual’s right to modify their own biology, and arguing for the moral potential of 
biotechnologies to improve individual wellbeing.201 
While traditional bioethical focuses such as risk, access, and justice still populate the 
literature, we will see that these concerns become sublimated to ontological and existential 
arguments regarding what it does and should mean to be human. We can therefore best understand 
the enhancement debate not so much as an ethical dispute about the merits of particular 
technologies but instead in terms of competing theories of human nature. ‘Human nature’ is a 
multifarious term, often used to signify two distinct, if related, modes of understanding: (1) an 
empirical, scientific understanding of homo sapiens sapiens’ biological and material structure and 
(2) a normative, philosophical understanding of universal human goods and ends. Through 
rhetorical appeals to nature, however, theorists of human enhancement conflate these two 
frameworks so that techno-science and normative ethics function as conterminous and mutually 
supportive systems of knowledge that can ground positions on whether enhancement is permissible, 
desirable, or even obligatory. Examining how bioethical actors and texts pick up and make use of 
the concept of human nature can thus provide us with an analytical lever for mapping the territory 
 
201 “Bioliberals” here refers to a smaller, more extreme cohort than the typical umbrella usage of the term. I make 
this hermeneutic decision for three reasons. First, transhumanists and like-minded theorists have been far more prolific 
than their liberal-leaning ‘moderate’ counterparts in writing texts on “human enhancement” and, in particular, making 
appeals to “human nature” – the language I am most interested in. Second, as I show throughout this project, the view 
of human enhancement as not just permissible but also desirable, or even obligatory, is becoming an increasingly 
common position in, and object of, bioethical discourse. Third, to the extent that more traditional, ‘mainstream’ 
bioliberals participate in the enhancement debate, their positions reflect a familiar view of ‘cautious optimism’ 
grounded in common moral principlism, which thus offers little new as a site of analysis. 
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of the enhancement debate and making sense of the normative and ideal accounts of ‘the human’ 
that it both depends upon and validates. 
This chapter thus sets the stage for the larger mission of this project: excavating the 
normative theories of subjectivity that ground the human enhancement debate and imagining 
alternative possibilities for thinking the future of human nature. In this chapter, we will see that, 
whereas bioconservatives describe human enhancement as a transgression of the natural, sanctified 
ground of human dignity and moral status, bioliberals describe it as an affirmation of the natural, 
‘higher’ traits of autonomy, rationality, and self-creation. In spite of privileging different 
characteristic human traits and ends, I will demonstrate that these opposing positions nevertheless 
share a similar understanding of the subject inherited from the Western humanist tradition and, in 
spite of the disruptive nature of the technologies in question, neither position moves us beyond all-
too-familiar modes of thinking human nature.      
2.2 Bioconservatism and the Sanctity of Human Nature 
As we saw in the previous chapter, it was bioconservative theorists who first authorized 
enhancement as a legitimate topic for public bioethics and, therefore, set the terms of the debate. 
To understand the contours of the enhancement debate then, we must first examine the 
bioconservative position in greater detail. Conservative texts on enhancement take the form of two 
complementary critiques: 1) the human dignity critique, i.e., the claim that using biotechnologies 
to modify human nature will undermine the self-understandings and modes of being that make us 
authentically human; and 2) the moral status critique, i.e., the claim that using biotechnologies to 
modify human nature will result in the loss of the common ground of moral and political rights. 
Both of these lines of critique build on the natural law tradition so that the identification and 
preservation of human nature is represented as conterminous with the survival of political 
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liberalism and the individual pursuit of the good life. It is, in turn, argued that enhancement will 
result in not just a substantive transformation in, but also the loss of, human nature as such. There 
is therefore an ethical obligation to preserve the human species through regulating, banning, or 
opting out of enhancement practices. I contend that these grounding appeals to human nature can 
best be understood in terms of the tradition of virtue ethics and that, in spite of being mobilized to 
critique ‘the’ techno-scientific worldview, such appeals are logically dependent on biological, and 
not just normative, descriptions of human life. 
2.3 The Human Dignity Critique 
Leon Kass, former chairman of the President’s Council, is one of the most vocal and 
influential champions of the human dignity critique. For Kass, technologies such as human cloning, 
reproductive selection, and regenerative medicine represent the first step toward an “inhuman” 
future. The fundamental challenge posed by these technologies, however, is not the technologies 
themselves, but the techno-scientific worldview that grounds and motivates their development and 
use. In re-conceptualizing the organic body as dead-matter-in-motion – rather than as animated, 
purposive, and striving – the modern biological worldview, he argues, located the meaning and 
source of life within human will and power. “This reductive science,” he contends, “challenges 
our self-understanding as creatures of dignity.”202  
To elaborate this point, he turns to the language of “playing God,” which he insists has 
been too easily dismissed by critics as a superstitious anxiety.  
The concern has meaning, God or no God. By it is meant one or more of the 
following: man, or some men, are becoming creators of life, and indeed, of 
individual living human beings (in vitro fertilization, cloning); they stand in 
judgment of each being’s worthiness to live or die (genetic screening and 
abortion)—not on moral grounds, as is said of God’s judgment, but on somatic and 
 
202 Leon R. Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity: The Challenge for Bioethics (San Francisco: Encounter 
Books, 2004), 20. 
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genetic ones; they also hold out the promise of salvation from our genetic sins and 
defects (gene therapy and genetic engineering).203 
 
Kass connects this concern to the dignity of human life in arguing that “man” has a special 
ontological and moral standing because “he” possesses the “godlike” qualities of reason, freedom, 
judgment, and moral concern. Man, however, is at best a mere likeness of God insofar as he is also 
defined by his animality. In contrast to “reductionist materialism,” which defines personhood as 
willing and thinking, Kass insists that true human dignity is also derived from “the worthiness of 
embodied human life…our natural desires and passions, our natural origins and attachments.”204 
It is an awareness of our own needs, limitations, and mortality that grounds a way of being that 
has engagement, depth, beauty, virtue, aspiration, and meaning. For example, in discussing the 
perils of radical life-extension, Kass argues that it is the fleeting nature of our lives that affords us 
meaningful engagement with the people, activities, and even objects that we find worthwhile. 
Taking this a step further, he suggests that the most “virtuous” and “noble” behaviors are 
sacrificial ones based in overcoming the attachment to self-interest and even survival itself. “To 
suffer, to endure, to trouble oneself for the sake of home, family, community, and genuine 
friendship, is truly to live” and functions as the basis of “excellence in deeds noble and just.” For 
example, in criticizing the project of radical life extension, Kass argues that “Immortals…cannot 
be noble” and “immorality is a kind of oblivion – like death itself.”205 For Kass, the very purported 
‘lows’ of human being, the “downward pull[s] of bodily necessity,” that enhancement seeks to 
overcome are essential sources and expressions of a dignified life. Given that a “truly human life” 
is “lived always with and against necessity, struggling to meet it, not to eliminate it,” we ought to 
 
203 Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity, 129.  
204 Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity, 20. 
205 Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity, 268. 
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understand finitude and our existent gifts as both sufficient and necessary for human flourishing 
and perfection.206  
Similar to Kass, political philosopher Michael Sandel contends that human enhancement 
threatens to erode “an appreciation of the gifted character of human powers and achievements.”207 
The fundamental problem for Sandel is not the drift toward mechanism but the drive toward 
mastery or “hyperagency,” i.e., “a Promethean aspiration to remake nature, including human 
nature, to serve our purposes and satisfy our desires.”208 In this admittedly secular version of the 
playing God argument, Sandel sees the predominance of hyperagency as leading to the loss of 
fundamental, a priori moral values or virtues. Eugenics and genetic engineering in particular 
represent “the one-sided triumph of willfulness over giftedness, of dominion over reverence, of 
molding over beholding.”209 Once again, it is not the practical effects of the technologies that 
matter most, but instead the (un)ethical orientation toward the natural and human worlds implicit 
in their use. In terms reminiscent of the mid-twentieth century Continental critique of techno-
science, the pursuit of human enhancement reveals an attitude of domination in which human 
beings (including the self) are reduced to instruments for the fulfillment of pure will. 
For Sandel though, it is not just about the ethical orientation we assume in the pursuit of 
enhancement, but also the one we conceal: the capacity to live life as a project in which we struggle, 
deliberate, wonder, and inquire in relation to realizing the purposes of the broader life stories in 
which we find ourselves. While the telos of one’s life project is relative to the person, and agency 
 
206 Kass, Life, Liberty, and the Defense of Dignity, 18. 
207 Michael J. Sandel, “The Case Against Perfection: What’s Wrong with Designer Children, Bionic Athletes, and 
Genetic Engineering” in Human Enhancement, ed. Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), 78. 
208 Michael J. Sandel, The Case Against Perfection: Ethics in the Age of Genetic Engineering (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2007), 26. 
209 Sandel, “The Case Against Perfection,” 84. 
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is part and parcel of such a project, we must be able to encounter and engage that purpose as it 
unfolds rather than determining it in advance, as we would with germ-line genetic engineering or 
embryonic human cloning. This speaks to a broader ethic of giftedness that Sandel wants to 
introduce as a ‘counter-weight’ to the willfulness that predominates in our culture: to 
instrumentalize nature, human and otherwise, is to fail to appreciate the human goods that already 
inhere in ‘the given’. 
This line of thought emphasizes particular values or virtues, as Sandel contends that 
enhancement practices would diminish our sense of humility, responsibility, and solidarity. For 
example, in determining the biological makeup of their offspring through germ-line genetic 
engineering, humans would demonstrate undeserved hubris, assume unprecedented moral 
responsibility, and eliminate the common ground of genetic chance. For Sandel, human dignity is 
grounded in a sense of the contingency of our gifts, “a consciousness that none of us is wholly 
responsible for his or her success,” and an “openness to the unbidden.”210 Gaining complete 
control over our own nature would thus eliminate the possibility of encountering the world as 
dignified beings. While he acknowledges that there is no pre-given red line between agency and 
hyperagency and that we should not uncritically accept all natural givens as a priori goods, he 
nevertheless wants to remind us that what is at stake is the potential to live a dignified life, i.e., a 
life of moral excellence, for molder and molded alike. 
The fact that both Kass and Sandel reference God, even while attempting to appeal to a 
pluralistic, public audience should be unsurprising given that the language of human dignity gains 
its coherence in the American context from not just secular political discourses on human rights 
but also mid-twentieth century Catholic and Protestant theological positions on medical ethics. On 
 
210 Sandel, “The Case Against Perfection,” 87. 
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December 7, 1965, the Vatican promulgated the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the 
Modern World, which established that the universal and inalienable principle of human dignity 
(i.e. respect for persons made in the image of God) is the “foundation for the relationship between 
the Church and the world.”211 This notion had widespread appeal outside of Catholic audiences in 
the United States, where the “socially progressive” concepts of human dignity and human rights – 
in particular the dignity and rights of the unborn – were used to coalesce and mobilize multiple 
religious groups across the political spectrum in support of the pro-life movement from the mid-
1960s until Roe v. Wade (1973).212  
The rhetorical concepts of playing God and human dignity have continued to circulate and 
feature in literature on enhancement from the burgeoning fields of Protestant and Catholic 
bioethics. Theologically conservative opponents of enhancement, for example, articulate a 
“stewardship” theology, which, based on Genesis 1, recognizes that humans are given “dominion” 
over God’s creations. “Dominion” here, however, is not interpreted in terms of dominance, but rather 
the call to protect, care for, and live in harmony with God’s creations. Furthermore, while humans 
are made in the image of God (imago dei), they are not given dominion over one another; proper 
dominion over humanity belongs to God alone.213  
 
211 Vatican Council II, “Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World: Gaudiam et spes,” promulgated 
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As we saw in the previous chapter, however, the ‘playing God’ critique and concomitant 
concerns about human dignity have, since the formal establishment of the field in the mid-1970s, 
been dismissed in secular bioethical literature due to their implicit theological character. It was not 
until the Bush administration, when the President’s Council published a 2008 report, Human 
Dignity and Bioethics – in which numerous authors made use of theological language to defend 
the use of “human dignity” for the field – that these concerns returned to the secular mainstream. 
This turn to theological language should be unsurprising given that, of the twenty-one contributors 
to the volume, four were advocates of a central role for religion in public life and eleven worked for 
Christian institutions (all but two of which were Catholic).214 
While the prominence of the rhetoric of human dignity testifies to the success of 
conservative Christian groups in entering into mainstream public bioethics through social and 
political activism – a continuation of their activism on issues such as abortion, stem-cell research, 
and euthanasia – we should not dismiss the human dignity critique as a religious argument unfit 
for public deliberation, as some critics have suggested.215 Given that the appeal to human dignity 
is intended to be legible to both religious and secular audiences and has been employed by theorists 
across the political and ideological spectrum for a wide range of purposes (e.g., human rights 
activism), we ought to resist the temptation to view the rhetoric of human dignity as a ‘traditional’ 
religious tenet competing with secular, rational bioethical arguments. Indeed, as we will see in the 
next chapter, the rhetorical use of human dignity is an important discursive mechanism through 
which conservatives translate their substantive values into non-sectarian language and mark their 
position as appropriate for public deliberation and inclusion in the secular (bio)political sphere. 
 
214 Steven Pinker, “The Stupidity of Dignity,” The New Republic 238, no. 9 (2008): 28-31. 
215 Ruth Macklin, “Dignity Is a Useless Concept,” British Medical Journal 327, no. 7429 (2003): 1419-1420.  
 114 
For the moment, it is most important to note that, while Kass and Sandel build upon a 
theological orientation, both underscore that we need not believe in the Judeo-Christian God or 
even the supramundane as such. Rather, the point is that, just as living a dignified life depends 
upon being elevated above our animal counterparts, so too does it depend upon being subordinated 
to something greater than human agency. We must recognize that finitude informs our most 
fundamental human goods and acts as the condition for living a virtuous life, and, therefore, ought 
to be preserved, lest we lose the very thing that makes us human in the first place. Put differently, 
agency is merely one virtue among others. Whether it is God or some secular equivalent, then, 
living a dignified life requires a conceptual ceiling no less than it does a conceptual floor, i.e., a 
sense of ontological subordination to something greater than one’s self. Understood in these terms, 
human dignity departs from its familiar secular, political meaning as a fundamental threshold of 
freedoms and rights that individual persons are entitled to by virtue of their status as human beings. 
Instead, it signifies an enduring and fully contained ontological status, i.e., a fixed position in the 
Great Chain of Being, and provides a universal standard for moral excellence – beholding and 
engaging with the giftedness of life as it is given – that runs counter to the project of human 
enhancement. 
2.4 The Moral Status Critique 
The moral status critique extends the threat of biotechnology into the realm of political 
theory, asserting that human rights and equality are grounded in a common human nature and that 
changing that nature would destabilize the coherence of equal moral status and the gains of 
political liberalism since the Second World War. Putting forth the most philosophically rigorous 
form of this claim, Frankfurt philosopher Jurgen Habermas contends that the foundation of 
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morality and procedural justice is a prior, ethical self-understanding of the species.216 This species 
ethic includes three premises: 1) we are autonomous authors of our own lives; 2) we approach 
others as autonomous authors of their lives; and 3) we seek to live with others who acknowledge 
us as “self-individuating” autonomous beings in a society that protects our right to be so. 
Biotechnologies, especially genetic intervention at the reproductive level, threaten this species 
ethic by undermining the individual’s capacity to see one’s self as the sole, fully autonomous 
authors of one’s own life. In recognizing both one’s self and others as artifacts of genetic 
engineering, instrumentalized to fulfill the desires of another human being, one would be incapable 
of identifying as part of the moral community of human beings. Hyperagency thus paradoxically 
results in the inability to take autonomy, and therefore ethical responsibility, seriously as 
grounding moral and political concepts. When taken to its logical extreme, human will and techno-
scientific instrumentalism objectify human agents so that their status as self-willing subjects loses 
its intellectual coherence. 
Political theorist Francis Fukuyama and bioethicist George Annas are less concerned with 
the coherence of autonomy and more so with the coherence of human nature as a stable, universal, 
and self-evident concept that can ground political rights discourse. Fukuyama explains that the 
demand for equality and recognition implies some non-contingent, essential human quality 
“underneath” that is worthy of a certain minimal level of respect. This “Factor X” is human nature, 
i.e. “the sum of the behaviors and characteristics that are typical of the human species, arising from 
genetic rather than environmental factors” (accounting for some statistical variance).217 Factor X 
cannot be reduced to any one trait such as the possession of reason, language, sentience, 
 
216 Jürgen Habermas, The Future of Human Nature (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2016). 
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embodiment, or emotions; instead it is made up of all of these qualities coming together in a 
complex human whole. This argument insists that genetics is the prior ground for cultural evolution; 
humans are wired to be cultural animals capable of modifying their own behavior through learning 
and transmission, which includes the capacities to derive moral values and create just political 
institutions.  
The crucial point, however, is not what Factor X is but rather what factor X does, i.e. 
differentiate the human species as the basis for moral status. “Every liberal democracy,” Fukuyama 
explains, “does in fact differentiate rights based on the degree to which individuals or categories 
of individuals share in certain species-typical characteristics.”218 Invoking the natural law tradition, 
he contends that Thomas Jefferson, John Locke, and Thomas Hobbes correctly understood that 
political rights and principles needed to be grounded in empirical observations of what humans 
were like “by nature.” There are universal, genetic-based values, norms, and capacities – e.g. the 
desire to embed oneself in communal relationships and the capacity to formulate, debate, and 
modify abstract rules of justice – that function as a solid ground for the establishment of equal 
political rights and, in Fukuyama’s narrative, world-historical progress toward democratic systems 
of government. It is therefore humans’ shared ontological status, as beings distinct from and 
elevated above other natural kinds, which enables us to presume an entitlement to principles such 
as equality and enact them in political institutions. Insofar as the presence of “posthumans” would 
rebut the presumption of a universal human nature and fixed species boundaries, the radical 
modification of human biology threatens to upend our foundational criteria for moral status. 
Fukuyama thus concludes that we must draw a “red line” between therapy and enhancement 
practices in order to protect and preserve Factor X. 
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In calling for a global bioethics based in the language and political framework of human 
rights, lawyer George Annas makes an almost identical case to Fukuyama. “Membership in the 
human species,” he explains, “is central to the meaning and enforcement of human rights, and 
respect for basic human rights is essential for the survival of the human species.”219 Therefore, 
biotechnologies such as genetic engineering that threaten the species integrity of the human also 
threaten the framework of human rights. Annas, however, take this argument a step further. He 
claims that the creation of posthumans would threaten the very existence of the human species 
since the differences between humans and posthumans would render one species inferior in the 
eyes of the other, leading to exploitation, enslavement, or even “genetic genocide.”220 Thus he 
calls for radical enhancements to be classified as “crimes against humanity” or potential “weapons 
of mass destruction” and proposes an international “Convention of the Preservation of the Human 
Species,” which would ban genetic engineering and human cloning at the global level.221 
Economic and social theorist Jeremy Rifkin captures the common thread of both critiques 
in his discussion of “species integrity.” Rifkin insists that we are entering into a “biotech century” 
governed by an “algenic” worldview in which all living things are reducible to biological material, 
DNA, that can be extracted, manipulated, recombined, and programmed into an infinite number 
of combinations with the goal of “accelerating” the natural process of evolution to create a “perfect 
organism” of “optimal efficiency.”222 Rifkin, however, contends that a concept of nature is “more 
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than just an explanation of how living things interact within one another. It also serves as a 
reference point for deciphering the meaning of existence itself” and the social norms “by which 
every society measures itself and justifies its relationship to the surrounding world.”223 In reducing 
life to pure information patterns, our new scientific cosmologies eliminate the idea of species 
integrity and drain living beings of their “substance.” “There is no longer any question of 
sacredness or specialness. How could there be when there are no long any recognizable boundaries 
to respect?”224 Thus, while Rifkin admits that some forms of bioengineering are inevitable, he 
urges the reader, “for God’s sake let’s put on the breaks,” lest we fail to recognize what is stake in 
this new scientific view of life: the sanctity and sacredness of life itself. Indeed, even when framed 
in terms of therapeutic ends, the fact that biotechnologies might portend enhancement leads 
bioconservatives to take an oppositional stance to almost all biotechnological development. 
Biotechnologies are a “slippery slope” and the long-term risks, i.e., the loss of human dignity and 
moral status, are not worth potentially more immediate therapeutic rewards.225 
2.5 Metaphysical Biology: A Virtuous Nature 
If scientific materialism is the principal object of critique in both conservative positions, it 
also paradoxically serves as their ground. Fukuyama, for example, contends that humans are 
“complex adaptive” systems and, as a result, the biological whole cannot be reduced to its 
constitutive parts and small changes can lead to enormous qualitative differences. His main point, 
however, is not that enhancement is a project full of unknowns. Rather, it is that the current human 
biological makeup is an intrinsically good product of evolution, which provides us with a unique 
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gamut of emotional capacities responsible for the purposes, wants, needs, desires, and fears that 
ground human values and aspirations.226 In spite of their critical attitude toward science and 
enhancement, then, bioconservative texts do not represent humans as non-biological; rather these 
texts interpret and mobilize biological theories – or emptier notions of ‘the biological’ – to assert 
the importance of fixed species boundaries and declare that our current human nature is both 
sufficient and required for human flourishing.  
The biological in this dystopian narrative of enhancement, however, stands in for a more 
general philosophical notion of what philosopher Alasdair Macintyre terms “metaphysical biology” 
inherited from the Aristotelian tradition of virtue ethics. In this tradition, “human beings, like the 
members of all other species have a specific nature; and that nature is such that they have certain 
aims and goals, such that they move by nature towards a specific telos. The good is defined in 
terms of their species-specific characteristics.”227 This kind of “pre-philosophical” virtue theory 
understands human nature as something that exists prior to human reflection and intervention, and 
which can thus ground a universal account of the good life.228  
While conservatives often diverge from Aristotle’s emphasis on philosophical reflection as 
the core ontological activity, there is nevertheless overlap with the Aristotelian tradition of 
 
226 Fukuyama, Our Posthuman Future, 148-177. 
227 Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame, I.N.: Notre Dame Press, 1991), 139. 
228 While Aristotle contended that philosophical reflection was necessary to deduce what constitutes individual 
human flourishing (eudaimonia), he nevertheless believed that this ‘final good’ was universal and objective rather 
than a matter of subjective preference. (I use the translation of “flourishing” rather than “happiness” for precisely this 
reason.) He thus laid out a number of universal, interrelated criteria for something to be considered a final good: 1) it 
must be pursued for its own sake; 2) it must be such that we only wish for other ends for its sake; 3) it must be such 
that we do not desire it for the sake of other ends; 4) it must be complete (teleion), i.e., always be a worthy choice; 
and 5) it must be self-sufficient (autarkês), i.e., allow for a life that lacks nothing. These criteria were further framed 
within Aristotle’s overarching ontological framework, according to which each creature within the Great Chain of 
Being was ‘naturally’ endowed with a unique function (ergon). For humans, this function, which also happens to meet 
the aforementioned criteria of a final good, is the virtuous exercise of the rational soul.  
Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1094a1-1098b20. 
 120 
understanding humans as having certain essential qualities, including a pre-determined telos, that 
distinguish them as a natural kind and the ‘excellent’ pursuit (and activation) of which will lead to 
individual flourishing (eudaimonia). Biology or “species-integrity” becomes synonymous with 
givenness, limitation, and finitude, all of which, the argument goes, are essential for living a 
virtuous, contented life and gaining membership in the universal moral community. To disintegrate 
our fixed species boundaries through the use of biotechnologies would thus leave us ethically 
unmoored (or moored to unethical values) and no longer authentically human. While it is 
notoriously difficult for bioconservative theorists to define human nature in positive terms, the 
implication is clear: there is a certain ‘wisdom of nature’ that ought to be respected insofar as 
human nature, as both a theoretical concept and a biological reality, grounds our most important 
extant self-understandings and moral frameworks. In the age of biotechnologies, we can look to 
what human nature is to guide our understanding of what it ought to be. 
2.6 Bioliberalism: Arguments from and against Nature 
Proponents of enhancement sometimes rebut the human dignity and moral status critiques 
in straightforward fashion. Nick Bostrom, for example, contends that, if we understand dignity as 
either 1) “the inalienable right to be treated with a basic level of respect” or 2) the quality of being 
worthy, honorable, or excellent, then posthumans would be no less capable of possessing dignity 
than their traditional human counterparts.229 Regarding the first understanding, there is nothing to 
suggest that posthumans would not be entitled to the same basic level of respect as ordinary 
humans since human rights is a threshold concept grounded in basic cognitive and motivational 
capacities.230 Regarding the second understanding, dignity depends upon the traits and values one 
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prioritizes and, for bioliberals, dignity “consists in what we are and what we have the potential to 
become, not in our pedigree or our causal origin.” 231  According to this more relative and 
progressive definition, the project of transforming human biology to ‘improve’ our nature could 
just as easily be seen as the source, rather than the antithesis, of human dignity. 
More often, however, proponents of enhancement tend to reject bioconservative critiques 
prima facie as arguments from nature. This makes sense if one takes seriously the naturalistic 
fallacy, i.e., that nature, human or otherwise, has no moral authority insofar as ought does not 
follow from is.232 The real problem for proponents of enhancement, however, is that human nature, 
whatever virtues it might possess, is also a rich source of the unrespectable and unacceptable, 
including susceptibility to disease, murder, and racism. Given the (at best) ambivalent moral status 
of human nature, we cannot simply assume the natural as a guide to what is desirable and 
normatively right. Arguments from nature are problematic, then, not because of logical error, but 
because nature and its accidents ought to be viewed with skepticism, if not outright pessimism, 
lest we forget that “nature’s gifts are sometimes poisoned.”233 
Bioethicists Allen Buchanan and Russell Powell, for example, explain that, human 
“organisms are remarkably unlike the work of a master engineer” insofar as human evolution 
demonstrates a “suboptimal design,” according to which the evolutionary process selects for traits 
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based on environmental fitness rather than the tendency to promote human good.234 Philosopher 
Nick Bostrom and neuroscientist Anders Sandberg similarly fault the “wisdom of nature,” 
identifying a “value discordance” between “the standards by which evolution measured the quality 
of her work and the standards that we wish to apply” in terms of both individual wellbeing and 
social goods.235 Philosophers Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu contend that humans have, 
based on their evolutionary history, evolved “myopic” moral psychologies that inhibit just and 
altruistic behavior.236 From self-esteem to self-control to altruism, there is no shortage of all-too-
limited capacities that can demonstrate the insufficient job of evolution in selecting for human 
traits.   
Given this pessimistic view of nature, proponents of enhancement see little reason to be 
satisfied with our natural gifts and thus assert that we can and should use technological means to 
liberate ourselves from our fallible nature by improving our physical, intellectual, emotional, and 
even moral capacities. Transhumanist philosopher Max More asserts that it is time to “amend the 
human constitution” and end the “tyranny” of aging, death, and other limitations through 
enhancement practices such as engineering the genome and supplementing the neocortex. 237 
Bostrom explains that “by any reasonable criteria” one could improve their life by increasing their 
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lifespan and cognitive and emotional capacities.238 Who would not want to live longer, remember 
more, and be happier? After all, we already pursue these ends through the use of medical practices 
(e.g., pharmaceuticals) and cultural institutions (e.g., education) and thereby implicitly 
acknowledge the deficiencies of our natural state. The premise for proponents of enhancement is 
thus unambiguous: “changing nature for the better is a noble and glorious thing for humans to 
do.”239 
While this account would seem to indicate that proponents of enhancement reject the 
importance of human nature altogether, this is far from the case. In attempting to invalidate 
conservative appeals to an essentialist human nature, proponents of enhancement paradoxically 
translate their rhetoric into normative arguments for a different, no less essentialist, conception of 
human nature. These theorists essentialize and naturalize the interrelated traits of rationality, 
autonomy, and self-creation so that human enhancement, even to the point of becoming posthuman, 
is understood as making us more rather than less human.  
There is no shortage of examples of bioliberals defending the essential humanness of 
enhancement. Bioethicist Gregory Stock argues that forgoing better and more powerful means to 
modify ourselves would be a denial “of what the past tells us about who we are.”240 Citing 
Frederick Jackson Turner, he identifies the spirit of exploration, scientific or otherwise, as essential 
to human nature and the American psyche in particular. “To turn away from germline selection 
and modification without even exploring them,” then, “would be to deny our essential nature and 
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perhaps our destiny.”241 Rather than preserving the human species, retreating from our Promethean 
aspirations would “deaden the human spirit of exploration, taming and diminishing us.”242 In 
defending the use of performance enhancing drugs in sports, bioethicist and philosopher Julian 
Savulescu contends that, “Biological manipulation embodies the human spirit – the capacity to 
improve ourselves on the basis of reason and judgment. When we exercise our reason, we do what 
only humans do.”243 Therefore, “to choose to be better is to be human.”244 Technologist Ramez 
Naam captures this pro-enhancement premise: “Embracing our quest to understand and improve 
on ourselves doesn’t call into question our humanity – it reaffirms it.”245  
2.7 The Virtues of Enhancement 
What these accounts have in common is an emphasis on the ‘natural’, ‘higher’ capacities 
of rationality, autonomy, and self-creation. Building on Enlightenment thinkers such as Immanuel 
Kant and Francis Bacon, humans are understood as uniquely equipped with the capacity to exercise 
their reason and will in order to remake their selves and environments. From Kant, we see the 
familiar notion of reason and will as the fundamental constitutive traits of human being. According 
to the Kantian tradition, autonomy (i.e., self-legislation according to reason) is a practical, logical 
postulate necessary for morality to be intelligible. In this formulation, one’s moral goodness is 
determined through the internal struggle between inclination (desire) and obligation (duty). One’s 
duties can, in turn, be deduced through rational deliberation and the formulation of actionable 
maxims based in the categorical imperative, i.e., the unconditional rule, “act only in accordance 
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with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law,” that 
binds all rational agents.246 Without presupposing that human beings are capable of (A) using 
reason to deduce moral maxims and (B) free to act upon those maxims, it would make little sense 
to speak of one’s moral goodness. Most prescient for our purposes, it is these same autonomous 
capacities that set humans apart and entitle them to be respected as unconditional ends-in-
themselves, i.e, as a “supreme [limiting] condition” upon whatever ends we have.247 Humans here 
possess intrinsic moral worth and a unique ontological status because of their given capacities to 
transcend their natural determination through obedience to the moral law.  
If bioliberals are quick to assimilate the Kantian emphasis on rational self-determination, 
the practical reason in which they are interested is not the moral reasoning of Kant (i.e., 
deontological determinations of the good), but the scientific, goal-oriented reason of Francis Bacon. 
More than just popularizing the scientific method, Bacon contended that science ought to be used 
to ‘achieve mastery over nature in order to improve the living conditions of human beings’, or, in 
Bacon’s words, to ground the project of “effecting all things possible” toward the “relief of man’s 
estate.”248 As philosopher Michael Hauskeller notes, “the ancient definition of the human animal 
as zoon logon echon or animal rationale is being evoked here and given a peculiar twist by putting 
the emphasis on practical reason or, more precisely, a reason that is directed towards self-
improvement.”249 What makes us human is not the ability to reason as such, but rather “a particular 
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goal-oriented use of reason.”250 From this Baconian perspective, reason in the fullest sense is the 
application of scientific knowledge in the form of technologies that enable self-improvement. 
Rational, historical progress is thus a practical and technological, rather than theoretical, project 
and scientific empiricism is a means rather than an end. What matters most is not whether 
enhancement conforms to deontic rules for action but rather what outcomes it will produce. If (A) 
reason a priori produces the most moral outcomes, (B) techno-science is the fullest manifestation 
of reason, and (C) human enhancement is the practical realization of the techno-scientific project, 
it follows that (D) human enhancement is a fortiori a moral pursuit. 
If human enhancement represents the fullest manifestation of reason, however, it also 
represents the fullest manifestation of freedom. On one hand, the principle of individual freedom 
is used to justify the right of individuals to use enhancements on themselves and their offspring. 
Bioethicist John Harris explains that modern democratic states are founded on a so-called 
“democratic presumption,” i.e. the presumption that citizens ought to be free to make their own 
choices in light of their own values, regardless of whether these choices and values are acceptable 
to the majority; only serious, real, and present dangers to other citizens or society are sufficient to 
rebut this presumption.251 Unless opponents of enhancement can convincingly demonstrate such 
dangers, it follows that “human enhancement technologies should be made widely available, and 
that individuals should have broad discretion over which of these technologies to apply to 
themselves (morphological freedom), and that parents should normally get to decide which 
reproductive technologies to use when having children (reproductive freedom).”252  
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For bioliberals, however, enhancement is not just an exercise in political freedom; it 
actually increases the freedom of the individual by providing an unprecedented number of choices. 
Bioethicist Ronald Bailey contends that, “giving children such enhanced capacities as good health, 
stronger bodies, and cleverer brains, far from constraining them, would in fact give them more 
freedom and more choices.”253 Ethicist Nicholas Agar thus asserts that we ought to embrace a 
“liberal eugenics,” which enables parents to make reproductive genetic choices and ensures the 
greatest possible range of potential life plans for future persons. By enhancing all-purpose traits 
with “intrinsic” value such as intelligence, the individual would be able to pursue any number of 
life plans that might not have been available given his or her natural genetic code. Insofar as self-
determination or “freedom” is a fundamental virtue and condition of wellbeing, technological 
enhancement is not just ethically permissible but also desirable.254  
Political freedom and individual self-determination are not seen as two distinct modes of 
autonomy here but rather as mutually supportive ends. If enhancement techniques can increase 
individual self-determination, and if democracies exist to protect and maximize the individual, 
natural right of freedom, then the state ought to encourage rather than restrict enhancement projects 
or, just as preferable, defer to the free market. In the context of enhancement social ethics, where 
supply and demand drive technological advancement and the choices of the individual are 
paramount, liberalism necessitates libertarianism. Given bioethicists longstanding role in 
authorizing government funding of biomedical and biotechnological research, this critical attitude 
towards government oversight might be seen as somewhat surprising. The simplest explanation 
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might be to understand it as a reaction to the regulatory success of conservative bioethicists under 
the Bush administration and the simultaneous privatization of technological research and design 
in Silicon Valley. It is also, however, worth noting that, as historian Fred Turner demonstrates, 
American “cyberculture” and its grounding idealization of free information exchange developed 
directly out of the libertarian political ethos of 1960s counterculture. Even as government agencies 
drove the research behind digital computers and the Internet, it was championed by “digital 
utopians” like Stewart Brand and John Perry Barlow as a means of effecting political 
decentralization and personal liberation.255 Given that biotechnologies are so often seen as part 
and parcel of the information revolution, it should be altogether unsurprising that techno-
enthusiasts imagine its ideal social and political conditions in similar terms.256  
Such historical connections, however, should not belie the importance of how bioliberals 
themselves historicize (or rather de-historicize) the project of human enhancement. In particular, 
bioliberals seek to establish the essential humanness of enhancement through positioning it within 
a classical narrative of modernization in which the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment act as 
watershed moments. As transhumanist bioethicist James Hughes explains: 
As soon as hominids developed the capacity for abstract thought, they began to 
imagine ways that their life could be radically improved. They developed medicines 
and magical practices to improve health and wisdom. They developed religious 
worldviews that posited times and places without toil, conflict, or injustice, a more 
perfect world where they would be free of their vicissitudes.…With the emergence 
of the European Enlightenment in the 1700, however, these aspirations found 
expression in the belief that a new world could and would be built on foundations 
of reason, science, and technology.257 
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This world-historical narrative is intended to communicate an enduring human essence: humans 
have always been organisms directed toward the goal of self-improvement and self-creation. 
Proponents of enhancement thus understand themselves as continuing the historical progress 
initiated by the Enlightenment tradition with biotechnologies functioning as one more means to an 
age-old end. The key difference for these enthusiasts is that, as the culmination of a long 
secularizing transition to practical reason, enhancement technologies promise to – unlike magical, 
religious and other unscientific means – finally fulfill our ancient longings.  
Despite invoking this traditional model of secularization, bioliberals do not necessarily 
view the scientific project of enhancement as being in conflict with religion. Hughes notes that a 
2005 poll of the World Transhumanist Association showed that while two-thirds of members 
identified as atheist, agnostic, secular humanist, or nontheist, a third self-identified with some kind 
of religiosity or spirituality, including Christian (8%), spiritual (5%), Buddhist (4%), and religious 
humanist (2%). 258  Just as important, “there are beginning signs of religious-transhumanist 
syncretism both within and outside of the major faiths.”259 Prolific Protestant theologians Ted 
Peters and Ronald Cole-Turner, for example, subscribe to a framework of “co-creation.”  Co-
creation presupposes that humans are best understood as not only made in the image of God (imago 
dei), but also as conscious subjects who act cooperatively with God in advancing the project of 
creation, i.e., as “created co-creators.” According to Peters, “a theology of continuing creation 
looks forward to the new … [and] is realistic about the dynamic nature of our situation. Everything 
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changes.”260 From this follows an ethics that “denies that the status quo defines what is good, 
denies that the present situation has an automatic moral claim to perpetuity.”261 Instead, Peters 
insists, “the concept of the created co-creator we invoke here is a cautious but creative Christian 
concept that begins with a vision of openness to God’s future and responsibility for the human 
future.”262 Whether expressed in religious or secular terms, however, the premise is the same: 
humans are, by their very nature, engaged in a project of not just self-determination but also self- 
and world-creation.  
2.8 Philosophical Ethics and/as Evolutionary Biology 
Rather than just forwarding a normative philosophical essence, this account is also 
naturalized to fit with understandings of evolutionary biology and molecular genomics. Like with 
its historical narration, the bioliberal account connects to an evolutionary narrative in which the 
human species has always been subject to change and Homo sapiens sapiens’ capacity to modify 
both self and environment has been crucial to its survival. As Buchanan and Russell explain, from 
the perspective of evolutionary biology, “survival is contingent on change, not stasis, since 
adaptive optimality is spatially local and temporally fleeting.” As a product of evolution, then, 
enhancement “is simply one more way in which a lineage (in this case, the human species) can 
buffer itself against the perennially decaying selective environment.” 263  Given humans’ 
“suboptimal” evolutionary adaptations - e.g. the genetic insensitivity to the post-reproductive 
quality of life – and the potential of intentional genetic modification (IGM) to overcome these 
“severe” limitations, evolutionary theory (purportedly) supports developing IGM technologies. 
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Futurist Ray Kurzweil argues that evolution – both biological and technological – is a 
process of creating patterns of increasing order and complexity according to an exponential model 
known as Moore’s Law, which he refigures as the “Law of Accelerating Returns.”264 Based on this 
trend of exponential increase, the next logical step is for humans to go beyond the hardwired 
limitations of the brain’s computing power by merging with intelligent machines. This merger of 
human and machine – which will involve utopian outcomes ranging from indefinite life-extension 
to the virtual uploading of consciousness – is what Kurzweil calls the “Singularity.” While the 
Singularity is a historical rupture in which biology is “transcended,” it is also perfectly consistent 
with an informatic view of evolution and is thus considered completely natural and even 
teleological.265 “Being human,” he explains, “means being part of a civilization that seeks to 
extend its boundaries.” 266 Thus, even in a universe in which artificial intelligence altogether 
supersedes its biological counterpart “our civilization will remain human—indeed, in many ways 
it will be more exemplary of what we regard as human than it is today, although our understanding 
of the term will move beyond its biological origins.”267 
The importance of the natural for proponents of enhancement is further elucidated through 
their discussions of the means of enhancement. While these thinkers tend to acknowledge that 
‘traditional’ means of enhancement such as education are legitimate, they nevertheless view them 
as insufficient. For example, proponents of moral enhancement such as philosophers Mark Walker 
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and Thomas Douglas contend that ethical virtues including truthfulness, justice, and caring are in 
large part heritable and are therefore subject to genetic modification.268 If the degree to which one 
possesses these virtues is hardwired, then there may be a limit to which the ethical aim of 
eradicating “evil” “can be realized through processes of socialization and education alone.”269 It 
follows that intervening in the human genome directly is the most efficient and, in some cases, the 
only means for humans to morally enhance themselves.270 
In this rendering of the human future, the utopian imagination is reoriented from social and 
political means toward biotechnology with biological enhancement functioning as the primary 
means to achieve individual human flourishing. If biology is the source of our defective physical, 
intellectual, and moral existence, it is also the potential source of our salvation. The bioliberal 
account of human nature is thus not intended to be a simple description of humans’ characteristic 
behavior. Rather, it is used as a ground for the normative directive to enhance. In this alternate 
understanding of human nature, enhancement is “what we are meant to do by virtue of what we 
are.”271 If we want to remain true to our nature, then we must support the development and use of 
enhancement techniques in all aspects of life. Thus Bostrom cites Kant’s famous motto of 




268 Mark Walker “Genetic Virtue: A Project for Twenty-First Century Humanity?” Politics and the Life Sciences 28, 
no. 2 (2009): 27-47. Thomas Douglas, “Moral Enhancement” Journal of Applied Philosophy 25, no 3 (2008): 228-
245. 
269 Walker, “Genetic Virtue,” 29. 
270 Douglas provides the most concise definition of moral enhancement: “A person morally enhances herself if she 
alters herself in a way that may reasonably be expected to result in her having morally better future motives, taken in 
sum, than she would otherwise have had.” Douglas, “Moral Enhancement,” 129.  
271 Hauskeller, “Prometheus Unbound,” 11. 
272 Bostrom, “A History of Transhumanist Thought,” 4. 
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2.9 Bio-Humanism and Beyond  
Frustrated with liberal and conservative bioethicists talking past one another, Hastings 
Center bioethicist Erik Parens published an analysis of the enhancement debate in 2005 that 
attempted to open a path of reconciliation between the two sides. Parens contended that both 
advocacy for and criticism of enhancement depend upon different understandings of “authenticity” 
that “grow out of two different but equally worthy ethical frameworks, which stand in fertile 
tension with each other.”273 Drawing on philosopher Charles Taylor’s The Ethics of Authenticity, 
he explained that each of us finds our own way of being in the world: “It is my job as a human 
being to find my way of flourishing as a being true to myself. ‘If I am not [true to myself], I miss 
the point of my life, I miss what being human is for me,’” leading to an experiential state of 
alienation. 274  Parens thus describes the two poles of the enhancement in terms of differing 
“psycho-ethical frameworks” of authenticity: gratitude and creativity. Gratitude obliges us to 
recognize that “we human beings are not the creators of life; we are creatures, whose job is to 
remember that life is a gift. It is our responsibility to express our gratitude for the mysterious whole, 
which we have not made.” 275  Creativity, on the other hand, compels us to recognize that 
enhancements “do not separate us from what is most our own. On the contrary, they give us what 
is most our own; they free us up so that we encounter the world as it really is and authentically 
create ourselves.”276 
While Parens’ synthesis of the enhancement debate maps onto what we have seen so far, 
his analysis draws our attention to the fact that the two predominant positions on enhancement 
 
273 Erik Parens, “Authenticity and Ambivalence: Toward Understanding the Enhancement Debate” The Hastings 
Center Report 35, No. 3 (2005): 34-41. 
274 Parens, “Authenticity and Ambivalence,” 35. 
275 Parens, “Authenticity and Ambivalence,” 37. 
276 Parens, “Authenticity and Ambivalence,” 36. 
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share more in common than most observers have been able or willing to recognize. In his attempt 
to generate more honest deliberation and collaboration, however, Parens chooses an approach of 
inclusive validation according to which the two predominant perspectives are folded into an ideal 
political pluralism and recognized as ‘authentic’ or ‘equally worthy’ by virtue of being principled 
beliefs. While Parens is right to identify sameness between the two sides, I want to suggest that 
the more exigent common ground between bioconservatives and bioliberals is their deep 
commitment to classical humanist ideals of selfhood and their unreflexive approach to the category 
of human nature. After all, the crux of both the conservative and liberal positions on enhancement 
is that we ought to pursue what will make us most human, whether that is preserving our species 
integrity or becoming posthuman. What is needed for enhancement ethics to progress, then, is not 
simply a more civil civic discourse in which conservatives and liberals actually listen to one 
another. Rather, we need to understand that both operative frameworks fail to meaningfully 
challenge or re-imagine familiar ontological understanding of ‘the human’ and are therefore 
equally unworthy of evaluating the moral potential of biotechnologies.  
Posthumanist philosopher Tamar Sharon’s reading of biotechnologies through Gilles 
Deleuze and Felix Guatarri’s lens of “schizoanalysis” is especially useful for understanding the 
discursive strategies through which humanism is operationalized in the enhancement debate.277 In 
Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate a cycle of de- and re-
territorialization in which relations, concepts, or practices are freed from their given “territory” 
and then resituated as part of a different system or assemblage. For Deleuze and Guattari, this is 
most evident in capitalism’s transformation of products into commodities, which deterritorializes 
 
277 Tamar Sharon, Human Nature in an Age of Biotechnology: The Case for Mediated Posthumanism (New York: 
Springer Books, 2013), 175-197. Tamar Sharon, “A Schizoanalysis of Emerging Biotechnologies: Renaturalized 
Nature, the Disclosed Secret of Life, and Technologically Authentic Selfhood” Configurations 19, no. 3 (2011): 431–
460. 
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labor-power by freeing it from specific means of production and reterritorializes it as wages. The 
main effect of the process of deterritorialization is that it liberates “desire,” what Deleuze and 
Guattari view as the primary reality of subjective and social being. Once unleashed, however, this 
libidinal surplus comes up against a “paranoid” counter-trend, a reaction that seeks to incorporate 
and recode schizophrenic energies by reterritorializing them back onto transcendental signifiers 
and normalizing institutions.278 
While I have no commitment to the psycho-analytic framework of “desire,” the concept of 
“reterritorialization” or, in this case, ‘re-naturalization’ is especially pertinent to our examination 
of the enhancement debate. 
Emerging biotechnologies embody a great ’schizophrenic’ potential to challenge 
and undermine – to deterritorialize – traditional, essentialist understanding of 
nature, the human and subjectivity. But these technologies also often comprise a 
‘paranoid’ tendency, that aims to capture and rechannel this subversive potential - 
to deterritorialize it – back onto fixed, conventional understandings of nature and 
the human, thus reinstating rather than invaliding humanist narratives.279 
 
Sharon examines this cycle using the case study of Assisted Reproductive Technologies (ARTs) 
such as in vitro fertilization (IVF), artificial insemination, donor insemination, preimplantation 
genetic diagnosis (PGD), hormone treatment, surrogacy, and cryo-preservation. On one hand, 
these disruptive interventions sever the link between heterosexual and biological reproduction, 
fragmenting conventional meanings of “nature,” “gender,” “reproduction,” motherhood,” and 
“family.” For example, surrogate motherhood deconstructs the classical concept of “motherhood” 
as necessarily biological and social, instead affording different concepts of genetic, birth, adoptive, 
 
278 Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, trans. Brian Massumi 
(Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1980). 
279 Sharon, Human Nature in an Age of Biotechnology, 176. 
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and surrogate maternities.280 On the other hand, as feminist scholars of science have argued at 
length, “the technologization and medicalization of conception has transformed women’s bodies 
into sites for increasing medical intervention and control…the reproductive female body in such 
narratives is…a body that needs to be incorporated into systems of normative surveillance and 
necessitates discipline.” 281  For example, even in ‘liberal’ countries such as Austria, France, 
Denmark, Ireland, and Sweden, donor insemination and IVF are restricted to women who are 
married and, most often, in heterosexual relationships.282 
Sharon is far from alone in accounting for this trend of paranoid counter-production in the 
realm of techno-science. Speaking on the naturalization of gender boundaries, Anne Balsamo 
explains that when “stable boundaries are displaced by technological innovation (human/artificial, 
life/death, nature/culture), other boundaries are more vigilantly guarded.”283 Guatarri would later 
describe the “immense processual potentials brought forth by the revolutions in information 
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processing, telematics, robotics, office automation, biotechnology and so on” as thus far only 
leading to “a monstrous reinforcement of earlier systems of alienation, an oppressive mass-media 
culture and an infantilizing politics of consensus.”284 Jill Didur contends that, “despite the rhetoric 
of hybridity and constructivism that characterizes…claims about the impact of these new 
technologies in society, their ownership, implementation, and regulation are haunted by an 
Enlightenment subject that presupposes knowledge as disembodied and humans as autonomous 
and unified agents.” 285  Donna Haraway identifies this paranoid trend as the “informatics of 
domination” in which the “translation of the world into a problem of coding” affords “control 
strategies” that essentialize, rather than deconstruct, classical dichotomies such as primitive and 
civilized, religious and secular, nature and culture, and organism and machine.286 The result is that 
new paradigms of understanding – in this case, the language of information – can reinscribe 
existing power relations and, for Haraway at least, the ends of global capitalism and militarism. 
These posthumanist authors share a belief that while the ‘anxiety’ or ‘pressure’ that biological 
sciences and technologies put on the liberal subject possess liberative potential, the informatic self 
often paradoxically does little more than reconstitute the humanist subject in different terms.  
Sharon, however, goes on to argue that this kind of reterritorialization is never just a 
repetition, and that the meaning of familiar categories becomes plastic and flexible, rather than 
just reinscribed or erased, when resituated. Scholar Gaymon Bennett echoes this view in his 
examination of human dignity, when he explains that “[It] is not a rhetorical remainder either of 
 
284 Félix, Guattari, “Regimes, Pathways, Subjects” in Incorporations, ed. Jonathan Crary and Sanford Kwinter (New 
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the history of humanism or human rights.” Rather, it is a distinctive discursive project enmeshed 
in particular “programmatic efforts to invent and stabilize new forms of life.” 287  While I 
acknowledge that the discursive practices for making sense of biotechnologies are more than mere 
repetitions, the ‘paranoid’ element of reterritorialization cannot be understated in mapping the 
territory of the enhancement debate. If biotechnologies’ material and symbolic potential to subvert 
familiar ideas of human nature represents a schizophrenic crisis of humanism, the human 
enhancement debate embodies a paranoid counter-trend in which human nature is reterritorialized 
as a transcendental signifier through which the threat of human enhancement can be reconciled. 
This is most apparent in the fact that “humanism” is a featured, normative part of the 
enhancement lexicon. Bostrom, for example, describes transhumanism as derived from and an 
extension of humanism. Humanists, he explains, believe that “individuals matter” and that “we 
can make things better by promoting rational thinking, freedom, tolerance, democracy, and 
concern for our fellow human beings.”288 Transhumanists, however, go further in asserting that, 
“just as we use rational means to improve the human condition and the external world, we can also 
use such means to improve ourselves, the human organism.” 289 It is little surprise, then, that 
transhumanists self-identify with Renaissance and Enlightenment thinkers such as Pico della 
Mirandola, Immanuel Kant, Francis Bacon, and Marquis de Condorcet who described human 
progress and the exercise of rational will as co-substantial. It is this desire to further the reach of 
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the human mind, and its concomitant view of the human body as an obstacle to be overcome, that 
leads critics to describe transhumanism and likeminded thinking as “ultra-humanist.”290  
Bioconservatives, on the other hand, often criticize a scientific or materialist humanism, 
which implies both a reduction of the human to its empirical attributes and an elevation of the 
human to a position of absolute will. This mode of humanistic thought, however, does not exhaust 
all the possible humanisms for conservatives. Edmund Pellegrino, who succeeded Kass as 
chairmen of the President’s Council on Bioethics, offers a different reading of Renaissance 
humanism, intimating that it put forth a more authentic vision of humanism than our current 
paradigm. This vision affirms the now-familiar ideal of an ontologically contained human dignity: 
“that human beings were the only creatures endowed with reason and the freedom to use it to 
determine their own destiny. That freedom, they thought, placed us firmly between the angels and 
the apes and endowed us with an inherent dignity that set us apart from both.”291 This speaks to a 
more pervasive sentiment among conservative bioethicists; it is not that we must reject humanism 
per se, but rather that we must subscribe to the right kind of humanism, one that champions being 
human rather than becoming more than human.  
The term “humanism” deserves some clarification at this point. What is it that makes the 
models of subjectivity being operationalized in the enhancement debate humanist? Humanism has 
historically been an unstable and contested category. From Renaissance humanism to German 
idealism to Darwinian scientific humanism, no two humanisms are identical.292 In this context, 
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however, it can be useful to speak of humanism as a coherent philosophical framework for several 
reasons. Foremost, there are a number of shared positions about the human subject that persist 
across different historical humanisms and which gained decisive articulation in seventeenth 
through nineteenth century Euro-American philosophy: 1) fixedness: man is a distinct and elevated 
natural kind whose constitutive characteristics are both pregiven and universal; 2) rationality: 
based on the use of reason, man is the locus of theoretical and practical certainty; 3) autonomy: 
man can self-consciously exercise his will to determine his own situation; and 4) transparency: 
man himself is both a privileged and knowable object of knowledge.293 In tandem, these traits 
express a historically particular idealization of Aristotle’s classical animal rationale, the 
‘enlightened’ recognition and exercise of which have been widely understood as decisive in 
initiating Western “modernity.”294 
 
293 The primary source material – what we might think of as the “canon” of Western philosophy – is far too prolific 
to give a meaningful account of here. Besides my own engagement with Enlightenment philosophers, this description 
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Vintage Books, 1994). Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse on Language, trans. A.M. 
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Critiques from feminist, post-colonial, environmental, and post-humanist studies, however, 
have demonstrated that, more than just delineating distinctive human capacities, what ties together 
humanism as a coherent “philosophy of man” is the inscription of a dominant subject defined in 
oppositional and hierarchical terms. 295 We can follow Saba Mahmood in understanding this as a 
paradoxical practice of universalization in which certain descriptive and normative categories of 
being and acting – in Mahmood’s example, an inherent desire for self-realization through the 
unconstrained exercise of individual autonomy – are assumed to apply independent of particular 
context.296 Political philosopher Jeffrey Minson notes that this humanist legacy can, in part, be 
traced back to Kant’s ethical formulation, which de-situated moral action through universalist, 
deontological determinations of the good that exist over and against the particular contexts in 
which moral acts unfold.297 To this, we might also add Kant’s explicit framing of embodiment – 
including desire, pleasure, and emotion – as the principal antagonist in cultivating a moral life.298 
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Indeed, feminist critiques have long noted how rational thought and individual agency have 
secured their place as the constitutive characteristics of the humanist subject through the discursive 
exclusion of the bodily, feminine, emotional, non-rational, and intersubjective.299 This practice of 
universalization is thus paradoxical because it equalizes through constructing oppositions and 
hierarchies. Descriptions of purportedly ‘natural’, ‘human’ modes of being and acting depend upon 
and afford the exclusion, erasure, or de-humanization of their non-conforming counterparts. In the 
context of humanism, then, ‘the human’ functions as a conceptual and linguistic sign of difference 
that delimits the self through marking non-humans (e.g., animals, technologies, nature, and non-
normative persons) as both other and less than.  
Both the particular traits of the humanist subject and its oppositional, hierarchical status 
here depend upon a prior metaphysical integrity. This should sound counterintuitive given that, in 
the prior chapter, we saw how the movement to a ‘molecular’ way of knowing acted as a condition 
of the human enhancement debate. To review, beginning in the late 1800s, medical illness was 
relocated in individual bodies and medicine was reconceptualized in terms of depth, organs, and 
functions, rather than just species and classifications. The body that emerged under this “clinical 
gaze” – a bounded, systemic whole – became the predominant model across scientific and 
humanistic disciplines in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.300 Starting in the postwar period, 
however, life scientists began to conceive of organisms in terms of transferable elements of genetic 
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information. According to this molecular way of knowing, the ‘stuff’ of life – information patterns 
– could be stored, transported, and reassembled, including across species lines. Human nature is 
always already ‘recombinatory’ and, taken to its logical extreme, the subject is an open, rather than 
closed, system of information flows.301 While I will return to the idea of molecular subjectivity in 
Chapter Five, the important point here is that the idea of human enhancement depends upon a prior 
understanding of the human body as an informatic self, always already open to biotechnological 
intervention. This recombinatory model of subjectivity provides the epistemic ground upon which 
bioethicists can speak of enhancement as a serious possibility in the first place. 
While this would seem to suggest that bioethicists are discussing a non-humanist subject 
with ‘leaky boundaries’, the actual subject of enhancement discourse – the human whose nature is 
at stake and whom we must make ethical decisions about – is instead the self-contained, self-
determining subject of classical humanism. Bioethical appeals to human nature presuppose what 
post-humanist theorist Elaine Graham describes as an “ontological hygiene,” i.e. a refusal to 
recognize that the conceptual (and not just physical) distinctions between the organic and 
technological, nature and artifact, human and machine are being called into question by both 
critical theory and techno-science itself.302 Both conservative and liberal thinkers reproduce a 
quasi-Cartesian dualism in which the human subject is separated from the rest of the natural and 
artificial world. For conservative thinkers, biotechnologies threaten to impinge on the human from 
the outside, penetrating the boundaries and integrity of the sacred, autonomous subject and thereby 
threatening human dignity and moral status. Even while will and power are questioned as supreme 
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values and ends, the ontologically distinctive and fully contained nature of the human subject 
remains paramount. For liberal thinkers, biotechnologies are a means for the autonomous, rational 
subject to exercise mastery over the natural world. While this more dynamic subject integrates 
technologies into the self toward the end of self-improvement, it remains in a fixed, transcendent 
position in relation to its environment and even its own body. 
In both cases, the imagined subject of enhancement is reminiscent of what Charles Taylor 
refers to as the “buffered self” characteristic of the modern, secular age: an individual self that (A) 
exists within and is “responsible” for a natural, material, and immanent real and which (B) 
internalizes knowing and acting into the interior space of the (rational) mind.303 While Taylor 
presents a far-reaching narrative of secularization and disenchantment that we will return to in 
Chapters Three and Four, the important point here is that, within the enhancement debate, there is 
a strong metaphysical distinction between the internal self and the outside world that acts as the 
condition for beliefs about the ethical status of enhancement and the future of human nature. 
Subjects are imagined as self-contained, self-determining entities, (heretofore) distinct from both 
nature and artifice, rather than constructed “in and through our environment, our tools, our artifacts, 
and our networks of human and non-human life.”304  
This model of subjectivity is, in turn, ‘naturalized’ by virtue of its universal and 
transhistorical status. For conservatives, the nature that biotechnologies threaten is one that has 
persisted through time and space as the (biological) common ground of species membership. 
Whether through references to God, nature, or virtue, these theorists establish the stakes of 
enhancement as the same conditions for living an authentic life that have existed as long as there 
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have been humans to pursue individual flourishing. There is, according to this position, nothing 
particularly modern about the values and ends that humans do (or ought to) pursue. Even when 
referencing modern political systems, the implication is that the coherence of these systems 
depends upon what humans have always been like ‘by nature.’ Put differently, modernity already 
sufficiently provides all the conditions required for human flourishing vis-a-vis the political 
recognition of human dignity and human rights and is, therefore, an achievement worth conserving. 
Likewise, for liberals, the unifying trait of goal-oriented self-determination allows historical, 
technological, and biological change to be assimilated into an enduring human essence. 
Modernization, realized through the development of techno-science, merely creates the conditions 
for humans to achieve goals – longer life, increased intelligence, greater contentment, and more 
moral behavior – as old as human culture itself.  
As Foucault reminds us, however, the transcendent subject in question “is neither the oldest 
nor the most constant problem that has been posed for human knowledge…it was the effect of a 
change in the fundamental arrangements of knowledge” beginning with the invention of the human 
sciences in the early modern period.305 For Foucault and other postmodern thinkers, seriously 
examining the ‘ontology of ourselves’ requires understanding the human as subject to socially and 
historically determined relations of knowledge and power. As Mahmood explains, “if the ability 
to effect change in the world and in oneself is historically and culturally specific,” then our 
categories of human understanding such as “agency,” “cannot be fixed in advance, but must 
emerge through an analysis of the particular concepts that enable specific modes of being, 
responsibility, and effectivity.”306 While the historically determined character of the human should 
 
305 Foucault, The Order of Things, 386-387. 
306 Mahmood, Politics of Piety, 14-15. 
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be obvious to bioliberals, who understand themselves as extending Enlightenment thought into the 
present and future, historicization counts for very little when one assumes that the ontological 
claims in question are ‘objective’.  
Objectivity here is articulated not only through philosophical appeals to essence but also 
scientific naturalization. By appealing to the scientific notion that certain morally worthy human 
traits inhere in our biological structure, both sides are able to treat their preferred traits as 
authoritative and universal. For conservatives, humans possess a “species integrity” in which the 
(purportedly) enduring biological characteristics of homo sapiens sapiens are valuable and even 
sacred. While the actual biological characteristics in question remain elusive in these accounts, 
there is little doubt that there is some structural relationship between the complexity of human 
biology as is and (conservative) human values. Meanwhile, liberals operationalize evolutionary 
biology to normalize and universalize the desire to enhance. If evolution itself is a process of 
modifying self and environment toward the end of self-improvement, then there is nothing 
qualitatively new or different about the use of biotechnologies, and enhancement is something 
toward which all humans already tacitly strive. In both cases, the metaphysical integrity of the 
humanist subject is somewhat paradoxically authorized by the very sciences that seem to call it 
into question.  
It is thus equally important to recognize that biological definitions are no less socially and 
historically determined than accounts of philosophical essence. Critical theorists such as Foucault 
and Donna Haraway have demonstrated that the biological and medical sciences have naturalized 
and normalized different traits at different moments in modern western history and, in doing so, 
provided moral authority to particular persons and systems of power. Evolutionary and behavioral 
sciences in particular have played a crucial role in reinforcing existing social assumptions by 
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formulating and instituting the disciplinary and regulative mechanisms according to which subjects 
are constituted as “normal” and “deviant.”307 Indeed, the histories of biology and psychology 
cannot be told without acknowledging the institutional projects of classifying homosexuals, 
women, persons of color, and the disabled (among others) as ‘naturally’ deficient and in need of 
medical correction (or altogether uncorrectable). While many such problematic theories have since 
been rejected, to presume that science will correct itself in an indefinite and progressive fashion 
misses the point: science is informed by and fed back into the cultural context in which it is 
produced and, therefore, scientific knowledge – operating as a discursive means of deriving 
objective truth about the self – is always already part and parcel of structuring social and political 
power.  
For both conservative and liberal thinkers, however, questions of power, to the extent that 
they are addressed, are articulated in the limited terms of technological access and positional 
equality.308 While the issues of access and equality are no doubt pressing, they ignore the more 
fundamental issues of power implicit in the philosophical and scientific project of normalization 
that underlies the enhancement debate. As philosopher Anita Silvers explains in an early critique 
of “normal species functioning,” “normalizing equalizes opportunity primarily for those who can 
be maintained in or restored to the image of the dominant group. But no natural biological mandate 
nor evolutionary triumph assures that the functional routines of this group are optimally efficient 
 
307 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Volume 1: An Introduction, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1990).  Haraway, Simians, Cyborgs, and Women. 
308 Whereas opponents of enhancement claim that enhancement technologies will exacerbate the already troubling 
class divide between rich and poor, proponents assert that the price point on these technologies will drop in short order 
and enhancements could actually level rather than further unbalance the socio-economic playing field. See, for 
example: Rifkin, The Biotech Century, 168. Naam, More than Human, 75. 
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or effective.”309 Philosopher Melinda takes this claim to its logical extension in her discussion of 
disability and transhumanism, contending that the ideal of human enhancement mediates “the 
protocols, procedures, and discourses surrounding, inhibiting, and constituting the identities of 
those considered unfit for the future…the task of defining who counts and, therefore, who gets to 
live.” 310  The therapy/enhancement distinction, which depends upon prior socio-medical 
definitions of normal species functioning, both carries the ideational load of prior normal/deviant 
distinctions and portends their extension into the realm of the biotechnological. However well-
intentioned, the projects of normalization implicit in the enhancement discourse threaten to 
“preserve existing patterns of functional dominance and privilege.” 311 To examine the power 
dynamics at work in human enhancement, then, we must also, as I have begun to in this chapter, 
reflexively analyze the ontological and ethical norms that are taken up in bioethical imaginings of 
both ‘normal’ and ‘enhanced’ human natures. 
Through this chapter, I have argued that both bioconservatives and bioliberals utilize 
rhetorical strategies of ‘naturalization’ – essentialist appeals to a biological and normative human 
nature – to ground their respective position on human enhancement. Furthermore, despite their 
apparent differences, both appeals depend on a similar humanist ideal of the subject as an 
autonomous, unified, and transhistorical agent. To frame the ethical status of enhancement, above 
all, in terms of whether it will make us more or less human, however, presumes the ontological 
coherence and privileged moral status of ‘the human’ and thus occludes critique of humanism and 
 
309 Anita Silver, “A Fatal Attraction to Normalizing: Treating Disabilities as Deviations from ‘Species-Typical’ 
Functioning” in Enhancing Human Traits, ed. Erik Parens (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1998), 
114. 
310 Melinda C. Hall, The Bioethics of Enhancement: Transhumanism, Disability, and Biopolitics (Lanham, MD: 
Lexington Books, 2017), xi. 
311 Silver, “A Fatal Attraction to Normalizing,” 108. 
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its universalist, oppositional, and hierarchical premises. We must, therefore, seriously question 
whether ‘humanness’ or ‘human nature’ is the most useful reference point for determining the 
ethical status of biotechnological development. Rather than using human nature as a means to 
identify and validate ‘consensus’ ethics, I suggest that we see the enhancement debate as a 
discursive occasion to open up and deconstruct the black box of longstanding humanist principles 
in bioethics. 
As critical theorist Neil Badmington reminds us, however, posthumanist intellectual 
practice cannot consist in the mere fashioning of “scriptural tombs” for humanism. Rather, 
posthumanist practice requires a “working through” and “rewriting” of humanist discourse from 
the inside – a “repetition” that identifies and questions “what is implicit in the founding concepts” 
without reinstating that logic.312 The next two chapters will continue this labor of “building a way” 
out of humanist bioethics through a more critical examination of the conservative and liberal 
positions on biotechnologies. In particular, we will see how problematic frameworks of secularism 
and secularization shape the operative utopian and dystopian logics of human enhancement. In 
turn, we can begin to ask: what would it look like to think the biotechnological ‘crisis’ in terms 










312 It is worth noting that Badmington’s language here draws on that of Sigmund Freud, Michel de Certeau, and 
Jacques Derrida, who he sees as proto-posthumanists. Neil Badmington, “Theorizing Posthumanism,” Cultural 
Critique 53 (2003): 20-22. 
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Chapter Three: 
Theologizing Public Bioethics  
 
3.1 A Substantive Turn 
In Chapter One, I documented and built on sociologist John Evans’ description of the 
development of American bioethics as a process of Weberian formal rationalization in which the 
professionalization of bioethics and the coextensive development of common moral principlism 
narrowed and instrumentalized public-facing bioethical discourse. While I believe that Evans 
places too much emphasis on professional distinctions – narrating theologians as the unique mantle 
bearers of substantive reason – his overarching description of the invention of bioethics as a 
process of discursive “thinning” is nevertheless persuasive.313 Beginning in the 1970s, bioethical 
modes of reasoning did in fact become more “formal” than “substantive” – a trend that still persists 
in most subfields of the discipline. While other historians of bioethics do not often use the same 
thin/thick language as Evans, he is far from alone in framing the birth and development of bioethics 
along these narrative lines.314 
 
313 John H. Evans, Playing God?: Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization of Public Bioethical Debate 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002). John H. Evans, The History and Future of Bioethics: A Sociological 
View (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). John H. Evans, “Science, Bioethics, and Religion,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion, ed. Peter Harrison (Oxford, UK: University of Oxford, 2010), 207-
266. 
314 As we saw in Chapter One, most historical and sociological analyses take the invention of common moral 
principlism to be the defining moment in the development of academic, public, and professional bioethics. While the 
retreat of religion is not stated in such explicit terms in most of these analyses, the more critical ones identify similar 
problems with the philosophical narrowness of the field’s guiding framework. The implication is that, whether 
incidental or necessary, the professionalization of bioethics has involved a ‘thinning’ of bioethical discourse vis-à-vis 
the predominance of utilitarian ethics, scientific interests, and legislative pragmatism. Carl Elliott, A Philosophical 
Disease: Bioethics, Culture, and Identity (New York: Routledge, 1999). Renée C. Fox and Judith P. Swazey, 
Observing Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). Robert M. Veatch, A Theory of Medical Ethics (New 
York: Basic Books, 1981). Tristram H. Engelhardt, The Foundations of Bioethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1986). Edwin R. DuBose, et.al, ed., A Matter of Principles?: Ferment in U.S. Bioethics (Valley Forge, P.A.: Trinity 
Press International, 1994). Daniel Callahan, The Roots of Bioethics: Health, Progress, Technology, Death (Oxford 
University Press, 2012). Heikki Saxén, A Cultural Giant: An Interpretation of Bioethics in Light of Its Intellectual and 
Cultural History (Finland: Tampere University Press, 2017). 
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This narrative framing, however, deserves further complication in two interrelated respects. 
First, for Evans and likeminded thinkers, the formal rationalization of bioethics reads much like a 
reiteration of the traditional secularization thesis in which theologians and other religious actors 
‘retreat’ from the public sphere as a condition of modern, secular life. It is no coincidence that 
Max Weber formulated one of the earliest and most influential versions of this thesis, describing 
the modern “disenchantment of the world” – grounded in the predominance of scientific 
empiricism and institutional utilitarianism – as necessitating the gradual diminishment of 
traditional, religious authority in public life.315 Second, we have seen that, at least in the context 
of the human enhancement debate, substantive concerns have begun to return to the mainstream 
of the field. Questions concerning ultimate ends and values – asked and answered vis-à-vis the 
language of human nature – are at the center of enhancement discourse. There has, however, been 
no straightforward reversal in which theologians re-enter the field and scientists retreat from it. 
How, then, can we understand the re-emergence of thick, public-facing bioethical discourse?  
To answer this question, we must undertake two tasks. First, we must examine the 
President’s Council on Bioethics (2001-2008) under President George W. Bush, which, as I noted 
in Chapter One, played an outsized and deliberate role in thickening public bioethical discourse 
through their reports on human enhancements. Second, we must leave behind not just the 
straightforward distinction between theologians and scientists but also the hard distinction between 
the religious and the secular that it implies.  
 
315 While I will return to Weber’s disenchantment thesis in more detail in Chapter Four, the basic outlines of his 
argument can be found in Max Weber, “Science as a Vocation” in Essays in Sociology, ed. and trans. H.H. Gerth and 
C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), 129-156. For secondary elaboration on the idea of 
disenchantment, see: Jason A. Josephson-Storm, The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of 
the Human Sciences (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2017). 
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Scholars of religion have long sought to trouble the presupposed oppositional relationship 
between religion and secularism, including the monolithic meta-narrative of modernization-as-
secularization upon which it depends. For example, critical theorists of religion have noted that, 
even if oppositional, religion and secularism are mutually constituted categories and therefore 
relational; secularism thus paradoxically ensures the presence, rather than the absence, of 
religion.316 To this end, historians of American religion have demonstrated that the retreat of 
religious actors and institutions from the public sphere and the purported internalization and 
domestication of religious life has been overstated; from the “prophetic religion” of the Civil 
Rights Movement to the rise of the evangelical Christian Right, religion persists as both an external 
and public phenomenon in the United States.317 Taking this a step further, religionists have shown 
that secularism – both as an abstract political ideal and in its particular institutional instantiations 
in the United States – is a theological invention, deeply informed by Protestant understanding of 
 
316 This has become a de facto position within the critical theorization of religion and secularism. One of the earliest 
and most influential articulations of this point, however, can be found in Talal Asad’s genealogical Formations of the 
Secular in which Asad argues that secularism does not represent a break from religion so much as a new kind of sacred, 
the production of which involved imbuing ‘religious’ concepts with new meanings and changing their ‘grammar’ to 
reflect different sensibilities about self and world. But more than just tracing secularism’s genealogical debt to religion, 
Asad shows that secularism’s enactment depends upon discursive acts of oppositional definition. Within the master 
narrative of secularization, religion is redefined as a mental phenomenon, i.e., a matter of private belief, individual 
conscious, and mythic imagination. This definitional work is what allows the secular to represent itself as the objective 
reality within which religion can (and ought to) be sited. The secular, in other words, foremost defines itself through 
descriptions of religion as ‘other’ – descriptive acts which are, paradoxically, derived from historically religious and, 
in particular Christian, modes of reasoning. Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity 
(Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2003). 
317  There is no shortage of literature, particularly from scholars of American religion, that demonstrates the 
(continued) presence of religion in the public sphere of (ostensibly) secular contexts. The two examples I reference 
here – “prophetic religion” in the Civil Rights Movement and the rise of the Evangelical Right – are simply two acute 
examples of religion both being imagined by religious actors as a political project and motivating highly visible 
political intervention. David L Chappell, A Stone of Hope: Prophetic Religion and the Death of Jim Crow (Chapel 
Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2005). Seth Dowland, “’Family Values’ and the Formation of a Christian 
Right Agenda,” Church History 78, no. 3 (2009): 606-631. It is also worth noting that sociologist Robert Bellah takes 
this idea a step further, arguing that political life in the United States is itself a form of “civil religion,” which involves 
“a genuine apprehension of universal and transcendent religious reality as seen in or, one could almost say, as revealed 
through the experience of the American people.” Robert N. Bellah, “Civil Religion in America,” Daedalus 96, no. 1 
(Winter 1967): 1-21. 
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“true religion.”318 This has, in turn, led to a recognition that, in spite of its self-representation, 
secularism is not an ‘empty’, neutral framework; it is full of particular metaphysical, ontological, 
and normative commitments ranging from an immanentist metaphysics to an individualist and 
pluralist pursuit of authenticity.319 Just as important, there is no singular, global secularism to 
which we can refer; rather, there are multiple secularisms, which shape and are shaped by the 
contexts in which they develop and operate.320 
While I will return to some of these arguments in greater detail in this chapter and the next, 
I want to highlight one of the common threads of these critical approaches: like “religion,” 
“secularism” is not (or not just) an objective sociological, historical, or philosophical description 
of a/the modern state of affairs; rather, it is a flexible category of understanding that operates in 
the very world(s) it attempts to describe. When we seek to make sense of secularism, then, we 
must attend to the particular ways in which the framework is being implicitly and explicitly 
 
318 Once again, there is no shortage of relevant texts on this topic. My thinking, however, especially indebted to 
philosopher of religion Mark C. Taylor, who traces the invention of secular modernity back to Luther’s and Calvin’s 
respective theological frameworks, historian of American Religion John Lardas modern, who demonstrates how 
antebellum evangelicals systematicity developed the conditions the secular experience of religion in their pursuit of 
“true religion,” and historian of American religion Tracy Fessenden, who examines how normative Protestant ideals 
have been repackaged in (exclusionary) textual narratives of authentic secularism since European colonists first 
‘settled’ in the United States. Mark C. Taylor, After God (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2007). John Lardas 
Modern, Secularism in Antebellum America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). Tracy Fessenden, Culture 
and Redemption: Religion, the Secular, and American Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007). 
319 This idea has most often been approached in terms of the identifying the metaphysical, ontological, and normative 
commitments that living secularly involves taking up – commitments elaborated on by many of the authors mentioned 
in these footnotes and which I will expand on below through engagement with philosopher Charles Taylor’s idea of 
the “immanent frame.” It also worth noting that some scholars have begun to approach this topic in terms of 
embodiment and affect rather than just self-conscious understanding. Charles Hirschkind for example, asks, “Is there 
a secular body? Or, in somewhat different terms, is there a particular configuration of the human sensorium – of 
sensibilities, affects, embodied dispositions – specific to secular subject, and thus constitituve of what we mean by 
‘secular society’?” Charles Hirschkind. “Is There a Secular Body?” Cultural Anthropology 26, no. 4 (November 2011): 
633. 
320 While it has the been the subject of a fair amount of criticism, José Casanova’s sociological work on the public 
character of Spanish, Polish, Brazilian, and American Catholicism has been an especially important departure point 
for this academic conversation. José Casanova, Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1994). For an overview of the argument(s) regarding the multiplicity of secularism(s), see: Janet R. 
Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini, Secularisms (Durham: Duke University Press, 2008). 
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operationalized. In this case, this means looking to how particular actors in a particular secular 
space – public bioethics – negotiate the terms of their own secularity, or lack thereof.321 
With this in mind, this chapter critically examines how the President’s Council on 
Bioethics addressed the topic of human enhancement. Through an examination of the Council’s 
meetings, statements, and reports, we can see this federal body, and the larger bioconservative 
cohort it represented, as attempting to construct a normative, ontological ground for the 
therapy/enhancement distinction based in the conceptually prior distinction of nature/artifice and 
expressed, in part, in Judeo-Christian theological terms. Given their use of theological language 
and conservative stance towards biotechnologies, the Council has often been represented as 
bringing ideological and theological modes of governance into an otherwise public, secular, and 
neutral domain: governmental bioethics. In contrast, I contend that that we can best understand the 
Council’s work as a discursive project of reconstituting the secularity of public bioethics through 
mobilizing a nexus of familiar philosophical and political ideas – “human dignity,” “human 
flourishing,” and “moral status” – and replacing “ideological neutrality” with “value diversity” as 
the basis for public debate. While it will become apparent that the Council’s ‘dignitarian politics’ 
are ethically problematic, I ultimately contend that its attempt at constructing a “richer bioethics” 
that takes ontological inquiry seriously is nevertheless instructive. 
3.2 New Council, New Bioethics 
Over the course of the late-1990s and early-2000s, the ethics of using human embryos, and 
in particular embryonic stem cells, for biomedical research became a major source of public 
controversy. While the scientific and medical communities championed the potential of stem-cell 
 
321 To be clear, not all of the aforementioned theorists take up a Foucauldian or constructivist approach to secularism. 
Each does, however, approach secularism, secularization, and/or secularity as formations that operates in the world 
and which are, therefore, not immune to their own standards of critique, including empirical analysis. 
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research for producing novel therapies, and in particular for correcting physical disabilities, the 
“pro-life” movement believed that the use of human embryos violated the “sanctity of life” in a 
manner akin to abortion.322 Motivated by the concerns of his conservative, pro-life constituents, 
President George W. Bush announced his decision to restrict federal funding for human embryonic 
stem cell research on August 9, 2001. Moving forward, laboratories that received federal funding 
were restricted to using only the twenty one viable cell lines that had already been created prior to 
the announcement.323  
Declaring that stem cell research was just one of the “ethical mine fields” at our scientific 
doorstep, President Bush followed this announcement less than three months later with Executive 
Order 13237, which established The President’s Council on Bioethics, chaired by physician Leon 
Kass, to advise the President on bioethical issues. The establishment of this Council was far from 
unique; with one or two exceptions, each president, beginning with Richard Nixon in 1974, had 
formed an ad hoc presidential commission to make biomedical policy recommendations. If the 
establishment of the President’s Council itself was par for the course though, it was clear from the 
outset that this commission would be different from its practical, policy-oriented predecessors as 
its first and foremost mission was “to undertake fundamental inquiry into the human and moral 
significance of developments in biomedical and behavioral science and technology.” Just as 
important, the president’s Executive Order declared that there was “no overriding concern to find 
 
322 For an overview of the human embryonic cell debate, see: Suzanne Holland, Karen Lebacqz, and Lauria Zoloth, 
ed. The Human Embryonic Stem Cell Debate: Science, Ethics, and Public Policy. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001). 
For more on formation of the “pro-life” movement see, Mary Ziegler, After Roe: The Lost History of the Abortion 
Debate (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015). 
323 George W. Bush, “Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research,” transcript of speech delivered from Bush 
Ranch in Crawford, TX, August 11, 2001, American Presidency Project, 
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/address-the-nation-stem-cell-research. 
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consensus,” the Council was “free to establish its own priorities,” and “public education” was to 
be considered no less important than “policy guidance” in its reports.324 
This account maps onto the language of the Council’s reports themselves, which often 
remark that prior commissions too narrowly focused on practical, utilitarian concerns rather than 
the relationship between ‘fundamental human goods’ and the ends of science. In the preface to 
their initial 2002 report, Human Cloning and Human Dignity, for example, the Council described 
their project in terms that both acknowledged and sought to subvert Evans’ description of the field. 
Investigating human cloning…provides the Council an important opportunity to 
illustrate how bioethics can and should deal with those technological innovations 
that touch deeply our humanity. Here, as elsewhere, the most profound issues go 
beyond the commonplace and utilitarian concerns of feasibility, safety, and 
efficacy.325 
 
It was with this in mind that the Council stated their goal as a “richer bioethics” – “one that seeks 
to do justice to the full human meaning of biotechnological advance” – and approaches 
biotechnology not just as practical means but a “conceptual and ethical outlook” based in 
“progressive aspirations” of “human empowerment” and situated as part of “a larger human project 
– toward perfection and happiness.”326 The foremost questions we must ask, the Council intimated, 
are not ones of utilitarian ends or even ethical permissibility, but rather, “What is a human being?” 
and “What are the implications of our humanity for how we pursue the growth of our knowledge 
and its applications in practice?”327 
 
324 “Executive Order 13237 of November 28, 2001: Creation of the President’s Council on Bioethics,” Code of 
Federal Regulations, title 3 (2001): 821-823. 
325 The President's Council on Bioethics, Human Cloning and Human Dignity: An Ethical Inquiry (Washington, D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 2002), xviii. 
326 The President's Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy: Biotechnology and the Pursuit of Happiness (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2003), 21-22. 
327 The President's Council on Bioethics. Human Dignity and Bioethics (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 2008), 28. 
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How did questions such as these, which were previously seen as inappropriate for public 
deliberation because of their substantive and implicitly theological character, become legitimate 
topics of inquiry for the President’s Council? Foremost, prospective human enhancement 
technologies such as human cloning, germ-line genetic engineering, and psycho-pharmaceuticals 
functioned as a discursive mechanism through which substantive, and sometimes overtly 
theological, inquiry was re-introduced into the public bioethical sphere. Unlike past ethical 
dilemmas such as abortion or euthanasia, the Council claimed, “What’s at issue is not the crude 
old power to kill the creature made in God’s image but the attractive science-based power to 
remake ourselves after images of our own devising.”328 “At stake,” they explained, “are the kind 
of human being and the sort of society we will be creating in the coming age of biotechnology. At 
stake are the dignity of the human being…and the nature of human flourishing.”329 The implication 
of these claims was that the unique power of biotechnological interventions to transform human 
nature demanded thicker ethical engagement than other biomedical interventions.  
The imminent prospect of human enhancement, however, does not offer a self-sufficient 
explanation for the re-introduction of substantive rationality. After all, as we saw in Chapter One, 
this was not the first time that enhancement technologies had come before a presidential 
commission. For example, past reports on human genetic engineering such as Splicing Life (1983) 
had declared that similar concerns over ‘playing God’ were outside the scope of public policy 
commissions.330 As the history of professional bioethics demonstrates, and as I suggest of much 
of the humanistic thinking on biotechnologies, it is very much possible to exclude relevant 
 
328 The President's Council on Bioethics, Beyond Therapy, 11. 
329 The President's Council on Bioethics, Human Dignity and Bioethics, 302. 
330 President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical Behavioral Research, 
Splicing Life: A Report on the Social and Ethical Issues of Genetic Engineering with Human Beings (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1983), Appendix B. 
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language and ideas that do not map neatly onto the extant terms of bioethical debate. We must 
therefore resist an explanation that even implicitly depends upon technological determinism, i.e., 
the reductionist belief that technologies unidirectionally determine social structures and culture 
values. 331  While particular technologies, real or speculative, might afford certain modes of 
reasoning, there is no necessary relationship between technology and discourse.332 How then was 
Council’s substantive discourse legitimized for a purportedly secular space and an imagined 
American public? What, in other words, was different about this institution? To answer this, we 
first need to turn to a prior commission, President Clinton’s National Bioethics Advisory 
Commission (NBAC), created by executive order on October 3, 1995.333  
3.3 Dolly: A Wolf in Sheep’s Clothing  
As we saw in Chapter One, the successful embryonic cloning of Dolly the Sheep by 
scientists at the University of Edinburgh in 1997 led to a spectacular moral panic in the United 
States. The logical implication that the same technique, somatic cell nuclear transfer, could be 
developed to clone human beings was widely interpreted as a threat to established reproductive 
and individualist norms. While the public reaction omitted important details regarding the science 
of embryonic cloning – failing to recognize the role of environmental factors in biological 
development and the still-limited success of the technique itself – the long-term threats were clear 
enough. If reproduction can be achieved through laboratory practices alone, what will happen to 
 
331 For more on theories of technological determinism, see: Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx, ed., Does Technology 
Drive History? The Dilemma of Technological Determinism (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1994). 
332 As I detail in Chapter Five, theorists who work on the social construction of technology argue that while 
technologies influence discourse, “different social groups associate different meanings with the artifacts leading to 
interpretive flexibility appearing over the artifact.” Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch, “The Social Construction of 
Technology” in The Social Shaping of Technology, ed. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman (New York: Open 
University, 1999), 113. 
333“Executive Order 12975 of October 3, 1995: Protection of Human Research Subjects and Creation of National 
Bioethics Advisory Commission,” Federal Register 60, no. 193 (Oct 1995): 52063-52065. 
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the value we assign to sexual reproduction and, by extension, the heterosexual, nuclear family? If 
I can be cloned whole cloth in the form a ‘delayed’ genetic twin, does that mean my ontological 
and normative status as a unique individual is a fabrication? Will human cloning and related 
practices of genetic manipulation lead to a de facto state of eugenics?334 While I believe that we 
should understand these concerns as quite specific to the Euro-American context – grounded in 
Christian ideals of heteronormative familial life, constitutional frameworks of rights-based 
political liberalism, and the post-World War II association between fascism and eugenics – this 
was not the common understanding. Rather, human cloning was seen as a threat to universal and 
natural human norms and therefore as a form of playing God in an otherwise established natural 
order. 
This moral panic led to widespread calls for political regulation and, on February 24, 1997, 
President Clinton requested that the NBAC, chaired by Harold T. Shapiro, assess the ethical and 
policy dimensions of human cloning and issue recommendations for a federal response within 
ninety days. A week later, the President issued an executive order banning federal funding of 
research on human cloning and requested that the private sector adhere to an indefinite voluntary 
moratorium.335 The following day, Representative Vernon Ehlers (R-MI) introduced two bills, one 
banning federal funding for human cloning research and the other criminalizing it.336 While neither 
 
334 These question reflect what the NBAC referred to as the “three novel developments” involved in embryonic 
cloning: “the replacement of sexual procreation with asexual replication of an existing set of genes; the ability to 
predetermine the genes of a child; and the ability to create many genetically identical offspring.” National Bioethics 
Advisory Commission, Cloning Human Beings (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1997), 2. 
335 Katharine Q. Seeyle, “Clinton bans federal money for efforts to clone humans,” The New York Times, March 5, 
1997, https://www.nytimes.com/1997/03/05/us/clinton-bans-federal-money-for-efforts-to-clone-humans.html 
ans.html mes.com 
336 U.S. Congress, House, Human Cloning Research Prohibition Act. H.R. 922, 105th Congress, introduced in House 
March 5, 1997, https://www.congress.gov/bill/105th-congress/house-bill/922.; U.S. Congress, House, Human 




bill made it to the floor – due largely to their ambiguous language and extensive federal reach – 
these would be the first of a number of similar bills introduced in subsequent years that sought to 
place limits on a scientific future that suddenly appeared to have no inherent ones.337 
As historian of bioethics J. Benjamin Hurlbut notes, much of the public discourse from 
scientists focused on the misrepresentation of the science itself by the national media as scientists 
and their biopolitical allies (unsuccessfully) sought to educate public constituents and 
representatives in order to create the conditions for factual, informed decision-making and prevent 
a negative overreaction that would halt related scientific research and development. 338 While 
public bioethics commissions have long been represented as allies of the scientific community, the 
NBAC zagged from its predecessors in its 1997 report, Cloning Human Beings, and, rather than 
privileging scientific expertise, sought to solicit the “widest possible range of views” and 
“strongest representations” so that “no aspect of public sentiment [would be] left unexplored” in 
its study of human cloning.339 
Challenging the conventions of their predecessors even further, the NBAC argued that this 
kind of representational labor required soliciting religious perspectives. The Commission 
suggested that the popular depiction of the human cloning debate as a “classical confrontation 
between science and religion” was “misleading” and that “the possibility of cloning humans offers 
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an opportunity for substantive dialogue between scientists and theologians.”340 The Commission 
thus solicited both oral and written testimonials from Jewish, Roman Catholic, Protestant, and 
Islamic ‘representatives’ on their respective traditions’ relevant theological positions, summaries 
of which were given a standalone chapter, “Religious Perspectives,” in the final report. Secular 
bioethicists on the NBAC synthesized these perspectives under common themes such as 
“responsible human dominion over nature,” “human dignity and destiny,” “procreation,” and 
“family life,” the content of which ranged from strong conservative claims that human cloning is 
intrinsically immoral and should therefore be banned to more moderate claims that it could be 
morally justified under some circumstances but would need to be strictly regulated in order to 
prevent abuses.341 I want to suggest that, even independent of their content, the inclusion of such 
religious material represented a dramatic sociological shift; for the first time in almost three 
decades, theologians had been invited back to the public bioethical table. 
While I do not doubt the NBAC’s belief that the inclusion of religious perspectives could 
‘offer mutual enrichment’, the motivation for that inclusion can best be understood in terms of the 
longstanding bioethical desire for moral ‘consensus’. As report itself states, 
The Commission was interested in religious arguments and conclusions about 
human cloning because religious traditions influence and guide many citizens’ 
responses to various issues in biomedicine, including such novel developments as 
human cloning...[the] NBAC was interested in determining whether various 
religious traditions and secular approaches achieve a rough consensus about 
appropriate public policy toward creating children through somatic cell nuclear 
transfer at this time.342 
 
Mobilizing a traditional ideal of American pluralism – according to which different and even 
conflicting religious norms are allowed to co-exist so long as those norms do not violate a shared 
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commitment to the laws of the state343 – the NBAC believed that it could democratically represent 
all U.S. citizens by locating moral premises held in common beneath pluralistic disagreement. 
“Religious perspectives,” in this case, stood in for public opinion and the positions of even elite 
theologians provided a litmus test for whether public policies, or the lack thereof, related to human 
cloning would engender “vigorous, widespread, and sustained moral objection.”344  Even while 
acknowledging that there is “no single ‘religious’ view on cloning humans,” the Commission never 
questioned whether consensus is possible or ought to be the principal end of public bioethics.345 
The NBAC’s report on human cloning nevertheless represents a substantial disruption to 
the public bioethical conventions that had been established in the 1970s in at least two senses. First, 
in treating all public disagreement over embryo research as ‘reasonable’ moral disagreement, and 
therefore appropriate for the public sphere, the Commission subverted the longstanding warrant 
that scientists, lawyers, and bioethicists possessed a privileged expertise on biomedical issues. In 
understanding themselves as a mechanism of representative, democratic governance, the NBAC, 
at least in principle, equalized and pluralized the kinds of knowledge needed for making bioethical 
policy decisions. Second, in seeking to discover a consensus bioethical position on human cloning, 
the Commission implicitly rejected the premise that this consensus had already been determined 
through the invention of common moral principlism. This unprecedented moment in scientific 
history seemed to demand another round of serious self-examination at the national level. 
 
343 Here I have in mind what Nathan Hatch calls the “democratization of American Christianity” and what Kevin 
Schultz later describes as the invention of “tri-faith America” according to which different religious denominations or 
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commitments and public opinion within a shared secular context. Nathan O. Hatch, The Democratization of American 
Christianity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989). Kevin M. Schultz, Tri-Faith America: How Catholics and 
Jews Held Postwar America to Its Protestant Promise (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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In pursuing consensus, however, the NBAC also reaffirmed a long-presumed epistemic 
divide characteristic of ideal secularism between scientific and moral questions; legitimate 
democratic disagreement concerned disagreement over questions of values rather than facts. As 
Hurlbut explains, this allowed the NBAC to sidestep the “ontological” and “moral status” 
questions that had previously structured public debates about human embryo research, i.e., the 
question of what the embryo is.  
The commission judged that If ontological questions were important to ethical 
debates, it was only because one system of values had attached particular meanings 
to them. These meanings could be dissociated from the ontological accounts and 
treated as yet one more moral account in the range of plural perspectives. 
Controversy over the embryo was a straightforward result of moral pluralism within 
the polity, and the NBAC’s task was to discover the overlapping consensus 
within.346 
 
Despite the NBAC’s aforementioned desire for “substantive dialogue” then, the Cloning Human 
Beings report was not especially substantive (at least not in the full sense in which I use the term 
to include ontological discourse). Theological claims concerning the nature of human being are 
present in the report, but the content of those claims is (intentionally) omitted as a subject of 
bioethical debate.  
In looking at the final recommendations of the report, the Commission advises the 
President to continue the current moratorium on cloning research and, if possible, ban such 
research through federal legislation (pending a later review of the issue in 3-5 years).347 The 
principle reason provided, however, is that “scientific evidence indicates that such techniques are 
not safe at this time.”348 However unusual the presence of theological discourse in the report might 
have been then, the NBAC still ended performing a familiar act of translation, transcribing 
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religious ‘premises, modes of reasoning, and conclusions’ into a secular, normative idiom. To the 
extent that religious perspectives factor into the report’s actual recommendations, it is as a 
reminder of the still-unfulfilled need to discover a consensus on “the ethical and social implications 
of this technology…should the time come when present concerns about safety have been 
addressed.”349 
3.4 The (Ontological) Politics of Human Dignity 
If the NBAC’s pluralistic model of consensus value-finding opened the path for religious 
actors and modes of reasoning to be included in public bioethics, the President’s Council sought 
to follow that path to its logical conclusion by maintaining the importance of pluralistic “value 
diversity” but abandoning the principal end of consensus, minimizing the need for secularizing 
translation, and re-introducing ontological questions into the public sphere. In the letter of 
transmittal to the president for their 2003 report, Beyond Therapy, the Council thus explained that, 
“In enjoying the benefits of biotechnology, we will need to hold fast to an account of the human 
being, seen not in material or mechanistic or medical terms but in psychic and moral and spiritual 
ones.”350  
This account of human being turned out to be grounded, above all, in a particular 
conception of human dignity. Human dignity might be most familiar to us as a modern, secular 
political ideal – referenced in documents such as the Charter of the United Nations (1945) and 
Universal Declaration of Human rights (1948) – that refers to a fundamental threshold of freedoms 
and rights individual persons are entitled to by virtue of their status as human beings. For those of 
us with some knowledge of American religious history (or readers of Chapter Two), it might also 
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be familiar from the Vatican’s 1965 Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World – 
which established that the universal and inalienable principle of human dignity (respect for persons 
made in the image of God) is the “foundation for the relationship between the Church and the 
world” – and the subsequent use of the “dignity of the unborn” as a slogan of the pro-life movement 
from the mid-1960s until Roe v. Wade (1973).351 While both of these genealogies inform the 
Council’s use of the term, I want to suggest that neither captures its full meaning or importance. 
The term human dignity first appears in the title of the Council’s inaugural 20002 
publication, Human Cloning and Human Dignity. While the Council spends a fair amount of time 
discussing how embryonic cloning-for-children might upset traditional, heteronormative familial 
and sexual dynamics, the real threat to dignity resides in the conceptual and ethical outlook 
structured into the practice of human cloning. In discussing cloning as a reproductive practice, the 
Council states:  
Why does this matter? It matters because human dignity is at stake. In natural 
procreation, two individuals give life to a new human being whose endowments are 
not shaped deliberately by human will, whose being remains mysterious, and the 
openendedness of whose future is ratified and embraced. Parents beget a child who 
enters the world exactly as they did—as an un-made gift, not as a product. Children 
born of this process stand equally beside their progenitors as fellow human beings, 
not beneath them as made objects. In this way, the uncontrolled beginnings of 
human procreation endow each new generation and each new individual with the 
dignity and freedom enjoyed by all who came before.352 
 
On one hand, we see that the dignity of the cloned child – who will question their individual 
identity and self-ownership as a result of being an intentional, unoriginal product – is in question. 
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This is no less true of cloning-for-biomedical-research, where one performs the willful destruction 
of human embryos, which, though not full human beings, are “not humanly nothing and therefore 
should not be treated as a resource alone.”353 On the other hand, and far more provocative, it is the 
dignity of those who would use or even support cloning that is at stake. “An embryo may seem to 
amount to little or nothing, but that very insignificance tests not the embryo’s humanity but our 
own.”354 When we “learn to receive the next generation less with gratitude and surprise than with 
control and mastery,” it is our dignity that is harmed. 355  Dignity here refers not just to a 
fundamental moral status to which we are entitled, but also living a dignified life, i.e., a life of 
moral excellence. Whether for reproduction or research, cloning implies an ethical stance of 
‘molding’ rather than ‘beholding’ – a failure to respect the givenness of human life – and therefore 
results in indignity for molder and molded alike. 
This conception of dignity gains clearer articulation in the Council’s 2003 report, Beyond 
Therapy, which examines the ethics of enhancement technologies ranging from amphetamines to 
SSRIs to engineered senescence. Rather than organizing the report around particular 
biotechnologies, however, the Council, explains that, “to understand the human and social 
meaning of the new age, we must begin…from where human beings begin, namely, with…human 
desires…desires for better children, superior performance, younger and more beautiful bodies, 
abler minds, happier souls.”356 While the Council stresses that each of these desires are ‘essentially 
human’ and worthwhile, pursuing them through biotechnological means would nevertheless be 
undignified and, indeed, inhuman.  
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The report thus counters the prospect of achieving each of these desires through “artificial,” 
biotechnological means with the potential loss of a respective “natural” and “dignified” human 
good. In creating better children through genetic screening or prescription amphetamines, we risk 
erasing the autonomy of the child; in improving competitive performance through muscular or 
cognitive enhancement, we risk losing the dignity of earned achievement; in ending aging through 
genetic intervention, we risk losing the meaning of finitude; and in modulating happiness through 
psycho-pharmaceuticals, we risk confusing ignorant bliss with self-aware contentment. While the 
case studies examined in the report are quite different from one another, the Council argues that 
they should nevertheless be read as parts of a whole insofar as “the desire to have a perfect body, 
one that perfectly executes the dictates of the will, is tantamount to a desire to transcend our 
embodiment altogether, to become as gods, to become something more-than-human.” 357 
Regardless of the particular biotechnological means or human ends then, acting on this posthuman 
“hubris” would entail replacing “full human flourishing” with “spurious or shallow substitutes.”358  
The solution to this problem, the Council contended, is not (or rather not just) extensive 
regulation of biotechnological research and development, but rather a substantive shift in our 
ethical outlook. We must go “beyond therapy,” the Council claims, not in the sense of enhancing 
our biology, but rather in looking beyond a medicalized and scientific view of life altogether; “for 
medicine, sickness, and healing are not the natural or best lens through which to look upon the 
whole of human life. Health, though a primary human good, is not the only—or even the 
supreme—human good.”359 The report further elaborates: 
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Going “beyond therapy” in this sense means returning to an account of the human 
being seen not in material or mechanistic or medical terms but in psychic and moral 
and spiritual ones. It is to see the human being as a creature “in-between,” neither 
god nor beast, neither dumb body nor disembodied soul, but as a puzzling, upward-
pointing unity of psyche and soma whose precise limitations are the source of its—
our—loftiest aspirations, whose weaknesses are the source of its—our—keenest 
attachments, and whose natural gifts may be, if we do not squander or destroy them, 
exactly what we need to flourish and perfect ourselves—as human beings.360 
 
Here we begin to see a more fleshed out understanding of what the Council means when it refers 
to human dignity. Living a dignified life – i.e., a life of moral excellence – requires a recognition 
of and appreciation for our given, biological limitations. When we approach our finitude as the 
source of human goods – of doing, striving, and becoming – we see that we already have the tools 
for human flourishing at hand. While we might still use biomedicine for therapeutic ends, we 
should be extremely skeptical of the slippery slope towards enhancement, for therein lies the path 
to wanting to become something more than human and, in doing so, becoming something less than 
human.  
Following the release of Beyond Therapy, bioethicist Ruth Macklin published an article 
entitled “Dignity is a Useless Concept,” in which she argued that the Council’s use of dignity was 
a “hopelessly vague” “slogan” that acted as a Trojan horse for theological, and in particular Roman 
Catholic, views about the sanctified natural order. Properly understood, dignity merely restates an 
established bioethical principle, respect for autonomy, and can therefore “be eliminated” from 
secular literature in medical ethics “without any loss of content.”361 In response to Macklin’s 
article and likeminded critiques, the Council published a report, Human Dignity and Bioethics, in 
2008, which sought to both clarify the meaning of human dignity and defend its usefulness to the 
field. 
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The fascinating part of this response, however, was that a good portion of the chapters in 
the volume did not seek to conceal religious language and present an authentically secular account 
of human dignity. Rather, most authors sought to explain why religious (in this case, Judeo-
Christian) ideas were useful or even ‘essential’ to a meaningful account of human dignity. The 
most frequent argument to be found in the report is that without some prior ontological grounding, 
claims to human uniqueness are mere “assertions.” For example, in his aptly named essay, “The 
Irreducibly Religious Character of Human Dignity,” David Gelernter contends that, 
human dignity as bioethics understands it is actually a sanitized version of “human 
sanctity”—one that has been purified of all traces of religion… Yet we sacrifice 
something when we switch from “human sanctity” to “human dignity”…Deleting 
religion has a cost—a truth the modern academic doesn’t want to acknowledge. 
Human sanctity carries a built-in explanation of its existence. Humans are set apart 
because, no matter what they make of themselves, God made them in His own 
image.362 
 
This reference to Genesis and the concept of imago dei is a frequent occurrence in the report. In 
his essay, “Human Dignity and the Mystery of the Human Soul,” for example, Robert Kranyak, 
contends that “the Bible and Christian theology may make the strongest case for human dignity.”363 
Performing what can only be described as scriptural exegesis, Kranyak cites both the Christian 
Bible and Psalms to show that “the special status of man cannot be reduced to any set of essential 
attributes but rests on the mysterious ‘election’ of man as the only creature in the universe made 
in the image of God.”364 The conclusion of these likeminded chapters is clear enough. If human 
dignity is to be useful category of understanding in bioethics, it must mean something more than 
an entitlement to political rights; it must elaborate the grounds and content of human specialness 
– a task for which Judeo-Christian theology, the argument goes, is especially well-suited. 
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Given Macklin’s critique, it should be unsurprising that the report demonstrates a recurrent 
frustration with the bioethical principle of autonomy – understood as deriving from Immanuel 
Kant’s philosophical position that individuals are entitled to dignity by virtue of being rational, 
self-determining beings – as presenting too ‘narrow’ of a view of moral life and human being. 
Kass explains this in terms of a distinction between “the basic dignity of human being and the full 
dignity of being (actively) human, of human flourishing.”365 While basic dignity, understood as a 
respect for autonomous persons intended to protect the weak, might be sufficient for the domains 
of clinical medicine and research involving human subjects, we need a more robust notion of 
human dignity to account for biotechnologies, which possess the potential for “dehumanization.” 
In other words, our bioethical principles must not just protect us from what is “humanly worst” 
but also seek to preserve what is “humanly best.” 
In elaborating what is humanly best, Kass first points to our “higher qualities.” Mobilizing 
the theological language of imago dei, he argues that, “the human being has special dignity because 
he shares in the godlike powers of reason, freedom, judgment, and moral concern, and, as a result, 
lives a life freighted with moral self-consciousness—a life above and beyond what other animals 
are capable of… the inviolability of human life rests absolutely on the higher dignity—the god-
like-ness—of human beings.”366 Recognizing only these god-like qualities, however, would be to 
misunderstand the true meaning of imago dei since “to be an image is also to be different from that 
of which one is an image. Man is, at most, a mere likeness of God. With us, the seemingly godly 
powers and concerns just described occur conjoined with our animality. God’s image is tied to 
blood, which is the life.”367 
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Kass, like other Council members, thus seeks to rescue the finite and mundane as the 
principle source of human dignity. “The account of human dignity we badly need in bioethics,” he 
explains, “goes beyond the said dignity of ‘persons’ to embrace the worthiness of embodied human 
life, and therewith of our natural desires and passions, our natural origins and attachments, our 
sentiments and repugnances, our loves and longings. What we need is a defense of the dignity of 
what Tolstoy called ‘real life,’ life as ordinarily lived, everyday life in its concreteness.”368 To this 
end, Kass provides an assortment of ‘dignified’ activities – sewing a dress, cooking a meal, 
offering a blessing made in gratitude, receiving a guest, kissing one’s bride, raising a glass in 
gladness – that do little more than hint at his own heteronormative proclivities and demonstrate 
just how difficult it is for bioconservatives to define their ideal in positive terms. The philosophical 
crux of his contention, however, is clear enough. There is an ethical demand to glorify ‘our’ 
“enobling human passions.” 
Hope, wonder, trust, love, sympathy, gratitude, awe, and reverence for the divine. 
No account of the dignity of being human is worth its salt without them. And no 
technologically driven world of the future that fails to safeguard the dignity of 
everyday life deserves our assent.369 
 
Put differently, the very purported ‘lows’ of human being, the “downward pull of bodily necessity” 
– embodied life, emotional passions, and social attachments – that enhancement seeks to overcome 
are essential sources and expressions of a dignified life.  
It is here that we find principal role of relating dignity to God for the Council. Rather than 
just providing an ontological ground for human uniqueness, theological language helps us 
understand that dignity, properly construed, entails humility and continual aspiration. “The dignity 
of being human, rooted in the dignity of life itself and flourishing in a manner seemingly issuing 
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only in human pride,” Kass explains, “completes itself and stands tallest when we bow our heads 
and lift our hearts in recognition of powers greater than our own. The fullest dignity of the god-
like animal is realized in its acknowledgement and celebration of the divine.”370 While Kass and 
others stress that we need not believe in the Judeo-Christian God, we must nevertheless recognize 
that the good life requires a sense of one’s own limitations – an ontological outlook that 
acknowledges that we are finite, and this finitude affords our most fundamental human goods. 
Losing this finitude, or even taking up an ethical outlook that fails to privilege it, would thus be 
tantamount to losing the very thing that makes us human in the first place. Understood in these 
terms, human dignity, far from being a functional, legal placeholder for respecting basic 
personhood, names an Aristotelian project of achieving individual human flourishing and provides 
a sense of purpose within that life project – beholding and engaging with the giftedness of life as 
it is given – which runs counter to the aspirations of human enhancement.  
3.5 Ideology and Secularity in Value Diversity 
Unsurprisingly, the Council was widely criticized for acting against the secular, pragmatic 
conventions of public ethics. The most straightforward critique took the familiar form of accusing 
the Bush administration of ‘stacking the deck’ by populating its commission with conservative 
thinkers.371 This critique, however, took a more particular form in the context of bioethics: the 
Council’s work was introducing “ideology” into the public sphere. Through the use of theological 
language and emotion-based modes of reasoning like the “wisdom of repugnance,”372 the Council 
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members were publicly mobilizing what, according to the premises of American secularism, ought 
to be internal, domesticated beliefs. In doing so, the Council was, the argument went, corrupting a 
space that was otherwise neutral by virtue being areligious, utilitarian, and consensus.373 
This threat of “ideology” had been anticipated since the beginning of the biopolitical 
culture wars. For example, a 1993 report from the Office of Technology Assessment on public 
policy bioethics commissions claimed that “successful commissions were relatively free of 
political interference, had flexibility in addressing issues, were open in their process and 
disseminations of findings, and were comprised of a diverse groups of individuals who were 
generally free of ideology and had wide range expertise.”374 Going further, the report states that, 
“ideology is a destructive criterion in appointing a bioethics committee. While selecting members 
solely on the basis of their stance on a particular issue – such as abortion – might be viewed by 
special interests as useful, such an approach is short sighted and likely to create gridlock.”375 
This critique, however, problematically assumes that secular, public institutions like 
bioethics commissions are, or at least can be, free of all ideological agendas. We can both clarify 
and problematize this understanding of secular neutrality through a (brief) examination of 
philosopher Charles Taylor’s influential text, A Secular Age. Taylor begins his work with the 
question: “Why is it so hard to believe in God in (many milieux of) the modern West, while in 
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1500 it was virtually impossible not to?”376 To answer this question, he describes ‘the’ modern 
secular condition in terms of being held “captive” in an “immanent frame.” We can understand the 
immanent frame as a background picture, an unselfconscious worldview, that entails taking up 
certain “exclusive humanist” premises – namely, an individual “buffered” identity, a scientific 
materialist epistemology, a normative confidence in instrumental rationality, and an immanent or 
“closed” metaphysics – as if self-evident. For Taylor, the “truth” of these epistemic commitments 
is so entrenched that the immanent frame always already appears to the consciousness of Western 
moderns as the neutral, given conditions under which life operates. It is in the confines of this 
secular, “disenchanted” “Closed World Picture” that religion is internalized and reduced to one 
(unreasonable) option among others. 
Taylor, however, is interested in more than just identifying the constitutive characteristics 
of the immanent frame; he wants to understand what provides that frame with its discursive power. 
What makes or has made the immanent frame seem “obvious,” “unchallengeable,” and “axiomatic” 
in the first place? To this end, he argues that the immanent frame depends upon two interrelated 
“master narratives” of modernization-as-secularization. The first is the Enlightenment narrative of 
maturation, according to which the development of scientific materialism and self-legislating 
moral reason represents the transition from childhood to adulthood, from barbarism to civilization, 
and, in doing so, makes religious “transcendence” “irrelevant to life.” The second narrative is the 
further framing of this maturation as a “subtraction” story in which the distortions of religion are 
“sloughed off” to reveal true understandings of the world and authentic understandings of the self. 
Modernization and secularization are, according to this narrative framing, deconstructive 
 
376 Charles Taylor, “The Immanent Frame,” in A Secular Age (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007), 
593. 
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processes that merely reveal reality rather than construct it. In short, it is through representing itself 
as a “factual” and “objective” worldview that inevitably results from rational civilization that the 
immanent frame becomes a picture “that cannot be challenged; indeed, alternatives to [it] are 
impossible to imagine. That’s what it means to remain captive.”377 As sociologist José Casanova 
surmises, “the function of secularism as a philosophy of history, and thus as ideology, is to turn 
the particular Western Christian historical process of secularization into a universal teleological 
process of human development.”378 
Taylor complicates the content of the immanent frame and the master narratives that 
support it in two instructive senses. First, taking up a secular, immanent worldview requires no 
less of a “leap of faith” than taking up a transcendent one. The term “belief” fails to capture the 
foundational nature of this leap since belief itself a secular invention that relocates moral and other 
self-conscious commitments inside of individuals who already exists in an otherwise objective, 
immanent real. Rather, independent of its logical or empirical coherence, the immanent frame is 
unselfconsciously taken up as the natural container for human experience and, in this sense, is 
logically prior to the questions of validity, justice, and belief we might ask within it. Second, the 
subtraction narrative “gives too little place to the cultural changes wrought by Western modernity, 
the way in which it has developed new understandings of the self, its place in society, in space and 
in time. It fails to see how innovative we have been.”379 While we might all now “wield” our 
modern meta-narratives in some sense, secularization was neither inevitable nor the result of 
destructive revelation. From the scientific establishment of “the true facts about the world” to the 
 
377 Taylor, A Secular Age, 566. 
378 José Casanova, “The Secular and Secularisms,” Social Research 76, no.4 (Winter 2009): 1054-1055. Emphasis 
mine. 
379 Taylor, A Secular Age, 573. 
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Kantian determination of “the ultimate values by which [we] live,” the secularization characteristic 
of modern life was (and I will argue still is) a profoundly constructive process.380 
Following both of these conclusions, I want to suggest that we should resist viewing 
secularism, and in particular secular institutions like public bioethics, as neutral, empty containers 
free from political or religious ideologies. To be secular or even to claim secularity is to take up a 
full breadth of metaphysical, ontological, and normative positions that shape all ensuing discourse. 
If the President’s Council disrupted the entrenched secular conventions of public bioethics through 
the production of theological and ontological content, this disruption did not represent the 
introduction of ideology into the public bioethical sphere. As I have suggested since the beginning 
of this project, the longstanding commitment to common moral principlism and scientific expertise 
in secular bioethics is a value-laden one that, like Taylor’s general description of the immanent 
frame, involves the prior assumption of humanist ideals about the metaphysical integrity of the 
self, the universality of Western moral norms, and, indeed, the separation of religion and state. 
Public bioethics was never free of ideology to begin with; no institution, secular or otherwise, is. 
We must, however, go further than just leveling religious and secular perspectives; for this 
still leaves the door open to view the Council’s work as merely religious and thus to uphold the 
strong religion/secular binary. For this task, we must return to the critical theorization of 
secularism and move beyond Taylor’s immanent frame.381 Critical theorization of secularism, at 
least in the field of religious studies, has most often entailed demonstrating an internal relationship 
between religion and secularism and, in particular, how Protestant understandings of religious life 
 
380 Taylor, A Secular Age, 580. 
381 For however groundbreaking Taylor’s description was, it still problematically framed secularism as a monolithic 
and fully actualized (if somewhat disappointing) phenomenon. It is thus with great certainty that he claims, “What I 
have been describing as the immanent frame is common to all of us in the modern West.” Taylor, A Secular Age, 543. 
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have informed secularism writ-large since its inception. While this line of criticism is cogent and 
well-worn, I am more interested in another theoretical trend: the call to contextualize and pluralize 
secularism.  
As scholars Janet Jakobson and Ann Pellegrini argue in their edited volume Secularisms, 
“If secularism is constituted in relation to religious formations, then secularism is not the universal 
discourse emanating from the European Enlightenment, but is in fact multiple, as are religions. We 
might then more aptly speak in terms of secularisms.”382 The master narrative of secularization as 
a singular, global process does not just (empirically) fail in light of religion’s persistence in the 
public sphere or its own religious origins; it also fails in light of the development of different 
secularisms in different contexts. While we must not elide “the dominating power relations in 
which this diversity is formed” – i.e., the history of Euro-American colonialism – we can 
nevertheless see that secularism in Turkey, secularism in India, and secularism in the United States 
are each informed by different (religious) genealogies that afford different imaginings and 
embodiments of the relationship between ‘church’ and state.383 
While these differences might be especially acute when comparing and contrasting nation-
states, the need to contextualize runs deeper than national identities. We must approach secularism 
as fully embedded in history, rather than as the condition, truth, or telos of history, i.e., we must 
approach it in the Foucauldian sense of “a set of material and linguistic practices that work across 
 
382 Jakobson and Pellegrini, Secularisms, 13. 
383 This is one of the central points of Jakobson and Pellegrini’s edited volume, Secularisms. The three examples I 
list here are drawn from chapters on these respective contexts within that volume. Taha Parla and Andrew Davidson, 
“Secularism and Laicism in Turkey,” in Secularisms, ed. Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (Durham: Duke 
University Press), 58-75. Banu Subramaniam, “What Tangled Webs We Weave: Science, Secularism, and Religion 
in Contemporary India” in Secularisms, ed. Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (Durham: Duke University Press), 178-
202. Tracy Fessenden, “Disappearances: Race, Religion, and The Progress Narrative of U.S. Feminism” in 
Secularisms, ed. Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (Durham: Duke University Press), 139-161. 
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multiple institutions.”384 Without discounting the common frame of imaginative reference that the 
master narrative of secularization provides, we can acknowledge that, even within the United 
States, both the discourse of secularism and its institutional instantiations change across time and 
space.385 If secularism is “a political project that deploys the concept of the secular,” then we can 
observe how the concept of the secular, like all discursive content, is necessarily subject to creative 
interpretation and instrumentalization.386 From this perspective, secularism is a process rather than 
a product, and the secularity of a given person, community, or institution is best approached as in 
media res.387 
With this in mind, I want to suggest that we should not view the Council as performing 
conservative religious work over and against a liberal secular counterpart. Rather, we can 
understand the Council’s introduction of substantive content as both the enactment and 
consequence of a change in the secularity of public bioethics. We can see this in at least two senses. 
First, building on the NBAC’s Cloning Human Beings report, the Council adopted a view of public 
bioethics as a site of reasonable moral disagreement. As we saw in Chapter One, Kass’s principal 
justification for the Council’s composition was its inclusion of diverse ‘ideologies’ or ‘values’ 
(rather than demographic or professional identities). This framework of value diversity, which was 
 
384 Jakobson and Pellegrini, Secularisms, 7. 
385  For example, in his ethnographic work on contemporary non-believer organizations, Joseph Blankholm 
demonstrates that different self-avowed secular coalitions understand and enact the secular/religious boundary 
differently, and that the structuring condition of secularism described by theorists thus cannot fully account for these 
“everyday forms of secularism.” Jacob Blankholm, “Making the American Secular: An Ethnographic Study of 
Organized Nonbelievers and Secular Activists in the United States,” PhD Diss, Columbia University, 2015. 
386 Jakobson and Pellegrini, Secularisms, 7. 
387 This language draws on scholar of religion Angela Zito’s discussion of “culture” in which she argues that “culture 
must be approached as process and not as thing; that it is produced through the social organization of material life, in 
time, and through human efforts; that this is all accomplished through the agency of persons whose very subjectivities 
are one of the products of this process.” Angela Zito, “Culture” in Key Words in Religion, Media, and Culture, ed. 
David Morgan (London: Routledge, 2008), 74. 
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intended to model an ideal secular pluralism, reconstituted biomedical expertise so as to include 
non-scientists and non-bioethicists. In taking the NBAC’s premise to its logical conclusion though, 
the Council, in essence, leveled all bioethical commitments as individually held “beliefs,” 
“theories,” or “values.” Much like the U.S. evolution debate in which biological evolution has 
been reduced to “just” a “theory,” established secular content – in this case, the four common 
moral principles – became subject to the very understanding of non-factual “belief” that was 
originally “dialectically produced in the [secular] discourse of religion.”388 The point I mean to 
make here is not (just) that this flattening of expertise was somewhat ironic in its reduction of 
secular claims to the status of religious ones (or vice versa). Rather, it is that this flattening 
reflected a quite traditional secular, democratic premise: that public policy debates should mirror 
those of the general public. Taking the social reality and normative merit of pluralism seriously, 
the argument went, requires building ideologically diverse institutions that are willing and able to 
debate topics in a grammar and depth that reflect actual public concerns – including, in this case, 
correcting an underrepresentation of conservativism in formal bioethics.  
Second, the prominence of “human dignity” can be read as a deliberate interpretation and 
instrumentalization of an established, if contested, secular category. Religious beliefs here are not 
introduced as self-sufficient ideas but discursively channeled through a political term already 
deemed appropriate for public debate. It matters that the foremost goal of the Council was to 
explain why and how the concept of human dignity (and not religion per se) is useful, or even 
necessary, for doing bioethics in the age of biotechnology. Religion – in the monolithic, Judeo-
Christian terms the Council understood it – is just one pluralistic tool, albeit an important and 
 
388 Robert J. Baird, “Late Secularism” in in Secularisms, ed. Janet Jakobsen and Ann Pellegrini (Durham: Duke 
University Press), 175. 
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underutilized one, for enriching extant secular bioethical discourse. Even for those who claimed 
that theological understandings were “necessary,” this rhetorical move most resembles Kant’s 
ideal of “practical necessity,” according to which we need to presuppose certain faith-based 
propositions – in Kant’s case, free will, the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul – in 
order to coherently intuit and live a duty-bound life.389 The Council, in other words, did not 
understand human dignity as a convenient means to sneak religion into public life; rather, religion 
was understood as an interpretive device that could clarify the extant concept of human dignity 
without undermining its most important secular attribute, i.e., being a ‘commonsense’ ideal that 
both reflects and reaches across pluralistic differences. 
Indeed, even as Kass and other members championed their departure from the secular norm, 
the Council did not understand its work as non-secular. Rather, by providing “richer” and more 
pluralistic content, the Council understood itself as performing a more ideal form of public debate. 
If the Council shifted some familiar secular binaries like private/public and fact/value to an 
uncomfortable degree, its work was nevertheless deeply informed by a secular imagining of 
pluralism par excellence and enacted predominantly through the use of a secular category, human 
dignity, that was intended to be legible to an imagined democratic audience independent of 
religious commitments. While it is important to acknowledge just how different the Council was 
from its predecessors, it is no less important to acknowledge that that difference was afforded by 
 
389 In the Second Critique, Kant argues that we need to take up certain metaphysical postulates as if true in order for 
morality to be intelligible. The three most prominent postulates he identifies are free will, the existence of God, and 
the immortality of the soul. Without free will there would be no moral choice - i.e., the choice between obligation and 
inclination - about which we could speak of in the first place. Without the existence of God, an omniscient and neutral 
moral arbiter, we cannot reasonably believe there are objective criteria for judging our moral maxims. And without 
the immorality of the soul we have no greater end towards which our gradual, but always incomplete moral self-
cultivation can be directed. These postulates are “practical” (as opposed to theoretical) because, given our non-access 
to the noumenal world, they cannot be definitely proven. They are, nevertheless, “necessary” in that their assumption 
is required for living a dutiful life. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans., Thomas K. Abbott (New 
York, NY: Dover Publications, 2004). 
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a reconstitution, rather than a subversion, of public bioethics’ secularity. Without this 
understanding in place, we run not just the general risk of omitting the contextual, flexible nature 
of secularism(s), but also the more particular risk of re-siting all substantive bioethical work, even 
work that that takes place in secular institutions and grammars, in the distinctive realm of religion, 
and, as is so often the case, de-legitimizing it in the process. 
To be abundantly clear, I do not believe that any bioethical position is inherently more 
legitimate by virtue of being secular. Rather, I am responding to the fact that the rhetorical strategy 
of labeling certain substantive questions or topics as “religious” has historically functioned as a 
means to marginalize them within the field of bioethics, public and otherwise. By deliberately 
emphasizing the secularity of the Council’s work, then, I am attempting to expand the familiar 
horizon of what counts as bioethical secularity, and, in doing so, complicate the clean distinction 
upon which such de-legitimizing rhetorical strategies depend. The fact that the Council’s work can 
be read as secular,390 both in spite of and because of its public use of theological content, shows 
us that substantive rationality cannot simply be excluded from bioethical debate on the basis of its 
religiousness or those characteristics – e.g. being a private matter of individual belief or otherwise 
“ideological” in character – most often associated with religion in a secular, immanent frame. 
3.6 A ‘Richer Bioethics’ or a ‘Return to the Norm’? 
In November of 2009, President Barack Obama replaced the President’s Council on 
Bioethics with the Presidential Commission for the Study of Bioethical Issues: a body intended to 
 
390 To further clarify, even when I use the normative language that we should understand the Council’s work as being 
secular, I am not suggesting that it is necessarily so. Such a position would require an essentialist view of secularism 
write-large, which I reject outright in this project. Rather, I am arguing that we can cogently read it along these lines 
and benefit the most from doing so, at least for the purpose of understanding how the Council’s work was afforded a 
space in public bioethics and why that affordance was exigent.  
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offer “practical policy options” rather than philosophical guidance.391 For liberal bioethicists and 
scientists, this move (at least initially) represented a welcome return to the secular, bioethical 
norm.392 In conclusion, I want to suggest that, while the findings of Bush’s Council are problematic, 
its intent to disrupt bioethical conventions can nevertheless be seen as instructive; and, likewise, 
that there is good reason to be suspicious of a return to the norm. 
First, there is merit in the Council’s elision of consensus as a prerequisite for bioethical 
inquiry. The common moral principlism long characteristic of formal bioethics can be dangerous 
insofar as consensus functions as a mechanism of power through which all non-normative ethical 
positions are concealed from, or marginalized within, public bioethical discourse. Insofar as 
principlism presupposes that there already exists moral norms toward which all communities are 
predisposed, prior bioethics commissions had no choice but to assume and present a consensus 
position, lest the whole framework collapse upon itself. While the President’s Council was often 
criticized for its conservative agenda, a closer reading of the meetings and reports demonstrates a 
surprising amount of time and space given to dissenters; even if positioned as marginal 
perspectives, liberal bioethicists, scientists, and philosophers are still given some voice in the 
Council’s work and it is recognized that consensus cannot, nor should it be, assumed.393 
 
391 “Executive Order 13521 of November 24, 2009: Establishing the Presidential Commission for the Study of 
Bioethical Issues,” Code of Federal Regulations, title 3 (2010): 270-281. Christine Grady, “Making the Choices 
Necessary to Make a Difference: The Responsibility of National Bioethics Commissions,” Hastings Center Report 
47, no. S1 (2017): S42-S45. 
Nicholas Wade, “Obama Plans to Replace Bush’s Bioethics Panel,” The New York Times, June 17, 2009. 
392 While optimism was high when President Obama first announced the new Commission and its pragmatic goals, 
the choice of its politically “uncontroversial” membership, including a mere two credentialed bioethicists, Dan 
Sulmasy and Christine Grady, quickly soured those within the bioethical discipline. Even this disappointment, 
however, speaks to the eagerness of bioethicists to return to the pre-President’s Council norm. David Magnus, 
“Bioethics and President Obama,” The American Journal of Bioethics 10, no. 5 (2010): 1-2. 
393 I have thus far intentionally minimized the Council’s internal contestations in order to focus on the shared 
positions of its conservative majority and their substantive differences from past bioethical commissions. Of the three 
reports I examine though, both Human Cloning and Human Dignity as well as Human Dignity and Bioethics include 
dissenting viewpoints from moderate and liberal voices. Human Cloning and Human Dignity, for example, sets aside 
a section for the “minority recommendation” in its Executive Summary, which advocates a less severe regulatory 
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Likewise, I want to suggest that the Council’s bioethical work was in fact “richer” than its 
predecessors in that took ontological inquiry seriously as a necessary condition of (at least modern) 
bioethical discourse. Sidestepping ontological concerns might, as Hurlbut argues, serve a 
functional purpose, but making normative claims about how a state of affairs ought to be 
necessarily involves taking up (often-tacit) claims about what the current state of affairs is. In this 
case, practical, utilitarian concerns of risk, access, and safety – while pressing and worthwhile – 
always already depend upon conceptually prior understandings of human subjectivity that narrow 
the scope of bioethical decision-making. These understandings ought to be made explicit so that 
their validity can be defended and alternatives can be considered. While I am not convinced that 
governmental commissions are the most appropriate space for this mode of deliberation, I have 
little doubt that biotechnologies do demand a more substantive analysis in which questions of 
human nature are not taken for granted – a premise that has, to some degree, been manifest in the 
enhancement debate. 
If the questions the Council asked were richer though, the answers it provided were not. 
For all their criticisms of consensus thinking, the Council ironically recapitulated that same mode 
of thinking in the content of its bioconservative positions, which claim to speak for and about 
human life in toto. Whether it is describing reproduction and child-rearing in heterosexual terms 
or educational and professional success as capitalist, meritocratic projects, there is no shortage of 
contextually-specific values that are uncritically framed as universal, natural, and God-given goods. 
The normative ideal of the dignified human presented here is more embodied and situated than 
 
approach than its majority counterpart. Likewise, Human Dignity and Bioethics presents at least three essays that 
could be read as contrarian, including one from transhumanist Nick Bostrom. See: Dennett, “How to Protect Human 
Dignity from Science” in Human Dignity and Bioethics, 39-60. Churchland, “Human Dignity from a 
Neurophilosophical Perspective” in Human Dignity and Bioethics, 99-121. Bostrom, “Dignity and Enhancement” in 
Human Dignity and Bioethics, 173-206. 
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most humanist imaginings; but, even as the finitude of human nature is reframed in a positive light, 
the metaphysical integrity, privileged normative status, and transhistorical presence of that nature 
is never meaningfully brought into question. The bioconservative position that ‘we’ ought to 
remain human ‘as is’ depends upon a profoundly strong sense of species-level identity and, 
therefore, a necessary concealment of substantive cultural, historical, and biological difference. To 
the extent that the Council’s Aristotelian and Judeo-Christian dignitarian politics represent an 
alternative to common moral principlism, then, it is an alternative of somewhat negligible 
distinction. 
These problems with the Council’s work, however, do not mean that we should simply 
welcome a return to the secular norm. Just as we should resist the temptation to view secularism 
as neutral, we should also resist the temptation to understand it in triumphalist terms. To dramatize 
this point, we can return to critical theorization on secularism and, in particular, the work of 
cultural anthropologist Talal Adad. In his influential Formations of the Secular, Asad explains that 
the secular is not “simply an intellectual answer to a question about enduring social peace and 
toleration. It is an enactment by which a political medium (representation of citizenship) redefines 
and transcends particular and differentiating practices of the self that are articulated through class, 
gender and religion.”394 The secular, Euro-American “ideology of political representation” is, in 
other words, a mechanism of de- and re-essentializing human subjects that sublimates particular 
modes of being into common, state-based identities. More than just cultural misunderstanding, 
Asad explains, this secular mode of sublimation has long acted as the basis for colonial and other 
kinds of ‘political’ violence towards Muslim and other non-Western peoples.395 After all, in the 
 
394 Asad, Formations of the Secular, 16. 
395 “Violence” here refers to both punitive, carceral measures internal to the state and interventionism (occupation, 
war, or other forms of political influence) abroad. To make the point reductively, we need look no further than one of 
the basic political justifications for the United States’ recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan: “spreading democracy to 
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meta-narrative of Enlightenment progress, secularization – including the formation of a liberal, 
democratic state that relocates religion in the private sphere – is an inherent good, and therefore 
justified at almost all costs. Asad thus rhetorically asks, “why is it that aggression in the name of 
God shocks secular liberal sensibilities, whereas the act of killing in the name of the secular nation, 
or of democracy, does not?”396  
While this kind of large-scale political critique might seem far afield from public bioethics, 
it is an important reminder that we should not uncritically accept the secularity of public 
institutions as a societal good. Rather, we must critically examine the discursive and material labor 
that such institutions’ secularity (and claims to secularity) perform. In this case, the secular 
convention of common moral principlism performs an erasure of difference through both its 
commitment to consensus ethics and its more fundamental elision of subject-formation as an object 
of bioethical debate. We would do well, then, to heed the President’s Council’s call for a richer 
bioethics. The ethical and ontological theories we take up in doing so, however, must be richer as 
well, lest we fall into the same trap of treating human being and flourishing as fixed, universal, 








the Middle East.” Regardless of the normative merit of this end, there is little question that it does justify large-scale 
violence in the name of re-constituting other peoples in the image of ideal secularism and, furthermore, depends upon 
on a master narrative in which the formation of the liberal, democratic state represents the maturation of all human 
civilizations. 
396 Talal Asad, “Is Critique Secular?” in Is Critique Secular?: Blasphemy, Injury, and Free Speech, by Talal Asad, 
Wendy Brown, Judith Butler, and Saba Mahmood (New York: Fordham University Press), 10. 
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Chapter Four: 
From Disenchantment to (Moral) Bioenhancement 
 
4.1 The Desirability Of Enhancement 
The year is 2050. Based on advances in “optogenetics,” it is now possible to genetically 
engineer human embryos so that the activity of individual neurons can be both measured and 
manipulated externally. Genetically modified neurons (GMNs) contain “nanosignalers” that 
indicate when activity is occurring in specific neurons and emit signatures of light that are picked 
up by a ubiquitous light-based communications network. In the confines of this network, 
information, even the information ‘inside our heads’, is transmitted to and from bioquantum 
computers that are trillions of times more powerful than their digital predecessors.  
2050 also marks the five-year anniversary of the completion of The Great Moral Project: 
the construction of the world’s most powerful, self-learning bioquantum computer, the “God 
Machine.” The God Machine monitors the thoughts, desires, and intentions of each human being, 
and is capable of modifying a person’s behavior in nanoseconds without that person ever knowing 
their behavior was modified. The God Machine was designed to give humans “near complete 
freedom” and only ever intervenes in human action to prevent great harms or injustices such as 
murder or rape. For example, as soon as a person forms the intention to murder, and it becomes 
inevitable that the intention will be acted on, the God Machine intervenes and the would-be-
murderer ‘changes his mind’. In the year 2050, then, there is no more “serious crime” and no more 
“malevolent” behavior; we have become morally “fit for the future.”397 
This Brave New World is the thought experiment proposed by philosophers Ingmar 
Persson and Julian Savulescu to compel their imagined audience to recognize the benefits of 
 
397 Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, “Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and the God Machine,” The Monist 95, no. 
3 (2012): 399-421. 
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“moral bioenhancement.” Moral bioenhancement (MBE), in the most general sense, is the use of 
bio- and neuro-technologies such as pharmaceuticals, neural implants, and genetic engineering for 
the deliberate improvement of an individual’s moral character, motives, or behavior, and 
represents the most recent and controversial variation of the human enhancement debate in 
bioethics.398 While such a project might seem far-fetched to outsiders, theorists of enhancement – 
speculating on recent findings in genetics, evolutionary biology, psychology, and neuroscience– 
see MBE as a plausible future scenario. The guiding question of the discourse, then, is not 
necessarily whether MBE is feasible, but rather whether it is desirable.399  
The debate concerning the desirability of MBE, in turn, depends on a more fundamental 
meta-ethical question: what ethical frameworks are legitimate for evaluating transforming our 
moral capacities and behaviors? In other words, on what normative grounds can we determine 
what counts as moral ‘improvement’, which capacities or behaviors should be targeted, and 
whether moral enhancement itself is a worthwhile project? Whereas meta-ethical positions are 
often implicit within other areas of the enhancement discourse, theorizing the ethics of modulating 
emotion, reason, and action – written into the literature as essential characteristics of the self – 
necessitates a clearer articulation of what ends constitute the good and what means are legitimate 
for its achievement than, for example, extending one’s lifespan or altering one’s physical 
appearance.400 Examining the discourse of moral enhancement thus affords a more precise picture 
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of the (bioliberal) ethical frameworks forefronted in this project as well as the logics that cut across 
more traditional philosophical distinctions. 
The discourse of MBE, however, also offers a second and more provocative point of 
leverage for understanding the larger enhancement discourse and its constitutive representations 
of human nature. While the now familiar liberal individualism of bioethics still predominates here, 
liberal bioethicists take up a far more social-minded rhetoric in pursuing the question of whether 
moral enhancement is desirable. In the case of moral enhancement, bioethical inquiry invites not 
just bio- and neuro-logical explanations of morality, but also social and historical ones. Which 
social processes are responsible for cultivating morality? Where do humans stand in terms of the 
history of moral progress? To put it in even more straightforward terms, we must first understand 
where we have been and where we are now in order to answer the question of where we should 
go. For advocates of MBE, we will see that this understanding turns out to be a master narrative 
of social and historical development eerily similar to classical secularization theses. 
In what follows, I begin with delineating three different proposed models of MBE: 
behavioral, virtuous, and rational – which, respectively, correspond to the Western philosophical 
traditions of utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and deontology. If a description of these models reveals 
how bioethicists imagine MBE taking effect though, it still does not tell us how MBE is being 
framed as desirable for imagined audiences. In the next part of the chapter, then, I demonstrate 
that the pro-MBE position depends upon both the implicit and explicit mobilization of 
modernization-as-secularization narratives. We will see that each of the three models shares 
common premises about what makes moral enhancement feasible and desirable, namely, the 
reducibility of all moral life to biological causes and the necessity of outgrowing ‘traditional’ 
means of moral cultivation if moral ‘progress’ is to continue.  
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In the ensuing section, I contend that, we can nevertheless identify important differences 
between this narrative framing and more traditional versions of the secularization thesis and should, 
therefore, understand it as a particular discursive formation, rather than just one more instantiation 
of a global, monolithic secularism. In conclusion, however, I suggest that this narrative’s 
constitutive species-level language still conceals both questions of power and the extent to which 
moral subject-formation is a social, embodied, and contextual process. While the inclination of 
advocates of MBE to situate their projects in social and historical contexts is instructive, the stories 
we tell must still move beyond master narratives of secularization if we want to seriously evaluate 
the potential consequences of modulating emotion, cognition, and behavior through 
biotechnological means. 
4.2 Behavioral Enhancement  
The MBE debate began in earnest in 2008 when philosophers Ingmar Persson and Julian 
Savulescu published an article entitled “The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement and the Urgent 
Imperative to Enhance the Moral Character of Humanity” in the Journal of Applied Philosophy.401 
The authors’ argument for moral enhancement being a species-level ethical obligation has since 
generated more (critical) attention than any other textual thread on the same topic. The logic of 
this position is apocalyptic in nature: developing and using technologies to improve our moral 
capacities at the bio- and neuro-logical level is a necessary means of preventing humanity from 
 
401 Persson and Savulescu, “The Perils of Cognitive Enhancement,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 25, no. 3 (2008): 
162-177.  
The authors have since fleshed out their project in numerous later works including: Ingmar Persson and Julian 
Savulescu, Unfit for the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). Ingmar 
Persson and Julian Savulescu, “Reply to Commentators on Unfit for the Future,” Journal of Medical Ethics 41, no. 4 
(2015): 348-352. Julian Savulescu, Thomas Douglas, and Ingmar Persson, “Autonomy and the Ethics of Biological 
Behavior Modification,” in The Future of Bioethics: International Dialogues, ed. Akira Akabayashi (Oxford, UK: 
Oxford University Press, 2014), 91-109. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, “Unfit for the Future? Human Nature, 
Scientific Progress, and the Need for Moral Enhancement,” in Enhancing Human Capacities, ed. Julian Savulescu 
and Ruud ter Meulen (West Sussex, UK: Blackwell Publishing, 2011), 486-502. 
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destroying itself. We can understand the rationale for this imagined future as premised on what is 
referred to as the ‘Bermuda Triangle of extinction’: 1) radical technological power, 2) mankind’s 
myopic moral psychology, and 3) liberal democracy. 
In an ironic twist, it is technological progress itself that poses the basis of the ‘ultimate 
harm’ of human extinction. The argument holds that ever-increasing technological advancements 
increase both the destructive power of technologies themselves and the likelihood of destructive 
technologies falling into the hands of a rogue state or lone, crazed individual. It will, in turn, 
become progressively easier for humans to cause disproportionate and catastrophic harms through, 
for example, biological and chemical warfare, weapons of mass destruction, and environmental 
degradation. Furthermore, these threats or ‘big harms’ need not be the consequences of intentional 
acts (e.g., terrorism); we see the potential for such harms in the side effects of scientific 
experimentation (the authors use the example of the 1970s Australian “mousepox” epidemic that 
resulted from the mass-sterilization of mice to prevent a “mouse plague”) or the economic means 
of production and consumption (the clearest example being capitalist-induced global warming). 
The authors stress that human “common-sense morality” – i.e., “a set of moral attitudes 
that is a common denominator of the diversely specified moralities of human societies over the 
world” – has historically featured a conception of responsibility as causally-based, according to 
which we are more responsible for the actions we directly commit or cause than those we allow to 
occur through our omissions (the so called “act-omission doctrine”).402 In contrast, Persson and 
Savulescu contend that, “we are all equally, and fully, responsible for a failure to help, not just 
responsible for contributing a ‘bit’ to such a failure.”403 On the macro-level, this means that the 
 
402 Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the Future, 13. 
403 Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the Future, 64. 
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more extensive powers of action societies possess due to science and technologies, the greater their 
moral responsibilities.404 To use the language of bioethical principles, beneficence (the promotion 
of the good) consists in more than just nonmaleficence (omitting harm), and that failures to act for 
the end of benefit are no less morally wrong than actions that harm. In short, humans have 
historically been bad at anticipating and taking responsibility for actions that occur as a result of 
indirect causes and their own omissions. Given the ever-increasing destructive power of 
technologies and the structural potential for both intentional and unintentional large-scale harms, 
it is a small leap for the authors from terrorist attacks and corporate pollution to extinction-level 
events. 
The commonsense morality referred to by the authors is not intended to be historical or 
anthropological so much as biological and psychological in nature. And while Persson and 
Savulescu trace most of our moral dispositions to deficient evolutionary traits such as the “special 
ferocity” with which non-human animals defend themselves and their territory,405 the authors 
argue that we do possess at least two morally worthwhile, hardwired traits: justice and altruism. 
Justice is described here in terms of fairness: “if you deserve some treatment then, other things 
being equal, it is just or fair that you receive it.” 406 Altruism, on the other hand, involves (A) an 
 
404 This is something that has, at times, been recognized but, most often, not acted upon at the level of the nation-
state. For example, in 2008 only five countries (Sweden, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands) met 
the modest goal of the United Nations to provide 0.7 percent of their national GDP in international aid. Persson and 
Savulescu, Unfit for the Future, 63. 
405 Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the Future, 19. For example, the doctrine of negative rights – according to which 
we have rights against others that they do not interfere with the use that we could make of ourselves and the property 
that we have by our own efforts – is described as one that initially evolved to enable small groups of humans (around 
100) to promote the survival and reproduction of the overall group and has an evolutionary origin in the territorialism 
of non-human animals. For this description, see: Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the Future, 15-23.  
406 Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the Future, 34. For example, reciprocity has been observed as a structural trait 
in communities of chimpanzees. This reciprocity, however, is of the “tit-for-tat” variety (e.g., sharing food in return 
for grooming). For this description, see: Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the Future, 32-42. 
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empathetic capacity to imagine from the inside what it would be like to be another conscious 
subject and (B) sympathetic concern about the wellbeing of that subject for its own sake.407  
Since our capacities for justice and altruism have evolved myopically to fit small circles of 
moral concern and primitive technologies, however, we are limited in our capacities to extend 
reciprocity outside of direct causal actions and altruism toward foreign and unfamiliar groups. 
Humans have thus historically failed to adequately recognize the interests of other human beings, 
future generations, and non-human animals and environments. What I want to emphasize is that, 
despite some recent backtracking efforts, 408  morality is being described here as a biological 
problem that requires a biological (or rather bio-technological) solution. If we are to respond to 
the moral responsibilities of a globalized, technologically advanced world in which the potential 
for harms and benefits are increasing at an exponential rate – i.e., if we are to become “fit for the 
future” – then we “must” decrease malevolence and increase beneficence through the use of drugs, 
implants, genetic engineering, and other biological interventions that enhance the core moral 
dispositions of altruism and justice. 
While political mechanisms are traditionally thought to address such issues, liberal 
democracies, which enact the limited moral interests of the majority, have failed to prevent, and 
in some cases worsened, global injustice and environmental destruction. Furthermore, the authors 
argue, liberal democracies’ goal of maximizing the freedom of individuals and offering tolerance 
to violent, hateful groups compounds the dangers of technological destruction; liberalism, in effect, 
pursues the goal of moral neutrality rather than a utilitarian maximization of benefit. Just as 
important, liberal democracies, with their emphases on freedom, pluralism, and privacy are 
 
407 Persson and Savulescu, Unfit for the Future, 109. 
408 Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, “The Art of Misunderstanding Moral BioEnhancement,” Cambridge 
Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24, no.1 (2015): 48-57. 
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impractical for instituting the sorts of programs required to secure mankind’s future welfare. For 
the authors’ imagined MBE project to be successful, it would need to be both global and 
compulsory since, in their predictive model, even a handful of morally deficient individuals pose 
an existential threat. 409  In spite of these criticisms, Persson and Savulescu do not suggest 
abandoning democratic institutions as such, but rather complementing them with MBE so that 
consumers and voters will make more just and altruistic decisions. While personal freedoms – in 
this case, the freedom to make decisions with respect to one’s own biology – might seem to be a 
high cost for a more moral future, the authors contend it is a necessary one to ensure that there is 
a future at all.  
I describe Persson and Savulescu’s model as “behavioral” in order to underline that 
enhancing behavior is both the preeminent goal and only legitimate criterion for evaluating 
morality in their framework. Building on classical utilitarianism, or its more particular variant 
welfarism, the premise is that we can and should judge morality according to how one contributes 
to the greater good through practical, empirically verifiable actions. It does not matter per se 
whether or not you can reason ethically or possess ethical motives or virtues; what matters is 
whether or not your actions function in service of “everyone on the whole.” The God Machine, for 
example, would be justifiable, even at the cost of certain kinds of autonomous decision-making, 
because the consequences represent a clear benefit to the wellbeing of the communal whole; after 
all, according to the authors, “serious crimes” are those actions we already agree upon as 
incontrovertible threats to communal welfare. There is also a surface resemblance to classical 
behaviorist models in biology and psychology here. While internal mechanisms are not ‘black 
 
409 The authors do, however, argue that some is better than none in this case as it would “reduce” the threat from a 
probability standpoint. Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, “Against Fetishism about Egalitarianism and in Defense 
of Cautious Moral Bioenhancement,” American Journal of Bioethics 14, no. 4 (2014): 39-41. 
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boxed’ for descriptive or explanatory purposes as in behaviorism, internal and biological causes 
are considered relevant only insofar as the enhancement of them is a (or, in this case, the) means 
to an end: catastrophe-avoidance. 
4.3 Virtuous Enhancement 
We can find a different model of bioenhancement in philosopher Mark Walker’s proposed 
Genetic Virtue Project: an interdisciplinary effort between philosophers, psychologists, and 
geneticists to discover and enhance genetic correlates of virtuous behavior. The Genetic Virtue 
Project depends upon three premises. First, the foundation of moral behavior lies in “personality 
traits” – a psychological term referring to “enduring behaviors that are stable across time and 
situations” – which Walker understands as being coterminous with both virtues and vices.410 While 
the goal is still to enhance behavioral output in this model, the targets, in the mold of classical 
virtue ethics, are the enduring character traits that both explain and are responsible for that behavior. 
Second, pointing to suggestive evidence from evolutionary biology and clinical psychology, 
almost all personality traits demonstrate at least “moderate” genetic heritability. For example, 
given that deception is a common tactic among a range of species as well as part of heritable mental 
illnesses like anti-social personality disorder (APD), it is reasonable to assume that truthfulness 
has a genetic component.411 While not committing to a complete biological determinism, Walker 
stresses that our genes at least influence our personalities and enduring behaviors.  
Third, if our virtues have some kind of genetic basis, then it is logical to postulate that we 
can detect and control the genes responsible for these heritable components. There is no a priori 
 
410 Mark Walker, “Genetic Virtue: A Project for Twenty-First Century Humanity?” Politics and the Life Sciences 28, 
no. 2 (2009): 28.  
411 Walker also mobilizes evolutionary biology to make the case for these moral capacities being hardwired. For 
example, chimpanzees demonstrate a sense of justice through reciprocal exchanges and aggressive behaviors when 
those exchanges go unfulfilled. Likewise, chimpanzees have been observed extending nurturance and protection to 
not just kin but also other unrelated chimps. 
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reason, Walker contends, that we cannot use methods such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, 
somatic and germ-line genetic engineering, or the addition of artificial chromosomes to cultivate 
personality traits like Walker’s preferred virtues of truthfulness, justice, and caring.412 While the 
idea of programming virtue into subjects seems to run counter to traditional Aristotelian models 
of virtue ethics in which virtue is cultivated through habit and demonstrated through choice, 
Walker emphasizes that the hope of the Genetic Virtue Program is “not to make persons virtuous 
but to make them better equipped to learn how to be virtuous.”413 Walker also acknowledges that 
a centralized project along the lines of the Genetic Virtue Program is highly implausible in liberal 
democracies. He nevertheless insists that it is “ethically advisable” and appeals to a now familiar 
libertarian model in which parents could (and should) use genetic virtue technologies to enhance 
their offspring. 
Models of virtue-engineering tend to mobilize sentimentalist accounts of morality in which 
emotions or sentiments, as opposed to reasoned principles and individual will, are the principal 
drivers of action. Just as virtues are equated with enduring psychological traits, emotions are 
equated with mental states and neurological processes. We can find a clear expression of this in 
philosopher Thomas Douglas’s proposal for “negative moral enhancement” which, rather than 
increasing moral capacities, reduces certain “uncontroversially bad” counter-moral emotions such 
as racial bias and violent aggression. Thomas argues that we can possess a rational or intellectual 
understanding of how we ought to act but still lack the emotional motivation to follow through on 
those actions. It follows that biomedical means should be used to reduce the underlying causes for 
 
412 Walker, however, clarifies that the Genetic Virtue Project should be understood as a supplement to traditional 
means of moral cultivation such as socialization and education since environment also has a role (of undetermined 
importance) in virtue-formation. 
413 Mark Walker, “Genetic Virtue,” 39. 
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morally wrong behavior (i.e., counter-moral emotions) rather than just relying on traditional means 
of moral cultivation like education that target the reasoning process alone. Rather than a 
transformation of our human nature, Douglas encourages us to see this as a suppression of our 
“brute selves,” which would free our “true” or “authentic” selves to have and act upon good 
motives, i.e., to be our best selves.414 While Douglas is providing a sentimentalist account for what 
motivates our actions, then, he is also proposing that we become our ‘best selves’ when we 
suppress or bring our emotions in line with our rational, self-determined beliefs; only when the 
body is completely subjected to the power of the mind can we become truly virtuous beings. 
Bioethicist James Hughes offers a more holistic model of virtue engineering in which 
character development depends upon the modulation of multiple, interdependent virtues rather 
than the improvement of a single trait such as empathy or intelligence. In particular, Hughes 
proposes a “minimal” model of moral enhancement focused on the improvement of four basic 
capacities that demonstrate some correspondence to neurogenetic and neurochemical causes: 1) 
self-control: restraint, conscientiousness, and temperance; 2) niceness: agreeableness, extraversion, 
empathy, and fairness; 3) intelligence: open-mindedness, curiosity, love of learning, and prudence; 
and 4) positivity: (lack of) neuroticism, emotional self-regulation, positivity, bravery, and 
humor.415 The targeting and moderation of these four interrelated capacities – which correlate to 
the four cardinal virtues of Plato and Aquinas (temperance, justice, prudence, and courage) – is 
intended to both respond to criticisms that MBE does not offer a holistic enough picture of moral 
subject-formation and provide a comprehensive virtue-ethics based approach.416  
 
414 Douglas, “Moral Enhancement,” 240. 
415 James J. Hughes, “Moral Enhancement Requires Multiple Virtues: Toward a Posthuman Model of Character 
Development,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 24, no. 1 (2015): 86-95. 
416 Bioethicist Fabrice Jotterand, for example, argues that, “the way human beings make moral decisions requires the 
interaction of a complex network of emotional, cognitive, and motivational processes that cannot be reduced just to 
moral emotions or technological control (moral capacity) but also to practical reasoning (i.e., the source of moral 
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We can also, however, understand Hughes as engaged in a project of universalization, of 
normalizing both the targets for moral enhancement and the practice of enhancement itself as 
structural characteristics of human culture. For example, Hughes explains that, “the ability to 
exercise self-control, in particular in relation to vices such as anger, intoxication, and sensual 
pleasure has been in a virtue in almost every system of moral thought, from Greek philosophy and 
the Abrahamic faiths to Hinduism and Buddhism, and Confucianism and Taoism.”417 Such claims 
can be found repeated for each of his ideal virtues. Rather than just using the rhetoric of 
universalism to claim that these virtues are pre- or trans-cultural and therefore inherent in our 
biological and psychological structures, Hughes is, in effect, establishing a minimal moral 
commonsensism or virtue-based consensus.418  
As we saw in Chapter One, the belief that there are common moral principles – autonomy, 
justice, non-maleficence, and beneficence – toward which all people in a given community are 
predisposed, has been one of the guiding frameworks of bioethics since the field’s inception in the 
1970s.419 In proposing a virtue ethics-based approach, Hughes is shifting the traditional bioethical 
focus from moral principles and ends to moral character and personality traits. Like Douglas, he 
is contending not just that there are certain forms of behavior that we can ‘uncontroversially’ agree 
 
content).” Fabrice Jotterand, “’Virtue Engineering’ and Moral Agency: Will Post-Humans Still Need the Virtues?” 
AJOB Neuroscience 2, no. 4 (2011): 7.  
Philosophers Nicholas Agar and John Harris take this even further in contending that “piecemeal” improvements of 
individual traits could upset the delicate balance of moral decision-making and end up ‘de-enhancing’ subjects. 
Nicholas Agar, “Moral Bioenhancement and the Utilitarian Catastrophe,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 
24, no. 1 (2015): 37-47. Sarah Chan and John Harris, “Moral Enhancement and Pro-Social Behaviour,” Journal of 
Medical Ethics 37, no. 3 (2011): 130-131. 
417 Hughes, “Moral Enhancement Requires Multiple Virtues,” 89.  
418 Philosopher John Shook describes “commonsensism” in this context as the appeal to “primary moral factors 
simple enough for broad comprehension and everyday application.” John R. Shook, “Neuroethics and the Possible 
Types of Moral Enhancement,” AJOB Neuroscience 3, no. 4 (2012): 5. 
419 The references to these principles are so wide in bioethics that a full citation is not possible. As we saw in Chapter 
One though, the first and most canonical text where these principles were elaborated is: Tom L. Beauchamp, Principles 
of Biomedical Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
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on as ethical and unethical but also that we ought to pursue these at the underlying level of 
personality traits and, even further beneath that, their bio- and neuro-logical causes. From this 
perspective, modern psychiatry’s project to “map the methods for diagnosing character flaws, and 
to determine the appropriate behavioral and chemical interventions to bring individuals lacking in 
self-control, empathy, intelligence, or positivity closer to the norm” is little different from those of 
a wide historical and cultural range of virtue-based moral traditions.420 
For Hughes, this seems to include the liberal democratic project itself. He suggests that, if 
explicitly self-chosen, MBE would conform to the Western virtues of happiness and freedom by 
enabling individuals to choose the moral traits they consider valuable and increase their own 
capacities for embodying those traits.421 Straddling the line between liberalism and libertarianism, 
Hughes goes so far as to suggest that moral enhancement can increase the citizenry potential of a 
given democratic state, enabling citizens to better pursue their self-chosen moral codes and 
increasing individual responsibility and accountability. While this view takes for granted what 
Hughes calls “the liberal personality” (based on psychology’s Big 5 Personality Traits)422 as a 
regulative ideal, the more important implication for our purposes is that, what makes moral 
enhancement reasonable and desirable, is that it is good for, and indeed an extension of, the 
democratic state and its attendant liberal values. 
 
420 Hughes, “Moral Enhancement Requires Multiple Virtues,” 92. 
421 James Hughes, Citizen Cyborg: Why Democratic Societies Must Respond to the Redesigned Human of the Future 
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2004).  
422 The “Big 5 Personality Traits” are a theoretical framework used by psychologists to diagnose the “personality” 
of individual subjects. Each of the five traits – extraversion, agreeableness, openness, conscientiousness, and 
neuroticism – represents a continuum between two extremes. While both the labels of the traits and the framework 
itself are contested, theoretical articulations of the big 5 have been operating in psychology since the mid-twentieth 
century. More recent studies have focused on showing both the empirical validity and genetic heritability of these 
traits. Craig Macdonald, Miles Bore, and Dun Munro, “Values in action scale and the Big 5: An empirical indication 
of structure,” Journal of Research in Personality 42, no. 4 (August 2008): 787 –799. Kerry L. Jang, John Livesly, and 
Phillip A. Vemon, “Heritability of the Big Five Personality Dimensions and Their Facets: A Twin Study,” Journal of 
Personality 64, no. 3 (1996): 577 –592.  
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4.4 Rational Enhancement 
Models of enhancement that focus on reason and judgment rather than behavior and virtue 
tend to come from more skeptical views of the MBE project. Bioethicist John Harris, an otherwise 
staunch proponent of human enhancement, argues that biotechnological techniques that target 
specific moral emotions or behaviors rather than general cognitive capacities are illegitimate forms 
of moral enhancement; for morality can only be properly understood in terms of rationality and 
autonomy.423 Mimicking the Kantian tradition of ethics, Harris understands humans as possessing 
the unique capacity to scrutinize their own motives; to identify their motivations for action and to 
evaluate whether those motives should be endorsed or rejected. Ethical expertise, he explains, is 
not “being better at being good,” but “being better at knowing the good and understanding what is 
likely to conduce to the good.”424 In turn, the space between knowing and doing the good is that 
of freedom. Morality, properly understood, is an exercise of free will, an explicit choice based on 
internal reasoning. For there to be moral action at all, there must be a choice between right and 
wrong and we must possess “the freedom to fall.” Psychological and genetic interventions that 
influence behavior prior to self-conscious judgment therefore threaten to undermine the freedom 
to be moral in the first place.  
Harris is not just mounting a general defense of freedom here; rather he is explaining that 
behavior- and virtue-based models of MBE demonstrate a fundamental category mistake. If 
morality is rooted in self-conscious cognition, and direct modulation of emotions diminishes or 
eliminates the need for cognition in the moral decision-making process, then “tinkering with the 
 
423 John Harris, How to Be Good: The Possibility of Moral Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016). 
John Harris, “Moral Enhancement and Freedom,” Bioethics 25, no. 2 (2011): 102-111. John Harris, “Moral Progress 
and Moral Enhancement,” Bioethics 27, no. 5 (2013): 285-290. 
424 Harris, “Moral Enhancement and Freedom,” 104. 
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emotions is not a form of moral enhancement at all. It is more like the threat of punishment: it may 
make immoral behavior less likely, but it does not enhance morality.” 425 Bioethicist Farbrice 
Jotterand explains this problem in terms of the difference between “character traits” and “having 
character.” Whereas the former refers to the enduring behaviors that could be controlled through 
modulating emotion, the latter describes “a person’s moral strength to establish a set of behaviors 
deemed adequate in projected circumstances. It qualifies one’s moral agency and presupposes 
one’s capacity of self-determination. Agency (reasons, motives, intentions) and actions constitute 
the two elements that refer to having character.”426 To confer moral worth upon an agent’s actions, 
those actions must be both deliberate and deliberative – a self-conscious response to the universal 
question ‘What is the good?’ and the particular question ‘What is my good?’ For Jotterand and 
Harris, direct modulation of emotions and behaviors does not afford individuals the capacities 
(namely, agency) to produce moral content and therefore offers no basis on which we can evaluate 
whether an agent’s actions merit moral praise. 
It is unsurprising, then, that Harris, like most critics of MBE, favors traditional, deliberative 
means of increasing moral conformity that have already been ‘proven effective’ such as a 
“sophisticated understanding of cause and effect,” “self-education, wide reading and engagement 
with the world,” universal education, parental example, peer pressure, an effective and fair legal 
system, responsible policing, and social welfare provisions.427 Harris does, however, offer a tepid 
endorsement for MBE in the form of chemical or biological interventions that improve general 
cognitive capacities such as conceptual or logical understanding and the reasoning process itself. 
 
425 John Harris, “’Ethics is for Bad Guys!’ Putting the ‘Moral’ into Moral Enhancement,” Bioethics 27, no. 3 (2013): 
3-4. 
426 Jotterand, “’Virtue Engineering’ and Moral Agency,” 8. 
427 Harris, “Moral Enhancement and Freedom,” 104. 
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Insofar as morality is based in our rational faculties, there is no reason that cognitive enhancements 
(e.g., in perception, attention, understanding, and memory) could not function as de facto moral 
enhancements.428  
This tepid endorsement gains clearer articulation in bioethicist Owen Schaefer’s proposal 
for “indirect” moral bioenhancement. Whereas direct moral enhancements are designed to bring 
someone’s beliefs, motives, or actions in line with what the enhancer believes is correct, indirect 
moral enhancements are designed to make people more reliably produce morally correct beliefs, 
motives, or actions without specifying their content. Targets for indirect moral enhancements 
might include: 1) logical understanding, i.e., the ability to make proper logical inferences and 
deductions, spot contradictions in one’s own beliefs and those of others, and formulate arguments 
to highlight the true point of connection between interlocutors; and 2) conceptual understanding, 
i.e., apprehending what Descartes called “clear and distinct perceptions” or self-sufficient ideas. 
Schaefer’s argument assumes a more practical bent than Harris’: an enhancement that comes 
preloaded with positions on moral correctness is coercive, forcing compliance with a set of moral 
norms determined by an external agent. For MBE to be legitimate, the argument goes, it must 
improve our capacities to reason out our own moral precepts and enable greater possibilities for 
inter-personal moral deliberation.429 
4.5 Secularization and/as Disenchantment 
From the beginning of the chapter I have suggested that we can read the debate’s more 
familiar lexicon of “evolution,” “progress” “improvement,” “modern,” and “civilization” in terms 
 
428 For more on cognitive enhancement, see: Nick Bostrom and Anders Sandberg, “Cognitive Enhancement: Methods, 
Ethics, Regulatory Challenges,” Science and Engineering Ethics 15, no.3 (2009): 311-341. 
429 G. Owen Schaefer, “Direct vs. Indirect Moral Enhancement,” Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 25, no. 3 (2015): 
261-289. 
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of secularization. While the association between traditional narratives of secularization and these 
various markers of gradual historical increase might seem obvious to scholars of religion, the 
relationship seems to be either unapparent or unremarkable to bioethicists. Indeed, while these 
models of MBE have been criticized from a number of perspectives, there has been little to no 
acknowledgement of the underlying social and historical narratives operating within them.430 In 
contrast, I want to suggest that this connection is remarkable insofar as philosophies of ideal 
secularization operate as meta-narratives that structure the discourse on MBE and afford 
representations of enhanced futures as both reasonable and desirable. If the coherence of the 
secularization thesis has been dismantled ad nauseum in religious studies, the task of 
understanding where and how it still operates in particular discursive spaces and what the 
consequences of its operation are remains a task of critical importance for the field. 
But we need to be careful not to treat the meaning of “secularization” as self-evident here. 
However monolithic such a master narrative appears, not all descriptions of secularization – even 
those that take it to be an objective historical or sociological description and an inevitable, global 
process – are the same. When I speak of a ‘classic’ or ‘traditional’ secularization thesis in this 
chapter, then, I have in mind German sociologist Max Weber’s influential “disenchantment” thesis 
 
430 The three main lines criticisms of MBE from within bioethics are that such a project would be inegalitarian, non-
pluralistic, and reductionist.  
Bioethicist Robert Sparrow, for example, argues that such interventions would be subject to an unequal economic 
market in which first access is given to the rich and powerful. This would, in turn, even further increase the 
inegalitarian nature of moral-political influence in the socio-economically disparate U.S. Robert Sparrow, 
“Egalitarianism and Moral Bioenhancement,” American Journal of Bioethics 14, no. 4 (2014): 20-28.  
Bioethicist Michael Hauskeller contends that, “Whether or not we regard a particular change in a person’s moral 
outlook as an enhancement depends entirely on the moral framework we embrace.” Michael Hauskeller, “The Art of 
Misunderstanding Critics,” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare 25, no. 1 (2016): 158 
Bioethicist Birgit Beck explains explains that “A fortiori, it could be argued that a possible influence on morality via 
an alteration of brain states and neuronal chemistry has to be considered as doubtful, at the least. It might simply be a 
category mistake to assume that morality depends on, it is, least of all, constituted by single individuals’ mental states.” 
Birgit Beck, “Conceptual and Practical Problems of Moral Enhancement” Bioethics 29, no. 4 (2015): 238. 
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in particular. In his 1917 lecture Science as a Vocation, Weber posited that the predominance of 
social rationalization and scientific empiricism means that all phenomena can now, in principle, 
be “mastered” through reference to calculation rather than spiritual or supernatural forces. 431 As 
a result, religious belief and “traditional authority” have been (or are in the process of being) 
devalued as descriptive and normative mechanisms in the modern world.  
Jason Josephson-Storm clarifies this notion of disenchantment in delineating four 
constitutive characteristics across Weber’s corpus: 1) metaphysical realism: the belief that the 
world exists as such and does not represent some other or deeper real; 2) ontological homogeneity: 
the belief that that there are no truly extramundane objects or people; 3) value nihilism: the excision 
of value from the world of fact; and 4) epistemic overconfidence: the belief that everything can be 
known by means of intellectual abstraction. 432  Together, these overlapping metaphysical, 
ontological, normative, and epistemological commitments form the given conditions of ‘the’ 
modern worldview and signal that ‘the world’ has become disenchanted. 
For Weber, this state of disenchantment is propelled by epistemic and institutional 
processes of “rationalization” that organize individual and social life. We can see the principal 
forms of rationalization driving and structuring the move toward disenchantment as: 1) 
instrumental: practical decision-making based on the evaluation of means and ends; 2) theoretical: 
mastery of reality by means of increasingly precise and abstract concepts; and 3) formal: 
determining actions based on previous (institutional) procedures and precedents.433 In Weber’s 
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reading, these forms of rationalization are not unique to secular, Western modernity; 434 
disenchantment, however, begins to take effect when instrumental, theoretical, and formal reason 
assume the role of unquestioned ultimate ends and values. Like most master narratives of 
secularization then, the disenchantment thesis assumes an end point, an epochal rupture in which 
at some point societies became (or will become) substantively different from their pre-modern 
forebears – i.e., a period in which a disenchanted ‘modernity’ comes into effect. 
In the most straightforward sense, Weber’s thesis can be read as a descriptive one, which 
attempts to locate and demonstrate the fundamental characteristics, as well as the historical and 
sociological roots, of the modern social condition. Unlike most of the established models of 
secularization that came before him, however, Weber’s disenchantment thesis took a critical stance. 
He went on to insist that: “Science is meaningless because it gives no answer to our question, the 
only question important for us: ‘What shall we do and how shall we live?’”435 Building on Hume’s 
classical is-ought distinction, Weber forwarded a form of value nihilism: science produces facts 
rather than values and, the more we privilege the production of knowledge concerning what is, the 
less theoretical space there is to locate meaning, purpose, or values, i.e., what ought to be. “The 
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metaphysical needs of the human mind,” he later explained, “are driven not by material need but 
by an inner compulsion to understand the world as a meaningful cosmos and to take up a position 
toward it.”436 Indeed, the mechanism of modern physics suggests that, “if these natural sciences 
lead to anything in this way, they are apt to make the belief that there is such a thing as the ‘meaning’ 
of the universe die out at its very roots.”437 Through this critique, Weber turned classical models 
of modernization on their head to posit that the beliefs and processes driving modernization could, 
in important respects, effect regress rather than progress.  
With this framework in mind, we can return to the aforementioned models of MBE in order 
to understand how narrative themes and motifs of disenchantment resonate in the literature. We 
will see that part of what makes the MBE discourse such as a compelling site of analysis is not just 
that proponents recapitulate some of the basic premises of modernization-as-disenchantment, but 
also invert Weber’s critical framing in claiming that the world is not yet disenchanted enough and 
that morality can and ought to be subsumed to techno-science. 
4.6 Disenchanted Behavior 
Persson and Savulescu’s model of behavioral enhancement provides a clear parallel to the 
disenchantment thesis insofar as it is, in effect, a critique of modernization. In the first place, it 
assumes that societies have modernized through the mutual developments of liberalism, capitalism, 
and science, and, furthermore, that this is a process with a natural and unstoppable momentum. 
Indeed, moral enhancement is appealed to as an ethical obligation, rather than just one ethical 
choice among others, because the rationalizing processes of modernization are self-sufficient and 
irreversible. This is most evident in their framing of social and historical development in terms of 
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technological determinism. Persson and Savulescu, for example, describe “human cultural 
development” across the last 40,000 years in terms of a gradual accumulation of (factual) 
knowledge and as driven by the development of more and more advanced communication 
technologies from oral to written to electronic.438  
Scientific knowledge and technological power, however, are not just the principal causes 
of cultural development, but also the principal content. For example, the authors cite Moore’s Law 
– the statistical trend of computing power doubling every two years – as both the preeminent 
example of the current accumulation of knowledge and as a promise of its continuation.439 More 
to the point, the most important consequences of cultural development are not social or cultural 
changes per se but rather an increase in technological powers: to effect harms (or benefits) at an 
unprecedented historical magnitude. From biological and chemical warfare to weapons of mass 
destruction to anthropogenic climate change, instrumental and theoretical rationalization have 
reached a tipping point in which cultural development threatens species extinction, in which 
progress becomes (the ultimate) regress of “making worthwhile life forever impossible on this 
planet.”440 
While the authors often cite the threat of aberrant individuals, the problem is just as much 
a systemic one. It is not just that the modernization provides increasing destructive power and, 
therefore, more inherent risk, but also that our modern institutions are value-neutral or value-
negligent. Indeed, the authors might be most infamous for their claim that current liberal 
democracies are “in danger of being too liberal.”441 In striving for “ideological neutrality” and 
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“negative rights,” liberal democracies both lack the capacities to regulate growing technological 
power and fail to privilege (welfarist) beneficence as an ultimate end or value. Furthermore, even 
when scientific, economic, or political projects recognize beneficence as an end, there is either a 
failure to recognize the moral role of omissions or a dearth of motivation to act upon those ends. 
Most important, there has been a profound absence of consideration for the long-term 
consequences of techno-scientific development; benefit is enacted as something spatially and 
temporally immediate. We can understand the authors as identifying a kind of formal 
rationalization here in which the structural logics and ends of science, capitalism, and democracy 
become self-perpetuating, forming the given and unquestioned institutional precedents for modern 
social life. The resulting situation strikes a similar tone to Weber’s value nihilism: our principles 
for ethical evaluation become intransigent so that freedoms and knowledge are de facto equated 
with historical progress rather than risk or harm.  
For Persson and Savulescu, however, the forces of modernization are not the principal 
culprits in creating our current grim situation. Exponential increases in technological power 
exacerbate the threat, raising it from local to global, but the real problem is our myopic biologies 
and psychologies. The authors again and again stress that, “human beings are not by nature 
equipped with a moral psychology that empowers them to cope with the moral problems that these 
new conditions of life create.”442 Due to evolving in small, close-knit communities with primitive 
technologies, we simply lack the biological and psychological capacities (i.e., sufficient capacities 
for altruism and justice) to either create or enforce regulative frameworks that can manage the 
threat of our new technological powers. If not always framed so apocalyptically, this premise is a 
recurrent one among proponents of MBE. While the progressive moral gains made through 
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religion, philosophy, and other non-scientific worldviews have been, for the most part, qualitative 
and worthwhile, no amount of moral education can re-program our genes or rewire our brains to 
overcome the hard limits nature has imposed on moral behavior. Insofar as “the human species has 
been essentially the same in biological and genetic respect for at least 40,000 years, that is, while 
the main part of the unparalleled human cultural development has taken place,” the project of 
modernization was doomed to fail from the start, and modernity, as an ideal moral order, destined 
to remain elsewhere and elsewhen.443 In other words, when theoretical rationalization is taken to 
its logical conclusion and human nature becomes subject to complete scientific representation, the 
modernization of the human subject collapses in on itself by revealing the limits of individual and 
collective autonomy. Or at least this would be the case if our biologies and psychologies were 
destined to remain static.  
If the problem of myopic morality is biological in nature, it follows that the solution cannot 
(just) be a revaluation of cultural values or a reorganization of social institutions in accordance 
with pre- or non-modern beliefs; it must come from science itself. On one hand, we can use genetic, 
neurological, and psychological descriptions of our evolutionary adaptations and character traits 
to identify the problem, myopic moral capacities and their genetic or neurological correlates. On 
the other hand, we can use biotechnologies such as pharmaceuticals, neural implants, or genetic 
engineering to solve the problem by, for example, modulating oxytocin, serotonin, and dopamine 
production to increase individuals’ capacities for altruism and justice. While the goals of their 
project are global or ‘species-level’ in nature, Persson and Savulescu are, like most theorists of 
MBE, subscribing to a bottom-up model of social transformation. If we begin with increasing 
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individuals’ moral capacities at the biological level, we can expect beneficial reorganization of 
political, economic, and other social institutions to follow.  
I want to suggest that, for these authors, the world is not disenchanted enough. If recourse 
to magic has been subtracted, recourse to religion, education, and politics remains an issue; it is 
only when reliance on all unscientific means is exorcised and autonomy itself is theoretically and 
instrumentally rationalized that we can expect to fulfill the aspirational and utopian goal of a law-
governed, moral social order (i.e., where all actors function as cogs in a global God Machine). This 
means not just accepting scientific abstraction as the principal means to understand and intervene 
in moral subject-formation, but also that individuals must cede their morphological freedom (the 
right to maintain or modify one’s own body) in service of the greater good. Persson and Savulescu 
are able to make these demands of their readers through placing their audience within an unfinished 
historical narrative of secularization in which 1) catastrophic risk grows exponentially with the 
pace of technological development and 2) the reader is both complicit in creating this situation and 
has a vested interested in avoiding the ultimate harm. And while an authentic disenchanted 
modernity remains elsewhere or elsewhen in this apocalyptic scenario, it is still, with some 
judicious biotechnological intervention, the teleological destination of global history. 
4.7 Disenchanted Virtue 
Hughes’ model of virtue engineering offers a no less interesting case study for thinking 
about MBE and secularization given his longstanding interest in the relationship between religion 
and human enhancement. Earlier in the chapter, we saw that Hughes folds ethical traditions from 
different times and places into a universal virtue ethics in which self-control, niceness, intelligence, 
and positivity function as commonsense moral character traits. He also repurposes this 
universalistic rhetoric to argue for MBE (and enhancement in general) as a structural feature of 
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human nature and historical progress. Here we can return to a pertinent quote from Chapter Two 
in which Hughes recapitulates a classical narrative of secularization. 
As soon as hominids developed the capacity for abstract thought, they began to 
imagine ways that their life could be radically improved. They developed medicines 
and magical practices to improve health and wisdom. They developed religious 
worldviews that posited times and places without toil, conflict, or injustice, a more 
perfect world where they would be free of their vicissitudes.…With the emergence 
of the European Enlightenment in the 1700, however, these aspirations found 
expression in the belief that a new world could and would be built on foundations 
of reason, science, and technology. All people would be united in an egalitarian 
commonwealth, freed by machines from poverty and the necessity of toil, from 
disease and even death by scientific medicine, and ennobled by heights of 
civilizational achievement.444 
 
This world-historical narrative is intended to communicate an enduring human essence: humans 
have always been organisms directed toward the goal of self-improvement and bioenhancement, 
including MBE, is therefore an expression of human nature and a continuation of the project of 
civilization itself. While magical and religious metaphysics might be misguided, then, ‘magic’ and 
‘religion’ express desires and ends – better health, longer life, more enjoyment, greater wisdom, 
and more moral principles – that are both essentially human and at the heart of the project of 
modernization. In this sense, “civilization is moral enhancement” and moral biotechnologies are 
part and parcel of the process of “humanizing ourselves.”445 
Unlike magical, religious, and other unscientific means, however, MBE – as the product 
of a long secularization transition to practical reason – promises to finally fulfill these essentially 
human desires. It is through the use of, for example, pharmaceuticals and gene therapies to increase 
dopamine reception in the central nervous system (and with it self-control, pleasure, cognition, 
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and conscientiousness) that we will ‘actually’ radically ‘improve’ our lives and afford a “rich and 
rare level of flourishing.”446 Hughes goes so far as to suggest that: 
 “neuroscience will offer us all the possibility of becoming the better people that 
we want to be…making concrete age-old religious question about what it means to 
be a good person…Our growing understanding of the brain and how it generates 
empathy, self-control, moral judgment and even spiritual transcendence suggests 
that we will increasingly be able to identify and treat not just psychopathy, but 
ordinary moral and spiritual weakness.”447  
 
MBE should, therefore, be seen as merely the next step on a natural continuum of trans-cultural 
development from magic to religion to science.  
In Hughes’ model of secularization, however, the institution of moral enhancement need 
not necessitate the retreat of religion per se. For example, as a former Buddhist monk, he explains 
that, “from a Buddhist perspective, the growing ability to control our behavior will be an 
opportunity to suppress unskillful impulses and behaviors, and enhance our practice of virtues” 
such as generosity, renunciation, patience, concentration, self-reflection, and wisdom.448 The fluid 
Buddhist conception of the self, he suggests, both permits and encourages the use of cognitive 
enhancement technologies as a principal means of self-transformation toward Awakening. 
Furthermore, the “Buddhist goal of a more engaged, compassionate, form of eudaemonic 
happiness will become increasingly relevant as an alternative to the growing temptation of 
wireheading and chemical bliss. Buddhism can offer a model of cognitive enhancement that points 
past the sand traps of liberation.”449 While Hughes does not make such normative contentions 
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about other religious worldviews, he elsewhere suggests transhumanism can be read as a form of 
“techno-millennialism” that recapitulates Christian eschatological goals in (more practical) 
humanistic and techno-scientific terms.450 
To the scholar of religion, however, the notion of religion operating here appears as both 
uncritical and reductionist. While much ink has been spilled demonstrating that we should not 
accept the conflict between religion and science as a historical or categorical given,451 the view 
espoused here – that religion is a homogenous institution organized around universal humans ends, 
and, furthermore, that religious practitioners would or ought to be open to secular, scientific means 
to accomplish those ends – is at best idealized and at worst naïve. Even within the discursive 
confines of the larger enhancement debate, we find a number of theologians and religious 
practitioners (Catholic and Protestant in particular) who insist that human enhancement does not 
accord with their religious principles and that means are no less important than ends.452 More to 
the point, this positive rendering of religion champions theoretical and instrumental rationalization. 
Means are subsumed to non-particular ends that can best be realized through the techno-scientific 
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practices of bio-technological intervention. Cast as a form of proto-science, religion, like pre-
modern magic, offers us no qualitative purchase outside of the scientific worldview.  
Much like with religion, Hughes is also interested in demonstrating that human 
enhancement should be seen as compatible with, and an extension of, the liberal democratic 
tradition. Opposition to human enhancement tends to center on its radical quality: that a ‘biotech 
age’ of designer people would signal an end to human nature as such and with it our grounding 
moral ideals and political rights. 453  For Hughes, however, narration normalizes moral 
enhancement so that it is seen as an extension of, rather than a threat to, familiar liberal values and 
ends. We can understand this in three interrelated senses. First, Hughes is making the now familiar 
bioliberal argument that individuals’ rights to modify their selves and their offspring are (or ought 
to be) protected in liberal democracies. The very freedoms supposedly under threat – the negative 
rights of the individual citizen – make enhancement ethically and legally permissible. Second, he 
is suggesting that MBE, much like other forms of enhancement, could extend those freedoms by 
enabling individuals to overcome otherwise hard biological limits that prevent them from acting 
according to their interests. MBE, in this case, would allow individuals to better conform their 
behavior to their own values (i.e., to fulfill their self-determined purposes in life), which would, in 
turn, afford greater happiness and flourishing.  
Third, virtue engineering could make us better citizens and aid the democratic process as a 
whole. For example, in describing how drugs or gene therapies could be used to increase our 
“emotional intelligence,” he explains that, “our cognitive capacity to understand the consequences 
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of our behavior for others is key to being a responsible and compassionate person”454 and that 
increasing our empathic capacities would, therefore, increase our abilities to act as “fully self-
governing and responsible citizens.”455 In terms similar to Persson and Savulescu’s God Machine, 
he postulates that, once we have “onboard expert systems watching and advising our 
behavior…We might then all be able to consistently reason with the clarity of philosophers and 
the selfless compassion of Gandhi or Martin Luther King.”456 In other words, MBE does not just 
increase personal responsibility, but also the very standards of responsibility against which persons 
can be held accountable.  
Through these claims, Hughes is building on his narrative assertion that MBE is in accord 
with ‘traditional’ magical and religious ends. Enhancement is modern; after all, the modern is 
nothing more than the progressive realization of the traditional. But just as it does not signal a 
radical departure from the distant past it also does not signal one from the present. Rather than 
undermining our cherished political values and rights, initiating a post-modern rupture, MBE 
embodies and increases them; it is the next progressive, civilizational means through we which 
can “raise the bar” for civic, moral, and political responsibility at a societal level. To be the most 
effective citizens we can, and for the democratic process to ‘get it right’, we ought to use whatever 
means available to enhance our virtuous character traits and moral reasoning. Liberal 
democratization, much like civilization on the whole, remains incomplete here, and actualizing the 
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4.8 Disenchanted Rationality 
It is less clear where supporters of rationalist enhancement like Harris or Schaefer fit into 
this scheme. Given their concerns with protecting the interior spaces of the mind (i.e., the 
capacities for individual reason and freedom) from techno-scientific control, we could read them 
as proposing something similar to Weber’s original disenchantment thesis in which the rationalist 
tendencies of modernization create a form of value-nihilism. Without the autonomy to reason out 
our own motives and to choose to act upon them, we lose the ability to be moral as such. The 
suggestion that reason itself could be enhanced, thus protecting and even growing our moral 
freedoms – in particular, our capacities for generating our own moral content – however, should 
give us pause.  
In a somewhat paradoxical twist, indirect moral enhancements target moral content through 
their refusal to specify or determine that content in advance. General cognitive enhancements do 
not just protect individuals’ abilities to produce content in this model, but also provide the 
capacities to create morally better content. It is not clear exactly what this would look like outside 
of more logically consist or empirically informed positions, but that is, of course, the point: our 
current capacities to make moral judgments are restricted by our natural, limited cognitive powers. 
By increasing our brains’ capacities for storing and processing information, we could grow and 
improve moral discourse itself rather than just behavioral conformity. In contrast to Weber’s value 
nihilism, this suggests that theoretical rationalization is in fact the next major step in value-creation 
and moral progress. 
4.9 The Same Old Secularization Thesis? 
To this point, it should start to be apparent that proponents of MBE take up and 
operationalize some of the fundamental premises of a secularization master narrative and, in 
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particular, Weber’s disenchantment thesis. There is little doubt among these thinkers that 
secularization – understood to be a monolithic, global process of human progress that both reflects 
and actualizes common moral ends – is in fact an objective description of our evolving state of 
affairs. Like we saw in Taylor’s description of the “immanent frame,” secular modes of 
knowledge-production claim to ‘slough off’ religious illusions to reveal (scientific) truths about 
self and world. This metaphysical realism takes the form of not just a general scientific materialism 
but also a rampant biological reductionism. The constitutive features of morality – whether those 
are agency and reason, sentiments and virtues, or motives and behaviors – can all be reduced to, 
and understood as external manifestations of, their genetic and neurological correlates. This further 
implies an ontological homogeneity in which there are no truly extramundane objects or people; 
magic and religion might appeal to legitimate, universal human ends, but spells and prayers are 
not valid means for achieving them, for they do not operate internal to an empirical, secular 
universe. In tandem, these premises represent a supreme epistemic overconfidence: there is no part 
of our reality, including and especially the inner workings of the human mind, that cannot be 
known through intellectual (namely, scientific) abstraction. It thus with great confidence that 
proponents of MBE claim that we can (or soon will be able to), for the first time in human history, 
manipulate the actual causes of moral thought and action, rather than cultivating morality through 
indirect social means and rough representative abstractions. 
In the last chapter, however, I argued that secularisms are multiple, diverse, and contextual 
phenomena, i.e., in-formation processes rather than fully actualized features of the world. 
Examining formations of the secular, therefore, requires attending to the differences in secular 
discourses and their material instantiations. This is no less true of discourses of secularism. The 
theories that purport to describe secularism in objective terms operate internal to the very history, 
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or rather histories, that they attempt to narrate. Just as there are secularisms, there are 
secularization theses. In this case, we are invited to critically examine the particular, immanent 
“secularism of a secular people,” albeit one grouped more by textual communication than 
organizational or communal alliances.457 I have thus chosen Weber as a point of departure for this 
chapter not just because his disenchantment thesis is such a common frame of reference for 
theoretical work on secularism, but also because, through juxtaposition, it allows us to highlight 
novel and important differences in the narrative work of proponents of MBE. 
While advocates of MBE might seem to present a familiar teleological narrative of human 
progress, we can nevertheless identify two important differences. First, if secularism is a relational 
concept defined through opposition to religion, religion is not alone in its oppositional status here. 
Secular education and democratic political governance are grouped with (rather than against) 
religion as ‘traditional’ social means of indirect (and ineffective) moral cultivation. The result is 
that all non-scientific epistemologies and instrumentalities are treated as mere steps on a 
progressive, teleological continuum of world-historical development. The ideal secular here, then, 
is not represented as a neutral, pluralist immanent frame in which science and culture, facts and 
values, operate in discrete spheres. Rather, the ideal secular is a time and space in which biological 
sciences are the preeminent means to understand and intervene in moral and cultural life.  
Second, despite a firm reliance on established Western ethical traditions, the appeals to 
moral enhancement here functions less as self-glorification and more as self-critique. This, 
however, possesses little resemblance to the Weberian critique that we have become too scientific 
and instrumental for our own good. Rather, in paradoxical fashion, advances in biological sciences 
have revealed just how unadvanced we purported moderns are. We now know that we are 
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genetically and neurologically programmed for certain ‘counter-moral’ modes of behavior, 
emotion, and reason. The solution, it follows, is not a retreat from science and instrumentalism but 
a complete commitment to it, all the way down to the level of biotechnologically modifying our 
individual bodies. The ideal secular, the authentic modern, then, is far from fully actualized in this 
narrative; it is precisely what ‘we’ – this assumed historical collective engaged in a collaborative 
project of social organization – still need to achieve. 
If scholarship on MBE from outside of bioethics is quite limited, there is nevertheless a 
growing body of literature on likeminded posthuman visions that, building off of Weber, 
characterize them in terms of “re-enchantment.”458 These counter-narratives contend that techno-
science has begun to “re-enchant” the world for techno-enthusiasts providing meaning, purpose, 
and values, or at least awe and wonder, to the very world it disenchanted in the first place. 
Anthropologist Abou Farman, for example, contends that “informatic cosmologies” such as the 
Technological Singularity re-enchant the universe through ascribing it unity and purpose. 459 
However apt of a description the re-enchantment thesis might provide, it nevertheless, like the 
original disenchantment thesis, still principally concerns whether or not disenchantment is an 
accurate empirical description of the condition of modern subjects. 
In contrast, I am interested in how the narratives of “re-enchanted” discourses – historical, 
cosmological, or otherwise – operate as regulative ideals. In this instance, we are invited to think 
 
458 For examples of this kind of literature, see: Robert Geraci, Apocalyptic AI: Visions of Heaven in Robotics, 
Artificial Intelligence, and Virtual Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). Mohammad Yaqub Chaudhary, 
“Augment Reality, Artificial Intelligence, and the Re-Enchantment of the World,” Zygon 54, no. 2 (2019): 454-478. 
Alexandra Sherlock, “Larger Than Life: Digital Resurrection and the Re-Enchantment of Society,” The Information 
Society 29, no. 3 (2013): 164-176. Raymond Lee, “The Re-Enchantment of Time: Death and Alternative Temporality,” 
Time and Society 18, no. 2-3 (2009): 387-408. 
459 Informatic cosmologies” are scientific descriptions of the physical universe based on theories of increasing 
information complexity or “intelligence.” Abou Farman, “Re-Enchantment Cosmologies: Mastery and Obsolescence 
in an Intelligent Universe,” Anthropological Quarterly 85, no. 4 (2012): 1069-1088. Abou Farman, “Secular Immortal: 
Transformation,” PhD Diss., The City University of New York, 2012. 
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about how the particular version of the secularization thesis that operates in the MBE discourse is 
powerful, i.e., the sense in which it possesses capacities to make claims about self and world seem 
both true and normative.460 In this regard, we can understand master narratives of secularization 
as forms of “constitutive rhetoric,” providing a collective identity for the addressed audience, 
constructing that audience as a subject in history, and demanding that subjects act in accordance 
with their identities to bring about a particular future.461 In the case of the MBE debate, the reader 
is assigned an identity as a member of a universal moral community, situated in a global history 
in which secularization remains an ideal but unfinished project, and instructed to embrace bio-
technological interventions as the exclusive means to bring that project to completion. Even more 
than particular ethical arguments from utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and deontology, we can 
understand this narrative framing as the principal discursive means through which the otherwise 
‘radical’ project of MBE is presented to readers as both reasonable and desirable.  
4.10 From Disenchantment to Danger? 
The aforementioned literature on re-enchantment also presents a second and related 
drawback. The fundamental desire for critical distance and objective description can discourage 
critique on the part of its theorists. We are invited to see that there are new forms of enchanted 
modern life but not necessarily how those forms might be problematic (or, for that matter, 
instructive). In other words, such analyses, with some important exceptions, attempt to uphold the 
 
460 This idea of power draws on Michel Foucault, who defines power as the “ubiquitous” and “nonsubjective” 
strategies, mechanisms, and techniques, which, often functioning beneath the level of discursive explicitness, 
constitute relationships of force. These strategies, mechanisms, and techniques both provide the conditions for explicit 
truth claims and supply discourses with their normative force. Discourses, in turn, reify the epistemic and material 
power relations that afford them. In this sense, discourse can be seen as “both an instrument and effect of 
power...discourse transmits and produces power.” Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality, Vol. 1: An Introduction, 
trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Vintage Books, 1990), 92-102. 
461 Raymie E. McKerrow, “Constitutive Rhetorics,” in Encyclopedia of Rhetoric, ed. Thomas O. Sloane (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2001), 616. James Boyd White, Heracles’ Bow: Essays on the Rhetoric and Poetics of Law 
(Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985). Maurice Charland, “Constitutive Rhetoric: The Case of the 
‘Peuple Québécois’,” Quarterly Journal of Speech 73, no. 2 (1987): 133-150. 
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very disciplinary distinction between fact and value that their subjects so deliberately transgress.462 
On the other hand, critiques of MBE from within bioethics have almost exclusively focused on its 
negative potential were it to become implemented, with little attention given to how its discursive 
inscriptions are consequential in the present. Indeed, there is a growing amount of scientific 
research and institutional activities funded in the name of MBE and these imaginings express 
beliefs about human nature that operate widely in fields such as genetics, evolutionary biology, 
psychology, and neuroscience. 463  In conclusion, then, I want to highlight some of the most 
problematic (and instructive) elements of the particular secularization narrative that operates in the 
MBE debate.  
The clearest problem stems from the universalism structured into its world-historical 
narrative of moral progress. For proponents of MBE, different cultures and communities are 
assumed to be operating within a common teleological unfolding of history and morality. While 
some social groups might ‘lag’ behind others in terms of secularization, it is nevertheless assumed 
that all peoples are (or ought to be) traversing the same path of Enlightenment towards the same 
eventual end: bioenhancement. 464  While most advocates are careful to make minimal and 
conservative claims about what moral enhancement would consist in (e.g., targeting character traits 
 
462 For example, literature on “enchanted materialism,” in which theorists seek to recover or discover alternate 
animating ontologies that reject the modern trend of de-spiritualizing and de-animating matter is much more critical 
in character. See, for example: Jane Bennett, Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things (Durham, NC: Duke 
University Press, 2010). Karen Barad, Meeting the Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of 
Matter and Meaning (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007). Eduardo Kohn, How Forests Think: Toward an 
Anthropology Beyond the Human (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2013). 
463 For an overview of the scientific theories that MBE draws on as well some of the current MBE projects under 
development, see: Harris Wiseman, The Myth of the Moral Brain: The Limits of Moral Enhancement (Cambridge, 
M.A.: M.I.T. Press, 2016). 
464 Cultural anthropologist Johannes Fabian demonstrates and problematizes the structural, secular assumption that 
whereas Western anthropologists inhabit the modern present, their non-Western subjects inhabit the pre-modern past. 
While his work is a reflexive critique of the discipline of anthropology, it nevertheless speaks to a more pervasive 
teleological temporality that structures master narratives of secularization. Johannes Fabian, Time and the Other: How 
Anthropology Makes Its Object (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 
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such as altruism and justice or reforming behaviors such as murder, rape and torture), there is still 
a tacit paternalism in assuming the existence of, and seeking to implement, a consensus moral 
framework. World-historical narratives of moral progress afford these authors and texts the marker 
of ‘the human’ and, as a result, the privileged position of speaking for the past, present, and future 
of the species. 
While moral consensus might seem like a laudable goal, we must remember that consensus 
also functions as a mechanism of power, marginalizing those moral life plans that do not conform 
to commonsensism. When narrativized as a global human project, models of MBE conceal the 
question of structural power: who gets to determine which moral frameworks are universal and 
legitimate for guiding the project of enhancement? This is exemplified by the fact that the authors 
of these texts – so often white, European and American men for whom classical theories of 
modernization and secularization seem commonsensical or self-evident – fail to acknowledge their 
own positioning. How is it that the canonical traditions of utilitarianism, virtue ethics, and 
deontology seem to form the entire spectrum of available meta-ethical perspectives in this 
discourse? Indeed, even when other ethical or ontological traditions are gestured toward (e.g., 
Buddhism), it is part of a process of conceptual translation in which otherness is reduced to 
sameness.  
We can find an even more glaring instance of this unselfconsciousness when, in their God 
Machine thought experiment, Persson and Savulescu suggest that we would settle the controversy 
of what constitutes “grossly immoral action” by deciding that the God Machine should prevent all 
“acts which would have resulted in imprisonment of a person,” as if the existing judicial and 
carceral systems represent a satisfactory moral standard for all people and a reliable representation 
of any given community’s interests. While the authors halfheartedly acknowledge that this 
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standard is merely a placeholder, its presence speaks to the structural difficulties of drawing 
substantive and ‘uncontroversial’ red lines between moral and immoral behaviors, emotions, and 
motivations. We must therefore be wary of the discursive erasure of alternative perspectives on 
ethics and human nature; and, if we take the possibility of MBE seriously, their erasure as such.  
If the universalization characteristic of this world-historical narrative seems familiar, it is 
important to stress that it is, in this case, afforded through biological reductionism in particular, 
i.e., self-sufficient bio- and neuro-logical explanations of human moral development at both the 
individual and social level. The selective citation of theories from genetics, evolutionary biology, 
psychology, and neuroscience provides a common and ‘objective’ ground according to which it 
becomes sensible to speak of humans as a singular agent – a species – with moral defects and 
aspirations that are consistent across individual members. When moral subject-formation is 
‘naturalized’ in this way, commonsensism becomes the authorized, de facto approach to bioethics. 
We might quibble over which principles and ends are or ought to be privileged, but there is little 
doubt that consensus principles and ends exist and are merely awaiting (techno-scientific) 
revelation and implementation. 
This rampant biological reductionism speaks to deeper problems with how moral subject-
formation is imagined in the discourse. As scholars of religion have demonstrated, master 
narratives of secularization tend to posit a teleological “dematerialization” of religion according 
to which all religious and moral life is reconfigured in terms of individual belief and textual 
practice rather than communal life, material interaction, and affective experience.465 The MBE 
discourse enacts a similar if quite particular form of this de-materialization. While moral subjects 
 
465 Salley M. Promey, “Introduction,” in Sensational Religion: Sensory Cultural in Material Practice, ed. Salley M. 
Promey, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 1-21. 
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here very much have bodies – indeed, we could go so far as to say that they are their bodies – they 
are not embodied. 466  When morality is reduced to bio- and neuro-logical causes, all other 
mechanisms of moral subject-formation are made irrelevant and the particular spatial and temporal 
positioning of the subject has little to no bearing on their moral status or development. Specific 
manifestations of morality are only important insofar as they evidence universal, biological truths 
and not because cultural context or affective experience have a substantive influence on how 
individuals or groups develop moral norms.  
More than just eliding the relative and contextual nature of moral standards, this framing 
omits the diverse and complex processes through which moral capacities and worldviews are 
acquired in the first place. Following the “material turn” in Religious Studies, we ought to take 
sensation, materiality, habit, experience, and environment seriously as constitutive factors in moral 
subject-formation.467 Just as scholars of religion have sought to move beyond belief as the sole 
container of moral life, so too must theorists of enhancement begin to wrestle with the idea that 
biological causes (and, for that matter, abstract philosophical concepts) are “one small subset (or 
feature) of the migrating system of forces running between bodies and worlds.”468 
 
466 This distinction between “body” and “embodiment” draws from N. Katherine Hayles, who argues that Foucault’s 
framework of “discourse” assigns subjects a body but struggles to account for the constitutive role of their embodied 
experience within a particular cultural environment. She thus suggests that we should temper such abstract discursive 
analysis with the cultural analysis of Michel de Certeau’s framework of “habitus.” For Hayles, this is not just a general 
analytical suggestion but also an important tool in showing how misguided transhumanist and likeminded imaginings 
of disembodied subjectivity are. N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1999), 192-221. 
467 Some exemplary texts that pursue this line of thinking include: Manuel A. Vazquez, More than Belief: A 
Materialist Theory of Religion (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011). Charles Hirschkind, The Ethical 
Soundscape: Cassette Sermons and Islamic Counterpublics (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). Colleen 
McDannell, Material Christianity: Religion and Popular Culture in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1995). Thomas A. Tweed, Crossing and Dwelling: A Theory of Religion (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
2006). We might also understand the “media turn” in the field, according to which material and technological 
mediation is a necessary condition of religious life, as a subgenre of this intellectual movement. Matthew Engelke, 
“Religion and the Media Turn: A Review Essay,” American Ethnologist 37, no. 2 (2010): 371-379. 
468 Donovan Schafeer, Religious Affects: Animality, Evolution, and Power (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 
2015), 34. 
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To be clear, this does not mean abandoning science as a theoretical resource. For example, 
recent works such as Donovan Schaefer’s Religious Affects have sought to incorporate 
evolutionary biology into critical theory of religion by thinking in terms of the “heterogeneous 
multiplicity” of animality and “the multidimensional spectrum of richly textured, feeling bodies 
emerging out of a branching array of deep evolutionary histories.”469 On one hand, Schaefer 
acknowledges that emotions are “semistable phenomenological forms” that “emerge out of a 
dynamic evolutionary history…reliably and predictably enough that they resemble an ahistorical 
essence.”470 On the other hand, emotions such as shame or fear are plasticly reassembled within 
embodied histories into living particularities – moved, combined, and rearranged in the life span 
of an organism and invested and distributed in actors, objects, and symbols outside of the 
individual body. Schaefer thus suggests that, “embodied histories always need to be understood in 
a double sense, as the accumulation of a complex genotype in deep time and as the cascade of 
accidents that affect the phenotype during an individual body’s life span.”471 Rather than discrete 
forms, then, biology and culture should be approached as ongoing, simultaneous processes, i.e., as 
“contiguous and interwoven systems of force moving at different speeds.”472 Schaefer’s work 
demonstrates an instructive desire to move past the binary nature/nurture mentality in both the 
humanities and hard sciences by thinking through affect and power in terms of ‘natureculture’. 
To this end, I believe there is actually something quite instructive in how proponents of 
MBE push the traditional humanistic boundary between fact and value through the use of genetic, 
evolutionary, psychological, and neurological theories. While we should resist taking up a 
 
469 Schaefer, Religious Affects, 58. 
470 Schaefer, Religious Affects, 47. 
471 Schaefer, Religious Affects, 49. 
472 Schaefer, Religious Affects, 49. 
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straightforward biological determinism, we can nevertheless acknowledge that descriptive 
understandings of what is necessarily inform prescriptive understandings of what ought to be. 
Insofar as we situate scientific theories as socially and historically determined formations, we 
(humanities scholars) should not be afraid to engage them in making sense of the world(s) we 
analyze. There is thus an implicit, if somewhat misguided, recognition in the MBE discourse that 
‘factual’ representations of the world can, and often do, act as the basis for making normative 
claims. The scientific theories that these thinkers invoke, as well as their deliberately narrow 
framing of them, however, privilege a dubious unidirectional and disembodied model of moral 
subject-formation. If we are to approach biological sciences as a useful theoretical resource, then, 
we must to look to theories that privilege the complexity rather than simplicity of human nature – 




















From Posthumanism to Post-Enhancement 
 
5.1 Postmodern Pessimism or Posthuman Optimism? 
To this point, I have claimed that both the bioconservative and bioliberal positions on 
human enhancement are problematic due to their essentialist historical, philosophical, and 
scientific characterizations of human nature. If the biotechnological interventions discussed under 
the rubric of human enhancement are radical, then the models of subjectivity being operationalized 
are all-too-traditional in their inability to challenge the self-contained, self-determining Man of 
Reason in both the present and future. I have also, however, suggested that each pole of the 
discourse provides a compelling building block for rethinking the ethics of biotechnologies. In the 
bioconservative position, we see an instructive aspiration to think biotechnologies as an 
ontological problem; enhancement technologies are a discursive occasion to call into question ‘our’ 
predominant self-understandings. In the bioliberal position, we see a cogent impulse to use 
emerging scientific thinking as a theoretical resource for bioethical examination; we need not take 
a ‘two cultures’ approach in which scientific theorization is the other of critical theory. In this 
chapter, I contend that both of these positive traits are encapsulated in a posthumanist approach to 
subjectivity, which attempts to reimagine subjectivities for the sustainable grounding of social 
recognition and relational ethics under the posthuman conditions of info- and bio-technological 
convergence.473 
While most self-identified posthumanist literature is bioethical in terms of its subject matter, 
this mode of critical theory has been structurally excluded from bioethics as a professional and 
public field. There are numerous reasons for this exclusion, including the fact that ontological 
 
473 Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2013). Rosi Braidotti and Maria Hlavajova, ed. 
Posthuman Glossary (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018).  
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work is often seen as disruptive to an intellectual tradition (bioethics) that takes its subject for 
granted in order to operationalize a ‘practical’ (universally and institutionally applicable) 
framework of normative ethics (common moral principlism). Ontology and ethics, however, are 
structurally related; evaluating the actions of a subject always already presumes a coherent 
understanding of that subject. Concealing questions of subject-formation in order to ask questions 
of normative ethics can, in turn, lead to not just incoherent but also dangerous ethical approaches. 
It thus merits asking: how might adopting a posthumanist model of subjectivity change the nature 
of the human enhancement debate? We will see that a posthumanist approach implies that human 
subjects are best understood as relational, embodied, and differential beings who have never been 
human in the classical sense of autonomous individualism. Instead, we are always already ‘cyborgs’ 
who co-evolve with our technologies as a condition of being (or rather becoming) itself. From this 
perspective, the conceptual framework of human enhancement, which is structurally dependent on 
essentialist appeals to human nature, is a category mistake.  
In Chapter One, I discussed the mid-twentieth century intellectual trend of “postmodern 
pessimism,” according to which technocracy and rationalization became associated with cultural 
domination (rather than moral progress) and modernization became a metanarrative or myth 
(rather than an historical inevitability).474 I claimed that this trend had a negligible influence on 
the field of bioethics, the development of which exemplified the process of Weberian formal 
rationalization. 475 The aforementioned philosophical critiques of techno-science do, however, 
 
474 Leo Marx, “The Idea of ‘Technology’ and Postmodern Pessimism” in Does Technology Drive History? The 
Dilemma of Technological Determinism, ed. Merritt Roe Smith and Leo Marx (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1994), 
237-258. 
475 John H. Evans, Playing God?: Human Genetic Engineering and the Rationalization of Public Bioethical Debate 
(Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 2002). John H. Evans, “Science, Bioethics, and Religion,” in The 
Cambridge Companion to Science and Religion, ed. Peter Harrison (Oxford, UK: University of Oxford, 2010), 207-
226. 
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represent a touchstone in the development of the self-identified posthumanist tradition.476 To 
understand a posthumanist approach to subjectivity – including how it relates to and differs from 
a ‘postmodern’ one – then, we must first return to the ‘alienation thesis’ of those mid-twentieth 
philosophers, best exemplified in the work of Martin Heidegger. 
To review, writing in the aftermath of the Second World War, Heidegger re-oriented his 
once-transhistorical approach to ontology around a critique of modern “techno-science.” To 
understand how power operates under conditions of radical technologization, we must go beyond 
a simple “instrumentalist” view of technology in which technologies are mere neutral objects 
subject to the irrational and unethical ends of individual actors. Instead, Heidegger argued, we 
must seek the “essence of technology” in ontological terms, i.e., the conception of Being and 
beings structured into the modern scientific and technological worldview – our operative 
“metaphysics of calculation” or condition of “Enframing” in which all beings, including the 
knowing human itself, are always already encountered as subject to objectification and 
instrumentalization. When this phenomenological lens of encounter is operationalized, humans 
structurally relate to all beings – not just natural resources and material technologies, but also other 
human subjects – as “standing-reserves,” i.e., in terms of their potential for human use and 
domination.477 
In addition to rejecting instrumentalism and classical views of techno-scientific progress, 
Heidegger went against the intellectual grain of his historical moment in a second important sense. 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Americans and Europeans sought to renew faith in 
 
476 Francesca Ferrando, Philosophical Posthumanism (London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic, 2020), 39-44. 
477 Martin Heidegger, “The Age of the World Picture,” in Off the Beaten Track, ed. and trans. Julian Young and 
Kenneth Haynes (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2002), 57-85. Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning 
Technology and Other Essays, ed. and trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977). 
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humanism, arguing that the de-humanizing atrocities of the war – from totalitarian regimes to Nazi 
eugenics to the atomic bomb – were the result of intellectual and political anti-humanism being 
mobilized – an inversion of the ideal premises of the Enlightenment, democracy, and liberalism. 
In turn, the dominant political discourses of the postwar moment sought to reinscribe the Kantian 
notion of humans as autonomous ends-in-themselves through constitutional and institutional 
languages such as “human rights” and “human dignity,” which still persist and resonate in the 
Euro-American context.478  
Heidegger, however, argued that techno-scientific de-humanization was, rather than an 
inversion of humanism, actually its apotheosis. The premise that the human has a pre-given, 
privileged ontological status grounded in its capacities for will and reason inevitably leads to a 
calculative worldview and an intuitive ethic of domination. The logical and paradoxical conclusion 
of humanism is the subject collapsing upon itself as it too becomes simply one more object of 
human beings’ epistemic and normative “will to power.” Furthermore, this particular 
representation of “Man” seemed to prevent its own deconstruction. The apparently self-evident 
and irrefutable characterization of the nature of Man as rational animal – which had dominated the 
Western onto-theological tradition for more than two millennia – occluded approaching the human 
being as an existential and ontological question. Humanism was, in other words, a discursive 
mechanism of concealment in which the question of human “essence” did not need to be asked 
because its answer was encountered as always already given.479 
 
478 Jean-Pierre Dupuy, On the Origins of Cognitive Science: The Mechanization of the Mind, trans. M.B. DeBevoise 
(Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 2009), 3-22. Gaymon Bennett, Technicians of Human Dignity (New York: Fordham 
University Press, 2016), 107-133. 
479 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism,” in Basic Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper and 
Row, 1977), 190-242. 
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Heidegger’s critique of the humanist will to power, however, concluded in paradoxical 
fashion. The problem with humanism, he insisted, was not that it overvalued humanity, but rather 
that it did not value humanity highly enough. Reducing the nature of Man to biological or 
zoological perspectives – the teleological culmination of our modern representational metaphysics 
– lowered Man to the status of mere animal and concealed ‘his’ “divine” nature. The difference 
between humans and animals, however, is not one of mere species or genus. Rather, Heidegger 
contended, it is ontological insofar as human beings are the only kinds of entities who can, and by 
their very nature do, ask the question of Being itself and who can thus engage in poietic “world-
forming.” The task of ‘well-being’ moving forward, as well as the essence of Man itself, then, is 
for him to become a “shepherd of Being” who dwells in the “Clearing” that is existential and 
ontological questioning. Heidegger, however, offered little in the way of elaborating what 
constituted such shepherding besides a life more informed by aesthetic and ascetic ideals than 
classical humanistic education.480 
I describe his thought process as paradoxical because, in assigning human being a place of 
radical ontological primacy, Heidegger reinscribed the grounding premises of the very tradition he 
sought to critique. Existential and ontological dwelling might not lend itself to domination to the 
same degree as an empirical, techno-scientific worldview, but the goal remains to emancipate 
human being above – to transcend – the natural world around it. Indeed, this vitalist worldview 
seems to function much like classical humanism in its deep essentialist ambition to define the 
human in oppositional and hierarchical terms, i.e., to even further widen the ontological difference 
between human beings and their others through the description of a unique, pre-given “innermost 
 
480 Peter Sloterdijk, “Rules for the Human Zoo: A Response to the ‘Letter on Humanism,’” Environment and 
Planning D: Society and Space 27 (2009): 12-28. 
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meaning.”481 Heidegger is thus exemplary of a philosophical tradition that approached humanistic 
narratives of progress with a radical skepticism and which treated techno-science as a source of 
alienation at the level of being itself. To reconcile the alienation that techno-science had caused 
for ‘the’ human condition, we would, the argument goes, need to reject the de-humanizing 
ontological premise that humans and technologies are some way, shape, or form of the same 
kind.482 
While the theorists who might be identified as doing posthumanist intellectual labor 
provide a diverse and at times conflicting collection of positions, there are nevertheless common 
theoretical commitments that make Heidegger a sensible point of genealogical departure. Foremost, 
as posthumanist philosopher Francesca Ferrando explains, like Heidegger’s approach, 
“Posthumanism investigates technology as a mode of revealing, thus re-accessing its ontological 
signification in a scenario where technology had been repeatedly reduced to its technical 
endeavors.”483 To be clear, this critique of instrumentalism should not be reduced to a social 
constructivist analysis of technologies.484 It is not just that technologies are “political” – i.e., 
always already enmeshed in the social conditions of their production485 – but that technologies are 
 
481 Roberto Esposito, “Politics and Human Nature,” Angelaki: Journal of Theoretical Humanities 16, no. 3 (2011): 
77-84. 
482 Some of the other most influential postwar critics of techno-science from the Continental tradition include Hannah 
Arendt, Jacque Ellul, Paul Tillich, and Theodor Adorno. See, for example: Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958). Jacques Ellul, The Technological Society, trans. John Wilkinson (New 
York: Vintage Books, 1964). Paul Tillich, The Spiritual Situation in Our Technical Society, ed. Thomas, J. Mark 
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Philosophical Fragments, translated Jephcott Edmund (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 2002). 
483 Ferrando, Philosophical Posthumanism, 44. 
484 For social constructivists of technology, technologies are embedded within and mediate human social life; but 
rather than subscribing to a straightforward technological determinism, constructivist contend that humans shape 
technologies just as much as the inverse through ‘interpretation’. Donald MacKenzie and Judy Wajcman, ed. The 
Social Shaping of Technology (New York: Open University, 1999). 
485 Besides Bruno Latour, who I believe would be miscast as a constructivist, the most influential text in the social 
construction of technology tradition is Langdon Winner’s “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” In this article, Winner 
contends that technical objects and systems are not politically neutral but lend themselves to particular institutionalized 
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also structurally related to the “the whole spectrum of ontological intra-acting within the frame of 
existence.”486 Scientific theories and material technologies are not mere theoretical or practical 
instruments; rather they tell us something about, and are structurally related to, what it is to be 
human.   
Mediated through contributions from feminist theory, however, critical posthumanists 
depart from Heidegger in two important senses. First, posthumanists reject the nostalgic, 
essentialist solution of returning to (or discovering) a more ‘authentic’ self; not just because we 
are past the historical point of no return, but because no such essential self has ever existed. Instead, 
these kinds of anthropocentric approaches should be dismantled through the deconstruction of the 
very dualisms – self/other, human/technology, natural/artificial – that allow the human to be set 
apart in the first place. This brings us to the second point of departure. While, following Michel 
Foucault and Donna Haraway, posthumanist theorists have been (rightly) critical of the often 
unquestioned and unequal power relations effected by techno-science, “the way Posthumanism 
engages in technology might leave space for other possibilities” than the antagonism characteristic 
of the alienation thesis. 487  Herein lies not just the difference between posthumanism and 
Heidegger’s position but also the difference between posthumanism and works that are more 
typically identified as postmodern. 488  Posthumanism approaches techno-science and subject-
 
patterns of power and authority. Langdon Winner, “Do Artifacts Have Politics?” Daedalus 109, no. 1 (1980): 121-
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486 Ferrando, Philosophical Posthumanism, 44. 
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488 Here I have in mind the poststructuralist and deconstructionist traditions best exemplified in the corpus of Jacques 
Derrida and his direct predecessors. While language is the most common focus in this genre, postmodern texts do 
often focus on techno-science, and one might argue that posthumanism falls under the broader postmodern intellectual 
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formation as structurally related; we cannot seriously talk about what it means to be a subject, and 
certainly not in this historical moment, without centering both scientific theories and material 
technologies in our ontological and ethical inquiries. By “centered” I do not just mean being a 
focus, for this was true of Heidegger as well. Rather, I mean being a productive intellectual 
resource for – rather than the anthesis of or incidental to – critical theorization. 
I have now suggested on numerous occasions that emergent information and biological 
sciences challenge the humanist subject of bioethics. What kinds of challenges do such scientific 
paradigms pose? In next part of this chapter, I examine three structurally related scientific 
paradigms – autopoiesis, extended cognition, and complex coevolution – that call into question 
the longstanding categorical binaries – self/other, human/technology, natural/artificial – that 
ground the bioethical subject thus far excavated in this project. We will, however, see that 
“challenge,” is a precarious word in this case. For while a wide range of scientific theories conflict 
with the implicit boundary work of the enhancement debate, the full implications of that 
theorization have rarely made their way into the discursive field of bioethics proper.  
5.2 Cybernetics and the Informatic Self 
Since the mid-twentieth century, the predominant epistemic paradigm in the biological 
sciences has been that of information, i.e., reading the nature and behavior of organisms in terms 
of communication systems. In Chapter One, I suggested that the introduction of information theory 
into the biological sciences afforded a molecular way of knowing according to which the human 
subject – a self-regulating transmission system in which messages, data, or codes are transcribed 
and translated – is always already open to biotechnological intervention. To better understand this 
molecular paradigm, we need to return to the first information discipline, cybernetics, and the 
specific conceptual frameworks, homeostasis and autopoiesis, responsible for encoding the human 
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subject as an informatic self. While cybernetics would fall into disrepute as a science by the 1980s, 
its core insight – that information could be used to understand the nature of both machines and 
organisms – became the dominant conceptual framework in fields ranging from molecular biology 
to cognitive science. Just as important, each one of the biotechnological projects in which theorists 
of human enhancements are invested – cryonics, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, 
engineered senescence, brain-machine interfaces, nanotechnology, and whole-brain simulation – 
depends upon some version of this basic understanding.489 It is not an exaggeration to say that 
cybernetics initiated what has since become known as the “age of information.”490 
Like so many histories of technology, this narrative begins in the context of wartime 
development. As enemy aircraft bombers increased in speed and maneuverability during the course 
of World War II, advances in antiaircraft weaponry, particularly field artillery and missile defense, 
were required to combat them. More specifically, military scientists were tasked with devising 
mechanisms for real-time ballistics and prediction. Whereas the former required determining how 
to fire a shell so that it exploded it at a specific point in space and time, the latter required 
determining where that point would be in relation to the enemy aircraft. Between 1940 and 1945, 
the National Research Defense Committee under Warren Weaver funded more than eighty 
academic projects with the purpose of developing practical wartime technologies. One of the 
smallest of these subsidies went to MIT mathematician Norbert Wiener, who, with his chief 
 
489 Mihail C. Roco and William Sims Bainbridge, ed. Converging Technologies for Improving Human Performance: 
Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology and Cognitive Science (Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic 
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engineer Julian Bigelow, developed a “predictor” which used statistical methods to determine the 
future trajectory of an aircraft based on its location and movement. Although it never reached the 
stage of practical application, it was in the theoretical development of this predictor that Wiener 
formulated the core ideas of cybernetics, which he would later define in his 1948 best-selling book, 
Cybernetics or, Control and Communication in the Animal and Machine, as the “science of control 
and communication.”491 
One of the central theoretical innovations of the predictor was imagining the pilot, the 
aircraft, and the anti-aircraft instrument as “servomechanisms,” which could be modeled 
mathematically as part of the same physical system. Servomechanisms are automated mechanical 
apparatuses that use negative feedback to regulate their own behavior.492 This framework was 
further developed when Wiener and Bigelow began collaborating with Dr. Arturo Rosenblueth, a 
professor of physiology at the University of Mexico. This collaboration culminated in one of the 
founding documents of cybernetics, a 1943 paper entitled “Behavior, Purpose, and Teleology,” 
which established the behaviorist model grounding cybernetic analysis and introduced “purpose” 
and “teleology” into the scientific lexicon. 493  Based on the methodological behaviorism or 
“classical conditioning” popularized by Ivan Pavlov, Wiener used a "black-box" method, which 
focused on the relationship between the observable (sensory) information input and the output, or 
“behavior,” that resulted. The behaviorist method omits the (unobservable) internal structure and 
organization of the object, focusing instead on the relations between object and environment. 
 
491 Cybernetics – based on the Greek κυβερνητική (kybernetike), meaning governance – gets its name from one of 
earliest examples of the servomechanism, the governor used to control speed in early industrial steam engines. Norbert 
Wiener, Cybernetics or, Control and Communication in the Animal and Machine (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 
2013). 
492 Wiener, Cybernetics, 11-12. 
493 Arturo Rosenblueth et. al, “Behavior, Purpose and Teleology” 
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While the behaviorist approach was well established (if contested) in psychology and physiology 
in the mid-twentieth century, coupling it to the concept of information was novel.  
Information is a concept with multiple, contested meanings in the history of science and 
should not, especially in cybernetics’ case, be conflated with the common understanding of the 
word as simply data or meaning. Engineer Claude Shannon is credited with formulating 
information theory in his 1948 paper, “The Mathematical Theory of Communication.” Here 
Shannon defined information as an abstract language for understanding communications problems, 
specifically for deriving the technical conditions necessary for the delivery of messages from a 
source (sender) through a channel to a destination (receiver). He insisted that information was a 
technical communications problem that should be understood independent of meaning or semantic 
content. Information is instead a measure of choice within a set of possibilities and thus a function 
of probabilities. The most fundamental form of information is a bit, which represents the choice 
between two alternatives, 0 or 1. As the number of choices increases so do the possibilities for 
transmitting information. Information thus functions as an inverse measure of probability. The 
more probable a message is, the less information it contains; the less probable a message is, the 
more information it contains. This can be understood in terms of redundancy. When a message is 
expected or already known, it contains no new information. The flip side of this is that without any 
redundancy there are no constraints on the possibilities for communicating a message, resulting in 
uncertainty or noise. The technical solution to the communication of information thus lies in 
determining the necessary amount of redundancy. There must be enough redundancy to control 
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the probability of the message being received but not so much redundancy that no new information 
is transmitted.494 
Wiener, who developed a similar theory of information at the same time as Shannon, drew 
more decisively from physics. For Wiener, the idea of information is grounded in Willard Gibbs’ 
model of a probabilistic universe. In contradistinction to the cause-and-effect determinism of 
Newtonian mechanics, Gibbs’ model understands physical states as probable outcomes – one 
possible state among others – that can be measured as “decisions” using statistical mechanics. As 
Wiener explains, “the measure of this probability is called entropy, and the characteristic tendency 
of entropy is to increase. As entropy increases, the universe, and all closed systems in the universe, 
tend naturally to deteriorate and lose their distinctiveness, to move from the least to the most 
probable state, from a state of organization and differentiation in which distinctions and forms 
exist, to a state of chaos and sameness.”495 There are, however, “local enclaves” such as organisms 
“whose direction seems opposed to that of the universe at large and in which there is a limited and 
temporary tendency for organization to increase.”496 Information is the measure of this negative 
entropy, i.e. the mathematical recording (logarithm) of a decision between probable alternatives in 
which the greater number of possible decisions exists, the greater amount of information there is.  
Wiener defined this process of negative entropy as “homeostasis,” i.e., the achievement of 
a state of equilibrium through purposeful feedback. “The term purposeful,” he and Rosenblueth 
explained, “is meant to denote that the act or behavior may be interpreted as directed to the 
 
494 Claude Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory of Communication,” Bell System Technical Journal 27 (1948): 379-
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attainment of a goal” – in this case, homeostasis.497 Feedback, on the other hand, “is a method of 
controlling a system by reinserting into it the result of its past performance.”498 Feedback occurs 
when a system uses sensors to receive information about actual past performance instead of merely 
expected performance and, in turn, uses that information to determine future performance. In the 
cybernetic model, environmental data are fed back into a system as input and the system 
purposefully (not to be confused with intentionally) affects the environment as output towards the 
end of homeostasis – a relationship governed by the transmission of information. As Wiener and 
Rosenblueth note on multiple occasions, this is analogous to the behavior of machines such as 
target seeking-mechanisms, and, as a result, reveals “that a uniform behavioristic analysis is 
applicable to both machines and organisms, regardless of the complexity of the behavior.” 499 
Cybernetics is thus the science of control and communication because it presupposes that the 
purpose of both machines and organisms is to control their self and environment through the 
communication of information. 
 In this analysis, however, information is more than just a measure; it is a mathematical 
language for describing patterns that inhere in objects themselves. Through their mathematical 
modeling, cyberneticists abstracted information so that it functioned as if it was prior to and more 
fundamental than the medium that instantiated it. Modern materialism, Wiener insisted, must 
appreciate that “Information is information, not matter or energy.”500 Likewise, “It is the pattern 
maintained by this homeostasis,” he contended, “which is the touchstone of our personal 
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identity.” 501  As John Durham Peters explains, “information functions as its own operational 
architectonic type of instruction, not as the stuff of sensory phantoms, cognitive qualia or 
empiricist observation: information is what organizes a natural world of matter and energy, the 
correlative of organization itself.”502 Information is that which not only describes the behavior of 
objects but also determines it. In making this claim, Wiener casts information as a kind of 
mathematical logos, according to which reality itself is structured by the organizing principle of 
information feedback. As philosopher Jean-Pierre Dupuy notes, this represented a theoretical 
inversion in which “nature is taken to imitate the very model by which man tries to imitate it.”503 
This information-based (meta)physics upended the familiar (humanist) ontological distinction 
between organisms and machines, humans and computers. For Wiener and the rest of his 
cybernetic cohort, there was no form of organization, animate or inanimate, which could not be 
understood as essentially a communications system, maintained through the transmission of 
probabilistic signals. In the mildest terms, digital machines afford us with an accurate and 
quantifiable epistemic framework for understanding human nature. In the starkest terms, humans 
are digital machines. 
Cybernetic analysis matured into its ‘second wave’ with Chilean biologists Francisco 
Varela and Humberto Maturana’s conceptual framework of “autopoiesis.”504 To understand their 
epistemological contribution, however, we must return to cognitive scientist Jerome Lettvin’s 
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seminal 1959 paper “What the Frog’s Eye Tells the Frog’s Brain.”505 In experimenting on their 
amphibious subject, Lettvin’s team placed microelectrodes in the frog’s visual cortex to measure 
the strength of neural responses to different stimuli. From the connected brain, the experimenters 
discovered that whereas small objects in fast, erratic motion produced maximum response, large, 
slow-moving objects produced little or no response. As N. Katherine Hayles explains, this 
experiment “shows that the [frog’s] eye speaks to the brain in a language already highly organized 
and interpreted instead of transmitting some more or less accurate copy of the distribution of light 
upon the receptors…The results implied that the frog’s perceptual system does not so much 
register reality as construct it.”506 It seemed that, after two centuries, Immanuel Kant’s schema of 
synthetic a prioris – in which manifold sensory data are organized according to internal, structural 
categories of understanding as a condition of appearing to consciousness – had finally found 
empirical backing.507 
Varela and Maturana were quick to extrapolate on the conclusions of this experiment, 
positing that the existence of all living creatures could be characterized “only though interactive 
processes determined solely by the organism’s own organization.”508 Rejecting the objectivist 
tendencies of behaviorism, the authors explained the fundamental premises of autopoiesis or “self-
making” as:  
An autopoietic machine is a machine organized (defined as a unity) as a network of 
processes of production (transformation and destruction) of components which: (i) 
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through their interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize 
the network of processes (relations) that produced them; and (ii) constitute it (the 
machine) as a concrete unity in space in which they (the components) exist by 
specifying the topological domain of its realization as such a network."509  
 
“Their key insight” in this, Hayles explains, “was to realize that if the action of the nervous system 
is determined by its organization, the result is a circular, self-reflexive dynamic. A living system’s 
organization cause certain products to be produced, for example, nucleic acids. These products in 
turn produce the organization characteristic of the living system.”510 Varela and Maturana had 
taken Wiener’s cybernetic analysis to its logical extreme; the organism does not just control itself 
and its environment, it actually constructs itself and, at least in an experiential sense, its 
environment. While Wiener’s homeostat might behave cybernetically in that it regulates itself in 
response to its external stimuli, it does not produce the components that produce its organization 
and is therefore not an autopoietic machine.  
This theorization is reminiscent of Kant in another sense: his belief in self-determination, 
or autonomy, as the defining characteristic of human subjectivity. On one hand, Varela and 
Maturana, like Wiener, challenged this belief by extending self-determination to all organisms and 
even (theoretical) machines. The scientists contended that, if all living systems could be 
characterized as autopoietic, then any physical system that could be characterized as autopoietic 
could also be said to be living. Life and autopoiesis are coextensive with one another.511 On the 
other hand, the biologists reinscribed the self-contained nature of subjectivity characteristic of the 
humanist philosophical tradition. “Autopoietic machines,” the scientists claimed, “are unities” that 
“specify their own boundaries in the process of self-production.”512  
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Varela and Maturana further addressed the issue of boundaries through the question: what 
happens when one autopoietic processes is subordinated to another? This was answered with their 
somewhat underdeveloped, hierarchical concept of “allopoiesis,” which states that there are 
secondary (allopoietic) processes in which the goal is something other than reproducing self-
organization and which affords subordination of one system to another. Likewise, the scientists 
acknowledged that the autonomy of autopoietic systems necessarily takes place in the context of 
structural coupling between different systems. Self-making is not subjectivist or solipsistic so 
much as relational (or at least positional).513 Nevertheless, the authors failed to fully develop the 
implications of systemic coupling and thus did not provide adequate answers to the questions of 
where one system begins and ends and how different systems inter- or intra-act. For all its 
subversive elements, autopoietic theory still depended on and validated the organizational closure 
of systems as an, or even the, structural feature of reality. 
The sporadic parallels I have introduced between cybernetic analysis and Kantian 
metaphysics might seem odd to the reader. Putting these two in conversation, however, makes 
more sense when we acknowledge that Kant was one of the first theorists to provide a definition 
for the word “organism” in his 1790 Critique of Judgment: 
In such a product of nature, just as each part exists only as a result of all the rest, 
so we must also think of each part as existing for the sake of the other and of the 
whole, i.e., as an instrument (organ)…But that is not enough…we must think of 
each part as an organ that produces the other parts (so that each reciprocally 
produces the other)…Only if a product meets that condition, and only because of 
this, will it be both an organized and self-organizing being, which therefore can be 
called a natural purpose.514 
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This formulation anticipates the frameworks of homeostasis and autopoiesis, treating those living 
things found in nature as both self-directed and self-organizing: individual parts cannot be 
understood outside of the purpose of maintaining the whole and the whole cannot be understood 
outside of the functions of its parts; the organisms is its own means and ends. There are important 
caveats to note here. For example, Kant was providing a heuristic for understanding nature, “a 
maxim for judging the intrinsic purposiveness of organized beings,” which “is regulative and not 
constitutive.”515 As subjective beings, we have no unmediated access to the noumenal ‘thing-in-
itself’. Nevertheless, as physicist Evelyn Fox Keller argues, Kant, in effect, named the agenda for 
the modern biological sciences: “The obvious task for biology was to understand the character of 
this special kind of organization or self-organization. At the close of the 18th century and the dawn 
of the 19th it was evident – to Kant, as to his contemporaries – that neither blind chance no mere 
mechanism, nor certainly no machine that was then available, could suffice.”516 
This genealogical connection between one of the fathers of classical humanism and one of 
the founding paradigms of the modern biological sciences is more than just an incidental historical 
fact. If not causal, Kant is at least demonstrative of certain important features of the nascent 
information sciences – features that also structure the human enhancement debate. Like the 
organism itself, this definition cannot be understood independent of the whole of Kant’s 
philosophical project. As Keller explains, “An organism is a body that, by virtue of its peculiar 
and particular organization, is made into a “self” which…achieves autonomy.” 517  The self-
organization of the organism is intended to provide an analogue to humans’ capacities for self-
determination but without undermining humans’ unique abilities to understand and act in 
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accordance with the moral law. Indeed, this schema of aesthetic judgment encloses different 
organisms, including the human self, according to familiar classifications in the Great Chain of 
Being and thus does little to challenge the classical distinctions between humans and their others. 
Kant’s organic model of life was not intended to be non- or anti-humanistic. In fact, just the 
opposite; as part of Kant’s larger corpus, it represents an important moment in the formation and 
closure of the modern, individualistic subject in which the natural and cultural are (ostensibly) 
reconciled through the formulation of their identity and difference.518 
It should not be entirely surprising then, that retreating into humanist rhetoric is a persistent 
theme in the intellectual history of cybernetics. This is most evident in Wiener’s public-facing 
writings, which attempted to translate cybernetic theory into social analysis and even normative 
ethics. His most prominent foil in these writings was his collaborator John von Neumann, whose 
famous socio-economic model of “game theory” was “based on the assumption that each player, 
at every stage, in view of the information then available to him, plays in accordance with a 
completely intelligent policy… [a] game as played between perfectly intelligent, perfectly ruthless 
operators.”519 To resist this de-humanizing characterization, Wiener contended that humans were 
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capable of acting as ruthless operators, but also possessed the capacity for self-determination, to, 
in a sense, transcend nature through obedience to the moral law. This position was elaborated in 
his final major text, God & Golem, Inc. (1962), which mobilized a generic Judeo-Christian 
language of “religion” to warn against the future of automation. Here Wiener explained that all 
acts of creation could be dissolved in a common economy of information exchange and that we 
could, therefore, draw no hard ontological distinctions between the “creative activity” of God, man, 
and machine. If creation is a matter of information exchange, then humans are in a powerful, even 
divine, position – for, like God, we can create other creative beings in the form of self-learning 
and self-reproducing automata.520 
But just as quickly as Wiener dissolves the distinctions between God, man, and machine, 
he reasserts them. He claims that no matter how learned or reproductive, machines were bound to 
act like the ruthless operators of Von Neumman’s game theory; in turn, he presciently predicts that 
humans would continually outsource their autonomy to intelligent machines, diminishing their 
potential to intervene in automated processes and therefore to take ethical responsibility. While 
Wiener’s concerns proved valid, the most important feature of his position for our purposes is his 
final decision to reassert the distinctive place of the human subject within an informatic ontology. 
Humans, in his analysis, are unique by virtue of having autonomous powers and ethical awareness, 
and we must not threaten that position by ‘playing God’ or becoming “gadget worshippers.” 
N. Katherine Hayles rightly criticizes the disembodiment of cybernetics’ informatic subject 
for the extent to which it erases the corporeal and contextual nature of human being. “To the extent 
that the [cybernetic] posthuman constructs embodiment as the instantiation of 
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thought/information,” she contends, “it continues the liberal tradition rather than disrupts it.”521 
To this, I would add that we must also emphasize the paradoxical ontological boundary work it 
accomplished. Cyberneticists failed to pursue the full ontological implications of homeostatic and 
autopoietic theory by continually closing off the system of the self. The subject described in the 
predictor project is not the pilot but the hybrid system of the pilot, the airplane, and the anti-aircraft 
instrument. Nevertheless, Wiener and most of his contemporaries took the self-determined and 
self-contained nature of the individual for granted. In other words, the informatic self might be 
disembodied, but the pattern that makes it up remains stable and sealed.  
Cyberneticists did not invent a new model of subjectivity then so much as transcribe and 
translate an epistemology of “depth” whereby the bits of information that compose the self – genes, 
neurons, or other components – remain contained inside and underneath the clearly defined 
exterior of the skin or the skull. Michel Foucault explains that, beginning in the late-eighteenth 
century with theories of “anatomical lesions,” new medical ways of seeing and knowing the body 
gradually relocated illness within a three-dimensional anatomy and shifted the focus of medical 
inquiry away from disease as an agent and towards the individual body and its constitutive 
organs.522 This re-localization of illness was coextensive with what Foucault terms the “clinical 
gaze” according to which medical knowledge-production became organized around the goal of 
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seeing through corporal tissue in order to diagnose and treat the hidden cause underneath. 
Posthumanist philosopher Tamar Sharon elaborates on this medico-epistemological shift:  
 
The modern clinical body hereafter became a bounded living organism, made up of 
functionally connected components (such as organs and tissues) and internal 
systems and processes (such as feedbacks, rhythms, and circulations), an organic 
and functional unity that is at constant risk of disruption by disease.523  
 
While much ado has been made about discursive disruptions to this paradigm,524 it remains 
pervasive even in a world transcribed and translated into the language of information; albeit with 
genes and neurons now substituting for tissue and organs. If humans possess a novel structural 
potential to be ‘freed’ from their physical bodies or enter in odd couplings with their technologies 
in the discourse of human enhancement, a/the essential self remains intact, at least for the time 
being. The system closes in upon itself and the task of dismantling subjectivity is made into a 
material project and perpetually deferred into an imminent biotechnological future. 
The most profound effect of this systemic closure has been the discursive proliferation of 
genetic determinism and the resulting over-emphasis on gene-editing in the discourse of human 
enhancement.525 As we saw in Chapter One, since James Watson and Francis Crick discovered the 
double-helix structure of DNA in 1950, biomedicine has been framed in terms of “geneticization,” 
which reduces individuals and even identities to their constitutive DNA codes. Within this way of 
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knowing, genes appear to be responsible for, and thus can act as a comprehensive basis to explain, 
all of human behavior.526 This emphasis on causal determination can be traced all the way back to 
Crick’s 1958 “Central Dogma” of molecular biology, which insisted on the unidirectional causality 
of genes and repudiated the idea of substantive influences from external factors.527 First-wave 
molecular genomics might have adopted the conceptual framework of information, but, in doing 
so, it omitted the in-built principle of feedback and further closed the information loop of self-
determination upon the self. While unidirectional ‘gene-for’ models of causation have been 
upended through the development of epigenetics and the introduction of complexity theory into 
molecular biology, 528  the damage appears to be done. Genetic determinism has, even with 
professional bioethics, affirmed an image of subject-formation as a structurally closed process in 
which technologies only ‘modify’ the self when penetrating beneath the boundary of the skin or 
skull directly and intentionally. 
5.3 From Symbolic AI to Neural Networks 
Where, however, does the self end and the other begin? What marks the boundary between 
‘my’ body and the technologies I ‘use’? Through this intellectual-historical examination of 
cybernetics, I have been calling into the question the boundedness of the informatic self. While 
the earliest forms of information-based theorization seemed to deconstruct some of the basic 
principles of metaphysical individualism by coupling organisms and technologies in complex 
networks of information exchange, cyberneticists and their contemporaries retreated into humanist 
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models of self-determination and structurally related epistemologies of depth. As philosopher of 
religion Mark C. Taylor demonstrates though, these boundaries are now being deconstructed at the 
material level through the co-evolving and co-emergent Internet of Things and Internet of Bodies. 
The Internet of Things is an expanding and evolving network of “smart” objects – phones, 
computers, televisions, home assistants, wearable devices, etc. – embedded with sensors and 
software that allow for the exchange of data with other devices and systems over the Internet. 
Whether through the use of an Alexa home assistant, a Fitbit smartwatch, an app on an iPhone, or 
the HTTP Cookies on a website, we are all now nodes in a growing Panoptic network of 
information exchange in which self-learning artificial intelligence algorithms record, predict, and 
even determine our consumer behavior. 
What is emerging through the Internet of Things is a world of ambient intelligence 
created by smart devices equipped with sensors and transmitters to send data to 
each other and to users whether or not they want it. This environment is thoroughly 
interactive – machines influence people, and people consciously and unconsciously 
influence machines. In these networks, intelligence is no longer limited to brains 
and minds, or even to computational machines, but is rather distributed in smart 
things. In this way, our everyday world is already becoming more intelligent and is 
increasingly capable of quasi-cognitive processes. This is creating an environment 
of ubiquitous computing.529 
 
If similar concerns about “cyber profiling” and the gradual outsourcing of our autonomous powers 
to machines are well-worn, 530  Taylor insists that we are entering into a new stage in our 
“intervolution” with smart technologies, the Internet of Bodies. This is most apparent through the 
integration of medical and prosthetic devices into the Internet of Things. As Taylor explains, 
“While most of these instruments were originally designed for military law enforcement and 
commercial reasons, their most important functions are being adapted for medical purposes that 
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are increasingly important for the treatment of diseases like diabetes.”531 When one, for example, 
outsources the management of their insulin levels to a smart artificial pancreas – an automated 
insulin delivery system that opens the loop of information feedback to also feed data into and 
receive data from the Internet of Things – a boundary appears to be crossed. The corporeal, 
biological processes that were once internal to the threshold of the skin or skull are directly and 
intentionally coupled with (already-networked) technologies; the human appears to become a 
hybrid, cyborg, or posthuman. 
For some theorists of enhancement, this phenomenon and others like it represent the first 
structural transformation of human nature. Until the advent of recent (or imminent) 
biotechnological interventions, the self has remained a hermetically sealed (and normatively good) 
system – an idea which we have seen has legacy that is no less scientific than humanistic. While 
we must not push aside the highly particular features of our technological and historical moment 
– one in which the degree of our biotechnological integration is increasing exponentially – I want 
to suggest that the proliferation of information technologies, and the scientific theories upon which 
they depend, also speak to a more structural or systemic characteristic of subject-formation: the 
“leakiness” of the self.532 Since first-wave cybernetics, the closure of the informatic self has been 
challenged across the biological sciences as the familiar boundaries of self/other, 
human/technology, and natural/artificial have been put under not just material but also theoretical 
pressure. Rather than reinscribing the bioethical focus on genomics – which is the result of a 
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misguided genetic determinism and which does not necessarily speak to the most urgent forms 
bio-intervention – we can best think through this leakiness using the lens of cognitive science, 
artificial intelligence, and what has been called “extended cognition.”  
We can also trace a far more direct genealogical thread from cybernetics to the fields of 
cognitive science and artificial intelligence than molecular genomics. For this, we must return to 
one of the founding documents of cybernetics, neurophysiologist Warren McCulloch’s 1943 “A 
Logical Calculus of the Ideas Immanent in Nervous Activity.” McCulloch theorized that the 
activity of the brain could be conceptualized as a neural network in which neurons fired according 
to an “all-or-none” binary logic, i.e. active (firing) or at rest (in repose), in order to determine 
mental states and behavior. 533 Like Wiener’s model, this network also followed the logic of 
feedback, or “circular causality,” so that “the nervous net provides the law of necessary connection 
whereby one can compute from the description of any state that of the succeeding state.”534 Unlike 
Wiener’s model though, McCulloch’s functional approach treated the circulation of information 
as a physical, structural process based in the brain; the “machine” was a “logico-mathematical 
being embodied in the matter of the organism.”535 From these premises, McCulloch concluded that 
the “mind,” which includes “existential operations” such as “memories, general ideas, and even 
Spinozistic consciousness,” can be understood through a statistical (computational) analysis of 
nervous activity and the construction of hypothetical models (networks).536 The self is located in 
(or at least an epiphenomenon of) the brain, and the brain is a physical neural network. 
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This model, which would come to be called “connectionism,” was further fleshed out in 
neurophysiologist Donald Hebb’s 1949 The Origin of Behavior. 537  Hebb contended that 
processing new information modifies synaptic connections, changing the physical wiring of the 
brain. In this model of “Hebbian learning,” the firing of a neuron either creates or reinforces the 
strength of a synaptic connection and increases the probability of neurons firing under similar 
circumstances. To quote Hebb’s Law, “Neurons that fire together wire together.” Over time, 
patterns of firing reconfigure the brain’s physical network of synaptic connections allowing for 
information to be stored and processed in new and different ways, i.e., learning. Through assigning 
numerical values or “weights” to the thresholds for synaptic firing, it was eventually theorized that 
neural networks were quantifiable and therefore could be mimicked as the basis for self-learning 
artificial intelligence. 
This neural network model, however, was not fully appreciated for some time in the co-
evolving fields of cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Two of the most seminal texts in 
machine learning – Allen Newell, J.C. Shaw, and Hebert A. Simon’s 1958 “Elements of a Theory 
of Human Problem Solving” and Marvin Minsky and Seymour Papert’s 1969 Perceptrons: 
Introduction to Computational Geometry – either ignored or repudiated the neural network model 
in favor of symbolic AI.538 As the name suggests, symbolic AI approaches problem-solving as a 
matter of symbolic or linguistic (i.e., human-readable) representations. In this top-down model, 
logical rules or procedures are first input into machines and then data are processed according to 
those rules or procedures. The adoption of symbolic AI, however, produced minimal practical 
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gains for machine learning, and historians of technology would come to call the period between 
1974 and 1980 the “winter of artificial intelligence.”539  
If top-down symbol manipulation was unable to reproduce human-level intelligence, then 
it stood to reason that human intelligence might not be a matter of symbol manipulation, i.e., of 
inner representations, in the first place. The 1980s thus saw neutral network models return to a 
predominant position through the work of computer scientists such as Geoffrey Hinton, Yann 
LeCun, and Yoshua Bengio. In these artificial neural networks or “deep learning” algorithms, 
which have only become computationally viable in the past two decades, information-processing 
is a bottom-up structure. Rather than beginning with a logical rule or procedure, the network begins 
with a goal or problem to solve (e.g., to recognize human faces). It is then fed huge quantities of 
data which it analyzes in a recursive process until it can find a pattern that leads to the best (i.e., 
most accurate or most efficient) solution. In the case of recognizing a human face, the network is 
fed huge quantities of random images and then uses a process of trial and error to identify some 
images as human faces and others as not human faces. In a method known as “backpropagation,” 
successes are reinforced using weighted numeric values that mirror the firing of neurons and the 
network readjusts its weighting system to correct for errors. In the past two decades, these 
“unsupervised” deep learning models have become the norm across machine learning platforms 
and reciprocally afforded the development of the Internet of Things. Distributed across almost 
 




countless sensory nodes in exponentially growing networks of information feedback, self-learning 
machines both mimic and reconfigure human mental phenomena.540 
5.4 Extending Boundaries 
As we have seen, the history of the information and biological sciences is a positive 
feedback loop in which theories of digital machines inform theories of human biology which 
inform theories of digital machines which inform theories of human biology and so on and so forth. 
If most of the deep-learning intelligences that constitute the Internet of Things are based on human 
neural networks, and if these intelligences are distributed across multiple physical media, is it not 
also worth questioning whether human intelligence is already a distributed process? This is 
precisely the question cognitive scientists and philosophers of mind have sought to answer through 
the Hypothesis of Extended Cognition and its attendant arguments.541 
The Hypothesis of Extended Cognition (HEC) claims that human cognitive states and 
processes do not reside exclusively in the brain or even the body, but also extend ‘outside’ to 
include objects in their environment. From clocks to calendars to notebooks to smartphones, there 
are no shortage of technologies – meant in the broadest sense of use-oriented material objects – 
that mediate everyday human life. Following the principle of feedback, these technologies shape 
our thinking and behavior, and we in turn modify these technologies to shape our future thinking 
and behavior. This kind of dependence is exceedingly obvious in some cases. For example, one 
might use a paper notebook or audio recorder to store the information from an academic lecture 
that would otherwise be too difficult to remember. Empirical studies in psychology, however, 
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demonstrate that this technological dependence runs far deeper than such obvious cases. For 
example, even during an undemanding task like copying patterns made of colored puzzle pieces, 
test subjects off-loaded cognitive labor to both other parts of the body (e.g., visual and haptic 
organs) and external objects (e.g., physical puzzle pieces).542 Whether it is a child using their 
fingers to count the days of the week or an academic using a written notation system to remember 
their thoughts, examples of this kind of cognitive outsourcing abound. The implication of this 
structural dependence is that Cartesian “brain in a vat” models of cognition are incoherent “because 
the normal brain depends crucially on sensorimotor interactions with the external world for 
developing its internal representations.”543 In short, “intelligent” thoughts and behaviors often (if 
not always) result from “two-way” interactions between brains, bodies, and environments.544 
HEC, however, goes beyond this somewhat straightforward observation. The brain in this 
formulation does not just interact with its environment to produce thought and behavior; rather 
those environmental processes are just as much “cognitive” or “intelligent” as their neural 
interlocutors. To be clear, this is not just a heuristic to gain an analytical advantage. Rather, it is a 
“physicalist,” empirical claim about the distributed nature of cognition. In his groundbreaking 
work in the Artificial Intelligence Laboratory at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
roboticist Rodney Brooks challenged symbolic AI approaches by theorizing intelligence as a fully 
embodied process. The field’s hitherto focus on representational problem solving had black-boxed 
dynamic sensory and spatial interactions with material environments, which, Brooks argued, are 
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“intimately tied up with the representation of the world used by an intelligent system.”545 Brooks 
instead claimed that we must follow the same trajectory as human evolution in developing artificial 
intelligences; artificial intelligence systems should begin with locomotion and simple interactions 
and then “incrementally” work their way up to more complex levels of abstraction. Like 
connectionist approaches, this is a bottom-up model of learning in which the input of data precedes 
rule making. In this model of “subsumption architecture”, however, intelligence systems – at least 
“complete” intelligence systems that resemble the human variant in their capacities to navigate a 
material world – require being “let loose in the real world with real sensing and real action.”546 For 
Brooks, the presumed difference between “central” and “peripheral” systems is erroneous; sensory 
organs are no less integral to information processing than the brain, and embodied interactions 
with the environment are no less integral to the development of intelligence than the formulation 
of abstract representations. 
HEC, however, is not just physical in the sense that it treats cognition as a fully embodied 
process. Rather, it also theorizes that the physical location of cognition (or at least its 
epiphenomenal basis) is the intra-active, material space of (information) exchange between brain, 
body, and environment. The most prolific version of HEC is the functionalist model theorized by 
philosophers of mind Andy Clark and David Chalmers. The philosophical framework of 
functionalism posits that the functional role of a physical state or process determines whether that 
state or process counts as ‘cognitive’. In applying this to HEC, the philosophers contend that, in 
many cases, “the human organism is linked with an external entity in a two-way interaction, 
creating a coupled system that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right.”547 To support 
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this argument, the authors use the following thought experiment: Inga is a healthy person with a 
‘normal-functioning’ memory. One day, she hears about an interesting exhibit at the Museum of 
Modern Art (MoMA) from a friend. Inga recalls that the MoMA is located on 53rd Street, and then 
sets off to see the exhibit. In contrast, Otto suffers from a mild case of Alzheimer’s disease and 
always writes down important information in his notebook so he can store and retrieve it. On the 
same day, Otto hears about the MoMA exhibit, retrieves the address from his notebook, and heads 
to the museum. 
According to Clark and Chalmers, Inga and Otto both possess a belief that the MoMA is 
on 53rd Street and their cognitive processes are therefore functionally equivalent. Otto’s belief and 
the cognitive processes associated with storing and recalling it, however, extend outside of Otto’s 
brain to include his notebook. While this thought experiment is problematic for a number of prima 
facie reasons – namely, its gross mischaracterization of Alzheimer’s disease and its unintentional 
implication that cognitive extension is an exceptional rather than normal phenomenon – its moral 
is still cogent. “The moral is that when it comes to belief, there is nothing sacred about skull and 
skin. What makes some information count as a belief is the role it plays, and there is no reason 
why the relevant role can be played only from inside the body.”548 
 The logical dependence on functionalism, however, leaves HEC in a precarious position 
insofar as external processes must mirror internal ones to be considered cognitive. With this in 
mind, the second wave of HEC arguments have shifted away from functionalist approaches and 
towards an emphasis on ‘complementarity’.549 According to this view, it does not matter whether 
external states and processes are functionally similar to internal ones. What matters is that there is 
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structural, reciprocal integration between brains, bodies and environment. As philosopher of mind 
Richard Menary surmises, “this is to think of a cognitive process as hybrid, straddling both brain 
and bodily manipulation of environmental vehicles” in a “continuous looping causal 
interaction.” 550  In terms reminiscent of Wiener’s “servomechanism,” the brain, body, and 
environment are modeled as a single system whose elements cannot be disentangled in the 
performance (or analysis) of specific cognitive tasks. From this perspective, Otto’s notebook is not 
cognitive because it serves the same function as Inga’s memory; rather, it is cognitive because it 
is systemically and inextricably integrated with his brain in the formation of his belief about the 
museum’s location.  
What does HEC mean for the boundedness of the self? While a complementarian approach 
proves more compelling than a functionalist one, it is Clark and Chalmers who best address this 
question. 
What, finally, of the self? Does the extended mind imply an extended self? Is seems 
so. Most of us already accept that the self outstrips the boundaries of consciousness; 
my dispositional beliefs, for example, constitute in some deep sense part of the who 
I am. If so, then these boundaries may also fall beyond the skin. The information 
of Otto’s notebook, for example, is a central part of his identity as a cognitive agent. 
What this comes to is that Otto himself is best regarded as an extended system, a 
coupling of biological organism and external resources.551 
 
Cognition, which includes both conscious and unconscious processes that constitute self-making, 
is a distributed process that takes place in and through interactions with material environments, 
and especially couplings with individual technologies. While critics are right to note that HEC can 
lead to “cognitive bloat”552 – i.e., absurdly high levels of extension – the most important point for 
our purposes is that subject-formation is an embodied and relational process. Even in the absence 
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of concrete determinations of exactly where systemic couplings begin and end, we can still 
acknowledge that the self leaks out from – or better yet, was never contained within – the 
boundaries of the skin or skull. 
5.5 Co-Evolving Complexity 
The mundane example of Otto’s notebook is useful because it points to the fact that 
cognitive extension is not a novel techno-scientific phenomenon; rather, the material extension of 
the self into its environment is a structural feature of subjectivity. This in-built ‘hybridity’ is most 
clearly demonstrated by the science that deals in macro-narratives: evolutionary biology and, in 
particular, the framework of “coevolution.” Coevolution is most commonly defined as “the process 
in which populations of different species evolve repeatedly in response to each other.”553 First 
developed to describe why flowers seem designed for the specific species of insects that pollinate 
them, the framework of coevolution approaches evolutionary history in terms of reciprocity and 
continual change.554 Population A causes population B to evolve, the new version of population B 
causes population A to evolve, and so on and so forth. Historian Edmund Russel explains that 
“evolution” should not be confused with “natural selection” in this case. Whereas natural selection 
refers to ‘non-human’ mechanisms that lead to the survival of individuals with different traits 
within generations, evolution refers “to all changes in the frequencies of inherited traits of 
populations over generations.” 555  While natural selection is one mechanism that can lead to 
evolution through the incremental development of new species, not all evolution is the result of 
natural selection and not all evolution requires species-level changes. Herein lies the core insight 
 
553 Edmund Russell, “Coevolutionary History,” American Historical Review 119, no. 5 (2014): 1515. 
554 Paul R. Ehrlich and Peter H. Raven, “Butterflies and Plants: A Study in Coevolution,” Evolution 18, no. 4 (1964): 
586–608. 
555 Russell, “Coevolutionary History,” 1516. 
 260 
of co-evolution: “People are as capable as any other species of affecting evolution” and evolution 
must therefore be situated in (not outside of) history.556 
The case of malaria disease provides an apt example of coevolution and the need to situate 
it in history. Following the Second World War, the proliferation of new insecticides to kill malaria-
carrying mosquitos and pharmaceuticals to kill malaria plasmodia seemed to spell the end of the 
disease. The World Health Organization’s eradication project made impressive progress until 
mosquitos and plasmodia evolved resistances to the insecticides and pharmaceuticals. The WHO 
was soon forced to abandon the project and, by the year 2000, roughly two million people were 
dying annually of malaria. Such a dramatic example points to the growing scope of human 
selection. As a result of carbon emissions and genetic engineering, among other causal factors, 
evolutionary biologists now contend that we are living in the midst of an anthropogenic “evolution 
explosion.” Most commonly termed the “Anthropocene,” humans are changing environments at a 
global level so as to affect the conditions in which virtually all organisms evolve.557 
 Most prescient for our purposes, the framework of co-evolution has evolved to focus not 
just on reciprocal relationships between different species but also reciprocal relationships between 
biological and cultural phenomena. In step with the widespread emphasis on molecular genomics, 
this strain of coevolution theory has focused on the codependence of genes and social organization, 
arguing that, “cultures create novel environments that lead to new pressures from natural or social 
selection on genes.” 558 Keeping with our focus on extended cognition, however, there are a 
growing number of anthropological studies that focus on the coevolution of brains, tools, and 
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environments. For example, Stanley H. Ambrose contends that, based on the bioarcheological 
record of the last 300,000 years, we have good reason to believe that “constructive memory” – i.e., 
the executive function of planning and imagining the future based in the anterior frontal lobe – 
coevolved with composite-tool manufacture.  
Making a composite tool, for example, a stone-tipped spear or a hafted stone axe, 
requires collecting and preparing several kinds of components composed of 
different raw materials that may be obtained at different times and in different 
places. The final assembly of the functional artifact may occur much later, and some 
materials may be kept in reserve for maintenance and repair of composite tools. 
Composite-tool manufacture in the [European Middle Paleolithic] and [African 
Middle Stone Age] thus marks an order-of-magnitude increase in technological 
complexity compared with the single-component tools of the Lower Paleolithic. In 
comparison with Lower Paleolithic and Early Stone Age humans, [European 
Middle Paleolithic] hominids must have had much more need for the constructive 
memory and planning faculties of the anterior frontal lobes.559 
 
Composite-tool use stimulated prefrontal activity and activated neurological pathways essential 
for “working memory” and homologous to syntactic speech. Indeed, Ambrose goes on to argue 
that composite-artifact manufacturing and grammatical speech also coevolved and that “the most 
fundamental changes” in transitioning to “modern human behavior” involved the neurologically 
related “capacities for planned use of the landscape, resources, and social relationships.”560 From 
this macrohistorical view, the wiring of the human brain, the resources of the environment, the 
building and use of material tools, and the development of social organization exist in a positive, 
coevolutionary feedback loop. 
 Information-based theories of self-organization and macro-narratives of biological co-
evolution meet in the framework of complex adaptive systems. In 1950, Ludwig von Bertalanffy 
publishes an article, “The Theory of Open Systems in Physics and Biology,” that eventually gave 
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rise to the field of systems theory. 561  Building on the insights of cybernetics, among other 
disciplines, the biologist claimed that mechanical apparatuses and biological organisms both 
operate as “systems” or “wholes” that follow the same fundamental principles of organization (e.g., 
negative feedback). In this case, metaphysical isomorphism both affords and demands the 
formulation of universal epistemological constructs that cut across the individual sciences.  
 Like general systems theory, complexity theory attempts to identify the common 
characteristics and laws of diverse systems. The introduction of the concept of “complexity,” 
however, challenges the fundamental principles of organization that characterized systemic 
frameworks such as homeostasis and autopoiesis. In their historical examination of evolution, 
David Depew and Bruce Weber define complex systems as “systems that have a large number of 
components that can interact simultaneously in a sufficiently rich number of parallel ways so that 
the system shows spontaneous self-organization and produces global, emergent structures.”562 As 
with homeostasis and autopoiesis, systems are viewed as dynamic (information) networks that 
follow the principle of self-organization. Self-organization in complex systems, however, is 
“emergent” and “spontaneous.”  
 When positive feedback increases the speed of interaction among more and different 
components, the system eventually reaches a “critical state” or “edge of chaos” between order and 
disorder. From this tipping point, effects that are disproportionate to their causes begin to emerge; 
“local” interactions cause non-linear changes in the properties of the system at the “global” level. 
Imagine a pile of sand on a table to which more sand is added at a constant and slow rate. The sand 
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will continue to pile up and, at some point, the addition of a single grain of sand will cause the pile 
to “avalanche.” While we can know that an avalanche will occur at some point, we find that the 
same grain of sand can unleash small avalanches, large avalanches, or no avalanches at all; and, 
just as important, “there is no way to tell whether a particular one will be insignificant or 
catastrophic.”563 Thus, complex systems are “emergent” because “the parts do not simply sum to 
give the activity of the whole” and “spontaneous” because both the timing and size of systemic 
changes are unpredictable.564 
 But what about adaptive? To help illustrate the adaptive nature of complex systems we can 
look to a longtime fascination of complexity theorists, social insects. In a 1992 paper given at a 
Santa Fe Institute workshop on Artificial Life, “Swarms, Phase Transitions, and Collective 
Intelligence,” Mark M. Millonas contended that “the action of the swarm on a scale of days, hours, 
or even minutes manifests a nearly constant flow of emergent phenomena.”565 Swarms of bees, for 
example, operate according to a logic that cannot be discerned from the analysis of a single bee. 
Rather, their complex behavior “is the result of the interactions between organisms.”566 Each 
individual bee merely responds the actions of surrounding individuals such that, even without a 
pilot, bees are able to fly in a stable formation. A sequence of local interactions between 
components causes the emergence of complex global behavior, or “collective intelligence.”  
 Swarm intelligence, however, would not be possible without following what Millonas calls 
the “principle of adaptability.”  
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When rewards for changing a behavior mode are likely to be worth the investment 
in energy, the group should be able to switch. The best response is likely to be a 
balance between complete order and total chaos, and, therefore, the level of 
randomness is the group is an important factor. Enough noise will allow a diverse 
response, while too much will destroy any cooperative behavior.567 
 
The adaptive nature of biological systems returns us to the framework of coevolution. Insofar as 
complex behavior emerges at the edge of chaos between order and disorder or information and 
noise, complex systems must remain open to, and coevolve with, their environments to maintain 
themselves. As Kauffman explains, “The very nature of coevolution is to attain this edge of chaos, 
a web of compromises where each species prospers as well as possible but where none can be sure 
if its best next step will set off a trickle or a landslide. In this precarious world, avalanches, small 
and large, sweep the system relentlessly.”568 Indeed, Kauffman goes on to argue not just that 
technological coevolution mirrors its biological counterparts, but also that the two processes 
coevolve with one another. Unlike the earliest information-based theories of self-organization, 
which paradoxically sealed organisms off from their environments at a metaphysical level, 
complex adaptive systems theory recognizes openness and, therefore, relationality as a structural 
condition of systematicity. 
Insofar as homo sapiens sapiens coevolved with material tools and environments in a 
complex and adaptive process of self-organization, the leakiness of the self is an originary feature 
of human nature. Both the physical capacities for cognition and the execution of particular 
cognitive tasks involves reciprocal, inextricable relations between brain, body, and environment. 
Furthermore, individual material technologies often play an outsized role in cognition, mediating 
the systemic feedback between sensation and representation. Given the widespread dependence on 
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the language of “human nature” in the human enhancement debate, it must be emphasized that, 
from a biological perspective, there is no, and has never been, a self that is ontologically 
independent of technologies. Rather, human development at both the micro-and macro- levels is 
best narrated as process of “technogenesis,” i.e., “adaptation, the fit between organisms and their 
environments recognizing that both sides of the engagement (humans and technologies) are 
undergoing coordinated transformations.”569 There will be no historical moment of rupture in 
which the self first escapes or transcends the body since the self has always leaked beyond the skin 
and skull through complex, subject-forming processes of material information exchange. We are 
always already hybrids, cyborgs, and posthumans. 
This claim, however, needs some clarification, lest it sound too much like the flattening 
universalism of the human enhancement discourse I have thus far been criticizing. If the extended 
nature of cognition points to relationality and embodiment as structural features of subject-
formation, it also points to plasticity. To quote philosopher Catherine Malabou on the “plastic” 
brain, “Synaptic development…depends on the synthesis between the spontaneous activity of the 
nervous system and interaction with the environment.”570 For example, in his 2008 article, “Is 
Google Making Us Stupid?”, Nicholas Carr theorized that the digital devices and Internet-stylized 
content mediating our cognitive process were changing our neurological capacities. Among other 
evidence, he cited developmental psychologist MaryAnne Wolf’s Proust and the Squid, which 
claims that “we are not only what we read…we are how we read.”571 The reading promoted by the 
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Internet prioritizes “efficiency” and “immediacy” above all else and turns us into “mere decoders 
of information” with limited attention spans and even diminished critical thinking skills. 572 
Normative judgments aside, the important thing to note here is that these changes are occurring at 
the neurological and not just behavioral level. When we learn to read, we form new circuits that 
connect the neural structures responsible for visualization, language, and conceptualization. As 
Wolf explains of digital reading, however, “The omnipresence of multiple distractions for attention 
– and the brain’s own natural attraction to novelty – contribute to a mindset toward reading that 
seeks to reduce information to its lowest conceptual denominator.”573 Our neural pathways are in 
turn “short-circuited” and the brain is gradually reprogrammed so as to not learn or not execute 
certain available cognitive functions. In this all-too-mundane example of reading digital text on 
the Internet, the structure of the brain itself is altered through a uniquely modern kind of cognitive 
extension. 
If the species-level rhetoric of coevolution compels us to think in the dichotomous terms 
of humans and their others, it also offers the theoretical resources to deconstruct those same terms. 
The moments of rupture and formation that coevolution narratives chart emerge from the hybrid 
and plastic features of human nature that we saw outlined in autopoiesis, cognitive extension, and 
complexity theory. Distributed through relationships of information exchange, the hybrid entities 
we call selves exist in reciprocal relationships of determination with their particular material and 
cultural environments. This is a temporal as well as a spatial claim. As Taylor reminds us, 
“complex adaptive systems develop over time and, therefore, are historical.”574 For a system to be 
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adaptive, it must both “anticipate” the future and “learn” from the past. The specific and multiple 
technologies we interact (or rather intra-act) with in and over time matter; these couplings inform 
how we process (or even construct) self and world. An aphorism of Brooks and likeminded 
epiphenomenalists applies here: “The world is its own best model.”575 Selfhood emerges from the 
“bottom” or “periphery,” i.e., the local, sensory, and material components of human experience. If 
we are to speak of human nature at all, that is, if we are to speak of some common biological 
identity, then that identity ought to be grounded in the capacities for difference at least as much as 
sameness. We are leaky selves who flow out of and back into the skin and skull – looping through 
our unique environments in the process – as a condition of our being at all.  
5.6 Posthumanist Parallels 
 
The interventions of these non-humanistic scientific frameworks have been paralleled in 
numerous ‘posthumanist’ approaches across the humanities and social sciences in the past three 
decades. In her analysis of this posthumanist literature, Tamar Sharon divides these works into two 
subgenres: “methodological” posthumanism and “radical” posthumanism. Grounded in the fields 
of Science and Technology Studies and Philosophy of Technology, methodological posthumanism 
is “characterized by an attempt to conceptualize analytic frameworks that can better account for 
the networks and zones of intersections between the human and the non-human.”576 From “actor-
network theory”577 to “ontological relationality”578 to “manglings,”579 these frameworks center 
non-human entities in an attempt to develop new methods for deriving historical, sociological, and 
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phenomenological knowledge. In contrast, radical posthumanism is grounded in feminist studies, 
cultural theory, and postmodern philosophy, and is “characterized by the view that emerging 
biotechnologies are contributing to a deconstruction of foundational discourses based in terms like 
‘nature’ and ‘human.’”580 This work goes a step further than its methodological counterpart in 
taking a normative position; the posthuman is a means of political resistance against the 
(dangerous) meta-narratives of modernity and possesses a liberatory potential moving forward. 
While Sharon’s genre distinction is useful for cartographical purposes, we will (through select 
examples) see that it overstates the differences in posthumanist discourse. Methodological and 
radical posthumanism are constituted through the same grounding theoretical commitment – 
originary prosthecity – which I contend can help us further develop the notion of human nature 
emerging in this chapter. 
5.7 Methodological Posthumanisms 
For methodological posthumanists, classic philosophers’ construal of techno-science as a 
monolithic and deterministic phenomenon restricts our recognition of how particular human 
contexts and values shape technologies and vice versa. For example, in criticizing Heidegger’s 
ontological approach, philosopher Peter Paul-Verbeek contends that, “to say that technologies 
spring from a certain manner of thinking and comporting oneself…does not mean that such a 
manner of thinking and comporting is the only allowable consequence of using technologies.”581 
This statement is representative of the broader “empirical turn” in Science and Technology Studies 
(STS) that began to take shape in the 1970s and 1980s according to which fieldwork, ethnographic 
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interviews, and archival research gained favor over more text-oriented and theoretical studies.582 
We can understand this empirical turn as a concerted effort to resist classical instrumentalism – 
i.e., the analysis of technologies as neutral, objective products of human use – but without de-
materializing and de-contextualizing those technologies.  
The baseline view that emerged in STS is what we might call the social constructivist view 
of technology: technologies are necessarily shaped by the social processes and biases that bring 
them into being, and therefore must be analyzed according to the interpretive frameworks of the 
social actors who develop and use them rather than reduced to inherent properties in the 
technologies themselves.583 This, in turn, requires examining concrete technological artifacts and 
systems in their specific social and historical contexts. It did not, however, take long for this 
baseline view to come under criticism from within the field of STS. If the constructivist view helps 
to materialize and contextualize technologies, it still reifies one of the classic problems of 
instrumentalism: centering the subjective ends of developers and users; human-technology 
relationships are approached as unidirectional rather than ‘symmetrical’. This criticism is the basis 
of methodological posthumanism – a discourse no one has influenced more than French social 
theorist Bruno Latour. 
For Latour, “modernization” has been a grand process of epistemic and ontological 
“purification” according to which the world has been divided into two separate categories of being: 
sentient, purposeful humans and neutral, inanimate objects – a subjective sphere of culture and an 
objective sphere of nature. 584  This a priori distinction is what makes instrumentalist 
 
582 Hans Achterhius, American Philosophy of Technology: The Empirical Turn (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University 
Press, 2001). 
583 MacKenzie and Wajcman., The Social Shaping of Technology. 
584 Bruno Latour, We Have Never Been Modern (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). 
 270 
understandings of technologies possible in the first place. To counterbalance this worldview, 
Latour contends that analyses of techno-science ought to be more inclusive and reciprocal; humans 
and technologies, subject and objects, should both be approached as actors or “actants” that have 
a “symmetrical” effect on one another. This requires bracketing off our inherited, essentialist 
conceptions of entities – not just general categorizations such as “subjective” and “objective,” but 
also hard distinctions between individual entities – in order to focus on how actants engage, 
connect, and associate in/as socio-material networks.585 
From the symmetrical perspective, the notion of (technological) mediation is paramount 
for understanding human action.586 To illustrate his notion of mediation, Latour analyzes the 
famous slogan of the Nation Rifle Association (NRA), “Guns don’t kill people; people kill people.” 
Latour asks: in the event of a shooting, what is the role of the gun? Opponents of gun sales take 
up a “substantivist” account in which the gun transforms an otherwise innocent person into a 
criminal; without the gun, there is no shooting. The NRA, on the other hand, take up an 
instrumentalist account in which the gun adds nothing to the action; it is a neutral tool that allows 
a preexisting human will to be carried out. For Latour, however, neither perspective accounts for 
the intermingling of human and non-human in the human-gun network that gives rise to the 
shooting action. 
Latour instead proposes a fourfold framework of technological mediation: 1) translation, 
2) composition, 3) reversible blackboxing, and 4) delegation. In translation, the subject/object 
opposition disappears and a new “hybrid” entity composed of both human intention and non-
human function emerges; engagement with technologies creates altogether new “programs of 
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action” for human actors. Composition proceeds from translation insofar as it signifies that all 
action is a collaborative, networked enterprise; “Action is simply not a property of humans but an 
association of actants.”587 Reversible blackboxing refers to the fact that ‘users’ are often unaware 
of the degree to which their actions are mediated – we encounter artifacts as independent entities 
rather than as part of the networks of manufacturers, materials, distributors, laborers, and so forth 
involved in their production and maintenance. The inside of the “machine” is “blackboxed” and 
its network of associations only becomes visible in the event of a breakdown. The final aspect of 
mediation, “delegation,” claims that techniques transgress the distinction between signs and things; 
humans can delegate programs of action to artifacts through design and use. In a now-familiar 
model of feedback, material artifacts can then prescribe certain programs of action for users. In the 
case of the gun, the person’s association with the gun transforms both person and gun into a new 
hybrid actant – an “assemblage” – with a “script” that is determined by an invisible network of 
social connections and movements and the in-built properties of the material object. Thus, 
ontological status and ethical responsibility ought to be distributed across entities rather than 
assigned to just the person or the gun. 
What is at stake here is not just discovering or recovering the technical details of a historical 
event or a technological object. Latour is not just being a ‘good historian’ or ‘good sociologist’ in 
the sense of getting all the facts right. Rather, when we miss all of these modes of mediation, we 
misunderstand the very nature of humans and technologies; we understand them as self-contained 
entities when in fact they are assemblages, produced and maintained through complex alliances 
that are at once technical, theoretical, and social. For Latour, then, there are not distinct spheres 
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such as culture and nature, and one might argue that there are not even distinct entities; there are 
just “heterogeneous chains of association that, from time to time, create obligatory passage 
points.” 588  Indeed, in terms that sound much like the complementarian model of extended 
cognition, he claims that “relations of humans and non-humans are so intimate, the transactions so 
many, the mediations so convoluted, that there is no plausible sense in which artifact, corporate 
body and subject can be distinguished.”589 Humans and technologies always already exist in 
(networked) relationships of co-constitution and co-determination, and the only question that 
matters in an analysis of either is “which associations are stronger and which are weaker?”590  
While much of methodological posthumanism follows from Latour’s sociological bent, 
Sharon also identifies a more philosophical strand based in the phenomenological tradition. 
Developed through the works of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, 
phenomenology is the study of the structures of consciousness from the perspective of subjective 
experience – the in-built modes of awareness and discernment that act as the condition of the 
possibility of humans’ unique mode of existence. Whether described in terms of 
“consciousness,”591 “being-in-the-world,”592 or “perception,”593 the phenomenological tradition is 
relational in that it offers a description of one’s relationship with the world rather than a description 
of the world as such. Humans always experience the world around them and that world is only 
ever made intelligible through our pre-existing modes of perception. In this sense, the 
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phenomenological tradition circumvents the problem of epistemic access to the noumenal world 
through a relational approach. This approach, however, still risks reaffirming the metaphysical 
subject/object distinction insofar as the world appears to only flow outward from the subject’s 
structures of consciousness. 
Posthumanist philosopher Don Ihde attempts to reconcile this subjectivist inclination 
through his “post-phenomenological” method, which is 
(a) …neither subjectivist nor objectivist, but relational. Its core ontology is an 
analysis of interrelations between humans and environment (intentionality). (b) It 
is not introspective, but reflexive in that whatever one “experiences” is derived 
from, not introspection, but the “what” and “how” of the “external” or 
environmental context in relation to embodied experience. And (c) all “givens” are 
merely indices for the genuine work of showing how any particular “given” can 
become intuited or experienced.594 
 
In Ihde’s framework, the originary condition of experience is not the subject’s perceptive 
capacities but the embodied relationship between the subject and their environment. Technologies 
are not objects of experience but a means of experience, acting as extensions of our pre-conscious 
embodiment. For example, eyeglasses mediate one’s experience of their world prior to conscious 
reflection. This embodied relation in turn produces a hermeneutic one: technologies offer a 
representation of the real that must be interpreted, compelling engagement with linguistic and 
meaning-oriented capacities while not being present as such. There are multiple forms of 
hermeneutics that might follow. For example, one might interpret the technology in terms of 
alterity, i.e., as a “quasi-object” that is ontologically distinct from the conscious self. Inversely, 
technologies can form “background” relations in which they are interpreted as part of the 
environment. Regardless of the particular interpretation of self and world that follows, the principle 
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is the same: material technologies have a structural role in human experience, mediating each 
person’s world both prior to and after it appears to consciousness.595 
Despite their acute disciplinary differences, Latour and Ihde exemplify the common theme 
of methodological posthumanism: technological mediation. Whereas Latour develops a method to 
analyze how technologies bring different kinds of action into being, Ihde develops one to analyze 
how technologies structure experiential relationships between self and world. Like the initial 
empirical turn in STS, both frameworks emphasize the need for material specificity; which 
technologies and environments enact mediation matter for which actions and experiences emerge. 
“Mediation,” however, is an ironic designation in this case since the term traditionally implies a 
relationship between two distinct entities (as in classic instrumentalism). For Latour, Ihde, and 
other methodological posthumanists though, technological relationships are so fundamental to 
acting, perceiving, and interpreting that there is no meaningful sense in which can we distinguish 
between subjects and objects as entities that relate to and move through the world. Human being 
is always already technologically relational as a condition of its possibility. 
5.8 Radical Posthumanisms 
Like methodological posthumanists, radical theorists take up a co-constitutive view of 
humans and technologies. But whereas methodological posthumanists are developing analytical 
tools to derive certain kinds of factual or heuristic knowledge, radical posthumanists are also 
interested in the liberatory potential of human-technology relationships. This is not liberation from 
the human species’ biological finitude as with transhumanism, but liberation from the fixed, 
essentialist notions of ‘human’ and ‘nature’ that have long had a structural relationship to 
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theoretical acts of ‘othering’ and material projects of political domination. In this regard, the 
radical variant of posthumanism takes up one of the basic premises of postmodernism and 
poststructuralism: the unified, rational subject of modern, Enlightenment humanism depends upon 
a dangerous and incoherent dialectic logic of reducing plurality and multiplicity to binary 
oppositions. For posthumanists though, the most important sites of analysis are techno-scientific 
ones, including the extra-discursive and biological elements of human experience; for herein lies 
not just the most dangerous manifestations of humanism but also the most potent theoretical 
resources for political resistance. 
If we take Latour to be the progenitor of methodological posthumanism, then his 
contemporary, feminist and postmodernist theorist Donna Haraway, can be seen as the progenitor 
of its radical counterpart. 596  For Haraway, humanism has historically depended upon the 
construction of categorical oppositions, and we “moderns” are witnessing the breakdown of three 
such crucial a priori boundaries: between the animal and the human, between the organism and 
the machine, and between the physical and non-physical. Haraway did not believe that such a 
breakdown could be enacted by the political theories of 1980’s feminism and Marxism, which still 
approached their subjects as quasi-humanist holistic unities. Rather, the agents responsible for this 
ongoing collapse are information sciences and technologies. Take, for example, the OncoMouse, 
a transgenic species of mouse engineered to carry an activated oncogene for the purpose of 
research into breast cancer. More than just being a literal reconfiguration of genetic material, the 
OncoMouse is also a reconfiguration of biological knowledge, laboratory practice, property law, 
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economic fortunes, and collective and personal hopes and fears.597 As such, it raises a host of 
destabilizing questions: can we still speak of ‘natural kinds’ in our posthuman moment of genetic 
engineering? What crosses and designs count as ‘legitimate’, and for whom? “Who,” Haraway 
asks, “are my familiars, my siblings, and what kind of livable world are we trying to build?”598 In 
a world reduced to bits of information networked in formative processes of exchange, hard 
ontological distinctions between humans and their others become difficult, if not altogether 
impossible, to uphold. 
In her foundational text, “A Cyborg Manifesto,” Haraway thus introduced the figure of the 
“cyborg.” 599  The cyborg, she explains, is “a cybernetic organism, a hybrid of machine and 
organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of fiction,” which is capable of “mapping 
our social and bodily reality” and acting “as an imaginative resource” for the ‘pleasurable’ and 
‘responsible’ construction of boundaries.600 In addition to being a direct product of cybernetic 
theory,601 the cyborg is the ideal symbol for Haraway because it is monstrous – neither fully human 
nor fully machine – and whose “blasphemous” existence therefore calls into question the humanist 
myth of wholeness and organicism. The cyborg, however, is not intended to be a “utopian” model 
of subjectivity insofar as it embraces all those features of human existence – hybridity, contingency, 
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ambiguity, and difference – that utopianism, like humanism, seeks to dialectically reconcile. 
Rather, it offers an alternative “myth” or “ontology” that affords us with non-dualistic and non-
oppositional modes of thinking politics and power.  
The “ironic” nature of the term “cyborg” – which implies the existence of two distinct 
entities prior to their coupling – is not lost on Haraway. In spite of her emphasis on the modern 
moment, there is no historical moment of rupture in which humans are transformed into cyborgs. 
Rather, from a materialistic perspective at least, humans have always been cyborgs whose 
embodied existence transgresses their own constructed boundaries. Modern information sciences 
and technologies do, however, represent a unique discursive occasion to deconstruct and 
reconstruct those boundaries and, in doing so, effect a radical form of inclusive politics based in 
affinity rather than identity. For Haraway and other radical posthumanists, this is more than just 
an opportunity. It is an ethical responsibility insofar as information can just as easily be a resource 
for “domination”; after all, it was developed for the purpose of war and, as we have seen, all too 
often gets sublated back into humanist ethics. If it is to fulfill its ethical potential, the cyborg – like 
any imagining of the posthuman – cannot be expected to speak for itself. 
 This challenge has been taken up through, among other means, the language and logic of 
“prosthesis.” Prosthetics are traditionally framed in egocentric language as alien objects that can 
be manipulated for the advantage of the individual or social self – substitutes for, or supplements 
to, an original unity. Posthumanist theorists such as David Wills, however, contend that it is 
possible to conceptualize prosthesis beyond identity and autonomy. In his influential work, 
Prosthesis, Wills rereads canonical writers – Virgil, Freud, Derrida, Condor, Roussel, Greenaway, 
Paré, and Gibson – so as to demonstrate the presence of some kind of prosthetic logic in each of 
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their corpuses.602 What really connects these writers, however, is the repeated and violent intrusion 
of biographical fragments about Wills’ father, an amputee with a wooden leg. For Wills, this 
wooden leg, what he refers to as “paternal paraphernalia,” is at once a material artifact, a personal 
obsession, and a performative literary device.  
 Building on the deconstructive tradition, this/the prosthesis acts as a mirror of man’s 
attachment to the writing machine and, as such, is intended to speak to the structural 
incompleteness of discourse. While his father’s leg has little to do with the thinkers in question, it 
haunts the author’s reading and writing practices. Wills cannot help but read his historical texts 
through the lens of his father’s leg – something he attempts to communicate, but which he can 
never communicate as such, to his readers through recollective intrusions that parallel his own 
digressive thought process. The wooden leg, or the organic one it was supposed to substitute for, 
are thus present as absences, the kind of extra-discursive addendum that inform, but cannot be 
sublimated into, all acts of discourse.  
 Concluding with an unpunctuated quote from Jacques Derrida, the reader is reminded that 
language is little more than (parenthetical) acts of “translation” that require substitution and 
supplementation as a condition of their possibility. Reader and writer are connected through 
information processing, and that mode of processing is one of différance, ‘the difference and 
deferral of meaning.’603 Here, one is reminded of polymath Gregory Bateson’s famous definition 
of information as “a difference that makes a difference.”604 Remember, when a message is too 
redundant or certain, it becomes noise rather than information. Insofar as communication is 
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difference all the way down, there is no original unity of meaning and no possibility of semantic 
closure to which the writer can refer. Discourse is thus a prosthetic phenomenon in which texts 
function as amputees that reader, writer, and all manner of unwanted guest prosthetize as a/the 
condition of meaning-making. 
The deconstructive logic of prosthesis gains a clearer connection to the information 
sciences in French anthropologist Michel Serres’s The Parasite. The idée fixe of the text, the 
parasite, is also the French word for noise, static, or interference in information theory. Serres takes 
advantage of the word’s semantic multiplicity by reading the idea of noise alongside the more 
familiar definitions of parasite as a biological organism that preys upon a host or an ‘uninvited 
guest’ who charms their way into a free dinner. Moving between the domains of literature and 
science – fables of rats and diagrams of black boxes – Serres translates parasitism into an 
asymmetrical model of ‘taking without giving’ that applies equally to information theory and the 
history of human relations.605 
 This model of parasitism rejects the oppositional logic of classical information theory, 
which suggests that there can be either order or disorder, either constructiveness or destructiveness. 
In contrast, parasitism claims that interruption is a productive force and that order and disorder are 
therefore relational states. Take, for example, the parable of the poor, starving man who approaches 
the kitchen door of a restaurant and smells the food inside to help sate his hunger pains. Catching 
him in the act, a kitchen hand comes out and demands that the uninvited guest pay for the services 
rendered. In the course of their disagreement, a third man arrives to settle the matter: 
Give me a coin, [the third man] said. The wretch did so, frowning. He put the coin 
down on the sidewalk and with the heel of his made it ring a bit. This noise, he said, 
giving his decision, is pay enough for the aroma of the tasty dishes…If the coin is 
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worth the roast, then the sound of the coin is worth the aroma of the food. And he 
returned the coin to the passer-by. Justice is done.606 
 
The third man, the disruption, makes an exchange between two different forms of order – one 
where coins are exchanged for food, and another where sounds are exchanged for smells – 
possible. In transforming the coin into sound, the parasite, i.e., the third man, opens up a channel 
for a new mode of exchange so that communication becomes possible. The parasite “invents 
something new…a new logic,” making the exchange into a “diagonal.”607 
 For Serres, there is nothing unusual about this kind of exchange; all systems are “crossed 
by a network of relations” and all relations are part of parasitic chains that interrupt or parasitize 
other kinds of relations.608 However, these parasitic relations are, paradoxically, constructive. In 
the absence of noise, the universe would be a homogeneous and reversible stasis of balanced 
exchanges, i.e., total equilibrium. In taking without giving though, the parasite violates an ideal 
system of equal exchange and introduces an element of irreversibility; duration and history 
commence. The parasite is thus the “simplest” relation and the “beginning of intersubjectivity. The 
third is always there…A third exists before the second. A third exists before the other.”609 The 
parasite is the difference that makes a difference, the condition of possibility of communication 
or, in even more general terms, systemic organization. 
 Serres’s parasite is intended to parasite the model of complex, adaptive behavior discussed 
in the prior section. Through its interruption, the parasite effects new forms of complexity in the 
system. In taking without giving, the parasite interrupts the system’s usual functioning, moving it 
further from equilibrium, and forces the host to act differently. Like diners deciding what to do 
 
606 Serres, The Parasite, 34-35. 
607 Serres, The Parasite, 35. 
608 Serres, The Parasite, 39. 
609 Serres, The Parasite, 63. 
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with an uninvited guest who shows up at the door, the host can either incorporate the parasite into 
the system – accepting the new form of communication the parasite effects – or expel the parasite 
and transform itself in the process. Herein lies the nature of all living systems: the struggle to 
incorporate or expel the parasite – to maintain or change in the context of an entropic universe. 
But even this opposition is a false one; regardless of which ‘decision’ is made, the organization of 
the system is adapted, or rather adapts itself, in the process. To attempt to return to the past, to 
yearn for prior states of purity and simplicity, is to deny the complexity that is necessarily 
generated by parasitic relations. 
While the topic of biotechnologies might seem to be far removed from Wills’s and Serres’s 
texts, I want to suggest otherwise. As is so often the case in the deconstructive tradition, what is 
true for discourse is also true for the subject. In demonstrating that all systems follow the 
“principles of nonintegrality, detachability, and replacement”610 both theorists implicitly depend 
upon and validate a conceptual framework of “originary prosthecity.” 611  French philosopher 
Bernard Stiegler captures the principle of this framework when he explains that the prosthesis 
“does not replace what would have been there before it,” nor is it “a mere extension of the human 
body.” Rather, “it is the constitution of this body qua ‘human.’”612 For Stiegler and likeminded 
posthumanists, the human has always evolved through the coupling with the supposedly ‘exterior’ 
evolution of technological objects; and technologies are therefore the enabling condition of human 
experience. The human(ist) view of a self-contained and self-determined subject, then, is little 
 
610 Wills, Prosthesis, 71. 
611 For more on this term, see: Joanna Zylinska, “The Future is…Monstrous: Prosthetics as Ethics” in The Cyborg 
Experiments: The Extensions of the Body in the Media Age, ed. Joanna Zylinska (London: Continuum, 2002): 214-
236. 
612 Bernard Stiegler, Technical and Time, 1: The Fault of Epimetheus (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 
1998), 152-153. 
 282 
more than the human “forgetting” its own prosthetic nature – concealing the extent to which, like 
discourse, subjectivity is always prosthetized and parasitized by material artifacts as a condition 
of its possibility. To quote the famous Australian performance artist Stelarc, “Technology is, and 
always has been, an appendage of the body;” it is “what defines human being.”613 
Whether articulated in terms of “assemblages,” “cyborgs,” or some other figuration, 
originary prosthecity is the ontological commitment that affords posthumanism with its particular 
mode of divergence from humanism. Through centering techno-science, we come to understand 
that the categorical distinctions of classical humanist discourse – self/other, human/technology, 
natural/artificial – through which the self-contained, self-determining Man of Reason has been 
constructed do not map onto the territory of human being. Rather, as posthumanist theorist Elaine 
Graham surmises, “To be human is already to be in a web of relationships, where our humanity 
can only be articulated – iterated – in and through our environment, our tools, our artifacts, and 
the networks of human and non-human life around us. 614  There is no “natural,” grounding 
opposition between humans and technologies – antagonistic or otherwise – that can act as the 
starting point for (bio)ethical analysis. 
5.9 Human Enhancement: A Category Mistake 
 
Thus far I have sought to elaborate a cross-disciplinary, posthumanist view of human 
nature that calls into question the integrity of the humanist subject. I have emphasized how 
centering scientific theories and material technologies in ontological analysis leads to a 
technologically relational view of human being in which subjectivity is constituted through 
 
613 Paolo Atzori and Kirk A. Woolford, “Extended-Body: Interview with Stelarc,” in Digital Delirium, ed. Arther 
and Marilouise Kroker. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997, 198. 
614 Elaine Graham, “Post/human conditions” Theology and Sexuality 10, no. 2 (2004): 27.  
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embodied interactions with the material environment and, in particular, technological artifacts. 
How, though, does taking up this posthumanist framework change our understanding of the human 
enhancement debate?  
 Foremost, it challenges the bioconservative framework. In order to represent 
biotechnologies as a threat to the purity of the self, conservative bioethicists must first assume a 
prior ontological separation between humans and technologies at the level of the ‘natural’. To be 
human is to be a self hermetically sealed inside the skin and skull with technologies functioning 
as mere external instruments. This difference is normative as well as ontological; both the intrusion 
of technologies into biology and the operationalization of a techno-scientific worldview are 
antithetical to human flourishing. Artificiality is a vice. If, however, we treat the human condition 
as one of originary prosthecity, then the conservative position collapses like a house of cards. For 
there is no essential, pre-technological self for ‘enhancements’ to desacralize. Technological 
relation is a condition of possibility for human subjectivity. This does not mean that the 
development and use of biotechnologies is a priori ethical; far from it. How the self relates to/with 
which technologies matters; indeed, this might be the ethical question moving forward. But it does 
mean that the technologization of human being is not in itself a valid objection to the development 
and use of biotechnologies. The structural integration of technologies into self-formation was 
never a yes/no proposition to begin with.  
 This would seem to push us towards the bioliberal position; after all, like posthumanism, 
the bioliberal position holds the basic premise that humans have always coevolved with 
technologies. For bioliberals, however, this relationship is both humanist and value laden. It is not 
a relationship of mutual constitution so much as a hierarchical instrumentalism in which 
technologies operate as external tools that have afforded the enhancement of human self-
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determination. This speaks to a deeper essentialism in which the self-contained, self-determining 
Man of Reason is presumed to be a universal, transhistorical subject; and, as the vehicle of reason 
and will, techno-science is evidence of, rather than a challenge to, the humanist model of 
subjectivity. This particular relationship between subject-formation and techno-science is the 
ground upon which bioliberals claim that technological ‘advancement’ should be seen as a, or even 
the, cause of social, historical, and moral progress. 
 We have seen that posthumanists agree that human-technology relationships are never 
neutral; technologies influence, and are influenced by, the social contexts of their design, 
production, and use. The technologization of the human, however, cannot be reduced to a single 
normative quality; it is not necessarily progressive. Insofar as human being is always already 
technological, the normative character of human-technology relationships is (potentially) as 
diverse as human being itself. This is precisely the reason I chose to begin this chapter’s narrative 
in the context of wartime research, where so much of technological development occurs. Not to 
imply that we ought to return to a classic instrumentalism where technologies are viewed as mere 
extensions of human intentions; but to remind the reader of the fact that it takes an astonishing 
amount of intellectual concealment to reduce technologization to a structurally ethical or unethical 
process – concealment which, as I hope I have shown in this project, is afforded through the 
essentialist language of human nature and monolithic representations of science and technology. 
For this same reason, adopting a posthumanist perspective problematizes more than just 
these two particular bioethical positions; it calls into question the entire category of human 
enhancement. Human enhancement has long been recognized as an imperfect category, a heuristic 
of convenience. The primary criticisms of it, however, have revolved around the fact that the 
therapy/enhancement distinction is a moving target based on which technologies are considered 
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socially acceptable or ‘normalized’ at the time of their ethical evaluation.615 For example, looking 
through the archive, one might be surprised to see how much issue the President’s Council of the 
2000s took with Adderall and other pharmaceuticals.616 For these bioethicists, there was little 
substantive difference between prescription stimulants and human cloning insofar as both were 
‘unnatural’ biotechnologies that had the potential to upend normal species-functioning.  
The real problem, however, is not the “enhancement” part of the equation but the notion of 
“human” that it depends upon. Like all humanist figurations, it is constituted through categorical 
oppositions; in this case, self/other, human/technology, natural/artificial. Such oppositions afford 
the construction of an essential, universal human whose biological and ethical features are fixed 
and bounded. Biotechnologies, which penetrate into the anatomical depth of the self, are, in turn, 
represented as a substantively different kind of technological integration – one which could go 
beyond instrumental use to modify the self itself. The natural question that follows is: how will 
biotechnologies modify human nature? Or, in the value laden terms of the enhancement debate: 
will biotechnologies make us more or less human?  
From the posthumanist perspective, however, humans are relational, embodied, and 
differential beings who always already exist in technological relationships of mutual constitution. 
There is no essential, universal human whose biological and ethical features are fixed and bounded. 
To the extent that there is some constant that we can call human nature, it is an emergent, 
distributed, and variable process of subject-formation that precludes the supposed a priori 
oppositions of self/other, human/technology, and natural/artificial. Insofar as it misidentifies the 
 
615 Ruth Chadwick, “Therapy, Enhancement and Improvement” in Medical Enhancement and Posthumanity, ed. Bert 
Gordijin and Ruth Chadwick (London: Springer Books, 2008), 25-37. 
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subject of enhancement, then, human enhancement is a category mistake. Likewise, whether 
biotechnologies will make us more or less human is not a valid criterion for bioethical evaluation. 
Technological integration is an ethically variable, contextually specific feature of human ontology 
and, therefore, cannot by itself function as a normative affirmation or denial of human nature. 
Biotechnologies cannot make us or more or less human, more or less natural, only differently so.  
How, then, should we think about biotechnologies and the ethics thereof? In the conclusion, I will 
consider some of the possibilities for, and limitations of, using a critical posthumanist framework 


















Enhancing the Debate? 
 
6.1 Human(ist) Enhancement: A Review Of Reasons 
In the course of this dissertation, I have argued that, in spite of the radical, ‘posthuman’ 
nature of the technologies in question, the human enhancement debate in bioethics is a thoroughly 
humanist discourse. In the most basic sense, this means that the ‘human’ of ‘human enhancement’ 
is conceptualized as the self-contained, self-determining ‘Man of Reason’ of the Western 
Enlightenment tradition. This ideal subject is constituted in essentialist, oppositional, and 
hierarchical terms. Essentialist in the belief that all humans across space and time share a ‘nature’ 
defined by the possession of specific traits or capacities; oppositional in the belief that this nature 
exists in metaphysical contradistinction to other natural kinds; and hierarchical in the belief that 
this nature affords a privileged ontological status and is, therefore, a normatively good thing. The 
result is that, regardless of whether one takes up a conservative or liberal stance towards 
enhancement, the ethical status of biotechnological interventions is reduced to arguments for 
whether (and how) such interventions will make us more or less human. The enhancement debate 
thus fails to call into question the coherence of humanness or human nature as an ontological and 
ethical criterion. 
In Chapter One, we saw that the humanist character of the enhancement debate builds on 
broader historical and intellectual trends within the field of bioethics. On one hand, the field’s 
emergence can be understood as a process of Weberian formal rationalization in which the 
discipline was ‘thinned’ and substantive inquiries about ultimate values were excluded from 
authorized discourse. This was actualized through the formation of common moral principlism: an 
ethical framework that presumes the existence of universally held moral principles – autonomy, 
non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice – which bioethicists can identify and channel to govern 
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the domain of biomedicine. On the other hand, the field’s very existence was, in part, a response 
to the ontological anxiety first produced by postwar information sciences and technologies, i.e., 
the techno-scientific deconstruction of boundaries between humans and machines and the implied 
possibility of modifying humans as if machines. While common moral principlism provided a 
pragmatic bulwark for applied bioethics, it did little to reconcile this anxiety. Thus, when genetic 
engineering and human cloning (re-)emerged as flashpoint controversies in the 1980s and 1990s, 
a new (complementary) conceptual framework for debating biotechnologies emerged to fill the 
void: human enhancement. 
Defined in contradistinction to medical therapies, the framework of enhancement 
partitioned off emergent biotechnologies – genetic engineering, psycho-pharmaceuticals, human 
cloning, brain-machine interfaces, and so forth – as technologies with the unique and novel 
potential to modify human nature to a substantive degree, i.e., to make subjects ‘inhuman’ or 
‘posthuman’. As we saw in Chapter Two, this discourse was quickly assimilated into the 
biopolitical culture wars of the 1990s with the most prominent positions being constituted along 
bioconservative and bioliberal lines. Conservatives took up a restrictive position, claiming that 
modifying human nature would disintegrate homo sapiens’ species-integrity and with it our 
privileged ontological status in the Great Chain of Being. Given the humanist foundations of the 
modern world, the result would be a dystopian collapse of self-identity, moral certitude, and even 
political rights. In contrast, liberals took up a permissive stance, claiming that biotechnologies 
could improve our constitutive capacities, making us smarter, healthier, happier, and even more 
moral. Insofar as we already take these ‘improvements’ to be objective goods, enhancement is 
simply the (necessary) means to achieve ‘commonsense’ ethical ends.  
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I also, however, argued that these two positions have far more in common than theorists 
have been able or willing to recognize; namely, both depend upon and validate humanist premises. 
While conservatives criticize modern “scientific humanism” for its glorification of techno-
scientific knowledge and power, humans’ ontological character, which is grounded in their 
biological makeup, is the basis of our most important cultural goods – our individual identities, 
moral principles, and political rights. The goal of bioconservativism is thus to conserve the 
(purported) purity of human nature, to prevent us from going down the slippery slope towards 
inhumanness by ‘playing God’ with biotechnologies. Bioliberals criticize this position for being a 
form of the naturalistic fallacy and contend that our biological makeup is little more than a set of 
structural limitations upon human flourishing that should be transcended through whatever means 
possible. The same theorists, however, prove just as dependent on the rhetoric of human nature for 
making their case, arguing that enhancement is ethical because it is an extension of the virtues – 
rationality, autonomy, and self-creation – that make us human in the first place. Modifying biology, 
even to the point of becoming ‘posthuman’, would therefore make us more rather than less human. 
For both opponents and proponents of enhancement, then, the extent to which biotechnological 
interventions align with a pre-existing human nature – one defined in essentialist, oppositional, 
and hierarchical terms – is the principal determinant of whether such interventions are permissible, 
desirable, or even obligatory.  
This discourse of ‘naturalization’ is more pernicious than it might seem. More than just 
reinscribing the subject of liberal humanism as a normative ideal, it conceals critical inquiry into 
the coherence of human nature as an ontological category. We might debate which traits constitute 
human nature, but the existence of a self-contained and self-determining – not to mention universal 
and transhistorical – subject is never brought into question. In constituting the audience as part of 
 290 
a humanist collective at a precarious moment of techno-scientific and historical change, the 
enhancement discourse implies that we are (and always have been) humanist subjects and that the 
only way this could change would be through radical biotechnological changes at the material 
level. The non-human, inhuman, and posthuman are always already imagined as temporal or 
spatial others – an artificial intelligence, a laboratory chimera, an enhanced posthuman – but never 
as the reader, the person for whom the consequences of biotechnological interventions are at stake. 
This is why I claim that posthumanist approaches, which de-center the individual subject in their 
analyses of techno-science, have been excluded from relevant bioethical discourse. The humanist 
structure of argumentation in the enhancement debate – and indeed, the category of human 
enhancement itself – precludes, or at least inhibits, the theoretical deconstruction (and 
reconstruction) of the individual subject. 
To be clear, the human enhancement debate has opened up bioethical discourse to a 
substantive degree. Prior to the conceptual framework of enhancement, biotechnologies and 
future-facing inquiries were afforded comparatively little attention in the field of bioethics. 
Furthermore, as I suggested in Chapter Three and Chapter Four, each pole of the enhancement 
debate offers something instructive for bioethicists moving forward. The conservative desire for a 
‘richer’ bioethics grounded in ‘big picture’ self-examination invites us to question the presumed 
actors and ends of common moral principlism. Likewise, liberals’ prolific use of genetic, 
evolutionary, and psychological studies reminds us that techno-science can be a creative resource 
for, rather than just the object of, bioethical theorization. The real problem, then, is that neither 
cohort takes their destabilizing ambitions far enough. Big-picture questions are asked and scientific 
theories are applied, but the end result is the reinscription or ‘reterritorialization’ of familiar 
 291 
humanist models of subjectivity. The deconstruction of the subject is transformed into a material 
(rather than theoretical) project and perpetually deferred into an imminent future.  
I have, however, suggested that the human enhancement debate is a discursive occasion to 
de- and re-construct the boundaries of the bioethical subject. Questioning what the human will or 
ought to become demands an answer to the conceptually prior question of what the human is. 
Taking up a posthumanist framework, as I did in Chapter Five, demonstrates that the human of 
classical humanism is not a coherent answer to this question. When we take the information 
sciences – in our case, theories of autopoiesis, extended cognition, and complex coevolution – to 
their logical conclusion, familiar ontological fault lines such as self/other, human/technology, and 
natural/artificial begin to collapse. Humans exist as material networks of information exchange 
that loop through bodies, artifacts, and environments as a condition of their being. While this 
phenomenon is changing at an exponential rate via digital networking and bio-interventionism, it 
is not unique to the information age. Rather, this continuous process of info-material exchange is 
a meta-framework for all subject-formation. To the extent that we can speak of a common human 
nature, it is relational, embodied, and differential rather than essentialist, oppositional, and 
hierarchical. Humans have always been cyborgs and therefore never been human as such. 
6.2 The Limitations of Humanist Bioethics 
With this review in place, I want to conclude the dissertation by addressing the exigence – 
the ‘so what?’ – of this project. In the introduction, I claimed that it would be a mistake to 
understand ontology and bioethics as distinctive projects. Normative ethics always already 
presumes a conception of subjectivity or human being. When we claim that a subject ‘ought’ to 
act in a particular way, we also make implicit claims about that nature of that subject. The 
nominalist and constructivist traditions allow us to take this claim a step further. Insofar as all 
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human existence is in some sense discursive, the categories we use to label subjects can either 
reveal or conceal certain modes of being and acting in the world. How we talk about human beings 
has a tangible effect on what we imagine human beings can and ought to do. The point I mean to 
make here is a simple but important one. The relationship between ontology and ethics is structural 
and, therefore, inescapable. When one chooses to ‘do bioethics’ without consideration of 
ontological categories, one is not taking a neutral or agnostic stance toward ontological problems. 
Rather, one is making a tacit choice to pick up and operationalize extant categories and ideas. This 
choice determines the horizon for ethical discourse; in the case of human enhance enhancement, 
what we imagine to be permissible, desirable, or obligatory. 
While this is in some sense true of all ethical discourse, the human enhancement debate 
represents a unique discursive occasion in at least two senses. First, the enhancement debate, 
however limited, explicitly invites us to engage with longstanding models of human nature in 
bioethics. In the Heideggerian tradition, humanism is a discursive means of concealment according 
to which the conceptual presence of a self-evident, pre-given ‘essence’ inhibits ontological 
examination.617 To use language that might have made Heidegger uncomfortable, the humanist 
subject functions as a black box: a complex piece of equipment with inner workings that are 
mysterious to the user. Bruno Latour translates this idea into a verb, defining “blackboxing” as: 
The way scientific and technical work is made invisible by its own success. When 
a machine runs efficiently, when a matter of fact is settled, one need focus only on 
its inputs and outputs and not on its internal complexity. Thus, paradoxically, the 
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I want to suggest that this description is just as true for discursive instruments, what Foucault calls 
“historical a prioris,” as technical ones.619 To quote Donna Haraway, “’Ideas’ are themselves 
technologies for pursuing inquiries. It’s not just that ideas are embedded in practices; they are 
technical practices of situated kinds.”620  
As we saw in Chapter Five, when a machine breaks down, when it is insufficient for 
resolving the problem at hand, the mediating presence of the black box is made visible and 
therefore accessible. The enhancement debate is precisely this kind of moment – a response to the 
breaking down of the bioethical machine (common moral principlism) and the need to re-engineer 
its inner workings. The framework of human enhancement thus poses a question that bioethics 
concealed for more than two decades: what is the ‘nature’ of the bioethical subject? This represents 
a rare and formative occasion within the discipline, a chance to open up a now-visible black box 
and switch, or even cut, its wiring. And as ‘radical’ posthumanist theorists suggest, the times and 
spaces in which symbolic boundaries are made “fuzzy” are often the most opportune ones for 
intervention.621  
Human enhancement, however, is not just a matter of symbolic boundaries. When I claim 
that we have always been cyborgs, my intention is not to minimize the transformative power of 
emergent biotechnologies. Even technologies that are now becoming normalized such as embryo 
selection, deep learning algorithms, and DNA self-testing kits were almost unimaginable as 
 
619 Michel Foucault, The Archeology of Knowledge: And the Discourse on Language, trans. A.M. Sheridan Smith 
(New York: Vintage Books, 2010), 126-131. 
620 Donna J. Haraway, Becoming Companion Species (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2008), 282. 
621 The term “fuzzy” is taken from Serres’ discussion of the parasite (original French being “flou”), which he draws 
from the mathematical concept of “fuzzy sets,” i.e., uncertain sets that allow for the gradual, rather than bivalent, 
assessment of the membership of an element within that set. The sense of “fuzziness” being intellectually and 
normatively opportune, however, owes more to Haraway, who again and again stresses that the epistemological and 
ontological blurring of info- and bio-sciences is a means to rethink extant categorical distinctions between self/other 
and the ethical relations therein. Michel Serres, The Parasite, trans. Lawrence R. Schehr (Minneapolis, MN: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2007), 56-57. 
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practical realities even a few decades ago.622 While not precise, predictive models of exponential 
technological development, or at least computational power, appear to be justified. 623  When 
theorists of enhancement imagine using genetic engineering, brain-machine interfaces, and 
psycho-pharmaceuticals to modify cognition, behavior, and lifespan, it is not baseless speculation. 
Rather, this speculation is important precisely because it is feasible. This speculation, however, is 
also powerful. How we think about techno-scientific futures – the language we use to describe and 
evaluate them in the present – influences which futures can and will become something more than 
just historical footnotes. Rethinking the human of human enhancement should therefore be 
understood more as an ethical demand than a convenient opportunity. 
If this helps us understand the original motivations for this project, it still does not address 
the exigence of its conclusions. Why, for example, does it matter that the human enhancement 
debate is a ‘humanist’ discourse? The most obvious answer is that humanism has a deeply 
troubling political history. From the Euro-American colonization of indigenous peoples to the 
industrial exploitation of local and global environments, an irreconcilable amount of damage has 
been done in the name of globalist, humanist projects of ‘modernization’, ‘civilization’, and 
‘secularization’.624 Here I am once again referring to humanism as an ideological framework rather 
than a singular historical movement. The common denominator that ties such projects together is 
the enshrinement of certain anthropocentric, Western beliefs and values as universal truths and 
 
622 For more on these respective interventions and their increasing ‘normalcy’, see: Samantha X.Y. Wang, “The Past, 
Present, and Future of Embryo Selection in In Vitro Fertilization,” Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine 84, no.4 
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623 Here, I have in mind Moore’s law, which predicts that the number of transistors in integrated circuits will continue 
to double approximately every two years. Gordon E. Moore, “Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits,” 
Electronics 28, no. 8 (1965).  
624  For this kind of all-inclusive critique, one can look to Zygmunt Bauman’s sociological description of 
“globalization.” Zygmunt Bauman, Globalization: The Human Consequences (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1998). 
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goods, the mass institutionalization of which are required for species-level human progress. This, 
in turn, affords the exclusion and erasure of ‘others’, whether that be technology, nature, or non-
normative persons. There is an almost astonishing dissonance between how humanism is depicted 
by bioethicists as a pure, aspirational ideal and the well-documented history of humanism’s 
entanglement with projects of political domination and environmental destruction.625  
This quite general critique, however, has been made ad nauseum by critical theorists and 
tells us little new or specific about the topic at-hand. The more pertinent point for us is that the 
operationalization of humanist thinking, and essentialism in particular, results in problematic 
conceptualizations of biotechnologies and the ethics thereof. Essentialism, which descends from 
the traditions of Platonic idealism and theological realism, is the belief that things have an inherent 
and immutable set of characteristics that constitute them as such. 626 The task of scientists and 
philosophers is therefore to discover those characteristics and their latent expressions. This 
doctrine is quite familiar to scholars of religion, who have spent recent decades challenging the 
essentialist assumptions of their field’s forebears. We can understand this entrenched religious 
essentialism in two senses. First, the belief that “religion” is a fixed thing-in-itself that is expressed 
in all societies. Particular beliefs and practices might change across time and space, but the basic 
structure of religion remains stable as a fact of human life. Second, that each religious group, the 
so-called World Religions, possess structural features that allow us to differentiate and categorize 
 
625 I have attempted to show throughout this project that, whether phrased in the specific terms of humanism or the 
more general terms of modernity, both bioconservatives and bioliberals champion the intellectual, material, and 
political gains of Western nation-states to a profound degree. Even for critical bioliberals like Ingmar Persson and 
Julian Savulescu, I believe their arguments can best be understood as a call for further modernization along established 
lines. 
626 For a comprehensive description of essentialism and its “muddled” roots in Aristotelian and Platonic logic, see: 
Bertrand Russell, History of Western Philosophy (London: Routledge, 2004), 121-199. 
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them as such. In either case, the foundational premise is that ideal precedes form, essence precedes 
existence, and our categories therefore represent the world as it is.627 
Scholars of religion have challenged this kind of religious essentialism on three instructive 
fronts. The first challenge is an empirical critique. Attempts to identify the inherent characteristics 
of religion fail to adequately describe the diversity of religious life on the ground. Through close 
historical, sociological, and anthropological examination of so-called religious communities, we 
find that generic categorical markers such as ‘belief’ and ‘practice’ are so capacious that they elide 
the complexities and specificities of “lived religion.” 628  Likewise, assigning necessary 
characteristics to particular religions conceals the deep differences that manifest even internal to 
groups that take up the same self-identification.629 Insofar as essentialism takes the immutable 
nature of forms for granted, it is a reductionist approach that produces an ever-widening gap 
between map and territory.  
To this end, many scholars of religion have adopted nominalist and constructivist 
approaches that treat religion as an “invented” or “imagined” category and not as a thing-in-
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the religious studies’ historical essentialism, see: Russell T. McCutcheon, Studying Religion: An Introduction (New 
York: Routledge, 2019). 
628 While there are no shortage of relevant examples, the term “lived religion” is taken from Robert Orsi, who 
explains that “rethinking religion as a form of cultural work, the study of lived religion directs attention to institutions 
and persons, texts and rituals, practice and theology, things and ideas - all as media of making and unmaking worlds. 
This way of approaching religious practice as fundamentally always in history and culture is concerned with what 
people do with religious idioms, how they use them, what they make of themselves and their worlds with them, and 
how in turn people are fundamentally shaped by the worlds they are making as they make these worlds.” This cannot 
be achieved, the argument goes, without paying close attention to religion as it is narrated and enacted - i.e., how it is 
or was lived out in particular social and material contexts - by religious practitioners themselves. Robert A. Orsi, The 
Madonna of 115th Street: Faith and Community in Italian Harlem, 1880-1950 (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 2002), xix. 
629 Historical religious scholarship on both sensation and spirituality have been especially attuned to recovering the 
beliefs and practices of particular communities that have otherwise been marginalized in the homogenization of 
religious movements and traditions. See, for example: Leigh Eric Schmidt, Hearing Things: Religion, Illusion, and 
the American Enlightenment (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000). Catherine L. Albanese, A Republic 
of Mind and Spirit: A Cultural History of American Metaphysical Religion (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
2007). 
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itself.630 According to this linguistic turn, religion is not a self-sufficient domain in a world with a 
pre-determined structure; it is instead a classification that orders an otherwise chaotic or 
unknowable world for practitioners and analysts alike. Whether we are discussing religion in 
general or particular religious traditions, we are talking about socially constructed symbols, beliefs, 
practices, institutions, and so on that operate internal to human history – technologies that were 
invented at particular times in particular places by particular people and the interpretations and 
effects of which, therefore, necessarily change and multiply. The logical conclusion of this insight 
has been a reflexive turn in the field, the most basic insight of which is that “the “the social 
scientific study [of religion] actually reverberates in the religious field, revitalizing and even 
producing religions.”631 Religion is not only constructed, it also constructs. Even more than tracing 
the shifting meanings of “religion” across time and space then, one the main challenges of 
contemporary religious studies is to understand how our organizing categories – including 
religion’s supposed constitutive parts (e.g., “belief”) and definitional others (e.g., “secularism”) – 
operate in the very world(s) they purport to describe. 
This epistemological approach reveals a third grounds for critique: normative ethics. Both 
taking up a pre-determined definition of religion and assigning inherent and immutable 
characteristics to particular peoples – in this case, different religious groups – has been a 
longstanding rationalization for discriminatory practices. Tisa Wenger, for example, demonstrates 
how the legal-moral ideal of ‘religious freedom’ – grounded in a particular Protestant conception 
of religion – has historically justified oppressive practices against minorities, especially indigenous 
 
630 I have elsewhere noted that two especially influential works in this reflexive turn are: Jonathan Z. Smith, “Religion, 
Religions, Religious,” in Critical Terms for Religious Studies, ed. Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998), 269-284. Tomoko Masuzawa, The Invention of World Religion, or, How European Universalism Was 
Preserved in the Language of Pluralism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). 
631 Jason A. Josephson-Storm, The Myth of Disenchantment: Magic, Modernity, and the Birth of the Human Sciences 
(Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2017), 13. 
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peoples, in the United States. Insofar as only certain kinds of religious life have been deemed 
‘authentically’ religious and, therefore, worthy of legal protection, the First Amendment and other 
forms of ‘religious freedom talk’ have functioned as a means to forward the ends of large-scale 
cultural and racial assimilation (intersecting with more familiar terms like ‘modernization’ and 
‘civilization’). To be clear, this is not a straightforward, unidirectional state of affairs. Wenger 
identifies religious freedom talk as a site of contestation, which includes minority communities 
attempting to mobilize the term for their own benefit. But if religious freedom talk ‘transformed’ 
rather than simply erased or protected Native cultures and beliefs, her conclusion is nevertheless a 
sobering one: “the dominant strains of American religious freedom talk functioned to bolster racial 
discrimination and the civilizational hierarchies that sustained it.”632 
What does this have to do with human enhancement? Similar kinds of                                                                                                                                                                  
essentialism with similar structural dangers are operative in the human enhancement debate. 
Following the original instinct of common moral principlism, theorists of enhancement attempt to 
discover and identify the inherent and immutable characteristics of human life. This project is 
aided by rhetorical practices of ‘naturalization’, which make it seem self-evident that there is in 
fact a (normative) human essence that precedes and is expressed through human existence. Like 
religion, the operationalization of an essentialist human nature both conceals and produces 
difference. On one hand, the claim to certain universal human characteristics and ends reduces 
difference to identity, concealing the actual diversity of human experiences and values on the 
ground. 633  As we saw in Chapter Two, both the bioliberal ideal of autonomy and the 
 
632 Tisa Wenger, Religious Freedom: The Contested History of an American Ideal (Chapel Hill, NC: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2017), 235. See also: Tisa Wenger, We Have a Religion: The 1920s Pueblo Indian Dance 
Controversy and American Religious Freedom (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2009). 
633 Here I have in mind Annemarie Mol’s ethnographic work on the disease atherosclerosis in which, through detailed 
examination of both the medical knowledges and practices used to treat the disease as well as diseased patients’ 
embodied experiences, she demonstrates that “no object, no body, no disease, is singular. If it is not removed from the 
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bioconservative ideal of dignity are products of particular Western intellectual genealogies, 
Kantian and Aristotelian respectively, that attempt to enshrine their values as universal goods. We 
must therefore ask: What histories and futures, what lived realities, go unwritten in the pages of 
enhancement texts? And what are the risks of reducing difference to identity in bioethical theory 
and praxis?  
On the other hand, the same essentialist language produces (binary) difference. Strong 
metaphysical oppositions between humans and technologies reinscribe a classical instrumentalism 
in which technologies are, or at least should remain, tools that ‘enhance’ human ends, rather than 
necessarily integral parts of the process of subject-formation. As a result, bioethical futures are 
framed as either ‘human’ or ‘posthuman’, either biological or technological, and the problem of 
biotechnological ethics is presented to readers as a straightforward oppositional choice: remain 
human as ‘we’ have ‘always been’ or become something altogether in- or post-human. Can an 
either/or ontological choice really capture the complex possibilities for being and acting that 
biotechnologies will afford? Just as scholars of religion seek to understand the discursive histories 
and consequences of their organizing categories, so too must bioethicists. The framework of 
human enhancement itself operates in the world it attempts to describe and influences the future it 
attempts to predict – sometimes far more subtly and dangerously than the people who use it seem 
to realize. 
If this speaks to the exigence of discussing humanism in bioethics, what about 
posthumanism? Foremost, I have argued that posthumanist approaches demonstrate the conceptual 
incoherence of the predominant frameworks in bioethics. Insofar as subject-formation is a complex 
process of self-organization that extends through and coevolves with material artifacts, it makes 
 
practices that sustain it, reality is multiple.” Annemarie Mol, The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice 
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002), 6. 
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little sense to speak of biotechnological interventions as ushering in altogether non-human modes 
of life or to evaluate their ethical merit in terms of making us more or less human. When we take 
bioethicists’ appeals to nature seriously, we, paradoxically, find that the either/or choice between 
human and posthuman, biological and technological, is invalid to begin with. The conceptual 
framework of human enhancement is not just reductionist or unethical; it is a category mistake. 
Just as important, posthumanism goes beyond the aforementioned constructivist 
conclusion that all social life is in some sense discursive and, therefore, ‘constructed’. 
Posthumanist philosopher Karen Barad’s quantum physics-inspired framework of “agential 
realism” is instructive in this regard. Barad argues that constructivist approaches can, even 
unintentionally, forward a top-down relationship between language and materiality and, in so 
doing, reinscribe metaphysical distinctions between the domains we name as “social,” “political” 
“economic,” “natural,” “cultural,” “technological,” and “scientific.” For Barad, such thinking 
produces a traditional “mediation” model of human-apparatus relationships in which there are 
“two separate entities or realms of practice influencing one another in determinate regions.”634 Just 
as humans do not ‘use’ apparatuses in the instrumental sense though, “apparatuses are not external 
forces that operate on bodies from the outside; rather, apparatuses are material-discursive practices 
that are inextricable from the bodies that are produced and through which power works its 
productive effects.”635 Given that “human concepts are embodied” and “apparatuses are discursive 
practices,” there is no prior discourse/material distinction that can act as an originary point of 
analysis. 
 
634 Karen Barad, Meeting The Universe Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning  
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007), 231. 
635 Barad, Meeting The Universe Halfway, 230. 
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Not unlike the ideas of “assemblage” and “cyborg” we encountered in Chapter Five, Barad 
argues that we should instead begin from the fundamental metaphysical unit of “entanglement.” 
Insofar as material entities are always already engaged in, and being reconstituted through, 
relational activity, subjects and objects only ever “differentially emerge and are iteratively 
reworked” from prior entanglements.636 These forms, however, can never become disentangled as 
such, for, as quantum physics shows us, no entity can exist in a non-relative, non-positional, or 
non-relational state. “Structures,” social or otherwise, should thus “be understood as material-
discursive phenomena that are iteratively (re)produced and (re)configured through ongoing 
material-discursive intra-actions.” 637  The universe is, in essence, an ever-multiplying set of 
positive feedback loops, each of which is engaged in continuous processes of self-differentiation. 
Being, or rather “becoming,” is the (re)production and (re)configuration of entanglements all the 
way down to – or, in Barad’s case, all the way up from – the quantum scale.  
Matter, however, is not just semantic and entangled in Barad’s framework; it is also 
agential. “Matter,” she explains, “is substance in its intra-active becoming – not a thing but a 
doing, a congealing of agency.”638 When Barad speaks of “agency” though, she is not referring to 
a unique property of self-willing humans à la classical descriptions of autonomy. Agency, here, 
refers to the emergence of difference in and through intra-active, material-discursive practices, i.e., 
changes in entangled phenomena’s ongoing materialization. This idea is more intuitive than 
Barad’s labyrinthine language would have us believe. Whenever an apparent set of boundaries, a 
“nodal point,” is produced – for example, when a demographic identity, a scientific theory, or a 
functional machine comes into existence – entanglements are reconfigured and a new set of 
 
636 Barad, Meeting The Universe Halfway, 239. 
637 Barad, Meeting The Universe Halfway, 240. 
638 Barad, Meeting The Universe Halfway, 151. 
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possibilities is afforded. This boundary work, in which matter materializes as difference, is agency. 
Matter, which replaces Man as the fundamental unit of action, is thus agential because it is active, 
causal, and differential. 
Barad’s framework leaves us with three important conclusions concerning constructivism. 
First, discourse is never immaterial; insofar as discourse (and, for that matter, power) are only ever 
a/effected through materialization, matter is a necessary condition of mattering. Texts, machines, 
institutions and other ‘material’ forms are not empty containers or neutral instruments for 
independently formed ‘social’ or ‘ideological’ ends. Second, the structures that emerge through 
discursive-material apparatuses are ‘real’ but non-essentialist, always already engaged in physical 
processes of (re)assembly that open new agential possibilities. Finally, then, critical reflexivity 
does not go far enough as an intellectual praxis. “Particular possibilities for (intra-)acting exist at 
every moment, and these changing possibilities entail an ethical obligation to intra-act responsibly 
in the world’s becoming, to contest and rework what matters and what is excluded from 
mattering.”639 There is an ethical demand to differentially reiterate and re-materialize structures of 
power to effect new entanglements and, with them, new agential possibilities. 
To this end, the broad coverage of posthumanism I provide in Chapter Five is supposed to 
be performative rather than just argumentative. It is intended to remind the reader that there are 
other theoretical means, including a deep diversity internal to posthumanism, through which we 
can contest and rework the category of human nature and its relationship to biotechnologies. 
Categorical binaries such as conservative/liberal, restrictive/permissive, and human/posthuman do 
not represent the entire spectrum of potential bioethical positions. The work of enhancing this 
discourse, however, begins at the level of ontology rather than just normative ethics; for, as we 
 
639 Barad, Meeting The Universe Halfway, 235. 
 303 
have seen, the reductionism and binarism characteristic of the enhancement debate are very much 
the logical conclusions of taking the all-too-traditional human of human enhancement for granted.  
6.3 From Theory to Praxis? Noise and Emergence 
 
“So what solution do you propose?” I have lost count of the times I have received some 
variation of this question after providing the elevator pitch for this dissertation or presenting a 
related paper at an academic or public conference. This question is equal parts uplifting and 
demoralizing. On one hand, it implies that I have persuaded the listener that there is a problem: a 
dissonance between our extant tools for doing bioethics and the ethical quandaries that 
biotechnological futures present. I have, at least on a surface level, succeeded in communicating 
the critique portion of the thesis. On the other hand, the listener is still waiting for the other 
argumentative shoe to drop, and the tacit assumption is that I must have cobbled together some 
one-size-fits-all footwear that will allow the field of bioethics to takes its next big step. To be clear, 
I do not find this question demoralizing because, as I think most academic would begrudgingly 
admit, deconstructive work is easier than constructive work. I find it demoralizing because it asks 
for the same kind of solution as the one I am criticizing – something that can do the same catch-
all theoretical and practical labor that the framework of human enhancement purports to do. In 
short, I have failed to communicate that we need different kinds of bioethical solutions and not 
merely a better version of human enhancement. I therefore want to use this final section to more 
precisely explain what I hope this project will (and will not) accomplish.  
As we saw in Chapters One, Three, and Four, numerous moderate and liberal-leaning 
bioethicists have bemoaned the emergence of a polarized culture war in their field and the 
concomitant end of the ‘Great Compromise’ that common moral principlism represented. This 
discontent should be unsurprising given that the moral authority of bioethics originated from the 
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premise that there is a pre-existing moral consensus that bioethicists were merely discovering and 
applying. It follows that the less moral consensus there is within the field of bioethics, the less 
persuasive the idea of moral consensus as such is. This disaffection has most often been framed as 
a criticism of ‘politics’ or ‘ideology’ entering into the otherwise neutral, secular space of public 
bioethics. To the extent we find self-reflexive critiques of the enhancement debate, then, they tend 
to either call for a ‘return to the norm’ of common moral principlism or for liberals and 
conservative to find ‘commonsense’ common ground. For these critics, the enhancement debate 
and its constitutive biopolitical positions are too extreme and therefore demand moderation and 
purification. 
In Chapter Three, I argued that the very idea of a neutral, secular public bioethics was 
incoherent; secularisms are no less ‘ideological’ than any other worldview. My criticism of this 
criticism, however, goes even further. Through this project, I mean to demonstrate that the 
enhancement debate is not extreme enough; we must challenge the common humanist ground of 
the current discourse and re-examine the bioethical subject itself. Put differently, the problem of 
the bioethical culture wars is not that there is too much diversity insofar as polarization forecloses 
the possibility of ethical consensus. The problem is that there is too little diversity, which leads to 
highly reductionist and exclusionary understandings of human nature. Wherever possible, the idea 
of consensus must be complicated and pushed, if not altogether dismantled. However 
counterintuitive, we must attempt to pollute rather than purify bioethical discourses.  
My use of “purify” here draws on posthumanist philosopher Alexis Shotwell’s critique of 
“purity politics” in environmental ethics. Building on critical theory from environmental, 
disabilities, and feminist studies, Shotwell defines “purity politics” as any normative mode of 
thinking that simplifies the complexity of being in the world by aspiring toward re(producing) 
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completely uncompromised selves or environments. Like the critique of humanism that we have 
been developing, Shotwell takes particular aim at the interrelated ideas of a fixed, natural order 
that privileges a pre-given species-integrity and an autonomous individualism that positions 
individual humans as the exclusive agents of normative ethics. She argues that, however well-
intentioned, the aspiration for both a pure self and a pure natural world “shuts down precisely the 
field of possibility that might allow us to take better collective action against the destruction of the 
world in all its strange, delightful, impure folic. Purism is a de-collectivizing, de-mobilizing, 
paradoxical politics of despair.”640  
We can understand purism as a “politics of despair” in three interrelated senses. First, 
“Since it is impossible to avoid complicity, we do better to start from an assumption that everyone 
is implicated in situations we (at least in some way) repudiate.”641 This is true in the now-familiar 
mode of social constructivism according to which the practice or performance of social norms 
reproduces extant, normative models of being and acting in the world. We are also, however, 
implicated in a more ‘natural’, ontic sense. To be human is to exist in a state of “viscous porosity” 
or “contaminated diversity” – a deep bodily reliance on, and openness to, our local environments. 
Whether it is desirable processes like breathing oxygen and metabolizing nutrients or undesirable 
ones like developing estrogen-responsive cancers and insulin resistances, “a human” is 
“coconstituted” in an “emergent interplay” between human and nonhuman agents. As Shotwell 
demonstrates through a number of case studies, this mode of “interdependence” has far reaching 
implications in our late capitalist world. For example, the long-term smelting of nickel alloy in 
Sudbury, Ontario has led to toxic acid rain that continues to cause disease and death at the local 
 
640 Alexis Shotwell, Against Purity: Living Ethically in Compromised Times (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 2016), 9. 
641 Shotwell, Against Purity, 5. 
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level. When we heat our homes with products made from nickel alloy smelted in Sudbury – a more 
common occurrence than we might expect – we are in some sense complicit in this unethical 
situation.642 The point here is not to cast blame, at least not on individuals, but to remind the reader 
that, because we are necessarily interdependent, “we are compromised and have made 
compromises, and this will continue to be the way we craft the world to come whatever they might 
turn out to be.”643 “The metaphysics of purity is,” thus, “a fragile fiction, a conceit under constant 
but disavowed threat – to affirm a commitment to purity is in one move to glance at the 
entanglement and constitution, the impurity, of everything and to pretend that things are separate 
and unconnected.”644 Purism is a politics of despair because it belies the necessarily impure reality 
of our situation and thus aspires toward an impossible and impractical end.  
Second, the purist conceit of metaphysical individualism mistakenly places the onus of 
normative ethics on individual persons. This is true for how we conceive of both the means and 
ends of ethical life. Following the Kantian tradition, ethics is taken up as a project in which 
goodness is achieved through you or I, as individuals, acting in accordance with binding moral 
principles. In turn, the larger end of ethics is imagined as the production of a pure, moral, individual 
self.645 In other words, metaphysical individualism lends itself to a self-centered moral worldview 
that both inhibits recognizing ethical problems as shared problems and disincentivizes acting 
collectively to address them. “If,” however, “we see that the social world, and its transformation, 
 
642 For her use of these terms as well her discussion of nickel alloy smelting, see: Shotwell, Against Purity, 77-106. 
643 Shotwell, Against Purity, 5. 
644 Shotwell, Against Purity, 16. 
645 The choice to invoke Kant here is mine rather than Shotwell’s. While moral perfection was an asymptotic end for 
Kant, it is important to note that it entailed individuals achieving an ideal balance between obligation and inclination. 
To be clear, morality here is not ‘selfish’; after all, obligation is about what we owe to others. But it is nevertheless 
self-interested and self-directed in that it is an individual and internal project of deriving rational maxims in the pursuit 
of personal moral perfection. This interpretation of Kant’s moral philosophy comes from my own reading of Kant’s 
Second Critique. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, trans. Marcus Weigelt (London: Penguin Classics, 
2007). 
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is what matters more than the individual body, which was never individual,” we are invited to 
approach norms through lenses other than voluntarism.646 For Shotwell, a longtime environmental 
activist, this is a personal and pragmatic, rather than just theoretical point. “The point is to change 
the world, this world, and so the point is complicated, compromised, and impossible to 
conceptualize, let alone achieve alone.”647 “Individuals” might “catalyze change,” she explains, 
“but change only happens collectively.”648   
Third, just as purism can conflate the nature of effective ethical action, it can also 
misidentify what is ethically problematic in the first place. I mean this less in terms of the 
aforementioned individualizing of moral problems and more in terms of the specific norms 
according to which we evaluate the merit of a situation. Let us take another example from 
Shotwell: studies on the exposure of frogs to the commonly used herbicide Atrazine. Frogs are 
often used as an “indicator species” to test how particular chemical compounds might affect their 
human counterparts. While Atrazine was shown to have ‘harmful’ effects on frogs, this harm was 
frequently described by scientists in terms of feminization and homosexual behavior, vis-a-vis a 
rise in estrogen levels, which could indicate similar effects in humans from long-term exposure. 
While these studies were intended to further environmentalist causes, “the subtext of this discourse 
is that feminization or queerness are harms to be avoided and the reasons to pursue 
noncontaminated waters and bodies.”649  The point here is not that ethical concerns about the 
effects of Atrazine and similar chemical compounds are unfounded; rather, the point is that in 
choosing to both privilege species-integrity as a necessary good and define that integrity in terms 
 
646 Shotwell, Against Purity, 157. 
647 Shotwell, Against Purity, 196. 
648 Shotwell, Against Purity, 163. 
649 Shotwell, Against Purity, 93. 
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of possessing a masculine, straight, and abled body, all deviations – in frogs and humans alike – 
are implicated as undesirable. Differences from established norms, whether extant or potential, 
becomes unethical in and of themselves.  
Situated in social contexts, science is never value-neutral, and the taxonomic and narrative 
work ‘naturalization’ enacts can, paradoxically, multiply the kinds of harms it tries to diminish. 
“The narrative we use to explain the world,” Shotwell explains, “structures what we do in it. So 
we can ask, what happens if we use this narrative to make these changes in the world?”650 In this 
case, Shotwell argues that there is an ethical demand to “attend more to harms that don’t happen 
to reinforce already entrenched social stigmas.”651 Shotwell clarifies that she is not calling for the 
rejection of normativity as such – after all, norms are necessary features of social life – but rather 
for the active prioritization of “open normativities,” i.e., “those normativities that prioritize 
flourishing and tend toward proliferation, not merely replacing one norm with another.” 652 
Flourishing here is ambiguously defined as, “well-being at the individual, species, and community 
level,” which “will continue to be an undecided and in-process norm.” 653 For Shotwell, this 
(intentionally) capacious judgment about what “deserves a future” depends on two identifiable 
ethical criteria. First, the normativities we enact must reflect the interdependent nature of being, 
accounting for the wellbeing of not just individuals and not just humans; when we make our 
compromises, we must think in terms of “harm distribution.” Second, “norms that flatten 
complexity” and foreclose the emergence of new or different norms ought to be “rejected.”654 
 
650 Shotwell, Against Purity, 101. 
651 Shotwell, Against Purity, 96. 
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From metaphysical and ethical individualism to the naturalization of extant social norms 
and stigmas, the human enhancement debate is no less purifying than the examples of 
environmental ethics Shotwell criticizes. Whether it is the bioconservative glorification of the 
(purported) human as is or the bioliberal imagining of the enhanced posthuman, the enhancement 
debate is best understood as a set of conflicting aspirations for a pure, individual self. In terms of 
what I hope to accomplish then, I hope to show that this particular discourse is a fiction – or rather 
a confluence of narratives – that simplifies the complexity of being in the world. More specifically, 
the models of subjectivity we pick up in telling narratives about biotechnologies structurally 
prioritize some values over others. In the case of the human enhancement debate, we are invited 
to view the world in essentialist, oppositional, and hierarchical terms – to, however well-
intentioned, view life as an individualist and anthropocentric project that closes rather than opens 
ulterior normativities and reduces biotechnological development to an individual, binary choice. 
In invoking a wide range of frameworks of interrelation and interdependence, I do not just 
mean to demonstrate that the anthropocentric individualism of humanism is ‘wrong’ or ‘harmful’. 
Rather, the point is that beginning from relationality rather than individuality at the level of 
ontology can have important implications for how we do (bio)ethics. When we approach 
subjectivities and actions as distributed, we are also invited to approach our interests and 
consequences in the same fashion. This means more than just considering who gets left out or 
marginalized through discourses or practices of human enhancement. It means calling into 
question whether the improvement of individual capacities (or the individual right to make such 
decisions) should be the preeminent lens through which we imagine and evaluate biotechnologies 
in the first place. On one hand, this entails taking seriously the criticism that the principle of 
autonomy has become disproportionately privileged over the principle of (distributive) justice in 
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bioethics (or at least in this particular instantiation of bioethical debate).655 On the other hand, it 
entails acknowledging – as scholars from animal studies and environmental studies have long 
demonstrated – that biotechnological research and development also has a profound impact on 
non-human animals and local and global environments.656  
In doing so, we can begin to see not just that our ‘individual’ choices resonate outside of 
their immediate effects, but also that those effects are circular, i.e., fed back into the environments 
and relations that constitute our existence. Let us take a mundane but profound example of this 
kind of (biotechnological) feedback: genetically engineered (GE) crops and honey bees. Like any 
genetically modified organisms (GMO), GE crops are living organisms whose genetic material 
has been ‘artificially’ manipulated to produce genes that do not occur in nature or through 
traditional crossbreeding. Most GE crops have been modified for the purpose of tolerating 
herbicides and pesticides that are regularly used to kill harmful weeds and insects.657 As weeds 
have developed resistances to herbicides and insects have developed resistances to pesticides, 
however, we are beginning to see increased usage of both of these kinds of chemical substances in 
some contexts – an occurrence afforded by GE crops high genetic tolerance for them.658 This 
 
655 See, for example: Daniel Callahan, “Bioethics and the Culture Wars” Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 
14, no. 4 (2005): 424-431. Ruth Macklin takes a particular version of this stance in arguing her chief focus is “striving 
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among populations in the world.” Sally Satel, “The Limits of Bioethics,” Hoover Institution, Stanford University, 
February 1, 2010, https://www.hoover.org/research/limits-bioethics.  
656 See, for example: Gary S. Sayler, John Sanseverino, and Kimberly L. Davis, ed., Biotechnology in the Sustainable 
Environment (New York: Springer, 1997). Richard Twine, Animals as Biotechnology: Ethics, Sustainability, and 
Critical Animal Studies (London: Routledge, 2010). 
657 For an overview of the rapid increase in biotech crops and the economic gains, see: International Service for the 
Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Application, “ISAAA Brief 26-2013: Executive Summary,” accessed July 13, 2021, 
https://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/46/executivesummary/. 
658 While the increased usage of herbicides is largely an accepted empirical observation, the increased usage of 
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 311 
increased usage (in addition to the introduction of altogether new pesticides) is speculated as one 
potential cause, along with habitat loss and climate change, for a massive decrease in honey bee 
colonies, especially during overwintering, in the United States.659 Unfortunately, honey bees are 
the most numerous and efficient pollinator species in the world, pollinating over 100 crops grown 
in North America, not to mention contributing to a host of other vital ecosystemic processes. With 
“colony collapse” occurring at a record and unpredictable rate, experts have warned that the 
disappearance of honey bees could have “catastrophic” effects for agricultural food supplies, 
causing both local and global food shortages.660 
If this seems far afield from the question of human enhancement, that is because it is; it is 
a reminder that while human evolution is indeed ongoing, it is also collaborative and complex. 
While I am by no means claiming that bioethics should be simply be reduced to environmental 
studies, I am suggesting that the stakes of biotechnological research and development – including 
when directed toward therapies and enhancements for human bodies – are bigger than just the 
modification of individual genetic codes or neural networks. The cascading effects of 
biotechnologies resonate and loop through nature-culture-media continuums – a point that is far 
too easily belied by the humanist framing of the enhancement debate. Beginning from ontological 
relationality rather than individualism, even just as a heuristic choice, invites us to ask questions 
beyond the deep immediacy of individual human dignity and flourishing. We do not need literal 
cognitive enhancements to do this;661 we need bioethical frameworks that privilege subjectivity as 
 
659 CCD Steering Committee, “Colony Collapse Disorder Progress Report CCD Steering Committee,” Agricultural 
Research Service, United States Department of Agriculture, June 2012, 
https://permanent.fdlp.gov/gpo16913/files/ccdprogressreport2012.pdf. 
660 Jacob Rowenson, Fruitless Fall: The Collapse of the Honey Bee and the Coming Agricultural Crisis (New York: 
Bloomsbury, 2008).  
661 This is a reference to Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu’s claims that the ‘immediacy’ of our ethical thinking 
is the straightforward result of evolutionary and cognitive limitations and, therefore, can only be addressed through 
 312 
a relational, embodied, and differential phenomenon. We are all compromised and will continue 
to be so; but the comprises we make need not be grounded in dualistic, anthropocentric 
worldviews.  
Like Shotwell though, I believe the first step towards making this a reality is taking up a 
stance of ‘againstness’. My primary imperative, then, is “to be against without predicting all the 
things there are to be for. Being against in this way – having a ‘no’ – involves also the Zapatismo 
invocation of the possibility of ‘many yesses.’”662 Just as Shotwell is against purity, I am against 
human enhancement. Not against the use and development of biotechnologies, at least not as such, 
but the reproduction of human enhancement as a categorical hermeneutic. Above all, this project 
is a call to abandon the framework of human enhancement in bioethics and to begin to develop 
and center non-humanist approaches for our posthuman moment. It is a ‘scream’ of “no!” In the 
hopes of opening future yesses.  
I do not believe this goal can be achieved alone or through pure substitution. In centering 
posthumanist frameworks, then, I mean to introduce a counterweight – rather than a ready-made 
framework for applied ethics – that can help us rethink the fundamental values and ends being 
prioritized in bioethics. I am, to use Serres’ language, a parasite – an uninvited guest channeling 
noise into the discursive field of bioethics so as to push the system further from its equilibrium and 
towards a more complex, adaptive reorganization. While we might do well to retain the recognition 
and dignity associated with the subject position of the humanist human, there is also much to be 
gained from beginning with ontological relation and the concomitant recognition of 
 
bio- and neuro-technological intervention. See, for example: Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, Unfit for the Future: 
The Need for Moral Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
662 Shotwell, Against Purity, 19. 
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